.
This appeal arises in a
litigation between the Stool of
Aowin as plaintiff and the Stool
of Upper Wassaw as defendant,
the main question i!! the
litigation being what is the
boundary between Aowin and Upper
\Vassaw. Aowin says that the
boundary throughout is the River
Tano. Upper Wassaw, on the other
hand. says that northward from
the point where the H.iver Anwia
110ws into the River Tano the
boundary is the River Anwia up
to its source, and thereafter
northward from that point along
a bush track up to the River
Huro and then along the Huro for
a short distance of half a
mile
or a mile. There is also in the
action a subsidiary claim to
damages for trespass by the
defendant, or people claiming
under the defendant, upon
certain land which is situated
within the boundarv of Aowin, if
the River Tano is the true
boundary
The trial Judge, Mr. Justice
Gardiner Smith, has held upon
the oral evidence adduced before
him, that Aowin's claim is
right; that is to say, that
throughout, the boundary between
these two territories is the
River Tano, and he made a
declaration to that effect. He
also upon the claim for
trespass, awarded damages to the
amount of £100. His decision was
affirmed unanimously by the
Court of Appeal, (Not
reported.)
and it is from that decision
that Upper Wassaw now appeals to
His Majesty in Council
The whole case, as their
Lordships view it, turned upon
two questions of fact. The first
question of fact arose in this
way :-1n the year 1925 the
Omanhpne of Aowin had affixed.
his' mark to a- document which
purported to be an agreement to
refer to arbitration the dispute
between Aowin and Upper Wassaw
as to their boundaries; and, in
pursuance of that agreement, an
award h2.d been made which
declared that the River Anwia,
from its source to its junction
with the Tano, was the boundary
between those points; but
expressly left undecided the
further course of the boundary
beyond those limits. That award
was therefore obviously
incomplete, and was open to
objection upon that ground. It
was, however, relied upon in the
present action by Upper Wassaw
as being a bar to the present
suit, upon the footing of res
judicata. The plaintiff,
Aowin, on the other hand,
alleged that the document in
question was not binding on
Aowin, because it (i.e., the
agreement for reference, which
purported to. confer
jurisdiction upon the
arbitrator) was in the English
language 'and had not been
properly explained and
interpreted to the Omanhene of
Aowin when he affixed his mark
to it ; in other words, that it
had not been. explained and
interpreted to him so as to make
him understand its true import.
There is no doubt that, as the
document was in the English
language and the Omanhene knew
no English, the onus lay upon
Upper Wassaw to establish that
the document had in fact been
properly explained and
interpreted so as to make the
Omanhene of Aowin understand
its real import. That is a pure
question of fact on which the
trial Judge found in favour of
Aowin, and his finding was
affirmed on appeal. There are
those two concurrent findings of
fact, and, although their
Lordships, if they were
convinced that those findings of
fact were erroneous, would have
power to reverse them, and
although there is evidence in
the case upon which the trial
Judge might conceivably have
come to a different conclusion,
nevertheless their Lordships do
not in the present case feel in
any way disposed to reverse, or
indeed feel justified in
reversing, those concurrent
findings of fact. The award,
accordingly, is no bar to the
present action, and the question
of the true boundary is entirely
a question of fact to be
determined upon the evidence
adduced at the trial of this
action and that is the second'
question of fact found by the
trial Judge, whose finding in
that respect also was affirmed
on appeal.
Their Lordships have had the
advantage of a very full and
skilful argument by Counsel for
the appellant; the evidence was
closely and carefully examined
and analysed by him, and certain
objections were taken to the
admission
or rejection of evidence, and to
t e weight attached by the
trial Judge and by the members
of the Court of Appeal to some
of the evidence which had been
adduced. Their Lordships having
considered the evidence, are not
prepared to hold that any
evidence was wrongly admitted or
wrongly excluded; and in any
event they are unable in the
present case to find that any
undue weight was attached to
evidence, or that there was any
evidence admitted or excluded
which, by its admission or
exclusion could have in any way
materially altered the trial
Judge's findings of fact as to
the true boundary. The trial
Judge rightly stated at the very
commencement of his judgment
that the plaintiff could only
succeed on proof of his
title. He heard the
witnesses, he observed their
demeanour in giving evidence,
and he formed his conclusion as
to the direction in which the
balance of the evidence, and the
weight of the evidence as a
whole told; and he held that the
plaintiff's title had been
proved to his satisfaction.
Here, again, the Court of Appeal
affirmed his finding; so here
again there are two concurrent
findings of fact from which
their Lordships from their own
appreciation of the evidence,
see no reason to differ.
In
the result, their Lordships are
of the opinion that this appeal
should fail and they will humbly
advise His Majesty accordingly.
The appellant will pay the costs
of the appeal.