Executor and Trustee-Indemnity
of Trustee against expenses
and/or improvements properly
incurred-Executor charged with
interest under testator's
mortgage deed-Non-production of
such deed-
Liability of
executor in respect of
personality.
Held: No duty on executor to
realise mortgage where
realisation is not required
for any testamentary purpose and
the security is not in peril. In
absence of production of deed
Court below should not be asked
to direct sale of mortgaged
property.
In absence of enquiry as to
breach of trust or wilful
default ordinary form of account
not to be varied.
Appeal allowed and case remitted
to lower Court for further
enquiries.
The facts of the case are
sufficiently set out in the
judgment.
C.
D. H. During
for the Appellant.
E. S. B. Betts
(with him
G. W. S. Ladepon Thomas)
for the Respondent.
The following judgments were
delivered :WEBBER, C.j., SIERRA
LEONE.
This is an appeal from the
judgment of Gray, j., of the
Supreme Court of the Gambia, who
gave judgment in favour of the
plaintiff Respondent for the
sum of £800 13s. 5d. and costs
against the
defendant-appellant.
The plaintiff's claim was as a
legatee under the will of job
Beigh, deceased, to have the
real and personal estate of the
said job Beigh administered and
an account rendered of what is
due to the plaintiff under and
by virtue of the said Will. The
Will is dated 1st November,
1926, and job Beigh died on
December 19th, 1927. The
defendant
is
sued as one of the executors of
the deceased.
The original writ was issued on
the 19th June, 1934, in which
the plaintiff's claim was
against two executors.
On the 28th June, 1934, there
appeared an alteration of the
writ numbered as Suit No.
19/1934, in which jean Pierre
Beigh was added as co-plaintiff,
and on the 15th November, 1934,
nearly five months after, a
further alteration of the
caption of Suit No. 19/1934 was
made, in which two more
plaintiffs were added, namely
joanna Beigh and Adelaide Fye.
There is no record to show how
these plaintiffs were
joined-suffice it to say the
action was finally heard and
determined between Ada Beigh as
plaintiff and Colin Shaw as
defendant. The three
co-plaintiffs, who were added,
dropped out of the case,
apparently satisfied with the
accounts rendered and payments
adjusted.
Appeal Court. March, 1936,
Sessions. Judgment delivered
26May,1936.
Ada Beigh, who was the wife of
the testator, was the largest
beneficiary under the Will.
To her was granted :-
(1) A lot of land, No. 10 Leman
Street, for the term of her
natural life, with remainder to
Father Superior of the Roman
Catholic Mission at Bathurst.
(2) The whole of the amounts due
on mortgage of 12 Hagan Street,
Bathurst, that is to say, both
principal and interest on it for
her absolute use and benefit.
(3) All the goods in the shop at
17 Piston Street, Bathurst, the
stock-in-trade and personal
effects belonging to the
testator in connection with or
use for purposes of trade and
the benefit of all contracts
subsisting and all cash loan
accounts.
There were other minor devises,
but only with the above three
was the action in the lower
Court concerned.
After hearing the parties the
learned Judge, in an exhaustive
judgment, ordered :-
(a)
An enquiry as to the value on
the 19th December, 1928, of the
security comprised in the
indenture of mortgage of 12
Hagan Street.
(b)
An account of amount due under
the said mortgage up to date and
of moneys in hand received by
the defendant in respect of
principal and interest due under
the said mortgage.
(c)
An enquiry as to value on the
19th day of December, 1927, of
all goods in shop at No. 17
Piston Street, and all other
personal effects and benefits of
all contracts subsisting in
relation to the testator's
business, together with an
account of such of the goods,
personal effects, benefit of
contracts and cash loan accounts
as have been employed in trade,
with all profits and interest at
the rate of five per cent. per
annum with annual rests upon
what has been so employed.
After due enquiry and account
taken were made and submitted to
the Court, the learned Judge
found in respect of the
enquiries and accounts as
ordered above that the defendant
was liable for payment of £800
13s. 5d. (including interest)
and gave judgment accordingly.
The grounds of appeal are as
follows :-
1. The learned Judge was wrong
in holding that any money
expended in rebuilding or
repairing premises No. 10 Leman
Street is money expended upon
capital improvements and must
not be taken into account.
2. The learned Judge was wrong
in holding that the appellant
must be charged with interest
accruing due under the mortgage.
3. The learned trial Judge was
wrong in making the appellant
liable for the full value of the
mortgaged property a year after
the testator's death instead of
the depreciation, if at all.
4. The learned Judge was wrong
in holding that the legacy of
the goods was not handed over to
the respondent.
5. The learned Judge was wrong
in assessing the profits on
goods sold and goods in stock at
5 per cent. with annual rests.
6. The learned Judge was wrong
in holding that the appellant
was guilty of a breach of trust
in dealing with the shop goods.
7. The learned Judge was wrong
in receiving evidence about
fresh matters after his order of
the 2nd May, 1935, and the
appellant was through illness,
to the knowledge of the Court,
not in a position to refute the
allegations and to instruct his
solicitor accordingly.
8. That the respondent could not
maintain an action against the
appellant as executor with
regards to goods in the shop ..
9. The verdict is against the
weight of evidence.
The first ground, namely, that
the learned Judge was wrong in
holding that any money expended
in rebuilding or repairing
premises No. 10 Leman Street was
money expended upon capital
improvements and must not be
taken into account deals with
the devise to the respondent of
the lot of land No. 10 Leman
Street for the term of her
natural life only, and the
learned Judge held that the Will
created a settlement with
respect to this property the
devisee being a tenant for life
(Settled Land Act, Section 2 (1)
)-that any money expended in
repairing and rebuilding was
money expended upon capital
improvements and that the
question of adjustment of such
expenditure was a matter between
the tenant for life and the
remainder-man and that no such
adjustment can be made without
giving the remainder-man an
opportunity of being heard.
"Therefore" (the learned Judge
said) "for present purposes any
moneys expended upon capital
improvements to the settled
estate must be treated as being
carried to a suspense account."
After hearing Counsel on both
sides I have come to the
conclusion that the learned
Judge was wrong in excluding an
order for an enquiry in to the
adjustments of the amount
expended by the executor in
repairing the house and building
a shop at 10 Leman Street. The
executor Shaw spent money
according to plaintiff's
instructions on building a new
shop and on repairs to the house
where she was then living
(Record, p. 33). A trustee is
entitled as of right to full
indemnity out of the trust
property against all costs,
charges and expenses properly
incurred
(Scott
&
Milne,
188425 Ch. D. 710 C.A., per Lord
Selborne, L.C., at p. 715). He
is entitled to be reimbursed out
of the trust property for all
improvements made and for moneys
expended on the preservation of
the trust property-
Rowley v. Ginnever,
2 Ch. 1897, p. 503-(Halsbury,
Vol. 28, pp. 157to 159) and on a
claim against him by a
beneficiary for an account was
in this case there can be no
abridgment of the account and
the Webber, C.J. appellant is
entitled to claim an adjustment
of the accounts dealing with the
property in Leman Street.
On this point I am of opinion
that the case should be returned
and that the executor should be
called upon to file an account
of all moneys expended on the
repairing, rebuilding and the
improvement of the trust
property. When these amounts are
properly adjusted, the executor
will be able to set off any
amount due to him from the trust
estate.
The second issue before us deals
with the amount bequeathed by
the testator to the respondent
on an alleged mortgage of 12
Hagan Street. Counsel relies on
three grounds, which are as
follows :Ground 2. The learned
Judge was wrong in holding that
the appellant must be charged
with interest accruing due under
the mortgage.
Ground 3. The learned trial
Judge was wrong in making the
appellant liable for the full
value of the mortgaged property
a year after the testator's
death instead of the
depreciation if at all.
Ground 9. The verdict was
against the weight of evidence.
Now the extraordinary feature
about this part of the claim is
the non-production of the
mortgage deed. Its very
existence is in doubt. The
parties in this case admit that
they have never seen the
mortgage and yet they admit that
a particular sum was due on the
mortgage and a particular sum
was due for interest-if there
was a mortgage what were the
terms as to repayment of the
debt and how much was the
interest? The testator died a
year after he made the Will: we
must then presume that on the
1st November, 1926, a mortgage
was in existence; but can we
presume, in the absence of the
deed showing the terms of
repayment, that it was in
existence on December 19th,
1927, when the testator died? If
there was a duty cast on the
executor to realise this
security by foreclosure, how was
he to proceed in the absence of
particulars? And if it were not
a legal mortgage, the legal
estate never became vested in
the mortgagee and the testator
could not foreclose.
Apart from this, and assuming
the existence of a legal
mortgage, the case quoted by
Counsel for appellant
(Re Chapman Cocks v. Chapman,
1896, 2 Ch. 778) lays it down
that there is no duty upon an
executor to realise a mortgage
created by a testator where
realisation is not required for
any testamentary purpose and the
security is not in peril-and
even if the security has fallen
in value it is not the absolute
duty of an executor to ca~ in
the mortgage
(Re Medland Eland v. Medland,
1889, 41 Ch. D. 476 C.A.). A
specific bequest of the mortgage
entitles the legatee to the
mortgage debt and to the
mortgage property subject to the
executor's assent-Halsbury, Vol.
21, p. 183. This assent has
never been withheld and from the
evidence can be implied. I
cannot hold that the defendant
is liable under this issue
except for any amount actually
received by him either by way of
repayment of principal or by way
of interest on the mortgage. In
this respect it is admitted that
the defendant should be debited
with £2 5s. principal repaid.
The executor should not be
otherwise charged without the
property being sold. It is
impossible in the absence of
this alleged mortgage deed to
ask the Court below to direct a
sale of the mortgage property. I
cannot hold that the defendant
has been guilty of a breach of
duty nor can I accuse him of a
breach of trust or of wilful
default. The good faith of ~he
executor has never been impugned
by the beneficiaries and he
cannot be made liable for
negligence or wilful default
when no such accusations were
made against him.
As to the third feature in this
case, namely, the liability in
respect of the value of goods in
the shop bequeathed to the
plaintiffrespondent, dealt with
by Counsel under Grounds 4, 5,
6, 8 and 9, it is agreed by the
appellant's Counsel that
qua
executor the defendant is
liable for the sum of £55 4s.
cash balance due up to the year
1927. After this year the
defendant-appellant handed over
the key of the shop to the
plaintiff-respondent and ceased
to function as executor with
regard to this bequest. This is
abundantly shown by the
evidence. The beneficiary took
possession, signed all indents,
and received goods in her name.
The defendant-appellant's
liability under this issue is
therefore fixed at £55 4s.
The result of my findings is as
follows :-
That this case be remitted to
the Court below with a
direction:
(1) that an enquiry be taken as
to the amounts expended by the
executor in improvements,
alterations and repairs to the
property 10 Leman Street, and
that the amount so found be
credited to the executor.
(2) that if the sum credited to
the executor under direction (1)
above is less than £57 9s. (made
up of £2 5s. principal repaid
under the mortgage and £55 4s.
balance due on the shop) the
Court below do enter judgment in
favour of the
plaintiff-respondent for the
difference in respect of the
balance; but if such sum amounts
to £57 9s. or more, then the
Court below do enter judgment
for the defendant-appellant in
respect of these parts of the
claim.
Before concluding I must draw
particular attention to the form
of account which the Court below
was asked that the executor
should· file. It is the common
form of account-there has been
no enquiry as to breach of trust
or wilful default and the Court
cannot vary the common form by
adding or by directing an
account for wilful
default-(Seton's Judgments G
Orders,
Vol. II, 5th Ed., pp. 985 and
986}.