Appeal
Court.
Lagos, 17th May, 1935
Appeal from Judgment
of Supreme Court.
Testamentary Disposition-
Consistent use of words" Native
Law and Custom" -Native Law
specific devise of allowance to
eldest son as Head of
Family-Same paid by
trustees-Interpretation of
Will-Costs out of estate.
Held
(Aitken,
J. dissenting): There was
implied authority that allowance
be paid; appeal dismissed,
except as to costs. Held
unanimously:
On merits appellants allowed
costs in Court below out of
estate: both parties allowed
costs in Appeal Court as between
solicitor and client to be paid
out of estate.
The facts of this case are
sufficiently set out in the
judgments.
A. L. Johnson
for Appellants.
R. F. Irving
(J. Martin
with him) for Respondents.
The following judgments were
delivered;-
AITKEN, J.
This case arises out of the
'Will of a wealthy Lagosian
trader named AlIi Balogun. The
Will itself is dated the 27th
August, 1932; there was a
codicil thereto dated the 17th
of June, 1933, which does not
affect the questions argued
before us; the testator died at
Lagos on the 13th of July, 1933,
and his Will was duly proved on
the 24th of October of that
year.
The Will itself-I need not refer
to the codicil-is an elaborate
and exhaustive document, drawn
up in accordance with the
provisions of English law but
making frequent reference to "
native law and custom." I quite
agree that full effect must be
given to all the testator's
expressed wishes in regard to
such " native law and custom",
but I am also very clearly and
firmly of opinion that his
wishes in regard to any subject
dealt with in his Will can only
be ascertained from the words he
has used therein. No omissions
can be supplied, and no
rectifications can be made
We are here to say what the
testator has done, not what he
ought to have done; and I feel
very strongly that we should
offer a firm resistance to all
arguments that appeal to our
emotions rather than to our
reason. Now I have already
described the testator's Will as
an elaborate and exhaustive
document, but the provisions
which have given rise to the
questions agitated before us may
be set out quite shortly as
follows:-
Firstly, the devise of the
testator's house known as No. 35
Victoria Street Lagos and "all
plates, furniture, pictures and
" books" therein, to the
trustees" during the period of
twenty-one " years after the
testator's death or such period
as is allowed by "native law or
custom," in trust for the head
of his house according to native
law and custom to the intent
that such house and furniture
etc. should be taken to be one
in the aggregate and should
remain as the testator's family
house" with the incidents " of
native law and custom thereto
attaching:"
Secondly, the direction that the
testator's eldest surviving
son-the defendant Busari Balogun-should
during his lifetime be the head
of the family under native law
and custom and should occupy and
live in No. 35 Victoria Street:
Thirdly, the direction that all
ceremonies, be it of marriage or
baptism, should take place in
No. 35 Victoria Street:
Fourthly, the direction that all
the testator's wives should be
allowed to continue in
occupation of the rooms occupied
by them in this No. 35 Victoria
Street house at his death during
widowhood and good behaviour
along with their children, with
further directions to ensure
that any rooms falling vacant
should be occupied by "
immediate" members of the family
only; and
Fifthly, a direction that the
trustees should on no account
lease out, sell or partition
amongst the testator's children
this. family house. N one of the
numerous devises and bequests to
be found in the rest of the
,will and in the codicil appears
to throw any light. on the
meaning of these five
provisions, and the only other
provisions of the Will that I
need mention are those
constituting and finally
disposing of what the testator
calls his residuary trust fund.
That fund is to be constituted
out of all his real and personal
estate not otherwise disposed
of, and a considerable number of
monthly or annual payments to
the testator's children and
others are charged thereupon. At
the end of twenty years from the
testator's death certain other
lump sum payments are to be made
therefrom, and the balance then
remaining is to be divided
amongst the testator's children
or the issue of any deceased
children in equal shares
per stripes.
When that division takes place
it would seem that the
testator's estate should be, to
use his own expression, " fully
administered."
: Having thus
set out the provisions of the
Will out of which the questions
before us arise, I can pass on
to the questions themselves. the
defendants are the executors and
trustees of the Will, and from
some date which does not exactly
appear put which must have. been
shortly after the testator's
death, they began to make Busuri
Balogun, in his capacity of head
of the family, an allowance of
£10 a month out of moneys
belonging to the testator's
estate in their hands. The
plaintiffs, who are daughters of
the testator and entitled_ to a
share in .the testator's
residuary trust fund as well as
to other benefits under his
Will, objected to such payments
:and eventually commenced this
action for the purpose,
inter alia,
of restraining the defendants,
in their representative
capacity, from continuing such
payments. The writ of summons
itself was very badly drawn, but
I do not think the plaintiffs
can be blamed for that, and the
learner] trial .Judge did
eventually succeed in getting it
amended so that it raised the
obvious complementary claim for
a refund to the testator's
estate of the payments already
made to Busari Balogun.
\When the action came on for
trial before Butler Lloyd, J. on
the 31st of January, 1935,
evidence was led on behalf of
the plaintiffs to place the
testators's Will before the
Court, and to show that at least
two sons of the testator, in
addition to the plaintiffs
themselves, objected to the
monthly allowance of £10 which
was admittedly being made by the
executors to Busari Balogun. At
the end of the plaintiffs case
Mr. Irving submitted that there
was NO case for the defendants
to answer on the ground that
since Busari, as head of the
family, was required to live in
the family house No. 35 Victoria
Street, an allowance for
entertainment was implied. It is
of some importance to bear this
ground of submission in mind,
as it shows clearly for what
purposes learned counsel then
considered that Busari Balognn's
allowance was being paid. The
learned trial .Judge overruled
Mr. Irving's submission on the
ground that as the defence was
relying" upon a custom of "
making payments to the head of
the family for the upkeep of a "
family house or other similar
purposes," that custom would
have to be proved by evidence.
The obvious criticism of this
ruling is that Mr. Irving was
not then relying' on any such
custom, but was alleging a very
different custom, to wit, one of
making an entertainment
allowance to the head of the
family. It is idle to guess at
the reasons which led to this
metamorphosis, but it is
noteworthy that it occurred.
To prove the custom he alleged,
or the custom propounded by the
learned trial ,Judge-I don't
know which-Mr. Irving called the
Rev. T. A. Ogunbiyi, Chief
Obanikoro who is one of the
defendants, and Busari Balogun
himself. The evidence each of
these gentlemen gave may be
summarised quite fairly in his
own words as follows:-
"Rev. T. A.
Ogunbiyi,.- Chief
in Holy Orders: living at Ikeja.
I am sixty-eight years of age. I
am familiar with Yoruba custom
and have quiver evidence as to
it before. We have a. family
house at Ebute Era
and others. I am the head and
manager. My father left no will
I maintain the family house out
of the incomings. If a house is
left as a family house by
will I should expect the head of
the family to keep
& an it up out of incomings if
any. If none he will apply to
the executors. v. If he keeps up
the prestige of the family the
head will be entitled to an
allowance for maintenance and
entertainment. I know of no
specific instance of this. He
will look after the children
while minors but not out of his
own pocket.
Chief Obanikoro.-One
of the executors of Balogun's
estate. He was a friend/of mine
and I often visited him. He was
a very wealthy. man. did things
well and entertained a lot. Had
he left no will the eldest son
would have succeeded as head of
the family and to the
liabilities which he would meet
from the income of the estate.
Alli Balogun provided for his
sons approximately equally. Even
if an eldest son, if he had a
larger share would not be
expected to payout of his own
pocket.
The allowance to Busari was
known to me, though I did not
actually authorise it. I
suggested it wasn't enough. I
discussed the matter with Mr.
Carr who agreed with me. No
member of the family has
complained to me.
By Court.-I
myself actually suggested an
allowance because I thought it
necessary for expenses in
connection with education and
maintenance of children and
charity and hospitality.
Balogun was not a Chief. Chiefs
do not usually .make a will. He
was a trader. His son should
occupy the same position as his
father. Ba]ogun disposed of all
of his property. I got something
as executor. There were many
legacies to friends. I know of
no other similar case to this
.
Busari Balogun-Eldest
son of AlIi Balogun. My father
lived entirely according to
native law and custom. I have
now taken on the duties of the
head of the house. I have tried
to carryon as he did. I have to
entertain strangers with money
and food. I am on the committee
of the mosque. I also look after
the minor children some of whom
are poorly provided for. I pay
the whole electric light bills'
and Conservancy and a yard boy.
Immediately after my father's
death a family meeting was held
and an allowance of £10 was
agreed to and later by the
executors. No one has ever
objected.
By
Court.--I am in fact losing
money over this. £10 is not
enough for everything, I had no
more property left me than my
brothers.
I did not receive £130 as rent
from one' of my properties.
Alakoro Street was devised to my
sons. I drew a cheque for
£200 for funeral ceremonies of
my father. I and another brother
bought my father's car. All the
family were present at the
meeting immediately after my
father's death. I presided.
Plaintiffs agreed then. I have
had the £10 ever since my
father's death. I also got £3 a
month and some rents. The rents
used to be about £8 a month but
ate less now.
My father left legacies to
various retainers. I only do
what my father did. Ladipo is
the yard labourer. My father had
a boy Dye. Yunusa is a boy under
age. He is an apprentice tailor.
He had £5 under the will which
is not enough. I had to help
Disiriyu as his tenants wouldn't
pay.
His mother had an allowance.
Biliaminu is a minor. So is :Muyibi,
he is an apprentice carpenter.
They all have a share or rents.
Bolaji has £3 and is a scholar
at King's College. Ganiyu also
has a house but I am assisting
him as his tenants won't pay.
There has been a number of
marriages and baptisms; the
family have not contributed for
them. I am familiar with the
will. He made provisions for
nearly every body. 'there is a
residuary fund.
By Court.-My
father had about £5,000 a year.
:My private income is about
£100."
One other witness was called for
the defence, namely Sabitiyu
Balogun, a daughter of the
testator; but her evidence is
perfectly valueless on the
question of native custom. Upon
this evidence the learned Judge
held that the executors were
justified in making the
allowance of £10 a month to
Busari Balogun in his capacity
of head of the family, and the
gist of his judgment appears to
be contained in the following
passages, which I will quote in
full:-
" With regard to the facts of
this case, there is little to
add to what I said in dealing
with Mr. Irving's submission
that no case had been made out
for him to answer. From the
evidence which has now been made
out for the defence I am
satisfied:
(1) That the customary head of a
family has duties of an onerous
nature in connection with family
ceremonies, the maintenance of
the family house and of needy
members of the family, and
hospitality to strangers;
(Z)
That he is entitled to reimburse
himself for expenditure in
connection with these duties
from family resources in his
control or failing such
resources by contributions from
members of the family;
(3) That· in the present case
the executors made the allowance
complained of to the head of the
family for the purpose of
reimbursing him for expenditure
of this nature;
(4) That the allowance has been
spent in a manner intended.
But the question remains were
the executors justified, or were
they committing a breach of
trust, in taking upon themselves
to make this payment? In strict
English Law they would not be
justified in going outside the
actual terms of the Will, at any
rate without the sanction of the
Court, but the legislature has
provided in section 20 of
Chapter 3 that in matters
relating to testamentary
dispositions amongst other
things no person shall be
deprived of the benefit of any
existing custom not being
repugnant to natural justice,
and has given this Court the
right to observe and enforce the
observance of such custom."
" Now what was in the mind of
the testator in making this
Will? He was a rich man owning a
considerable quantity of real
property over which he had an
absolute right of disposal. He
devised the bulk of this
property specifically to members
of his family, probably with the
idea of avoiding the wrangles
and legal expense commonly
incident to the partition of an
estate of this size. At the same
time he directed that certain
property should be retained as a
family house in accordance with
native law and custom, and
directed that the eldest son as
head of the family should live
in that house and that family
ceremonies should be held there;
but he placed the control of the
family affairs, not as would
have been the case had he died
intestate in the hands of an
unwieldy and possibly
quarrelsome family meeting, but
of a carefully chosen body of
executors. He gave the eldest
son no larger share than the
others, but while clearly
intending that he should
continue to carry out the duties
I have specified above, he
failed to provide the means
which would enable him to do so.
Can it be said that the
executors were guilty of a
breach of trust in supplying
this omission? It must not be
forgotten that Wills are a new
thing in this country, and that
testators cannot be expected to
make their wishes as clear as in
a country where Willis have been
made for centuries, where
unlimited precedents are
available, and where the tenure
of land is not complicated by
the persistence of native
custom, and it was no doubt for
the purpose of giving effect to
the real intention of a testator
and of avoiding the necessity of
a too rigid adherence to the
ipsissima 'rerba
of a 'Will that testamentary
dispositions were included in
section 20. In my view no breach
of trust has been committed
here. To hold otherwise would in
the present case result in
depriving the person designated
as head of the family of the
benefit of his customary right
to reimbursement for the
expenses necessarily. thrown
upon him by his position.
There will be judgment for
defendants."
Well, I see no reason to quarrel
with the learned trial Judge's
findings of fact, though the
'evidence in support of them is
far from strong, but those
findings do not seem to me to go
anything like far enough to
justify the £10 a month
allowance which the defendants
have been making to Busari
Balogun in his capacity of head
of the family. To my mind to
justify any such allowance in a
case like this, it is necessary
to prove a native custom
entitling a head of the family
to contributions from the
testator's estate even though
the testator's Will contains no
provision whatever relating to
any such contributions. In other
words, it is necessary to prove
a native custom which supplies a
testator's omissions and
re-writes his Will for him-a
very powerful native custom
indeed and for the life of me I
cannot see that anything
remotely resembling the shadow
of such a custom was proved
before the learned trial Judge.
If such a custom does, in fact,
exist here or anywhere, then the
golden rule of construction that
a testator's intentions are to
be collected from the words he
has used has gone by the board,
and with a vengeance. Now in
this case I am in a small
minority of one and therefore,
by a pncsumptio juris et de
jure,
I must be wrong j yet it seems
to me that my learned brethren
have not only decided in favour
of the existence of such a
custom as I have just described,
but have also added at least two
clauses to the testator's 1Vill
which may, conjeeturally; be
stated as follows: -
No. 1.-" And I hereby authorise,
direct and empower my trustees
to make such allowance out of my
residuary trust fund as they, in
their absolute discretion, shall
think fit, to my said eldest son
Busari Balogun for the following
purposes, to wit
(a)
for the purpose of enabling him
to maintain my said storey house
and land No. 35 Victoria Street,
Lagos, as my family house and
(b)
for the purpose of enabling him
to keep up that prestige,
dignity and reputation for
generosity which I regard as
inseparable from his position as
the future head of my family".
No. 2.-" Notwithstanding every
thing hereinbefore contained and
in particular notwithstanding
the direction whereby my
trustees are directed to
distribute the whole of my
residuary trust fund after a
period of twenty years from my
death, I hereby vary that
direction by empowering and
authorising them, at the end of
such period, to retain such part
of my said residuary trust fund
in their hands as they, :n their
absolute discretion, shall think
fit, for the purposes of
(a)
providing for their own
remuneration under this my Will,
and (
b)
providing a fund out of the
income arising from which my
said storey house and land No.
35 Victoria Street, Lagos, shall
be maintained as my family house
for such period as is allowed by
native law awl Custom "- which
is, so my learned brother Graham
Puul informs me, for ever.
WeIl, I suppose I must be wrong;
I suppose this native custom of
magical force and power does
enable the Courts of this
country not only to repair
omissions in testator's Wills,
but also to alter their
dispositions and extend their
effectual operation from a mere
twenty years to infinity. I
suppose that all these things
can be done, but my mind is,
unfortunately;, far too
pedestrian to keep pace with
them. The golden rule which I
enunciated earlier on shall be
my refuge, and I must most
respectfully decline to take any
part in supplying a testator's
omissions or altering or
extending his dispositions.
It if! argued that these things
can be done by virtue of section
20 of the Supreme Court
Ordinance, but to my mind that
section merely provides that
where a testator expresses a
desire that his dispositions
shall be interpreted and take
effect in accordance with native
custom, his wishes shall be
respected. And why not? ,But how
can such a provision be
interpreted to mean that native
custom can ,be applied to amend,
extend and alter a testator's
dispositions? here again I
suppose that it can, because
three learned Judges say that it
can; but in spite of my
readiness 'to learn I find my
capacity for assimilating novel
propositions of law unequal to
the occasion.
Other questions arising out of
the position my learned
brethren's decision will create
occur to me, for example : -What
is to happen if the family
remove Busari Balogun from his
headship, as they are fully
entitled to do? Is this upkeep
and maintenance of house and
prestige allowance payable to
all or any of Busari's
successors in the headship of
the family, or only to Busari?
Suppose the Balogun family
leaves Lagos, or ceases to live
in the family house, or ceases
to exist, must that family house
still be repaired and maintained
by the trustee? And what is to
happen to the £25 a year payable
to the trustees until the
testator's estate be fully
administered-a period fixed by
him at twenty years after his
death but now to be extended
indefinitely? But what useful
purpose can be served by
canvassing these questions now
seeing that, axiomatically, my
learned brethren are right and I
am wrong. I have at any rate
said sufficient to explain the
main grounds on which I feel
compelled most reluctantly, to
differ from them, and it would
help no one were I to continue
·with my arguments or to suggest
to what extent
I,
personally, think that the
trustees would be justified by
the testator's Will in repairing
and maintaining his family house
No. 35 Victoria Street. The
exact form or order to be made
in this case will be that
propounded by my learned brother
Graham Paul, and I agree that
the Court's of both parties in
this Court and in the Court
below should be borne by the
testator's estate. The point
raised in this action is both
novel and important, and it is a
point that should be determined
as much in the interests of the
trustees as in the interests of
the beneficiaries.
GRAHAM PAUL, J.
As I find myself in regretful
and respectful disagreement with
the learned President of this
Court I must deal at some length
with the questions raised on
this appeal.
The fundamental issue in this
appeal is as to the
interpretation of the 'Will of
the late AlIi Balogun, a very
wealthy trader of Lagos who died
on 13th of July. 1933, leaving a
very large estate to be dealt
with under his 'Will.
The plaintiffs-appellants are
two of the daughters of the late
AlIi Balogun and the
defendants-respondents are sued
"by themselves and as the legal
personal representatives of the
late AlIi Balogun" The
respondents are in fact the
executors and trustees of the
late Alli Balogun's Will.
The respondents as such trustees
decided to make, and did make,
to Busari Balogun, the eldest
son of the testator, out of the
residuary trust funds in their
charge under the Will, a monthly
allowance of ten pounds. The
appellants in this suit seek an
order that any such payments
made by the respondents should
be refunded by them to the
residuary estate of the
testator, and that the
respondents should be restrained
by injunction from making any
further such payments. The
ground of the appellant' claim
is that the payment of this
allowance is not authorised by
the testator's Will.
At the trial the defendants'
counsel at the conclusion of the
plaintiffs' case submitted that
there was no case for the
defendants to answer but the
learned trial Judge ruled
against him and directed that
the defence should proceed. The
appellants in this appeal
appealed against that
interlocutory judgment as well
as against the final judgments,
but at the outset of the hearing
of the appeal their counsel
withdrew the appeal so far as it
concerned that interlocutory
judgment and the appeal as
regards that judgment was
dismissed. At the conclusion of
the defence the learned Judge in
the Court below dismissed the
plaintiffs' claim and against
that judgment they have brought
this appeal.
By his Will the testator
directed that his eldest
surviving son should during his
life-time be "the head of the
family under " native law and
custom". He further directed
that his said son should occupy
and live in "Makanjuola House"
and that all ceremonies "be it
of marriage, baptism, (Ikomo
Jade) " should take place in the
testator's said family house.
Earlier in his Will the testator
had devised unto his trustees
during the period of twenty-one
years after his death or such
period as is allowed by native
law and custom, " in trust for
the "head of my house according
to native law and custom" the
plate, furniture, etc. in "Makanjuola
House" and the house itself
(together with another house
property) and in regard to whose
properties the testator added "
the same shall be taken to " be
one in the aggregate and shall
remain as my family house " with
the incidents of native law and
custom thereto attaching" .
There is a further direction in
the Will that on no account are
the trustees to lease out, sell,
or partition amongst any of the
testator's children, his said
family house and a child so
insisting shall forfeit his or
her interest in the same.
It is mainly under the
provisions of the Will to which
I have referred that the
defendants made, and contend
that they had a right and duty
as trustees to make, the
allowance in question.
I must confess that throughout
the arguments I have seen no
difficulty whatever in accepting
the view of the defendants. In
fact upon the pleadings and the
evidence for the plaintiffs it
seems to me that there was much
to be said for the defendants'
counsel's contention that the
plaintiffs' claim should have
been dismissed without caning
upon the defendants.
The Courts of Nigeria are
perfectly familiar with the
position of the head of a family
under native law and
custom-particularly in Lagos,
although the main principles do
not differ very materially in
other parts of the country. The
head of the family is in charge
and control of the family
property; he collects the
revenue of family property; he
has to make certain
disbursements out of the family
revenue for family purposes,
upkeep of the family property,
funeral, marriage and baptism
ceremonial expenses of members
of the family often involving
the entertainment of strangers,
litigations on behalf of the
family, maintenance of indigent
members of the family, education
of children and so on. The head
of a family has very
considerable and onerous duties
to perform, varying in degree of
course according to the size,
wealth and importance of the
family. And I have never heard
it suggested that the head of a
family had under native law and
custom to meet the expenses of
duties properly incidental to
his position as head of the
family out of his own money as
distinct from family funds.
It is true perhaps that there is
no ease to be found in the
Nigeria Reports specifically
laying it down that the head of
a family in Lagos has the rights
and duties as regards family
revenue and family expenditure
which I have specified. The
reason is that no one has ever
thought of questioning these
rights and duties. It is however
by no means an uncommon thing
for members of a family to query
the dealings of the head of the
family with family funds. In the
short time I have sat on the
Bench in Lagos I have had
several such cases in .court.
They have been claims for an
account., and items of
expenditure have been examined
to see whether they were proper
family expenditure or not. It is
in such enquiries that the
principles of native custom I
have enuncittted have emerged
and have received judicial
recognition and sanction.
I have considered it necessary
to recite these judicially
recognise(] principles of native
law at some length before
approaching their applicability
to the present case as it seems
to me that throughout this case
due weight has not been given to
those principles.
Counsel for the appellants in
his argument. before this Court
demonstrated that the provisions
of the Will as regards the
family house simply left the
position as it would have been
in intestacy under native law
and custom. I agree with him in
that, except as to the
interposition of trustees. But I
go a little further. Counsel for
the defendant by " House" meant
only the fabric of the building.
My view is that his remarks
apply' equally to the " Rouse"
in the wider sense of the word
as used in the "Tin when the
testator refers to the " Head of
my
House
" .
Ordinarily under native law and
custom if AlIi Balogun had died
completely intestate his eldest
son would have become head of
his family under native law and
custom-that is admitted by
counsel for the appellant. Part
of his immediate duties would
have been to distribute among
the members of the family-in
consultation with the principal
members of the family-and
probably with assistance and
advice from friends of the
family the real and personal
properties of his deceased
father. Such distribution often
leads to family feuds, sometimes
to a complete disruption and
disappearance of the family as a
real unity. The large numbers of
partition or sale suits in the
Divisional Court at Lagos in the
last ten years are evidence of
that. The late AlIi Balogun from
the terms of his Will was
obviously very well aware of
that. The clauses in his ·Will
disinheriting- any child who
became quarrelsome or caused
litigation or who insisted on
partition of the family house
are definite clues to his
apprehensions. In his Will he
deliberately relieved the head
of his family who was to succeed
him from this fruitful cause of
family dissensions by himself
sorting out in his Will his real
and personal properties among
the members of the family, ann.
by giving the residue to
trustees to control for twenty
years.
There is something almost
pathetic in the picture of this
shrewd and worthy man who had
made his own fortune putting his
thumb mark to his Will with two
main ideas in his head. He
wanted to deal with all his
properties and with all the
members of his family
individually so as to avoid
disputes. But above all he
desired to perpetuate his family
house and his family. He devised
the family house to his trustees
for twenty-one years after his
death or such period as is
allowed by native law and
custom. He provided that any
child trying to have it
partitioned should be
disinherited.
It may be an interesting
question what is to happen to
this devise in trust on the
expiry of twenty-one years from
the testator's death. But that
question is not in this appeal
or for this Court. It is the
obvious intention behind the
devise that matters now.
The properties, real and
personal, which the testator
dealt with in his will were his
own to do with as he liked.
Nothing of what he owned was his
by inheritance under native law
ann. custom. Nothing of it all
was communal property. It is
safe to say that in this country
where, as some think, the
individual is crushed down by·
the communal system there has
never been a native of the
country who to anything like
this extent was free to dispose
of a large estate absolutely as
he liked.
What he calls the " Family
House" in his Will is simply
what
he
decided he wished in future to
be
his
family house. He deliberately
put it in a different position
from any other part of his
estate, real or personal. If he
had not wished-and I think the
material parts of his Will show
that he fervently wished-to
perpetuate his family house and
his family as unities to persist
under native law and custom, he
could have left out all
reference to a family house or
to a head of his house or to a
head of his family or to native
law and custom and directed
instead that the buildings be
sold and his eldest son get a
definite share. But he elected
otherwise. His Will shows
clearly his intentions. He
desired his family house and his
family to be perpetuated as
unities with all the incidents
of native law and custom, and he
charged his trustees and
directed his eldest surviving
son accordingly. It is
impossible to read this Will
without realising that the
testator intended that the
family house and the head of the
house should continue with a
suitable prestige. I agree
entirely that we must in
deciding this case be guided by
our reason and not by our
emotions but it is necessary to
bring to the reading and
interpreting of a Will a certain
amount of sympathetic human
understanding of the testator's
mind as revealed in his Will.
To my mind the references in the
discussions in this suit and in
this appeal to sections 20 and
16 of the ,Supreme Court
Ordinance represent a much too
narrow view of the issues
involved. The broad view, and in
my opinion the correct view, is
that we must arrive at the real
intention of the 'testator as.
expressed in
the
Will, and give effect to it.
'
Shortly put, the intention of
the testator, as I understand it
from his Will, was to make his
eldest surviving' son head of
the family with all the rights
and duties of a head of a family
under native law and custom
except in so far as these rights
and duties are in the '\Till
expressly restricted by devises
or directions to the trustees or
to individual members of the
family.
With all his voluminous devises
and directions the testator has
still left a residuary estate.
That residuary estate "not
otherwise specifically disposed
of" is vested in the trustees.
Taking that vesting of the
residuary estate along with the
direction that his eldest
surviving son should be the head
of the family under native law
and custom I am of opinion that
the residuary trust fund is a
fund to which the head of the
family is to look for the
expenses of carrying out his
functions
qua
head of the family. It is true
that there is a provision for
the ultimate division of that
fund but that division must be
subject to the trusts created
and to the directions given by
the testator.
The persons in charge of that
fund are not the members of the
family but trustees very
carefully chosen' by the
testator.
It is important to note that the
devise to the trustees of the
family house is for twenty-one
years or such period as is
allowed by native law and custom
(probably in native law a devise
in perpetuity) whereas the
residuary trust fund is to be
divided after twenty years. It
may be that the trustees will
have to come to the Court twenty
years after the death of the
testator for directions as to
what they are to do in respect
of the conflicting provisions of
the Will, but that question need
not now be dealt with.
Faced with the devise of the
family house and the direction
as to the eldest son being head
of the family under native law
and custom the trustees might
have said to the head of the
family , , You must carryon as
head of the family and you must
" let us know whenever you wish
to incur any expense however "
trifling in that capacity and we
shall then have a meeting of
"trustees and decide whether we
shall give you the money". The
trustees have not taken that
cumbersome course and I do not
blame them-some of them are busy
men. Instead, they have
considered all the
circumstances, the onerous
nature of the duties, and the
funds available, and they have
decided that an average of
£10 a month is a reasonable
amount to allow the heac1 of
this large house to cover his
expenses in that capacity.
Though the amount is actually
spent by the head of the house
the responsibility for the
amount is that of the trustees.
If the trustees are not
satisfied with the way the head
of the house is spending his £10
a month, they can stop it or
reduce it. As a condition of its
continuance they can call on the
head of the house for an account
of how he spend it.
In the course of the arguments
there have been a good many
reference to :English practice
and English analogies. These
analogies are sometimes
dangerous but I should like to
refer to one. If in England a
testator directed in his 'Will
that his eldest son was to be
educated at Oxford University,
without specifying how much was
to be spent or from what fund,
no one would dream of suggesting
that the trustees should carry
out that direction in any other
way than by making out of the
residuary trust fund such an
allowance to the son as they
considered reasonable. And so
long as the amount was
reasonable, no Court would
interfere. To my mind that is a
helpful analogy in principle.
This is not an action for an
account. It is an action for an
order to stop altogether the
trustees from allowing to the
head of the family the supplies
to which as head of the family
under native law and custom he
is in my opinion clearly
entitled. The trustees in this
suit upon the statement of claim
and the evidence for the
plaintiff were not called upon
to meet a case that the head of
the family had spent more than
under native law and custom he
was entitled to spend, or that
the trustees had given him more
than as head of the family under
native law and custom he was
entitled to spend. The case they
were called upon to meet was
that the head of the house was
not entitled to anything' out
of the estate to meet his
expenses as head of the house.
There is no provision in the
Will that the trustees are to
payout of the family fund
available, namely the residuary
trust fund, the cost of upkeep
and repairs of the family house
but counsel for the appellant
when I put the point to him
agreed that it was implied that
the trustees should do so. It
seems to me only logical to hold
that the same implication is to
be read out of the 'Will in
regard to the upkeep of the
headship of the family.
It is suggested that if this
Court upholds the judgment it
will be arrogating to the Courts
a power to re-write the
testator's Will for him, or to
insert a provision which the
testator left out. Emphatically
I cannot accept that suggestion.
the position seems to me exactly
the other way round. It is the
appellants who ask the Court to
insert, at least in two places
in the Will, a provision not put
there by the testator, a very
vital and contradicting
provision to something like the
following effect:-
" But the head of my family
contrary to native law and "
custom is to payout of his own
pocket expenses he may " incur
as head of my family and is not
to be reimbursed "out of the
family funds available namely
the residuary " trust fund".
I can be no party to the
insertion of such a provision in
the testator's Will.
From my experience of cases
where the head of a family has
accounted for his expenditure on
family matters I have no doubt
whatever that £10 a month in
this case is a very moderate
allowance. If I had had any
doubt on that point and had
wished to have sound advice of
two people on it I should quite
probably have chosen Chief
Obanikoro and Mr. Henry Carr to
advise me. As it happens they
were specially chosen by the
testator himself as guardians of
his estate which in my view
gives to the opinions of these
two trustees on this question an
even greater weight than their
experience and reputation alone
would entitle them to. I th in
kit was a wise choice of
trustees and I see nothing in
this case to justify the Court
in going against the trustees'
views as to the reasonableness
of the allowance made. It
appears in evidence that both
Chief Obanikoro and Mr. Henrv
Carr considered the allowance
too small and there is no
substantial evidence to
contradict them.
I am of opinion that the appeal
on the merits should be
dismissed with an order that the
costs of each side in this Court
assessed at fifteen guineas be
paid out of the estate, the
appellants to have in addition
out of the estate the sum of £19
Is. as out of pocket expenses.
But I desire to add a grave
warning that this allowance of
costs to the unsuccessful party
out of the estate is not to be a
precedent to be followed in
other cases unless Which the
Court concerned is absolutely
satisfied that the unsuccessful
party was reasonably expectant
o{ success. I agree with the
views expressed by the learned
trial Judge as to the danger of
encouraging speculative
litigation.
As regards the appeal on the
question of costs I think that
the plaintiffs should have been
allowed their costs out of the
estate, assessed at the same
figure as those of the
defendants, namely sixty
guineas.
BARTON, J.,
This case consisted originally
of three appeals, the first
appeal being from a ruling by
the Court that there was no case
for the defendants to answer,
the second being from a judgment
on the merits, and the third
from the Court's order as to
costs.
The first appeal has been
withdrawn, the respondents'
counsel not asking for costs, it
only remains, therefore, to deal
with the second and third
appeals.
The second appeal, which is the
main appeal, deals with the
construction of the Will of one
AlIi Balogun who died at Lagos
on the 13th July, 1933. 'The two
plaintiffs, who are daughters of
the deceased, alleged that the
defendants, who are the
executors and trustees of the
deceased's Will, committed a
breach of trust by paying Busari
Balogun, one 'of their number, a
monthly allowance of £10, the
total of such payments amounting
to £200 which they claim should
be refunded to the residuary
trust estate. The plaintiffs
also claim an injunction to
restrain the defendants from
continuing to make these
payments. The defendants admit
that they made the payments
alleged but assert that they
were justified in doing so, as,
in making them, they acted in
accordance with native law and
custom and in accordance with
the intention of the testator as
shown on the face of the Will.
The learned Acting Chief
Justice, who was the trial
Judge, gave judgment for the
defendants. Now it is clear from
a perusal of the Will that there
are no expreS1J words
authorising these payments, the
question therefore to be decided
is whether there is an implied
authority from the words used.
It appears from the Will that
the testator devised unto his
trustees, " during the period of
twenty-one years after my death
or such period as is allowed by
native law or custom in trust
for the head of my house
according to native law and
custom", the plate, furniture,
etc. in his house No. 35
Victoria Street, Lagos, known as
Makanjuola House " so that the
same shall remain in and be in
and form part of my family house
so far as is permitted by native
law and custom, together with my
said house No. 35 Victoria
Street, also Nos. 20 and 24
Isale-Agbede Street, Lagos,
aforesaid with the outhouses and
appurtenances thereto to the
intent that the same shall be
taken to be one in the aggregate
and shall remain as my family
house with the incidents of
native law and custom thereto
attaching." Later on in the Will
the testator directed as
follows: -" I also direct that
my eldest surviving son shall
during his lifetime be the head
of the family under native law
and custom and shall occupy and
live in my said house,
Makanjuola House, at 35 Victoria
Street, aforesaid."
The
testator further directed that
all ceremonies of marriage and
baptism of members of the family
were to take place in the said
house and that "my trustees
shall on no account sell or
partition amongst any of my
children my said family house,
and a child so insisting shall
forfeit his or her interest in
the same." The 'Will is a long
one and the testator was
evidently the owner of a
considerable amount of house
property and a very wealthy man
and, the number of .times he
makes use of the expression "
native law and custom" when
alluding to the family house and
the head of the family,
indicates to my mind that he was
a man who had a great respect
for such observances. After the
plaintiffs had closed their-
ease in the Court below it was
submitted by the defendant8'
counsel that there was no ease
to answer and the learned Acting
Chief Justice 'quite properly
ruled that as the defendants
relied upon native law and
custom as their authority for
making the payments it was
necessary to prove that custom
by evidence.
Evidence of native custom was
then taken and the Court found
as follows:-
(1) that the customary head of
the family has duties of an
onerous nature in connection
with family ceremonies, the
maintenance of the family house
and of needy members of the
family, and hospitality to
strangers;
(2) that he is entitled to
reimburse himself for
expenditure in connection with
these duties from family
resources in his control or.
failing such resources, by
contributions from the members
of the family;
(3) that in the present case the
executors made the allowance
complained of to the head of the
family for the purpose of
reimbursing him for expenditure
of this nature; and
(4) that the allowance was spent
in the manner intended.
Throughout the case there has
been no suggestion that the
amount of the allowance which
was paid to Busari Balogun, who
was the eldest surviving son of
the deceased and who occupied
the family house as head of the
family, was excessive. Now even
if the defendants had not paid
Busari any allowance at all,
they as trustec3 under the Will
would be responsible for the
upkeep of the fabric of the
building; instead of expending
money on this themselves they
gave Busari an allowance for
this purpose such allowance also
to cover expenditure incurred by
him as head of the family
according to native custom. As
regards that part of the
allowance which it was necessary
to expend on the upkeep of the
fabric, it is clear that if the
defendants were at any time not
satisfied that the money was
being spent for this purpose
they would be entitled to stop
it, and, as 'regards that part
of the allowance which was paid
to cover expenditure arising
from duties as head of the
family, it would to my mind be
unreasonable for Busari to be
expected to pay for it out of
his own pocket, I cannot believe
that this could have been the
testator's intention, and, in
this connection it has to be
remembered, that the testator
directed that no part of the
family house was to be sold or
partitioned, and also that he
gave Busari no larger share than
to his other children. Under
section 20 of the Supreme Court
Onlinance native law or custom
not being repugnant to natural
justice, equity and good
conscience is applicable in
causes or matters relating' to
testamentary dispositions where
the parties are natives, that is
to say if a testator who is a
native directs that native law
and custom is to be applied in
carrying out his "Will, it is to
be applied provided it is not
repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience.
After considering the Will as a
whole and having regard to the
expressions therein contained,
and to which I have referred, I
am of opinion that according to
its true construction it was the
implied intention of the
testator that his eldest
surviving son was to be
reimbursed for expenditure in
maintaining the family house and
for expenditure incurred
according to native custom in
his position as head of the
family; I am of opinion that
especially is this intention to
be implied from the words "and
shall remain as my family house
with the incidents of native law
and custom thereto attaching"
and the words directing that his
eldest surviving son " shall
during his lifetime be the head
of the family under native law
and custom and shall live in my
said house," and that such a
construction is in no way adding
to the terms of the Will.
I
am also of opinion that although
the testator did not mention any
specific sum to be paid to the
head of the family for the
above-mentioned purposes, the
allowance paid by the trustees was
most reasonable under the
circumstances.
For these reasons I am of opinion
that the appeal should be
dismissed. It may be asked what is
to happen to the devise to the
trustees at the end of twenty-one
years, my answer to this is that
we are not called upon to decide
that question in this appeal, this
appeal is only concerned with the
intention of the testator.
With regard to the question of
costs I am of opinion that as the
question raised is an interesting
one and not previously decided,
the costs of both parties both in
this Court and in the Court below
should be borne by the estate.
The following order as to cost was
made: ~
The plaintiffs-appellants are to
have their cost in the Court
below, which are hereby assessed
at sixty guineas, paid out of the
testator's estate; and both
parties to this appeal are to have
their costs of the appeal taxed as
between solicitor and client and
paid out of the test |