.
Land – Stool
lands - Recovery of possession -
Damages for trespass - Perpetual
injunction - Revocation of the
Declaration Instrument -
Allodial ownership - Possessory
or Usufructuary ownership -
Possession of vacant land -
Forfeiture of the land
HEADNOTES
The plaintiff
is Omanhene of the Lower Axim
Traditional Area and belongs to
the Royal Nvaviley Family of
Lower Axim who are the owners of
Lower Axim stool lands The
ancestors of the defendants who
belonged to the Royal Nvaviley
Clan but were not immediate
family members of the
plaintiff’s Nvaviley Royal
Family came from Abassie in the
Ahanta area. The ancestors of
the plaintiff by name Ebriku and
King Kweku Kyina I granted
permission to the ancestors of
the defendants to farm on
various portions of the land
including an area called Kudu
Bolofo. The plaintiff who was
enstooled Omanhene in 1987 is a
successor to a long line of
chiefs who had been in
possession and control of Lower
Axim Stool Family lands of which
the land in dispute is a part
from time immemorial. The land
in dispute has been the subject
of several concession enquiries
and litigations involving the
plaintiff’s stool. As owners of
Lower Axim Stool Lands,
occupants of the stool in
consultation with principal
members of the family appointed
certain individuals not
necessarily members of the
Nvaviley Royal Family as Odikro,
Headmen etc. to oversee the
interests of the Royal Family
over the lands. These included
the chief of Ewoku. In spite of
the plaintiff’s stool family’s
dealing with the land as owners
in the form of mining and timber
concessions over the years and
their involvement in several
litigations over the land in
dispute, the defendants’ late
head of family, Adia Kpole
caused to be published a
Statutory Declaration over the
disputed land purporting to be
Ewuku Nvaviley Family lands. The
plaintiff contends that the said
Statutory Declaration, which was
made at a time when there were
cases pending at the High Court
Sekondi involving the parties
over portions of the disputed
lands, was calculated to deceive
the general public and therefore
null and void. It is also
alleged that soon after the
Statutory Declaration, the
defendants alienated portions of
the disputed land to individuals
and organisations and had the
documents covered by the grants
signed by Omanhene of Ahanta
Traditional Area who has no
jurisdiction over Lower Axim
Lands. In their pleading the
defendants stated categorically
that it was their ancestors
called Arizi, Kwadoh, Kaku
Kyinah, Kofi Tsea who were all
members of the Royal Navivaley
family of Ewuku who cultivated
the land when they joined their
sister Azia Mansah who had
earlier founded the village of
Ewoku. They planted food crops
on the land and after their
death the portions of the land
they had cultivated were given
to both family and non-family
members for planting coconut and
palm trees. Apparently, for the
use of the land they paid
tribute in the form of food
crops to the plaintiff stool
during Kuudum Festivals. They
stopped the practice of paying
tribute to the plaintiff’s stool
when the plaintiff’s predecessor
took action against their
predecessor. They contend that
the land in dispute belongs to
them and they had dealt with it
long before the Statutory
Declaration. The High Court
concluded that the defendants
have not deliberately challenged
the plaintiff’s allodial
interest in the land to be
deprived of their possessory
rights over Ewuku land. The
plaintiff appealed before the
Court of Appeal The appeal was
allowed
HELD
Even though
we are of the view that the
Court of Appeal based its
decision inappropriately on
forfeiture of the land granted
to the defendants’ family which
the plaintiff did not ask for,
we still share the opinion that
taking into account the totality
of the evidence adduced at the
trial and the reasons given in
this judgment the appeal ought
to be dismissed. We therefore
dismiss the appeal. However, in
place of the orders given by the
Court of Appeal in its judgment
we make the following orders: (i)
Declaration of title to all that
piece and parcel of land
described in relief (a) of the
plaintiff’s claim, subject to
the rights of the defendants’
family as holders of the
determinable or usufructuary
title in respect of the land
granted to them at Ewuku. For
the avoidance of doubt, the
areas outside the land granted
to the defendants’ family by the
plaintiff’s stool are declared
in favour of the plaintiff’s
stool. (ii) In place of reliefs
(b) and (c) of the plaintiff’s
claim we make an order for the
defendants and their grantees in
areas beyond the environs of
Ewuku to negotiate with the
plaintiff for terms of their
occupation of lands on which
they have trespassed. (iii) We
grant the order for perpetual
injunction against the
defendants, their agents,
servants, assigns and workmen
etc. in respect of the lands
outside the area of the
defendants’ family’s grant at
Ewuku. (iv) Declaration that
the Declaratory Instrument
described in relief (f) of the
plaintiff’s claim is null and
void and of no effect.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Statutory
Declaration Act 1971 Act 389
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Awuah vrs.
Adututu [1987-88] 2GLR 191
Koglex [No.
2] v. Field [2000] SCGLR 175
Vanderpuije
v. Adam [1961] GLR (Pt II) 733
Nyame v.
Yeboah [1961] GLR 281, S.C.
Feli v.
Akessse (1931) 2 W.A.C.A. 46,
P.C
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
ARYEETEY, JSC:
COUNSEL
W. A. N.
ADUMUA-BOSSMAN FOR THEDEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/
APPELLANTS.
KODWO ERSKINE
FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
______________________________________________________________________________________
ARYEETEY, JSC:
In this
judgment we would refer to the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent
as the plaintiff and the
defendants/respondents/appellants
as the defendants. The
endorsement on the plaintiff’s
writ of summons which was issued
on 17th June 1996 in
his claim against the defendants
is for the following reliefs:
a)
Declaration of title to all that
piece and parcel of land
situate, lying and being within
Lower Axim Traditional Area in
the Western Region of Ghana
measuring 15 square miles and
bounded on the North by the Main
Axim-Takoradi Motor Road, on the
South by the Agyambra Stool
Lands, on the West by Domunli/Agyan
and Akonu Stool Lands and on the
East by Agyambra and Abura Stool
Lands;
b)
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION;
c)
DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS;
d)
PERPETUAL INJUNCTION against the
defendants, their agents and/or
servants, assigns and workmen
etc. from interfering with the
plaintiff and the Royal Nvaviley
Family of Lower Axim and the
stool’s possession occupation
and enjoyment of the said land;
e)
AN
ORDER to set aside/or for the
revocation of the Declaration
Instrument dated 22nd
August, 1984 and marked as
SDI.924/84 made in favour of
ADIA KPOLLEY (deceased) the
predecessor of the 1st
defendant and the then head of
the Nvaviley Family of Ewoku for
and on behalf of Ewoku Nvaviley
Family of Ewoku in respect of
the land described in paragraph
(a) of the claim above. OR
ALTERNATIVELY
f)
A
DECLARATION that the Declaratory
Instrument dated 22nd
August, 1984 and marked as
SDI.924 made in favour of ADIA
KPOLLEY (deceased) the
predecessor of the 1st
defendant and the then head of
Nvavilley Family of Ewoku for
and on behalf of Ewoku Nvavilley
Family… in respect of the land
described in paragraph (a) of
the claim above is null and void
and of no effect.
The plaintiff
is Omanhene of the Lower Axim
Traditional Area and belongs to
the Royal Nvaviley Family of
Lower Axim who are the owners of
Lower Axim stool lands. The land
in dispute forms part of Lower
Axim Paramount Stool lands. The
plaintiff sues for himself and
on behalf of the Royal Nvaviley
Stool family. In his pleadings
he gives the background of his
claim as follows: The ancestors
of the defendants who belonged
to the Royal Nvaviley Clan but
were not immediate family
members of the plaintiff’s
Nvaviley Royal Family came from
Abassie in the Ahanta area. The
ancestors of the plaintiff by
name Ebriku and King Kweku Kyina
I granted permission to the
ancestors of the defendants to
farm on various portions of the
land including an area called
Kudu Bolofo. The plaintiff who
was enstooled Omanhene in 1987
is a successor to a long line of
chiefs who had been in
possession and control of Lower
Axim Stool Family lands of which
the land in dispute is a part
from time immemorial.
The land in
dispute has been the subject of
several concession enquiries and
litigations involving the
plaintiff’s stool. As owners of
Lower Axim Stool Lands,
occupants of the stool in
consultation with principal
members of the family appointed
certain individuals not
necessarily members of the
Nvaviley Royal Family as Odikro,
Headmen etc. to oversee the
interests of the Royal Family
over the lands. These included
the chief of Ewoku. In spite of
the plaintiff’s stool family’s
dealing with the land as owners
in the form of mining and timber
concessions over the years and
their involvement in several
litigations over the land in
dispute, on 22nd
August 1984, the defendants’
late head of family, Adia Kpole
caused to be published a
Statutory Declaration over the
disputed land purporting to be
Ewuku Nvaviley Family lands. The
plaintiff contends that the said
Statutory Declaration, which was
made at a time when there were
cases pending at the High Court
Sekondi involving the parties
over portions of the disputed
lands, was calculated to deceive
the general public and therefore
null and void. It is also
alleged that soon after the
Statutory Declaration, on 22nd
August 1984, the defendants
alienated portions of the
disputed land to individuals and
organisations and had the
documents covered by the grants
signed by Omanhene of Ahanta
Traditional Area who has no
jurisdiction over Lower Axim
Lands.
In their
pleading the defendants stated
categorically that it was their
ancestors called Arizi, Kwadoh,
Kaku Kyinah, Kofi Tsea who were
all members of the Royal
Navivaley family of Ewuku who
cultivated the land when they
joined their sister Azia Mansah
who had earlier founded the
village of Ewoku. They planted
food crops on the land and after
their death the portions of the
land they had cultivated were
given to both family and
non-family members for planting
coconut and palm trees.
Apparently, for the use of the
land they paid tribute in the
form of food crops to the
plaintiff stool during Kuudum
Festivals. They stopped the
practice of paying tribute to
the plaintiff’s stool when the
plaintiff’s predecessor took
action against their
predecessor. They contend that
the land in dispute belongs to
them and they had dealt with it
long before the Statutory
Declaration.
JUDGMENT OF
THE HIGH COURT
In his
judgment, dismissing the
plaintiff’s claim, the learned
trial High Court Judge stated at
pages 148 and 149 of the record
of appeal as follows:
“It must be
observed that P.W.2, Nana Agona
Miezeh I, the chief of Agona and
P.W.3, the abusuapayin of Kona
Abradze family of Dadwen
otherwise known as “Alongoba”
family testified that their
respective lands belong to the
plaintiff herein being the
Omanhene of Lower Axim
Traditional area, their
respective lands falling under
Lower Axim stool. However they
all conceded that at the time
their ancestors entered the
land, the lands were virgin
forests and that it was the
Omanhene of Lower Axim who
permitted their respective
ancestors to enter the land. In
my view the “ownership” they
conferred on the plaintiff and
for that matter on Lower Axim
stool is nothing but an
assertion of their recognition
of the Lower Axim stool as the
allodial estate holder. This is
quite distinguishable from their
respective determinable
possessory interest they hold on
the land. For instance, the
Omanhene of Lower Axim cannot
alienate their land without
their consent and any alienation
made must also be made known to
the Omanhene by way of tribute.
In other words, the recognition
of the allodial interest the
Omanhene of Lower Axim enjoys is
what is expressed by the tribute
and the homage they pay to him
especially during special
occasions like the the Kundum
festival.
In this case
after evaluating the evidence as
a whole, it is my view that the
defendants’ family, having
descended from Komele Azia
Manzah who was granted
permission to live and settle on
Kodubolofo and later Ewuku land
about 150 years ago, seem to
have acquired an estate in Ewuku
land which the law recognizes as
usufructuary, possessory or
determinable title and
importantly this interest
co-exists and indeed
simultaneous with the Lower Axim
stool’s absolute ownership
otherwise described as
allodial.”
The trial
court then went ahead and drew
the distinction between “the
allodial ownerhip of land along
with the rights that go with it
and the possessory or
usufructuary ownership of land
plus its incidents as clearly
spelt out in holding 4 of the
case of AWUAH VRS. ADUTUTU
[1987-88] 2GLR 191 at 193”. He
concluded that the defendants
have not deliberately challenged
the plaintiff’s allodial
interest in the land to be
deprived of their possessory
rights over Ewuku land. The
plaintiff appealed and his sole
ground of appeal before the
Court of Appeal was that “The
judgment was against the weight
of evidence”.
JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT OF APPEAL
The unanimous
judgment of the Court of Appeal
dealt extensively with the issue
of allodial ownership of the
plaintiff’s stool as well as the
issue of determinable or
usufructuary title of the
defendants’ family. In reading
the unanimous judgment of the
court Honyenuga, J.A. made the
following observations at pages
259-261 of the record of
appeal:-
“It was obvious that a stool
subject would acquire a
determinable or usufructuary
interest in the land if (a) he
reduced the land into his
possession, (b) the boundaries
must have been established and
the land cleared and brought
under cultivation and (c) must
most importantly acknowledge
loyalty or allegiance to the
stool.
In the
instant appeal, there is
sufficient evidence on record
that the determinable or
usufructuary title rested with
the respondents. All the
incidents of usufructuary title
is on record. There is evidence
that Eziamansa was first granted
Kudubrofo land by the
appellant’s predecessors but
could not settle there but left
to settle at Ewoku (Awuku) where
they farmed. … There is also
evidence that some of the
descendants who included the
respondents have lived and are
still living and are in
possession of these lands for
over 100 years. The respondents
who are subjects of appellant’s
stool owed their continued
occupation of the land upon
their allegiance to the
appellant’s stool. The
respondents have however stopped
paying tribute and stopped owing
allegiance to the appellant’s
stool. They even went to the
extent of claiming portions of
the land not granted to them.
The trial
judge found that it was the
conduct of the appellant which
elicited the stoppage of the
performance of custom to the
appellant stool and there the
appellant could take advantage
of that. Is this finding of the
learned trial judge supported by
the evidence on record? … From
the legal authorities, it was
obvious that forfeiture from a
subject occupying a stool land
was an extreme form of
punishment and this could be
inflicted after an inquiry.
Coming to the finding of the
learned trial judge, I think
that his reason for the refusal
of the payment of tribute to the
stool was wrong and not
supported. In any case if it was
because the legal actions taken
by the stool as a result of the
misconduct of the respondents,
nothing prevented the
respondents from continuing with
the payment of tributes to the
allodial title owner while
litigation raged on. The
respondents rather took
advantage and gave out portions
of land not granted to them and
had a statutory declaration made
on the land, thus challenging
the title of the appellant.
As already
stated the law was that a
subject of the stool’s continued
occupation determinable or
usufructuary title to the stool
land was a sine qua non to the
subject acknowledging the
loyalty to the stool. From the
record, the respondents had
denied the title of the
appellants who are their
allodial title owners by
refusing to pay tribute to the
stool, granting portions of land
to others which belonged to the
allodial owner among others. The
appellant would therefore be
entitled to forfeiture of the
land in dispute subject to the
respondents approaching the
appellant’s stool for an
enquiry. … It is for the reasons
that since there is evidence
that the defendants denied the
title of the appellant stool and
refused to owe allegiance and
pay tribute to the stool, the
learned trial judge was wrong in
coming to the findings and
conclusion he arrived at. I
would therefore not support the
judgment because it is against
the weight of evidence”
The appeal
was allowed. However, it would
be expected that the Court of
Appeal would deal adequately
with the sole ground of appeal
namely: “That the judgment is
against the weight of evidence”.
Essentially that ground of
appeal invites the Court of
Appeal to review the whole of
the evidence, documentary and
oral, adduced at the trial and
come out with a pronouncement on
the weight of evidence in
support of the judgment of the
trial court or otherwise. In
the case of Koglex [No. 2] v.
Field [2000] SCGLR 175 Acquah
JSC (as he then was) at page 185
of the report stated the duty of
the appellate court on the issue
as follows:
“Briefly, the
primary duty of an appellate
court in respect judgment based
on findings of fact, is to
examine the record of
proceedings to satisfy itself
that the said findings are
supported by evidence on record.
Where there is no such evidence
that findings ought to be set
aside.”
Where
findings are based on
established facts the appellate
court is in the same position as
the trial court and it can draw
its own inferences from the
established facts. In our
consideration of the Grounds of
Appeal therefore, our main focus
would be to look closely at the
totality of the evidence adduced
at the trial and seek to do what
in our view both the High Court
and the Court of Appeal did not
do adequately, that is, draw
necessary inferences from facts
that are clearly established by
the evidence, both oral and
documentary, adduced at the
trial. It is only when that is
done that the expectations of
justice would be fully met.
CONSIDERATION
OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The
defendants appealed and filed
the following Grounds of Appeal:
I. The Court
of Appeal erred in reversing the
judgment of the trial High
Court, Sekondi on a ground that
was not relied on by the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent
as the basis of his claim.
II. The Court
of Appeal further erred in
ordering the forfeiture of the
land when it had stated that the
forfeiture may only be inflicted
upon an occupant after due
enquiry had been conducted and
an opportunity given the
occupant of land to state his
case or her case, whereas on the
facts no due enquiry nor
opportunity to be heard in
Defendant’s Family’s defence
proved by the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent.
III. The
Court of Appeal again erred in
allowing the appeal without
stating what reliefs it has
awarded the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent.
IV. The
appeal court erred in allowing
the appeal, which it held to be
a rehearing, without resolving
any of the issues which were set
down at the Summons for
Directions for hearing and which
had been dismissed by the trial
High Court.
V. The Court
of Appeal erred in basing its
judgment on evidence which was
not adduced at the trial.
From the
judgment of the Court of Appeal,
a substantial part of which is
quoted above, we are of the view
that if the Court of Appeal had
dealt adequately with the sole
Ground of Appeal, namely “That
the judgment is against the
weight of evidence”, rather than
strayed into areas which were
not covered by the issues raised
by that Ground of Appeal, a good
basis for its judgment would
have been arrived at. The only
grounds of appeal which were
touched upon by the written
submissions of the Defendants’
counsel were Grounds I, II and
V. Counsel for the appellants
dealt with Grounds I and V
together before dealing with II.
We intend to take all the three
grounds together.
Indeed the
learned trial judge stated the
law relating to the rights of
allodial title holders and what
owners of determinable or
usufructuary estate are entitled
to correctly. However, in his
judgment at page 145 of the
record of appeal the trial judge
gave a wrong summary of the case
of the plaintiff as follows:
“Plaintiffs’
case is that they own all the
lands at Lower Axim Traditional
area and that since the land in
dispute is an integral part of
Lower Axim Traditional Area, the
corollary is that they are
owners of the land in dispute.
Plaintiffs claim that the
defendants belong to the Royal
Nvaviley clan and that they
(Plaintiffs) permitted their
(defendants’) ancestors to farm
on various portions of the land
including a portion called
Kudubolofo. They therefore
contended that the defendants
are their tenants on the land. ”
By the
erroneous summation of the
plaintiff’s stand, the learned
judge disabled himself from
appreciating a fundamental issue
of the litigation that is,
overstepping of the original
grant to the defendants’
predecessor by the defendants
being successors of
stranger-grantees. What appears
to have eluded the learned trial
judge is the fact that the core
of the dispute is not simply the
defendants’ family’s rights as
the holders of the determinable
title of the land in dispute.
The mainstay of the controversy
is indeed the extent to which
the defendants’ family could
exercise rights as usufructuary
owners of the land. Of course,
payment of tribute by the
defendants’ family to the
plaintiff’s stool meant that
members of the defendants’
family could exercise some
rights as owners of a
determinable estate recognisable
by the allodial owners. Indeed,
as quoted above from the
judgment of the High Court, it
was the conclusion of the trial
judge that “the defendants’
family, having descended from
Komele Azia Manzah who was
granted permission to live and
settle on Kodubolofo and later
Ewuku land about 150 years ago,
seem to have acquired an estate
in Ewuku land which the law
recognizes as usufructuary,
possessory or determinable
title…”
As a
reminder, what sparked off this
litigation was when, in the view
of the plaintiff’s stool, the
defendants went beyond their
boundaries of Ewuku lands as
stranger-grantees and claimed
rights in areas within the
plaintiff’s stool’s land which
were beyond the undisputed
boundaries of their grant. It
is obvious that the trial judge
was misled into equating Ewuku
Family land to the whole 15
square miles land as depicted by
the Statutory Declaration,
exhibit N. If the trial judge
had looked at reliefs (e) and
(f) of the plaintiff’s claim
relating to the Statutory
Declaration he would have had a
clearer picture of the main
issue at stake and done justice
to his case. He would have
realised that the area of the
Statutory Declaration covered
the stool lands of P.W.2, Nana
Agona Miezeh I, the chief of
Agona and P.W.3, the Abusuapayin
of Kona Abradze family of Dadwen
otherwise known as “Alongoba”
family as well as other
grantee-families and stools.
Both P.W.2 and P.W.3 testified
that their respective lands
belong to the plaintiff being
the Omanhene of Lower Axim
Traditional area, and that their
lands fall under Lower Axim
stool.
MODE OF
ACQUISITION BY DEFENDANTS:
As borne out
by the documentary evidence on
record, especially the two writs
issued at the instance of the
plaintiff’s predecessor in 1981
and their corresponding
statements of claim which can be
found at pages 222-228 of the
record of appeal as exhibits L
and L1, which constitute the
antecedents of the Statutory
Declaration, the real contest
between the parties is the
determination of the extent of
the defendants’ family’s land
over which their usufructuary
ownership operates. We would
come back to the two writs and
their respective statements of
claim later. At this stage we
would do well to look at the
evidence with regard to the mode
of acquisition of the land in
dispute by the defendants’
ancestress in our bid to
ascertain the limits of the
boundaries of the forest land
which they cultivated at Ewuku.
To start with, the trial judge
commented in his judgment that
the plaintiff did not offer any
proof of the mode of acquisition
of the land by his stool family.
What should be noted is that in
reality both in the pleadings
and throughout the trial the
allodial ownership of the Lower
Axim Omanhene of the subject
matter of the litigation is not
in dispute. It means that it was
not necessary for the history of
the acquisition by the stool to
be recounted by way of
traditional evidence. The
defendants do not dispute that
the plaintiff’s stool owns the
allodial title to the land which
is the subject matter of this
litigation, as the judgments of
the both the High Court and the
Court of Appeal conclude.
However their evidence,
especially that of the first
defendant, seems to suggest that
in spite of the fact that their
ancestress, Azia Mansa did not
belong to the Royal Nvaviley
family of the plaintiff’s stool
and therefore a complete
stranger so far as the
plaintiff’s stool was concerned,
went to occupy the land in
dispute without any
authorisation and permission
from the plaintiff’s stool.
According to his testimony on
oath, later the brothers of Azia
Mansa joined her at Ewuku, broke
the virgin forest land which
they cultivated.
The first
defendant was insistent that
before the arrival of his
ancestress the village of Ewuku
did not exist and it was his
Abassie Nvaviley Family that set
up that village. According to
his evidence-in-chief it was
their ancestress who appointed
her husband Kofi Arko of Agyasi,
and enstooled him as the first
chief of Ewoku. Kofi Arko had
been her patient whom she had
cured of his ailment before
their marriage. That portion of
1st defendant’s
examination-in-chief which is at
pages 110 and 111 of the record
of appeal is as follows:
“She settled
there and practised her trade
i.e. fetish priesthood. People
used to come to her for
treatment of all sorts of
ailments. She would give
portions of the land to people
she cured for them to feed
therein. One Kofi Arko of Agyasi
fell sick and he was brought to
Azia Mansa for treatment. After
the treatment he proposed and
subsequently married Ezia Mansa
who was then unmarried. Later on
some brothers of Ezia Mansa
joined her in Awuku. These
brothers were Gyentuwah Kwanor,
Kofi Tiah, Kweku Kyinakyi. Later
Kofi Arko became the chief of
Awuku. Ezia Mansa therefore
explained to him though he had
become chief, he does not own
the Awuku land. Being the first
to settle there she and her
family owned it.”
Apparently,
this is to explain that the
defendants’ family land did not
belong to the Ewuku Stool. In
cross-examination he testified
on oath that that happened about
200 years ago. However even
though he continually denied
throughout his testimony that
his ancestress was ever given
permission by the plaintiff’s
predecessors to cultivate the
land granted to her by the
plaintiff’s stool, there is the
clear admission by all the
defendants both in their
pleading and their testimonies
on oath that their family paid
tribute to the plaintiff’s stool
as owner of the
allodial title of the land in
dispute.
In the
circumstances of this case, one
means of verifying the veracity
of the traditional accounts
given by each party is to
examine critically the divergent
versions given by them to
determine whether they conform
to legally attested principles
of modes of customary land
acquisition by stool subjects as
well as strangers. As indicated
earlier in this judgment there
is no need for us to look at the
mode of acquisition of the
allodial title by the
plaintiff’s stool. What we have
to examine is the evidence
adduced on behalf of the
defendants that their ancestress
went into occupation of the land
in dispute apparently without
leave or licence of the
plaintiff’s stool. In spite of
that assertion by the 1st
defendant in his oral testimony
in court, in line with the
Statement of Defence that his
family’s possession of the land
in dispute was without the prior
permission of the plaintiff’s
stool family, he had to
reluctantly admit that his
family paid tribute to the
plaintiff’s stool.
Cross-examination of the 1st
defendant appearing at page 115
of the record of appeal reveals
his lack of candour in his
narration of his family’s
history respecting their
acquisition of the land in
dispute. It reads:
“Q. Was
Eziamansa granted permission to
settle at Kudubrofo by the
paramount chief?
A. No.
Q. When she
moved to Awuku there was already
a settlement there?
A. No, the
place was virgin forest.
Q. At Awuku
was she granted permission by
the stool of Lower Axim to
settle there?
A. At that
time there was no Lower Axim
Omanhene but there were various
chiefs. It was later that Lower
Axim was made Omanhene.
Q. Are you
saying that the sub-chiefs came
onto the land before the
paramount chief?
A. Yes, he
was made paramount in 1947. …
Q. Which
Omanhene was in Lower Axim when
Eziamansa went to Awuku?
A. Ohene Atta
I. He was not even then
Omanhene. He was later made so.
Q. When did
your predecessors start paying
tribute to Omanhene?
A. 1947”.
Certainly the
1st defendant’s
answer in cross-examination that
when Ezia Mansa went to Ewuku
Ohene Atta I was not the
Omanhene but was made Omanhene
in 1947 cannot be correct since
he testified that the event of
the settlement occurred about
200 years ago. In any case we
have a situation where the
defendants’ family is supposed
to have on their own acquired
possession of vacant land which
purportedly did not fall within
the area of control of
plaintiff’s or any other stool
and therefore the need to seek
for permission and authorisation
from that stool before breaking
the virgin forest of that land
did not arise. However we are
now confronted with a state of
affairs in which a supposedly
autonomous family of the
defendants, obviously as a sign
of allegiance and
acknowledgement of the
plaintiff’s stool’s superior
allodial title, pays annual
tribute to that stool. Certainly
payment of tribute in any form
by the defendants’ family to the
plaintiff’s stool could only
signify its acknowledgement of
the plaintiff’s stool’s allodial
ownership of the land in
dispute. It is therefore an
indication that the defendants’
family’s presence on the land in
dispute could not have been
without the permission and
authorisation of the plaintiff’s
stool. That indeed would be a
far cry from the 1st
defendant’s assertion in his
oral testimony that his
ancestress, Azia Mansa went to
Ewuku and without leave or
licence of the plaintiff’s stool
broke its virgin forest land.
On their
family’s mode of acquisition of
the land the defendants also
testified that their ancestors
gave forest lands to some
strangers and they granted them
permission to cultivate part of
the virgin forest land. We would
therefore have to look at the
defendants’ family’s position on
the land. Being strangers
themselves the question to ask
is: Would they be entitled to
give out virgin forest lands to
other strangers for cultivation?
Our understanding of the
customary law position is that
it is only after the stranger
with the permission of his
grantor stool or family has
reduced a virgin forest land
into cultivation that he would
be entitled to give portions or
all of it to others without
reference to the grantor stool
or family. It is only the
allodial title owner who could
make a grant of virgin forest
land to strangers for
cultivation.
INFERENCE
FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
Since we come
to the conclusion that the
defendants’ ancestors could only
have occupied the land with the
leave or licence of the
plaintiff’s stool which must
have resulted in the payment of
tribute by the defendants’
family to the stool, another
important aspect of the case to
look at would be the extent of
the land granted to the
defendants’ stranger family.
Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeal agree in their
conclusion that the defendants’
family became owners of the
determinable title of the area
of their grant. In the case of
Awuah v. Adututu and Anr.
[1987-88] 2G.L.R. 191 the Court
of Appeal held that The
usufructuary title which a
stranger-grantee acquired placed
him in the same position as a
subject of the stool except that
in the case of farming land as
well as building land the title
of a stranger-grantee was
limited to a well-defined area
demarcated and granted to him,
whereas the subject of the stool
was not so limited to the area
he could occupy. Consequently,
the subject of the stool or a
stranger-grantee of the stool
could maintain an action against
even the stool in defence of the
usufructuary title and might
impeach any disposition of such
interest effected without his
consent in favour of a third
party.
Unlike a
stool subject or a member of a
family, in the case of a
stranger-grantee the area of his
formal grant is specifically
marked out and therefore clearly
identifiable. Therefore it is
expected that there should be a
clear demarcation and
identification of the area of
land granted to the defendants’
family. Since the evidence is
indisputable that the
defendants’ ancestress formally
settled at Ewuku it would be
expected that land granted to
her to cultivate would be
located in that area in the
absence of evidence of any other
formal grant or grants from the
plaintiff’s stool. It means
therefore that any cultivated
land that falls outside the area
of the grant to the defendants’
family area could not be
regarded as the defendants’
family’s land. The evidence from
the defendants seems to suggest
that the successors of their
ancestress continued to
cultivate forest lands beyond
the outskirts of Ewuku which
implies that these were done
without formal grant from the
plaintiff’s stool, as they would
have the court to believe. As
members of a stranger family and
unlike the case of stool
subjects it would be expected
that they would still have
needed formal grants from the
stool to carry on their
expansion programme. Evidence of
the 1st defendant
especially appears to relate to
farms allegedly cultivated by
some of his ancestors which
spread far beyond Ewuku where
its first chief who, according
to the testimony of the 1st
defendant, did not own a share
of the defendants’ family land,
was supposed to have been
enstooled.
Such evidence
would suggest that the
defendant’s ancestors did not
operate within the area
supposedly allocated to them as
strangers by the plaintiff’s
stool. It also follows that
even if it is established that
members of the defendants’
family did cultivate farms in
other areas which fell outside
the area allotted to them by the
grant they would not have
acquired those farm lands since
they do not fall within the area
of the grant by the plaintiff’s
stool to them. It is in this
context that we ought to view
the stand of the plaintiff. From
the documentary evidence
exhibits L and L1 that we have
referred to, it was only after
the defendants had encroached
upon lands beyond the areas of
the grant of the plaintiff’s
stool to their family that the
plaintiff’s stool raised its
first protest in the form of
issue of writ of summons against
the defendants’ family on 3rd
March 1981.
The Writ of
Summons and Statement of Claim
of that case i.e. NANA OHENE
ATTA II V. OPPONG KOFI AND 2
OHERS, can be found at pages
222-225 of the record of appeal,
exhibit L. The solicitor for
the plaintiff in that case was
Mr. B. E. Kwaw Swanzy. The first
leg of their claim was for
Perpetual Injunction restraining
the defendants from extending
their farming operations to
places outside Ewuku without the
knowledge consent and
concurrence of the plaintiff.
Paragraphs 2-5 of the Statement
of Claim read as follows:
“(2) The
defendants herein hail from
Abasi a village outside the
Lower Axim Traditional area have
lived in Lower Axim for a very
long time.
(3) The
defendants have been allowed to
farm in the area they live but
it has now been observed by the
plaintiff herein that instead of
limiting their farming
operations to Ewuku they have
extended their said operations
to Kadabasia and its surrounding
areas without authority.
(4) The
defendants have also sold some
of the lands in the Atechem
Anosi and Agona areas also the
property of the plaintiff,
without the consent or
concurrence of the Plaintiff
herein.
(5) The
defendants have wilfully and
maliciously asserted or
purported to assert proprietary
rights to the lands they have
been alienating to various
persons”.
Also at pages
226-228 of the record of appeal
we have a second Writ of Summons
and Statement of Claim (exhibit
L1) at the instance of Nana
Ohene Atta II, by the same
solicitor, against Bolo Kofi and
others who were farmers and
distillers of Akpeteshie from
Ewuku and who, according to his
pleading, had gone beyond the
area of Ewuku Village to fell
palm trees on land belonging to
the plaintiff’s stool. That Writ
of Summons was issued on 26th
May 1981. As expressed earlier
in this judgment it is in the
context of this background that
we ought to view the Statutory
Declaration which the defendants
rely on in their pleading and
their oral testimony.
In our
opinion the trial High Court
judge oversimplified the issues
which the pleadings and the
evidence adduced in this case
present. He dwelt mainly and
extensively on the usufructuary
title of the family of the
defendants and its accompanying
incidents. However, we do not
think that that was the main
focus of the plaintiff’s claim.
It is worthy of note that the
present litigation started when
the defendants’ family published
the offending Statutory
Declaration in 1984 which was
after exhibits L and L1 had been
issued in 1981 at the instance
of the plaintiff’s predecessor.
Looking at the pleadings and the
issues that are raised thereby,
strictly speaking, this is not a
simple case of a contest between
allodial title holders and
owners of usufructuary or
determinable title. In his
judgment at pages 149 and 150 of
the record of appeal the learned
trial judge stated the relevant
law relating to the rights,
obligations and responsibilities
of allodial title holders and
owners of determinable or
usufructuary estate. What
appeared to have eluded him were
the events which sparked off
this litigation which could give
him a clue as to the main focus
of this litigation and therefore
the foremost of the issues at
stake. Obviously it was when
the defendants’ family went
beyond the limits of what the
plaintiff’s stool considered as
the area of the grant to that
family and claimed ownership of
areas extending beyond the
location of their grant that the
plaintiff set in motion the
litigation process to recover
what he considered as belonging
to his family and stool and not
given to the defendants’ family
by a formal grant.
It is
understandable that to the
plaintiff’s stool payment of
tribute by the defendants’
family related to the specified
area of the grant which was
bound to be the case since they
are stranger-grantees on the
land. Perhaps that is why the 1st
defendant seems to blow hot and
cold in his sworn evidence
before the court. He did that by
denying that his ancestress and
later her siblings ever sought
the permission from the
plaintiff’s stool to cultivate a
limited, demarcated portion of
the virgin forest land as
stranger-grantees, while at the
same time admitting in
cross-examination that his
family in the past paid annual
tribute to the plaintiff’s stool
which signified their family’s
recognition of the plaintiff’s
stool’s allodial title. That
indeed gave confirmation to the
fact that as stranger-grantees
their ownership was limited to
areas of the grant or grants to
them.
STATUTORY
DECLARATION:
What is
striking about the decisions of
both the High Court and the
Court of Appeal is the complete
failure by both courts to deal
with the issue of Statutory
Declaration, exhibit N which
indeed dictated the nature of
the plaintiff’s claim. As it can
be seen, the writ of summons
upon which this appeal is based
is a marked departure from what
the plaintiff’s predecessor’s
1981 writ of summons, exhibit L
which we have already referred
to. In exhibit L the claim
against the plaintiff’s family
related to lands which
specifically fell outside the
area of the grant by the
plaintiff’s stool to the
defendants’ family at Ewuku. In
the current litigation it is all
about the whole fifteen miles
square area which the Statutory
Declaration seeks to claim for
the defendants’ family. Also the
defence of the defendants
substantially hangs on it. They,
in spite of their pleading to
the contrary, eventually
admitted that the plaintiff’s
stool is the allodial owner of
the whole of Lower Axim lands.
More importantly, reliefs (e)
and (f) of the plaintiff’s
claim, which undoubtedly relate
directly to the subject of the
Statutory Declaration would
require pronouncements of the
two courts as to the validity or
otherwise of that document. It
is therefore imperative that in
this appeal some attention ought
to be devoted to the all
important issue of validity or
otherwise of the Statutory
Declaration, which both the
trial High Court and the Court
of Appeal failed to touch upon.
At this stage
it would be, in our view,
worthwhile to deal specifically
with the issue of the Statutory
Declaration, exhibit N. We shall
first have a look at the
requirements for making of that
document and then proceed to
consider the circumstances under
which exhibit N was made.
Section 4— of the Statutory
Declarations Act, 1971 (Act 389)
is on Procedure for making
Statutory Declaration. It reads:
“Every
magistrate, notary public,
commissioner for oaths and any
other person authorised by law
to administer an oath may take
and receive the statutory
declaration of any person
voluntarily making it before
him, and shall certify it under
his signature”.
We have had a
close look at the Statutory
Declaration from the defendants,
exhibit N and what stands out
quite clearly is that the
declaration did not satisfy the
requirement of section 4 of Act
389. To be precise the
declaration was not made before
any of the qualified persons
listed in section 4 of Act 389
quoted above. It was “DECLARED
SIGNED AND SEALED BY EDIAH
KPOLE, Declarant herein after
the contents have been truly and
audibly read over in English and
interpreted to him and his
elders in the Evalue language by
DAVISON AMOAH of Asemasa in the
presence of 1. OPPONG KOFIE …
Linguist, 2. KRACHI KWAW …
Secretary, 3. KWAME TANDOH …
Elder”. The date of the
declaration is not stated on the
document. However we have the
oath of Davidson Amoah before
the Registrar, High Court,
Sekondi dated 17th
October 1984. That means at the
time of making of the Statutory
Declaration the 1st
defendant’s predecessor, Edia
Kpole and the first defendant
were fully aware of the claim of
the plaintiff’s stool. That is
because in 1981 the plaintiff’s
predecessor had issued the two
writs, exhibits L and L1 against
the predecessor of the 1st
defendant and others who dealt
with the defendants’ family to
register his stool’s claim to
lands which fell beyond the
boundaries of Ewuku. We have
already given some details of
the two writs earlier in this
judgment. At this stage it would
be pertinent to have a quick
look at the content of the
affidavit in support of the
Statutory Declaration,
especially its paragraphs 5-10.
They read as follows:
“5. That
according to the traditional
history of the Ewuku Nvavile
Family, DOMENLE EDZIA MANZA with
KWESI EWIAH (Deceased) the heads
of my ancestors were the first
persons to settle on the said
Ewuku Nvavile Family Lands with
their subjects.
6. That at
the time my ancestors, led by
the said KOMENLE EDZIA KANZA –
Heads of family settled on the
said Ewuku Nvaviley Family Land
described in the schedule hereto
and delineated on the plan
hereto annexed the said
hereditaments were a RES NULIUS
that is to say no man’s land.
7. That my
ancestors were therefore the
first to occupy the said
hereditaments and develop the
same.
8. That by
reason of first occupation and
development my ancestors became
the bona fide owners of the said
hereditaments.
9. That ever
since my ancestors acquired the
said land, the EWUKU NVAVILE
FAMILY have been in undisputed
possession of the said land and
has exercised act of ownership
thereon including the right of
sale, alienation, demise and
other disposition without any
interruption or adverse claim
from any stool or person.
10. That the
land described in the Schedule
is hereby declared the bona-fide
property of the EWUKU NVAVILE
FAMILY free from all
encumbrances whatsoever.”
By the
Statutory Declaration, the
defendant’s family came out with
the area of land they claim as
belonging to their family and
they leave us in no doubt as to
the total area of forest land
which members of that family
have supposedly cultivated in
their own right. To verify the
accuracy or otherwise of the
delineation of their supposed
family land area we would do
well to look closely at certain
features of the area as well as
the evidence of the 1st
defendant given in
cross-examination. In the course
of cross-examination of the 1st
defendant he was offered the
opportunity to explain how the
boundaries of the land depicted
in exhibit N, the Statutory
Declaration, were arrived at. We
would reproduce the portion of
his cross-examination at page
122 of the record of appeal
which has a direct bearing on
the subject as follows:
“Q. The
exhibit N you made, when you
were demarcating the boundaries
how did you go about it?
A. We went
to the Lands Commission and out
of the master plan they did it
for us when we mentioned our
boundary owners to them.”
Clearly the
mode of marking out the
boundaries of exhibit N is not
an acceptable customary law
practice for that purpose. In
the case of Vanderpuije v. Adam
[1961] GLR (Pt II) 733 it was
held by Ollennu J., as he then
was, that a person cannot
unilaterally fix a common
boundary between his land and
that of adjoining owner. The
Supreme Court affirmed that
decision in the case of Adam v.
Vanderpuije [1963] 1 GLR 194.
See also the cases of Nyame v.
Yeboah [1961] GLR 281, S.C. and
Feli v. Akessse (1931) 2
W.A.C.A. 46, P.C. There is no
indication that in the
preparation of exhibit N the
defendants’ family caused a map
to be drawn based on features of
the land which they were
supposed to show to qualified
surveyors as well as boundaries
of the land agreed upon by
defendants’ family and owners of
adjacent lands.
FORFEITURE
Payment of
tribute by the defendants’
family-grantee to the
plaintiff’s stool was obviously
an acknowledgement by the
defendants’ family of the
plaintiff’s stool’s superior
allodial ownership of the land
of which the area of the grant
to their ancestress is only a
part. In other words payment of
tribute by the defendants’ Ewuku
family to the plaintiff’s stool
was indicative of recognition by
that family of the plaintiff’s
allodial ownership of the area
of the grant which is at Ewuku
from where we suppose the
defendants’ family name EWUKU
NVAVILE FAMILY is derived. That
means payment of tribute to the
plaintiff’s stool related only
to the area of the grant to the
defendants’ ancestress and not
beyond it.
With this
background we look at the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
based on the refusal by the
defendants’ family to pay
tribute to the plaintiff’s stool
which relates to the grant to
that family. The judgment of the
Court of Appeal based on
forfeiture on account of refusal
by the defendants’ family to pay
tribute to the plaintiff’s stool
ought to be seen as relating to
only the area of the grant at
Ewuku in respect of which the
defendants’ family used to pay
tribute to the plaintiff’s
stool. As demonstrated in this
judgment the attempt by the
defendants in their defence to
ostensibly relate payment of
tribute to the whole area
covered by exhibit N in order to
justify the exercise of their
usufructuary rights beyond the
area of their grant failed. In
reality the plaintiff’s claim
covers the whole area which
exhibit N, the Statutory
Declaration seeks to claim as
belonging to the defendants’
family. The plaintiff’s stand
has all along been that the area
covered by exhibit N was not
what his stool granted to the
plaintiff’s ancestress. That
means so long as the plaintiff’s
stool is concerned payment of
tribute related to only the area
of the grant to the defendants’
ancestress at Ewuku. It would
therefore be illogical and
indeed inappropriate for the
Court of Appeal to base its
judgment in respect of the whole
area claimed by the plaintiff
upon the refusal by the
defendants’ family to pay
tribute in respect of the area
of the grant to their
ancestress, which is limited to
the environs of Ewuku. After all
in part of its judgment quoted
above the Court of Appeal came
to the conclusion that the
defendants’ family granted
“portions of land to others
which belonged to the allodial
owner among others”. That in our
view could have been good basis
for its decision, looking at the
claim of the plaintiff in its
totality. We do not think that
it is necessary for us to deal
with Ground II of the grounds of
appeal since that would be
uncalled for in the
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Even though
we are of the view that the
Court of Appeal based its
decision inappropriately on
forfeiture of the land granted
to the defendants’ family which
the plaintiff did not ask for,
we still share the opinion that
taking into account the totality
of the evidence adduced at the
trial and the reasons given in
this judgment the appeal ought
to be dismissed. We therefore
dismiss the appeal. However, in
place of the orders given by the
Court of Appeal in its judgment
we make the following orders:
(i) Declaration of title to all
that piece and parcel of land
described in relief (a) of the
plaintiff’s claim, subject to
the rights of the defendants’
family as holders of the
determinable or usufructuary
title in respect of the land
granted to them at Ewuku. For
the avoidance of doubt, the
areas outside the land granted
to the defendants’ family by the
plaintiff’s stool are declared
in favour of the plaintiff’s
stool. (ii) In place of reliefs
(b) and (c) of the plaintiff’s
claim we make an order for the
defendants and their grantees in
areas beyond the environs of
Ewuku to negotiate with the
plaintiff for terms of their
occupation of lands on which
they have trespassed. (iii) We
grant the order for perpetual
injunction against the
defendants, their agents,
servants, assigns and workmen
etc. in respect of the lands
outside the area of the
defendants’ family’s grant at
Ewuku. (iv) Declaration that
the Declaratory Instrument
described in relief (f) of the
plaintiff’s claim is null and
void and of no effect.
B.
T. ARYEETEY
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
BROBBEY, JSC:
I have had
the benefit of reading and
studying in advance the judgment
of my Brother Aryeetey JSC. I
agree with the judgment and wish
to add the following in the form
of a re-statement of established
principles of customary law
applicable in similar
situations.
The principle
that a person can reduce
portions of land to his
possession and thereafter claim
ownership of it applies only to
members of the same family who
occupy land belonging to that
family.
-
By
“family” is meant members
who hail from the same
family root. “Family” in
this context cannot include
members of the same clan
like Oyoko or Aduana. To
illustrate this further,
there are Aduanas in various
Regions or places such as
Ashanti in Essumeja, Obo in
Kwawu, Asante Akim in Agogo.
Their common bond is that
they are all described as
Aduana and use similar clan
symbol but are not related
in any other way. An Aduana
from Kwawu cannot claim to
belong to an Aduana family
from Asante Akim in any
other way. An Aduana from a
different place cannot claim
land belonging to the Aduana
family in a place totally
different from his own
Aduana family.
-
Where
members of a totally
different family migrate
from one place to a
different place and they are
given land on which to
settle (hereinafter called
the Settlement Area), it is
but common sense to subsume
that the settlers are
confined to live within the
boundaries of the areas
given to them to settle on
(the Settlement Area). If
such a settler takes land
outside the Settlement Area,
he becomes a trespasser of
the area he has taken
without authority.
-
For the
avoidance of doubt, the area
outside the Settlement Area
belongs to the original
owners.
-
In case
the Settlement Area is not
well demarcated or where the
boundaries are not clearly
known, one can deduce the
boundaries to be from a
reasonable distance from the
boundaries of the Settlement
Area. The fact that the
boundaries are not clear
should not be taken as a
reason for the settlers
arrogating to themselves
areas far away from the
Settlement Area. When a
person gives another a place
to stay, that should not be
taken as a licence to take
any area that the Settler
likes onto himself, unless
so permitted by the original
owners.
-
Only
members of the original
family who originally owned
the place and gave out the
place to the settlers have
the right to develop and
occupy areas outside the
Settlement Area. They can
acquire land outside the
Settlement Area by
occupation or by development
like farming, building
thereon etc. Such
acquisitions are rights
which settler do not have
and cannot have by reason of
the fact that they are
strangers to the original
family which owns the land.
-
In the
instant case, the plaintiffs
maintained that their family
members were from Lower Axim
Traditional Area. They
contended that the
defendants were not part of
their family members. They
insisted further that the
defendants were originally
from Ahanta when their
ancestress emigrated to
Lower Axim and was given
land (Ewuku) to settle on.
On the facts of this case,
Ewuku was the Settlement
Area. The contention by the
plaintiffs that the
defendants were from Ahanta
was never challenged by the
defendants. In fact, when
they arrogated part of the
Axim lands to themselves and
gave them out to others,
they got the Ahanta chief to
sign the documents. What
authority did the Ahanta
chief have over Axim lands
for him to have signed for
the defendants? That was not
explained by the defendants.
The defendants and all his
family members who took
lands outside the Settlement
Area given to them (Ewuku)
were trespassers.
-
As
trespassers, they could not
give what did not belong to
them. It was a clear case of
nemo dat quod non habet. All
who took from the defendants
lands outside the Settlement
Areas of Ewuku were
themselves trespassers.
-
The fact
that the defendants and
their fellow trespassers had
developed the trespassed
lands or stayed on the lands
for several years were no
grounds for decreeing valid
title in their favour. If
long possession were enough
to found title in their
favour, it would mean that
whenever anyone took
possession of another
person’s property and held
on to it for a very long
time, he becomes the owner
of that property. That kind
of acquisition of ownership
by long possession would
lead to chaos. The principle
is that long possession is
valid and is evidence of
title but not against the
true owner. Whenever the
true owner surfaces, the one
in possession should give
way to that true owner.
I wholly
agree that the appeal fails and
should be dismissed.
S. A. BROBBEY
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree:
DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C.
DR. S. K. DATE-BAH
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
I also
agree: ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C.
S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS)
(JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT)
I also
agree: BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C.
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
W. A. N.
ADUMUA-BOSSMAN FOR THEDEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/
APPELLANTS.
KODWO ERSKINE
FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.
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