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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD IN ACCRA ON

 10TH JUNE, 2011 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP MR. JUSTICE S. H. OCRAN

 

SUIT NO. BL 468/07

_______________________________________________________

AUGUSTA AKWELEY ANNANG

                                                                VRS.

                                                ACCRA METRROPOLITAN ASSEMEBLY

                                                MAJ. (RTD) AWUAH

________________________________________________________

 

 

JUDGMENT

BY COURT:

The Plaintiff by her writ issued on 24th May, 2007 claimed against the defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs.

a)    Special damages for

                      i.        Cost of buildings destroyed

                    ii.        Cost of Valuation.

b)    General damages

c)    Perpetual Injunction restraining defendants from carrying on any demolition on Plaintiffs land without due process of law.

d)    An order that the Plaintiff be granted her building permit by the 1st defendant.

The basis of the Plaintiff’s claim is that she is putting up a house on a parcel of land at Okpobi Gonno, Teshie, Accra.

Before she commenced the building she applied for a building permit but she did not receive it. She commenced the said building and almost completed it before it was pulled down by the 1st Defendant on 29th June, 2002.  That before the building was pulled down no notice was pasted on her building except the one written on the building on 28th June, 2002 and that this demolition exercise is in breach of the Local Government Act (1993) Act 462.

The defendants have resisted the Plaintiff’s claim, and pleaded that they acted within the law, as the Plaintiff had no development permit before she commenced her building.  The defendants pleaded further that in so far as the Plaintiff did not commence her action within 12 months after the building had been pulled down, the Plaintiff’s action is statute barred, and that the action is a nullity. 

To this pleading, the Plaintiff pleaded in her reply that she earlier on commenced an action against the Defendants and withdrew it with the leave of the Court, with liberty to reapply before the instant suit was filed, and therefore the action is not statute barred.

The issues that were set down for determination are follows:

a)    Whether or not the Plaintiff applied for a building permit.

b)    Whether or not apart from the written notice on Plaintiff’s building on the 28th day of June, 2002 there was any prior notice to plaintiff.

c)    Whether or not Defendants demolished the property of Plaintiff in accordance with the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462).

d)    Whether or not the conduct of the Defendant in demolishing Plaintiff’s property with alleged Writ of Possession is fraudulent and Ultra Vires.

e)    Whether or not the action is statute barred.

f)     Any other relevant issues arising out of the Pleadings.

Before dealing with the other issues raised by the pleadings, I will want to resolve issue ‘e’

The defence is that since the demolition is said to have occurred on 29th June, 2002, and this action was instituted on 24th May, 2007, the action is statute barred.

Section 127 A of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) states as follows:

Where a suit is commenced against a District Assembly or an Officer of a District Assembly for an action done in pursuance of the execution or intended execution of an enactment or of a public duty or a public authority, or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of that enactment, duty or authority, the suit shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuing damage or injury within twelve months after the date of the cessation.”

The Plaintiff concede that this action was commenced in 2007, but that she commenced an earlier action in 2002 against the Defendants and others for the demolition of her structure. She however discontinued that action with leave of the court and with liberty to reapply.

The leave to discontinue and liberty to re-apply has not been tendered but since the plaintiff was not challenged on this assertion that she sued the Defendants and others and discontinued, I accept this evidence of the Plaintiff to be the truth. It must also be noted that it was the Defendants who suggested to the Plaintiff under cross examination that she had earlier on sued the Defendants together with Storemount Company Ltd in Suit Number L/505/2005.  To this the Plaintiff answered that she sued them, but withdrew.

Having accepted same as the truth, an important question which counsel for the parties did not avert their minds to in their addresses is this “what is the effect of leave to discontinue and liberty to re-apply.”

Having been granted leave to re-apply, what will be the commencement date of this suit, which on its face was commenced on 24th May, 2007.

The Plaintiff did not lead any evidence on when she was granted leave to discontinue the previous suit with liberty to apply.  Granted the discontinuance was immediately before this present action was commenced, that will not backdate the present action which was commenced on 24th May, 2007.  Section 127 A of Act 462 used the phrase “the suit shall not lie or be instituted”.  This is mandatory and the Plaintiff should have brought her action within twelve months after the demolition of her building which was on 29th June, 2002.

In the case of Heward-Mill Vrs. Heward-Mill (1992) 1 GLR 153 the court of Appeal held in its first holding that “where a statutory condition must be complied with before a court could have jurisdiction to make an order, failure to comply with such a condition would leave the court with no discretion to make any order or orders in the matter.

Since the Plaintiff commenced this action in 2007 which is more than 12 months after the building of the Plaintiff had been demolished, I hold that the Plaintiffs action was statute barred by section 127 A of the Local government Act 1993 (Act 462). Having held that the Plaintiff’s action was statute barred before it was commenced in 2007; no useful purpose would be served by going into the merits of the other issues set down.

I therefore dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim.

 

 

Counsel:                  Mr. Nii Adjin Mensah for Plaintiff Applicant. 

                                                Selina Fenteng for Defendant.

                                   

                                   

 

 

 

     (SGD.) MR. JUSTICE S.H. OCRAN 

                     Justice of the High Court

 

 
 

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