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BENIN, J.A.:
This is an application brought
by the plaintiff herein seeking
an order of interim injunction
restraining the defendant, its
agents, servants, privies and
assigns from further entering
into and or in any other way
enforcing the agreement dubbed
or entitled “Guinness means
profit” retailer scheme
initiated by the defendant and
or any similar or further
agreements with outlet owners of
the plaintiff and in Ghana
pending the final determination
of the suit herein in terms of
the accompanying affidavit and
for such order or orders as this
honourable court may seem fit.
In the accompanying affidavit,
the plaintiff set out the
reliefs endorsed on the writ,
which as at now amended, seek
the following:
1. a declaration that the said
agreement is unreasonable and in
restraint of trade and against
public policy and therefore null
and void and totally of no
effect;
2. a declaration that the said
agreement undermines competition
and seeks to achieve an unfair
advantage over its competitors
and is thus contrary to public
policy;
3. injunction;
4. damages; and
5. a declaration that the said
agreement amounts to an act
inducing the said retailers to
breach their contractual
relations with the plaintiff.
In the affidavit in support, the
plaintiff deposed that its
products namely, Club Super
Stout, Club Dark Beer and Castle
Milk Stout (which it launched
recently) have common
characteristics with the
defendant’s product namely
Guinness Foreign Extra Stout and
for that reason these products
compete with each other on the
open market. But by the
agreement-which I shall refer to
in due course-the defendant has
induced their common retailers
with money to covenant that they
will stock only the defendant’s
products, both alcoholic and
non-alcoholic and also to
display advertisements put up by
only the defendant. As a result
of this, “ the retailers …. have
refused to stock the plaintiff’s
products and in fact some of
them have even returned stock
which had been supplied to them
earlier on.” Not only that, the
plaintiff alleges that “some of
the retailers have refused to
sell the plaintiff’s product and
those who have been selling the
plaintiff’s products have been
sanctioned.”
It is the plaintiff’s
contention, as deposed to, that
the defendant’s said act is an
unlawful activity by inducing
their mutual customers to break
their contracts with the
plaintiff. Also “ the terms of
the said agreement are
unreasonable, contrary to the
public interest, has the
tendency of creating a monopoly
and amounting to a restraint in
trade and has as a result
compelled the plaintiff’s
retailers to cease stocking
their products.”
The plaintiff also says that
“the conduct of the defendant is
preventing the Ghanaian public
from exercising its freedom to
choose any alcoholic or
non-alcoholic beverage in
drinking bar or other authorised
place where the plaintiff and
defendant’s products are sold.”
The plaintiff also charges that
“the defendant’s act of
inducement contravenes the
tenets of social and economic
liberty and prosperity
particularly the liberty of the
individual to trade with whom he
pleases and the prosperity of
the nation by expansion of the
total volume of trade.”
As a result of all the
foregoing, the plaintiff is
saying that it has lost
substantial income and continues
to lose income, and so if the
defendant is not restrained the
plaintiff who has already
suffered will continue to suffer
extreme economic hardship and
substantial inconvenience.
A copy of the agreement was
annexed to the plaintiff’s
affidavit. In fact it is no
different from the copy annexed
to the defendant’s affidavit.
It is titled: “Guinness means
profit” retailer scheme. It has
the following sub-headings to be
filled in with appropriate
details: (a) customer; (b)
outlet name; (c) address; (d)
distributor; and (e) period.
The terms and conditions are:
1. I agree to stock both sizes
of Guinness foreign extra stout
(330 ml and 625 ml) and no other
packaged stout or dark beer for
the duration of the scheme.
2. I agree to stock both Malta
Guinness packs (bottle and can)
and no other non-alcoholic malt
drink for the duration of the
scheme.
3. I accept my target for the
month of …. as follows ….
FES 330 ML ………………….FES 625 ML
…………….
MG BOTTLE ………………… MG CAN ………………
…I would like to be included in
the monthly award scheme.
4. I agree to display GGL
advertising materials as
specified and not to display
advertising of any other
stout/dark beer or malta.
5. I agree to make available to
GGL personnel at all times my
stock record book and
distributor invoices for last
month and this month (these will
always be at the bar)
6. I will not disclose details
of this agreement with anyone
outside Guinness Ghana Ltd.
Signed by customer …………….
Signed by GGL representative
……….
This is the agreement which the
plaintiff wants the court to
restrain whilst the action to
have it declared altogether void
has not been determined. As
expected, the defendant totally
rejects this application. By an
affidavit in opposition filed on
April 13, 1999 the defendant
says “there is no law in Ghana
that prevents the defendant from
having an exclusive distribution
agreement with some retail
outlets with incentive bonuses.”
It says also that the scheme
covers only 183 out of the 7000
retail outlets in Ghana; that it
is a purely voluntary scheme so
a number of retailers offered it
declined to partake, without
losing the privilege of selling
Guinness products.
The defendant deposed in the
affidavit that the plaintiff
withdrew Club Super Stout from
the market long ago. That the
Castle Milk Stout was launched
on March 26, 1999 and was
delivered on the market on March
29, 1999, and just a day later
this writ was issued. And this
new product which is the only
product of the plaintiff with a
semblance to the defendant’s
stout was on the market as at
the date the writ was issued.
That every consumer goes to a
place where he can get the
product he likes. That the
scheme is to enable the
retailers to share in the
defendant’s profits and this is
a prudent business practice.
That the common law notion of
restraint of trade is an archaic
concept. In the view of the
defendant “it will be unfair and
against fair market competition
for an injunction to be granted
against the defendant in
relation to a agreement which is
of benefit to the retail outlets
who are happy, not coerced and
who stand to benefit from
incentives provided in the …..
scheme who will stand to lose a
large amount of money if the
scheme is terminated.”
In his argument, counsel for the
plaintiff relied largely on
their affidavit depositions
already referred to. He
referred to clause 4 of the
agreement which he submitted is
in restraint of trade and
designed to drive away
competition from the market. On
the number of retail outlets
with which the defendant has
entered into the agreement,
counsel said though it appears
small in terms of numbers, yet
it constitutes the choicest and
most lucrative in terms of
volume of sales. Counsel
referred to statistical data
annexed to an affidavit in which
it is noted that the defendant’s
activities cover the entire
country and so counsel submitted
the defendant does not need this
scheme in order to remain in
business, and thus the scheme
aims at only stifling
competition. The state suffers
if trade is not expanded and
taxes paid accordingly. The
defendants are the market
leaders with over 40% of the
market so they have nothing to
lose if this agreement is put
aside. Counsel cited certain
authorities in support of his
argument and I will refer to
them in due course if it should
become relevant or necessary.
For his part, counsel for the
defendant cautioned that this
being only an application for
interim injunction, an order
nullifying the agreement at this
stage may cause a lot of damage
if at the end of the day the
agreement is upheld as valid.
He also cautioned against the
use of statistics since they do
not provide full proof evidence.
Counsel said the fact that there
are some similarities in their
products does not mean they are
the same. He said the action by
the plaintiff is a panic move to
ensure that the plaintiff’s new
product gets a share of the
market. It was counsel’s
submission that protecting a
market share does not amount to
an agreement in restraint of
trade. On public interest,
counsel said the defendant is
one of the largest tax payers in
the country. They also spend
money to promote sports.
Counsel said the reference to
Malta Guinness is not proper
since the plaintiff does not
produce a similar drink. That
even defendant’s own maxi malt
failed on the market and this
shows that the market is
controlled by the taste of the
consumers. People go to
particular bars for diverse
reasons.
Counsel submitted that
competition should not be looked
at as restraint of trade, the
two are clearly distinguishable.
The agreement which is with just
3% of the retailers is no
monopoly of the market. Counsel
also submitted that the
agreement has no binding legal
effect; also it is purely
voluntary. Contrary to what
plaintiff is saying, it is
rather the plaintiff who is
seeking, by this action, to
compel the other contracting
parties to break their agreement
with the defendant. Counsel
said to grant this application
will be prejudging the entire
case. He suggested, therefore,
that the court restricts the
time within which the case shall
be heard.
It is common knowledge that the
grant of an injunction is an
equitable remedy which, though
has crystallised into written
rules of practice, is still
largely a matter for the court’s
discretion having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the
case. Therefore as the numerous
authorities on the subject
agree, the court must examine
each case on its own merits
applying the law, where
appropriate. And in this
exercise great emphasis should
not be placed on decided
authorities unless they have a
direct or significant bearing on
the facts confronting us, or
they are general principles
decided upon by a superior court
as applicable to particular
issues or questions. But even
such general principles are to
be applied against the
background to the case. One of
such principles applied by
English courts is that it is not
the practice of the court
(except by consent) to grant on
an interlocutory application, an
injunction which will have the
practical effect of granting the
relief claimed, see DODD VS.
MARINE WORKERS UNION (1923), 93
L.J. Ch. 65. But even here the
court will not desist from
granting an interim injunction
as will be necessary to prevent
an irreparable damage; it is
equally entitled to say whether
there is a legal basis for the
relief endorsed on the writ upon
which the application is
founded. In this country, the
Court of Appeal has said that
there are substantial reasons
why pronouncements in
interlocutory applications which
pre-determine the issues for
trial should not be encouraged.
That was in the case of
VANDERPUYE VS. NARTEY (1977) 1
G.L.R. 428. See also ARMAH VS.
LANDS COMMISSION, ACCRA AND
OTHERS (1979) G.L.R. 79 holding
1. By these decisions, it must
not be understood that they lay
down any rule that the court
must not examine the parties’
respective case; for, as held in
the VANDERPUYE VS. NARTEY case
(supra), the court must be
satisfied that the claim is not
frivolous or vexatious, in other
words, that there is a serious
question to be tried. What the
court is not expected to do is
to make findings of fact or to
determine the issues.
To make a decision on such
application easier, the English
courts look for a legal right in
the applicant and then go on to
find whether that right is
abused or threatened or
irreparable damage or injury is
caused to that right. But the
emphasis has been on
infringement or threatened
infringement to the established
legal right; the other
considerations come into play
subsequently especially where
the injury is found to be
substantial and not trivial. On
these principles see these
cases: 1 CORPORATION OF
BIRMINGHAM VS. ALLEN (1877), 6
CH. D. 284;
2 BALLARD VS TOMLINSON (1884) 26
CH. D. 194;
3 KING VS. BROWN. DURRANT & CO.
(1913) 2 CH. 416;
4 ARMSTRONG VS. SHEPPARD AND
SHORT , LTD. (1959) 2 Q.B. 384
C.A.
5 LUGANDA VS. SERVICE HOTELS LTD
(1969) 2 ALL E.R. 692, C.A.
In the first case listed above,
it was stated that an injunction
will not be granted to restrain
a threatened and irreparable
injury, however serious, unless
the plaintiff’s legal rights
will be thereby invaded. The
third case listed above decides
that an injunction will be
granted though no pecuniary
damage is proved if the acts
complained of will result in
infringement to the plaintiff’s
legal rights. I think that
unless a party can establish a
legal right which is capable of
being protected by an
interlocutory injunction and
which is clearly violated or
being violated and such
violation should be stopped or
the complaint is about a
threatened violation of the
right which may be prevented by
a quia timet injunction, the
court will have no justifiable
basis to interfere before the
parties’ rights are finally
determined in the action. This
principle of establishing a
legal right underlies the
various concepts employed by the
courts in dealing with
application for interim
injunction. So that when the
case of VANDERPUYE VS. NARTEY
(supra) decides that there must
be a serious question to be
tried, it means no more than
that the applicant must satisfy
the court on the pleadings, if
any, or by affidavit evidence,
that he has some right which has
been, or is threatened to be,
infringed unless the respondent
is restrained.
On the general principles
applicable to such application,
some useful guide was given by
the Supreme Court in the case of
IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU
11 VS ABDULAI (1984-86) 2 G.
L.R. 231 at pp. 235-236, per
Adade J.S.C. who delivered the
opinion of the court, as
follows:” ……… it is relevant to
observe that these courts have
consistently operated on the
principle that where two parties
are litigating, every care must
be taken to ensure that the
party who eventually wins does
not find his judgment useless in
his hands ………. the courts try to
hold the balance evenly between
the parties so that one does not
take undue advantage of the
other during the course of the
litigation. These principles
are applied, subject to the
balance of convenience in a
particular situation and to the
hardship which the making or
refusal of an order may have on
one or the other of the
parties.”
A similar reasoning was adopted
in the case of ODONKOR AND
OTHERS VS. AMARTEI (1987-88) 1
G.L.R. 578, S.C. AT P. 581,
where it was held that “the
basic purpose of interim order
is, as much as possible, to hold
the balance evenly between the
parties, pending a final
resolution of matters in
difference between them, and
also to ensure that at the end
of the day the successfully
party does not find that his
victory is an empty one, or that
brings him more problems than
blessings.”
What right/s then is the
plaintiff seeking? Has any right
of the plaintiff been violated
by the defendant? Is any right
of the plaintiff being violated
or threatened with violation by
the defendant? Or is it the case
that the defendant, by the
agreement has caused or is
causing or threatens to cause
substantial or irreparable
damage to the plaintiff? Answers
to these questions will help us
determine this application with
much success.
It is necessary then to consider
the grounds for the reliefs
sought. These are: 1. that the
agreement is seeking to
monopolise the market; 2. the
agreement is in restraint of
trade; 3. the agreement is
inducing their common retailers
to breach their legal
obligations with the plaintiff;
4. the agreement has caused and
is causing harm to the
plaintiff. And the plaintiff
contends that as a result of the
foregoing it has suffered and
continues to suffer financial
loss. And on the question of
convenience and hardship,
plaintiff contends that the
defendant has nothing to lose if
the application is granted since
it already controls a
substantial share of the
market. I am proceeding ,
therefore, to consider these
points raised and the response
of counsel for the defendant.
To begin with, the issue of
monopoly. At common law the
High Court has power to hold an
agreement void as creating an
unlawful monopoly. The agreement
must be considered in the light
of all the surrounding
circumstances, including
agreements made between the
parties and third persons, and
the benefit that it accrues to
the public. Generally speaking,
such an agreement is not illegal
and does not give any cause of
action to a third person injured
by its operation; see para. 74
of Halsbury’s Laws of England,
vol. 47, 4th edn. At page 66 of
this book is found this relevant
passage:” …..it is no monopoly
if the control, being lawfully
and fairly obtained, is limited
to particular persons or places
or to a particular kind or make
of article for which a
substitute is obtainable ….” In
the footnote, these cases are
cited: SERVAIS BOUCHARD VS.
PRINCES’S HALL RESTAURANT LTD.
(1904) 20 TLR 574, CA and
BRITISH OXYGEN CO VS. LIQUID AIR
LTD. (1925) CH. 383, and the
principle deducible from them is
that an agreement by one trader
to take a particular class of
goods exclusively from another
is not in restraint of trade,
thus such an agreement does not
seek to do anything illegal or
unreasonable.
Thus the plaintiff must succeed
in satisfying the court that the
agreement seeks to control the
market to the exclusive benefit
of the defendant and the other
parties to the agreement. By
the agreement the retailer is
not to stock any other stout or
dark beer or advertise any such
products other than the
defendant’s. The effect of
this, according to the editors
of Richard Whish’s book
Competition Law 3rd edition,
which counsel for the plaintiff
graciously made available to me,
is that it is a demerit of the
exclusive purchasing agreement
(such as the one in question)
that it may seek to “foreclose
the market to other
manufacturers and that they
prevent the purchaser acquiring
goods more cheaply elsewhere;
this in turn may deprive the
ultimate consumer of the benefit
of lower prices.” But in this
case there is no competition as
to the prices of these
products. The consumers, whose
interest may be sought, do not
select beer products based on
competitive prices since the
prices are almost always the
same. This is the factual
situation in this country of
which judicial notice may be
taken. So it is not possible to
say the consumers are deprived
of the benefit of lower prices
where there is an agreement to
foreclose other producers; one
may only talk about not having a
particular brand. But that
hardly passes for a monopoly.
In my view the applicant must
show that really this agreement
is monopolising the market. The
statistics provided show the
defendant controls 25% of the
beer market. And the report
from which these statistics were
produced did not say the
defendant’s market share has
shot up as a result of this
agreement. So that as of now
the evidence is not available to
show how the agreement has led
to a monopoly of the market by
the defendant. It may well be
forthcoming at the trial and
this is necessary in view of the
common law principle that
agreement limited to particular
persons and places is no
monopoly if it is fair and
reasonable. Fairness and
reasonableness are matters of
law for the court to decide in
the light of the facts. The
plaintiff is saying the 183
retailers with whom the
agreement was entered
constitutes a good part of the
market. That is not enough, we
must know how far their failure
to stock the plaintiff’s
products is assisting the
defendant to monopolise the
market. It is also not enough
to say it is monopolistic, and
thus contrary to public policy
or public interest without
giving us any idea how the
consuming public is losing
something by the agreement. It
will be unreasonable if there is
a covenant in the agreement
against competition per se, see:
McELLISTRIM VS BALLYMACELLIGOTT
CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURE AND
DAIRY SOCIETY LTD. (1919) A.C.
548 per Lord Birkenhead, L.C.
But on the face of the agreement
one cannot talk of an outright
monopoly, it could pass for sale
promotion too; the evidence will
decide what it is. In these
circumstances it is my view that
it is unfair to grant an
injunction when the court is not
satisfied that a serious issue
is raised as regards the
agreement being monopolistic of
the market.
Next, it is argued that the
agreement is in restraint of
trade. In an earlier ruling
given in this same matter on
April 30, 1999 I held, inter
alia, that a third party, who is
injured in his person or pocket
by an agreement to which he is
not privy may still seek a
declaration that it is void on
ground of public policy or
public interest I venture to add
that if such a party is able to
satisfy the court that his
commercial interests are harmed
he may also sue for a
declaration. This is based on
the common law notion of freedom
to trade in a reasonable way
without harming another’s
interest. If there is a
contract which fetters an
existing freedom, it can be said
to restrain trade, but it is not
so if it opens a door by
providing a party a new economic
opportunity.
In this case there is no doubt
that by the agreement the
retailers who have signed it are
limited as to what products they
can sell or advertise. But the
defendant is saying that it is a
reasonable agreement as it
enables the retailers to share
in the defendant’s profits. And
I remember counsel saying so far
some 69 million cedis has been
paid to the retailers as bonus
under the scheme. The defendant
says it is a sales promotion
agreement and that the plaintiff
too has been conducting sales
promotion of one kind or
another. Thus prima facie there
appears to be nothing wrong with
the agreement since the parties
to it who may complain that it
is restrictive against them are
not complaining. Thus the onus
is on the plaintiff who is
attacking the contract to show
that the restraint, if any, is
injurious to it and especially
to the public. See page 319 of
the ESSO PETROLEUM case (supra),
per Lord Hodson. Since on the
face of the agreement per se it
does not infringe any known
public policy, its
reasonableness and fairness is
to be presumed in defendant’s
favour until the contrary is
proved. And so too any injury
suffered by the plaintiff or the
public is to be established
clearly. Before then the issue
of restraint of trade does not
seriously arise so as to attract
any sanctions, albeit interim,
at this stage in the
proceedings.
The third limb of the argument
centres on what the plaintiff
claims is an inducement by the
defendant, by virtue of the
agreement, to the joint
customers to breach their
obligations with the plaintiff.
I have held in the earlier
ruling in this action on 30
April, 1999 that an agreement
whereby one party is induced to
break his agreement with a third
person is contrary to public
policy and is thus actionable
per se, without proof of
damage. In the book by Richard
Whish that I referred to
earlier, the learned editors put
it this way at page 58: “An
action may be brought against
someone who intimidates a third
party into harming the
plaintiff, or against a
defendant who wrongly interferes
with the plaintiff'’ s trade or
business."
So we begin by asking whether
there is any agreement between
plaintiff and the 183 retailers
with whom the defendant has
entered into the present
agreement. It is agreed on the
pleadings that these are joint
customers of the parties. But
if a person is your customer,
does it necessarily imply or
mean that there is an agreement
between the two of you? I think
not. A customer, as I
understand it, is not bound to
take goods from any particular
person to sell in the absence of
a binding agreement, written or
otherwise. The Oxford Advance
Learner’s Dictionary defines
“customer” to be a person who
buys something from a tradesman,
shop, etc. And it appears from
the pleadings that it is this
ordinary meaning that is meant
by “joint customers”; that is
, retailers who sell the
products of both the plaintiff
and defendant. The plaintiff
is yet to provide any evidence
to show that these retailers are
indeed under any obligation,
legal or otherwise, to sell
their products, even though it
is a relief endorsed on the
writ. I cannot conjecture what
sort of evidence plaintiff
intends to rely upon to
establish this particular
relief. But it is necessary for
this court to be satisfied that
there is a contract between
plaintiff and the retailers, or
any of them, the performance of
which he is interested in, and
thereby giving him a legal
right, and that the defendant
had entered into this agreement
with those retailers or any of
them, and so on the face of it a
serious question of inducement
to break one’s contract arises.
As it stands now, I do not know,
because it has not been
disclosed, the nature of the
legal relationship, if any, that
exists between the plaintiff and
those retailers, whether it is
based on a written or oral
contract, or even on a custom of
trade. The court will not see
its way clear in granting an
injunction in these
circumstances.
The final limb of this argument
deals with the financial loss
the plaintiff says the agreement
has caused and continues to
cause it. The plaintiff has
averred that some of the
retailer customers who entered
into the agreement with the
defendant returned stock which
had been supplied them, and have
ceased to stock the plaintiff’s
products. These averments were
denied by the defendant in its
statement of defence. It is the
law that “in a proper case a
valid covenant in restraint of
trade may be enforced by
injunction notwithstanding that
it provides for the payment of a
sum by way of liquidated
damages; however, the covenantee
cannot claim both the sum by way
of liquidated damages and an
injunction, but must elect
between the two. Election may
be made in the statement of
claim, and is not affected by
the fact that both remedies have
been claimed in the writ,”
quoting from para. 63 of
Halsbury’s laws, 4th edn. Vol
47. The plaintiff is not a party
to the said agreement. I am
unable to fathom the reason why
a party has to elect between a
claim for damages and an
injunction in matters in
restraint of trade. But since
all the cases referred to in the
passage from Halsbury’s which I
quoted above, dealt with parties
to the contract who claimed
liquidated damages, it may not
be an appropriate authority in a
case where a third party seeks
general damages and an
injunction only.
In a case like this, as was
rightly stated in Richard
Whish’s book (supra) at p.55 the
case of MOGUL SS CO. VS.
McGREGOR, GOW AND CO. (1892) AC
25; (1891-94) ALL ER REP. 263 HL
still remains an authority for
the proposition that a plaintiff
cannot recover damages for harm
inflicted by the operation of a
contract which is in restraint
of trade. The English courts
have tried to get around the
rather harsh effect of this
common law principle by granting
declarations that such
agreements are void, see EASTHAM
VS. NEWCASTLE UNITED FOOTBALL
CLUB LTD. (1964) CH. 413, and
were prepared to grant an
injunction in NAGLE VS. FIELDEN
(1966) 2 Q.B. 633; (1966) 1 ALL
ER 689 CA. Similar reliefs were
granted in these cases:
1. DICKSON VS. PHARMACEUTICAL
SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN (1967)
CH. 708; (1967) 2 ALL ER 558 CA,
which was affirmed by the House
of Lords as reported in (1970)
AC 403, (1968) 2 ALL ER 686;
2. GREIG VS INSOLE (1978) 3 ALL
ER 211; (1978) 1 WLR 1520. In
these cases the plaintiff’s
opportunity to work had been
affected by the monopolistic or
quasi-monopolistic power of some
trade association or trade
union. But the principle is
equally applicable to a
plaintiff whose commercial
interests are injured by a
contract in restraint of trade.
Yet the position of the law
remains that a third party may
only recover for declaration and
an injunction, but not damages.
It appears to me therefore that
no serious question of damages
arises in law. And granting
that the law permits the
plaintiff to recover damages yet
it must satisfy this court that
it has lost something
substantial and that irreparable
damage will be caused it if this
application is not granted. The
plaintiff has so far
concentrated on what the
defendant is deriving from the
market, it is not telling the
loss it has incurred and
continues to incur. It has not
told us, for instance, how much
it was earning prior to the
agreement and whether the
earning has reduced since then.
All the statistics provided have
concentrated on the defendant
but even these do not actually
disclose a rise in the
defendant’s earnings and a
corresponding drop in the
plaintiff’s. Bare assertions
will not do even in such
applications, there must be a
serious question in law or fact
raised. This argument is also
not satisfactory.
In conclusion, it is to be
stated that this agreement
involves two parties who so far
want to continue with it. The
court must respect parties’
freedom to contract and give
effect to a contract freely and
voluntarily entered into. It
may intervene only where there
is satisfactory evidence that it
is in restraint of trade,
monopolistic, an inducement to
the mutual retailers to break
their agreement, if any, with
the plaintiff; and that it is
unreasonable, unfair and
contrary to public interest or
public policy. However, to
ensure that any delay in the
hearing may not work any
hardship, I propose to conduct
an expeditious hearing with the
co-operation of counsel. On
that note I dismiss the
application without costs.
(Sgd.) A. A. BENIN J.A.
JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT.
COUNSEL
FUGAR for the
plaintiff/applicant
OKUDJETO for the
defendant/respondent |
