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COMMERCIAL  COURT CASES

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) HELD IN ACCRA ON 29TH  JULY  2010 BEFORE HER LADYSHIP BARBARA ACKAH-YENSU (J)

 

SUIT NO.ACC/11/09

 

1.   ANDREW KWAME ANDOH

2.   GRIETJE HAITSMA                                          === PLAINTIFFS

 

                                                          VRS.

 

1.   TBL RESOURCES LIMITED

2.   HAITSMA LIMITED                                           === DEFENDANTS

 

=======================================================

 

 

 

JUDGMENT:

 

By a Writ of Summons issued on 20th May, 2009, the Plaintiffs commenced this action praying for the following:

 

“a.    An Order dissolving the 2nd Defendant Company and its assets sold out and proceeds distributed among the shareholders

 

b.     An Order for recovery of US$5,000 monthly outstanding balance

of rent payable to the Plaintiffs with the agreed penalty of 25% therein with effect from September, 2008 up to and inclusive of the date of payment.

 

c.       Interest on the said total outstanding balance plus the interest of 25% monthly with effect from September, 2008 up to and inclusive of date of payment.

 

d.      An Order restraining the Defendants, their agents and assigns from using the name “Haitsma” for incorporation of any company or enterprise for their benefit. 

 

d.      Damages.”

 

Plaintiffs’ case is that by an agreement between the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant, the 2nd Defendant leased its equipment to the 1st Defendant.  By the said agreement the 1st Defendant was enjoined to pay a monthly rent of US$ 5,000.00 (Five Thousand United States Dollars) which sum was to be paid to the Plaintiffs.  They stated further that the 1st Defendant had defaulted in payment of the rent.

The Plaintiffs claim that the rentals aforesaid are for their personal benefit and have accordingly instituted this action in their individual capacities for the reliefs indorsed on the Writ of Summons.  

 

It is the Defendants’ case that the 1st Defendant vehemently contests this action and maintains that indeed the Plaintiffs have no cause of action at all against it.  While the 1st Defendant admits there is an agreement between the 2nd Defendant and it and the fact that the said agreement places on it the obligation of paying a monthly rent of US$5,000.00 it states that the rentals are to be paid to the Plaintiffs in their capacity as the representatives of the 2nd Defendant in the said agreement.  The 1st Defendant contends therefore that the rentals are due to the 2nd Defendant and not for the personal benefit of the Plaintiffs.

 

Before I look at the issues to be determined in this suit, I will state some material facts which in my opinion are not disputed by the parties.

 

1.   That Haitsma Equipments Limited is a Limited Liability Company Incorporated under the Companies Act 1963 (Act 179)

 

2.   That the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant are shareholders and Directors of Haitsma Equipments Limited.

 

3.   That prior to the incorporation of Haitsma Equipments Limited the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant entered into a Joint Venture Agreement

 

4.   That there is a Rental Agreement  dated 5th June, 2008 between Haitsma Equipments Limited and the 1st Defendant.

 

5.   That in the lease aforesaid Haitsma Equipments Limited is represented by the Plaintiffs.

 

 

The Defendant appears not to be challenging the fact that it owes some money on the rental payment.  What they are saying is that the money is owed to the 2nd Defendant and not the Plaintiffs.  In my opinion therefore, the main issue to be determined is whether the monthly rental of US$ 5,000 is payable to the Plaintiffs or to the 2nd Defendant.

 

According to the Plaintiffs’ Attorney, Hayford Atta Boafo, he introduced the Plaintiffs to the 1st Defendant, to invest into a drilling rig for a bore hole drilling business.  The arrangement was under the cover of a Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit “B”) the parties initially signed a Memorandum of Understanding (Exhibit “C”).  The Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant incorporated a limited liability company.  The Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a rental agreement with the 2nd Defendant (Exhibit “E”).

 

It was Hayford Atta Boafo’s evidence that in the said Exhibit “E”, 1st Defendant was the local partner and the Plaintiffs were the “foreign partners”.  For ease of reference, I shall reproduce the whole agreement.  It reads as follows:

 

“RENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TBL RESOURCES LTD & HAITSMA EQUIPMENTS LTD

 

This Agreement is made on this    5th   day of June 2008 between M/S TBL RESOUCES LTD, represented by the director of Finance & Admin; MR. JONATHAN GADOR, Hs. No. 4, 2nd Soula Street, Labone.  P.O. BOX CT 6109, Cantonments, Accra, GHANA.

 

And

HAITSMA EQUIPMENTS  represented by MR. ANDREWS KWAME ANDOH AND GRIETJE HAITSMA resident at Camminga str. 23, 8892 ZH Franeker, Holland.

 

1.    Haitsma Equipments Ltd owner of the Drilling Rig Unit II with registration nos. GR 8133 X and GR8134X with its accessories has agreed to give a rental agreement to TBL Resources Limited.

 

2.    This rental agreement is effective from 01.06.2008 and is valid for a period of two years with the option to renew.

 

3.   TBL Resources shall be responsible for all maintenance works on the equipment over the rental period.

 

4.   TBL Resources shall provide all logistics including spares accessories , PVC, Gravel and cement and mud chemicals.

 

5.   TBL Resources is to provide fuel, casings and all other lubricants needed to execute the drilling works.

 

6.   TBL Resources is to take care of its own workers, in terms of payment of salaries, allowances etc and provide all logistics (support vehicles, maintenance of vehicles, all spares and accessories, etc.) needed for them to execute the drilling work at site.

 

COST

7.    TBL Resources shall pay a rental fee of US$5,000.00 a month over the 24 month period to the foreign partners.

 

8.    Rental charges shall be payable in the first week of the next month and shall be paid on monthly basis.

 

9.    TBL Resources shall pay interest on the invoice at the rate of 25% per annum for delayed period.

 

10.     During the period of this Agreement, the equipment shall be under the sole control of TBL Resources Limited.

 

It is agreed that any misunderstanding should be resolved amicably.  In the event that an amicable solution cannot be reached, both parties shall seek the services of an arbitrator.  The ruling of the arbitrator shall be binding on both parties.

 

This Agreement duly signed by the two parties is sufficient evidence of the acceptance by each party to be bound by its terms.  This rental agreement supersedes the initial rental agreement signed on 01.11.2007.   

 

Signed for and on behalf of TBL RESOURCES LTD

 

        Sgd.

JONATHAN GADOR

(Finance/Admin Director)

 

In the presence of

 

Witness

Martin Boafo

P.O. Box 15447 ACCRA –NORTH

Signed

 

Signed for and on behalf of  HAITSMA EQUIPMENTS LIMITED

 

                  Sgd.                                                           Sgd.

ANDREWS KWAME ANDOH                        GRIETJE HAITSMA

 

In the Presence of:

 

Martin Boafo

P.O. Box 15447 ACCRA- NORTH

Signed “

 

In my opinion, an interpretation of the 7th paragraph will determine the issue as to who should be paid the monthly rental fee of US$5,000.00.  The object sought to be achieved in construing any contract is to ascertain what the mutual intentions of the parties were as to the legal obligations each assumed by the contractual words in which they sought to express them.  This proposition expresses both the object of interpreting any contract, and also the limitations placed upon the courts in seeking to ascertain and give effect to the elusive intention of the parties. 

 

That the court seeks to give effect to the intention of the parties to a contract is true only in a loose sense.  In the first place, the parties cannot generally give evidence to the court as to what their intention really was.  Secondly, their contract may have been made for them either by a lawyer employed for that particular purpose; or by the draftsman of a set of standard terms which the parties, or sometime one of the parties.  Thirdly, the words chosen by the parties may imperfectly express what they wished to achieve, or they may have been selected as a compromise between rival points of view; or the parties themselves have had different understanding of what the words meant.  Fourthly, the court is concerned to ascertain, not what is the intention of the actual parties to a contract, but what would have been the intention of hypothetical reasonable parties, placed in the same position as the actual parties, and contracting in the words used by the actual parties.  Thus in Reardon-Smith Line Ltd v. Hansen-Tangen[1976] 1 WLR 989, Lord Wilberforce said:

 

“Where one speaks of the intention of the parties to the contract one speaks objectively- the parties cannot themselves give direct evidence of what their intention was – and what must be ascertained is what is to be taken as the intention which reasonable people would have had if placed in the situation of the parties”.

 

A similar point was made by Lord Reid in McCutcheon v. David Mac Brayne Ltd. [1964] 1 WLR 125, approving the following quotations from Gloag on Contract (2nd Ed. 1985, P.7):

 

“The judicial task is not to discover the actual intentions of each party it is to decide what each was reasonably entitled to conclude from the attitude of the other”.

 

It is therefore more accurate to say that the object of a court of construction is to ascertain the presumed intention of the parties, on the assumption that both parties are reasonable.

For the purpose of the construction of contracts, the intention of the parties is the meaning of the words they have used.  There is no intention independent of that meaning.  The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract, in so far as that has been agreed or proved.  In attempting to reach a conclusion as to the presumed intention of the parties, the court will generally adopt an objective approach, that is to say that it will consider what would have been the intention of reasonable persons in the position of the actual parties to the contract. 

 

Precisely, the paragraph being construed reads thus:

       

“TBL Resources shall pay a rental fee of US$5,000.00 a month over the 24 month period to the foreign partners.”

 

The agreement is said to be between TBL Resources, represented by Jonathan Gador and Haitsma Equipments represented by Mr. Andrew Kwame Andoh and Grietje Haitsma.  It appears to me therefore that the agreement is between two entities/companies.

 

In my opinion, if the parties to the agreement (Exhibit “E”) intended that Haitsma Equipment (2nd Defendant) should be paid the monthly rental fee, it should have stated categorically that the said amount should be paid to 2nd Defendant and not the “foreign partners”.  2nd Defendant as an entity is definitely not a foreign partner; it is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Ghana.

 

Exhibit “B” captures the genesis of the whole transaction/ arrangement between the parties.  The parties herein entered into a Joint Venture to purchase a drilling rig.  The total investment was $200,000 with each of the partners contributing 50% of the amount.  Parties subsequently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  Exhibit “B” spelt out the status of the parties in the agreement.  The Plaintiffs, who are individuals and are resident in Holland, were referred to as “Foreign Partners”, and the 1st Defendant was designated as a “Local Partner”, under the Terms of Payment under the Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit “B”), it was stated that there would be a monthly transfer of Foreign Partners’ profit to the Foreign Partners.

 

According to Exhibit “B”, invoices were to be raised and the Foreign Partners paid for same.  But in Exhibit “E”, it stated that the Foreign Partners were to be paid an amount of $5,000 monthly simpliciter.  There was nothing about the said partners raising any invoice before payments were made.

 

It is my view that 1st Defendant’s argument that the $5,000 was meant to be paid to 2nd Defendant has not been proved. Payment of monthly profits to the Foreign Partners under Exhibit “B” in my opinion is not inconsistent with the provision for the payment of a monthly rental fee of $5,000 per month in Exhibit “E”. Indeed, Exhibits “F” and “G” are series of e-mails sent by Jonathan Gador to the Plaintiffs in which Mr. Gador makes reference to payments made to the Plaintiffs and explains why there had been delays in making outstanding payments, amongst other things.

 

D.W.1, in his evidence in chief, stated that Defendants were paying the monthly $5,000 and the 25% it attracted whenever there was a default, to the Plaintiffs until they defaulted and Plaintiffs caused their lawyer to write to them demanding same that they consulted their lawyer who advised them not to pay.

 

I will find that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the payment of $5,000 per month under the agreements between the parties herein. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover the outstanding amount on the monthly rental fee of $5,000 together with the agreed penalty of 25% thereon, and I will so hold. Plaintiffs are also entitled to interest on the total amount at the interest rate of 25% from September, 2008 until date of final payment.

 

With regard to the claim for an order dissolving the 2nd Defendant Company and for its assets to be sold and the proceeds distributed among the shareholders, there is no evidence placed before the Court as to why the 2nd Defendant Company should be dissolved.  The Companies Act, 1963, Act 179 provides the procedures for winding up a company.  Winding up may be by way of an official liquidation in accordance with the provisions of the Bodies corporate (Official Liquidations) Act, 1963 (Act 180); or by private liquidation in accordance with the provisions of the Code.  In the circumstances of the instant suit, I cannot grant the said relief and will accordingly dismiss same.

 

Plaintiff is also praying that the Court make an Order restraining the Defendants and their agents from using the name “Haitsma” for incorporation of any company or enterprise for their benefit.  The evidence adduced on behalf of the Plaintiffs was that “Haitsma” is the family name of the 2nd Plaintiff.  Consequently I will grant the said prayer and order that the Defendants and their agents be restrained from using the name “Haitsma” for incorporation of any company or enterprise for their benefit.

 

Plaintiffs are making a claim for damages, but no basis has been laid for such an award.  I will accordingly dismiss same

 

In conclusion, I will order that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiffs, all the outstanding amount on the monthly rental fee of $5,000 together with all the penalty that the amounts have accrued. Plaintiffs are also entitled to interest on the total amount at 25% from September, 2008 until date of final payment.

 

Costs assessed at GH¢2,000.00.

 

    

                                                                            (SGD)

 BARBARA ACKAH-YENSU (J)

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

 

COUNSEL

DUBIK YAKUBU                                      -        PLAINTIFFS

BANNERMAN WILLIAMS JNR.            -        DEFENDANTS

 
 

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