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Freetown Municipality Ordinance,
1927-Protection of Municipal
Officers-Failure to Serve Notice
in Writing-County Court Rules,
Order XIX rule 7-Failure to File
Notice of SPecial Defence.
Order XIX, r. 7, of the County
Court Rules lays it down that a
Defendant who intends to rely on a
defence by Statute must file a
notice of such intention five
clear days before the return date.
Section 180
(I) of the Freetown Municipality
Ordinance, 1927, protects officers
acting under its provisioU3 by
providing that writs shall not
issue against them until the
expiration of one month after n(>tice
in writing, setting out certain
details, has been served on them.
The Court held, on a case stated,
that an allegation of failure to
serve the required notice is a
defence by Statute and as such
must be specially pleaded as a
defence under the above County
Court rule.
K
S.
Beoku-Betts
for the Plaintiff.
H.
]. L. Boston for the
Defendants.
The following judgments were
delivered :~-
DEANE, C.]. THE GOLD COAST COLONY.
This is a case stated for the
opinion of the Court under section
4 of Ordinance No.9 of 1929. From
the statement of the case and from
the written judgment of the
learned Chief Justice, which is
referred to in the statement and
attached to it, it appears that
the Plaintiff sued the Defendants
for the sum of £56 Is. The
Defendants are persons who are
entitled to the protection
afforded by section 180 (1) of the
Freetown Municipality Ordinance,
1927, which reads as follows: "A
writ or process shall not be sued
out against or served on the
Council or any member or officer
thereof or any person acting in
his aid for anything done or
intended to be done or omitted to
be done under the provisions of
this Ordinance until the
expiration of one month after
notice in writing has been served
on such Council, member, officer
or person clearly stating the
cause of action and the name and
place of abode of the intended
plaintiff and of his solicitor (if
any) in the cause, and on the
trial of any such action the
Plaintiff sh,all not be permitted
to go into evidence of any cause
of action which is not stated in
the notice so served, and unless
such notice is proved the Judge
shaH find for the Defendant." At
the close of the Plaintiff's case
on the trial of the action the
Defendants' Counsel submitted that
the Plaintiff, having faiJed to
prove service of the notice
required by the section, the
Defendants were entitled to
judgment. To this contention the
h~arned Chief Justice acceded, and
entered judgment for the
Defendants with costs, although
the Plaintiff had contended that
141
Appeal Court Oct., 1931
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