'This is an appeal by the
defendants from a judgment of
the 'Vest African Court of
Appeal, dated 18th Max, 1931,
reversing a ,judgment of the
learned Chief .Justice of the
Colony of the Gold Coast, dated
30th September, lU30.
'The action with which the
appeal is concerned was raised
at the instance of the Head
Chief of Tafi Atome, and was
directed against the Head Chief
of Djokpee and certain of his
subjects. In hi:'! writ of
summon the plaintiff claimed
damages from the defendants for
trespass, and an injunction
restraining them from entering
on certain lands, or in any wise
interfering with the plaintiff's
possession of them. The
territory in dispute is
designated as " Bunya land," and
it is delineated by boundary
lines marked R.E.H. upon a map
(Exhibit B) in the 'Vest African
Court of Appeal, these
boundaries having been so
initialled by Hall, Acting Chief
Justice.
It is not in dispute between the
parties that, in the year 1927,
the appellants or their
representatives cut down an odum
tree within Bunya land, and
that, accordingly, if the title
to that land is in the
respondent, as he claims, a
trespass was committed by the
appellants.
The respondent's claim being one
of damages for trespass, and for
an injunction against further
trespass, it follows that he has
put his title in issue. His
claim postulates, in their
Lordships' opinion, that he is
either the owner of Bunya land,
or has had, prior to the
trespass complained of,
exclusive possession of 'it.
The principal question to be
decided in the appeal would
accordingly seem to be-Has the
respondent discharged the
onus
which rests upon him of
demonstrating beyond reasonable
doubt that the title to the
disputed land is in him? The
appellants sayNay; the
respondent says~Aye.
The learned Chief Justice
divided the evidence adduced by
the respondent into two classes
:-·(1) Traditional evidence as
to how he became possessed of
the land in dispute, and (2)
evidence of use and occupation
of the land. On the first of
these topics the learned Judge
held that the respondent's case,
which was that the land was
acquired by him by gift, failed,
and that the appellants' case,
which was that the land was
theirs by conquest, succeeded.
As regards the second topic, the
learned Chief Justice held that
no such use and occupation of
the land by the respondent as
would displace the title of the
appellants had been proved.
Indeed, so far all possession is
concerned, the learned Judge
stated that the appellants, in
his opinion, had the better case
for a title by occupation.
In the Court of Appeal Gardiner
Smith J., who delivered the
judgment of the Court, expressed
the view that the learned Chief
Justice had paid excessive heed
to tradition, and insufficient
heed to what he termed the
"existing facts." The Court of
Appeal gave no considered
opinion on the competing
contentions of gift and conquest
which had been so fully
canvassed in the Court below.
They based their judgment,
reversing that of the Chief
.Justice, and finding in favour
of the respondent, mainly upon
the contents of certain German
maps, and, to a lesser extent,
upon evidence of possession by
the respective parties of the
land in question. The Court of
Appeal also dealt at length with
certain evidence relating to an
arbitration Said by the
respondent to have been entered
into between him and the
appellants, ill virtue of which
their competing claims to Runya
land were submitted to and
decided in favour of the
respondent by the Chief Delame Y
of Vey. While the Court of
Appeal dealt with this evidence,
they were careful to state that
they completely disregarded, in
reaching the conclusion which
they did, the evidence relating'
to the arbitration in question.
In their Lordships' opinion, the
first question logically and
chronologically, to consider in
the appeal is the traditional
evidence regarding the
acquisition of a title to the
disputed territory. Behind that
question lies another, viz.:
What weight is to be attached to
that evidence? On the first
question, the learned Chief
Justice, who had the advantage
of seeing and hearing the
witnesses, held, as their
Lordships have already pointed
out, not only that the
respondent's case of gift
failed, but that the appellants'
case of conquest succeeded. The
learned Chief Justice, after a
careful analysis of the evidence
on this topic tendered by the
respondent. refused to accept
it. On the other hand, he held
that the evidence tendered by
the appellants was reasonable
and consonant with the facts as
he found them. The Court of
Appeal, while minimizing the
weight to be attached to such
evidence, did not suggest that
the learned Chief Justice was
wrong in t he conclusion which
he reached on the evidence, and
their Lordships see no reason
for thinking that the decision
of the learned Chief Justice on
the evidence adduced was other
than sound On the question of
the weight to be attached to
evidence of tradition, their
Lordships do not differ from
the carefully expressed view of
the learned Chief Justice at p.
62, line 29, of the Record
regarding the function of
traditional evidence in such an
enquiry as this. Such evidence,
in their Lordships' opinion,
falls to be considered and
weighed,
quantum Valeat,
along with the other evidence in
the case.
As, However, the Court of Appeal
in effect based its judgment
upon certain German maps, it is
appropriate
in limine
to advert to them, and to their
implications. There are two
German maps, the one map marked
Exhibit C, and the map marked
Exhibit A. The first question
which arises is whether these
maps, or either of them, fall
within the provision of Schedule
I, Order 6, Rule 14, of the
Rules of the Supreme Court. the
rule is in these terms: -" All
maps made under the authority of
any Government, or of any public
municipal body, and not made for
the purpose of any litigated
question, shall
prima facie
be deemed to be correct, and
shall be admitted in evidence
without further proof."
Now, Exhibit A, on which chief
reliance was placed by the
respondent, purports to have
been issued by the German
Colonial Office. It was tendered
in evidence in the Court of
Appeal, and, to say the least,
it was not objected to by the
appellants. 'Whether in these
circumstances they can now be
heard to demur to the Board
considering the map may be
doubtful. Whether the map may be
regarded as falling within the
description "made under the
authority of any Government" -in
this case the German
Government-may also be doubtful.
Their Lordships do not find it
necessary, however, for the
purposes of this appeal to
determine either of these
questions.
For', assuming, while not
affirming that the map falls
under the Rule it must be
remembered that it only enjoys a
presumption of correctness,
which may be rebutted by other
evidence. Their Lordships are of
opinion that, on the assumption
stated, there are considerations
which neutralise, if they do not
outweigh, the benefit conferred
upon the map by the Rule. Their
Lordships note that the map is
on a very small scale: that it
is, and must in the
circumstances be, doubtful
whether it was intended to be
used for the purpose for which
the respondent seeks to use it,
viz., to set out accurately
tribal boundaries: and that,
moreover, it has been shown to
contain inaccuracies, which were
pointed out in argument. In
short, the map is of such a
character that it would not be
safe to draw an inference from
it regarding the tribal
boundaries now in dispute. In
these circumstances, their
Lordships are unable to agree
with the Court of Appeal that"
if the evidence of the maps is
accepted, the title is in the
appellant." Their Lordships
think that the Court of Appeal
attached undue importance to
the. maps, and that their legal
effect has been much
exaggerated. 'They are unable to
hold that in the circumstances
the maps neutralise the
traditional evidence, which is
in favour of the appellants.
The Court of Appeal considered
with somewhat meticulous care
the evidence relating to the
award said to have been made by
Delame in an arbitration between
the parties. '1'he learned Chief
Justice excluded evidence
regarding the terms of the
award-when it was tendered by
the most appropriate, if Dot the
only appropriate witness,
namely, Delame himself. This
exclusion, their Lordships
think, was unfortunate. They are
of opinion that
quntum valeat
Delame should have been allowed
to state what' his award was. It
is, however, enough for the
purposes of this appeal to say
that there is weighty evidence,
which their Lordships are
prepared to accept, to the
effect that the appellants
resiled from the arbitration
proceedings before the award was
issued. Moreover, it is proved
that, though the respondent's
evidence is that Delame cut a
line as a boundary, when the
respondent's surveyor inspected
the land, no objective trace of
a boundary could be discovered.
His evidence in that he found no
boundaries. How in these
circumstances the so-called
award can be of any value in
determining the problem before
their Lordships they are unable
to apprehend. It is not perhaps
surprising that, in the
circumstances stated, the Court
of Appeal abstained in their
judgment from treating the award
as even an ingredient in the
conclusion which they reached.
The Court of Appeal next
considered the evidence of "
existing facts," and their
bearing on the issue between the
parties. The first of these
facts relates to certain farms
said to have been cultivated in
Bunya land by the respondent.
Now, in the first place, it must
be remembered, as the learned
Chief Justice points out, that
these are not farms in the sense
in which the word is understood
in England. They are merely
small patches of land which
yield a catch crop. '1'heir
Lordships are unable to hold
that, assuming that these small
pieces of land were cultivated
by the respondent, that fact
yields an inference that the
whole of Bunya land, in which
they are situated, and which was
stated by Counsel to measure It
miles in length by half a mile
in breadth, must also and in
consequence be deemed to be in
the exclusive ownership or
possession of the respondent.
'their Lordships cannot agree.
with the Court of Appeal in
thinking that the evidence of
farming in part of Bunya is
evidence of title to the whole
land.
N ext, the respondent relied on
the evidence relating to certain
roads in or near the disputed
area. The Court of Appeal,
because one of these roads is
not to be found on a small-scale
map, held, despite evidence t6
the contrary, that there was no
road there. This conclusion
appears to be unwarrantable. In
any event, their Lordships are
unable to apprehend how these
roads in themselves can yield
any independent inference of
possession -far less exclusive
possession by the respondent.
After all, these so-called roads
are mere paths, and there is no
evidence that they were used in
face of a challenge of right to
do so. If, as would appear to be
the case, the roads are founded
on as leading to - the
respondent's farms, the
inference to be drawn from that
fact seems to their Lordships to
be negligible.
As regards the evidence relating
to fish traps on the Bunya river
on which the respondent founded,
it seems plain that these fish
traps, which were connected with
the farms already mentioned,
were movable in their character,
and that, again, any inference
drawn from their existence and
position must be of but small
importance..
As regards the evidence of
timbering, counsel for the
respondent described it as a
"dead heat." In these
circumstances, their Lordships
consider themselves absolved
from reviewing the evidence
relating to that matter in
detail.
The evidence relating to
fetishes Was treated lightly by
the Chief Justice, and was
treated in the Court of Appeal
as irrelevant.
Certain evidence was tendered by
the respondent from neighbours
of his on the subject of
boundaries, regarding which it
is probably enough to say that
the learned Chief Justice
refused to accept it as worthy
of credence. Indeed, the
evidence of the respondent
regarding boundaries generally
consists of mere assertion-which
is not helpful, and the red
lines relied on do not reproduce
any physical features which can
be found upon the land in
dispute. '
Finally, the respondent founded
on the evidence relating to what
was termed the "Mahoon
incident." It was argued for the
respondent that he had proved
that certain members of the
appellants' tribe were fined by
Mahoon for hunting, and so
trespassing, on Bunya land. 'the
respondent's counsel contended
that it was a significant fact
that, while substantive evidence
was given by him to the effect
that the first defendant was one
of the hunters who was fined by
Mahoon, that defendant did not,
hough he was present in Court,
enter the witness box to deny
the charge. 'the comment of the
-respondent's counsel is
prima facie
just and forcible, and no
convincing explanation of the
first defendant's failure to
give evidence to the contrary
was forthcoming. But their
Lordships think it is enough to
say regarding the Mahoon
incident that the Judge of first
instance, who saw and heard the
witnesses, and observed their
demeanour, did not accept as
truth the evidence given on
behalf of the respondent
regarding this matter.
That evidence was given-so he
says-" in a parrot-like
fashion." Now, while even on
questions of fact and
credibility, a Court of Appeal
-must not abdicate its
functions, it is nevertheless
trite law that, not possessing
the advantages of the Judge of
first instance, a Court of
Appeal should be chary of
overruling his opinion on a pure
question of credibility. In
their Lordships' opinion, no
reason for altering the
conclusion of the learned Chief
Justice on this matter was
adduced by the respondent in
argument. Their Lordships cannot
in these circumstances regard
the Mahoon incident as
established the evidence
regarding possession would seem
to be, in point of fact,
neutral. Roth parties can lay
claim to certain acts of
possession within the disputed
territory, many of which were,
as the learned Chief .Justice
says, fleeting in their
character. Rut what seems quite
clear-and it is decisive, in
their Lordships' view, of ,this
part of the case-is that the
respondent has failed to prove
exclusive possession by him such
as is necessary to instruct a
title to claim the remedy which
he seeks. Nor must it be
forgotten that, in regard to'
possession, as in regard to
tradition, the attitude of the
learned Chief Justice to much of
the respondent's evidence is one
of incredulity, and that,
commenting on the demeanour of
the witnesses, he regards the
respondent's case on this topic
as honeycombed with false and
even manufactured evidence.