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AYIKUMA ADAMS, (SUBSTITUTED BY NANA OFUSU APPIAH) EMMANUEL ADJAH ANKRAH AND JAMES K. B. VANDERPUIJE v. EMMANUEL TETTEH LOMOTEY AND NII ARYEE ANKRAH [25/7/2001] CA. 14/2000.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA.

_____________________________

CORAM: AMPIAH, (PRESIDING),KPEGAH, JSC,ADJABENG, JSC,LAMPTEY, JSC, ADZOE, JC.  CA NO. 14/2000  25TH JULY, 2001

1. AYAHUASCA ADAMS, substituted by  )   - PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

NANA OFAYS APIA                               )

2. EMMANUEL ADJANKH                      )    - CO-PLAINTIFF/

3. JAMES K. B. VANDERPUIJE               )    - RESPONDENTS/

VRS.

1. EMMANUEL TETTEH LOMOTEY     )    - DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT

OF ODORKOR, ACCRA                       )

2. NII ARYEE ANKRAH                            )   - CO-DEFENDANT.

______________________________________________________________________________

 

JUDGMENT

LAMPTEY, JSC:

The brief facts of the case on appeal are that the plaintiff obtained a customary grant of the land in dispute from the Manche Ankrah family sometime in 1962. He went into possession almost immediately. Sometime in 1980 the defendant entered that land and started putting up a wooden structure. The plaintiff promptly pulled down and destroyed the wooden structure. A complaint of this fracas was made to the Ghana Police. The Ghana Police did not pursue the complaint and did not investigate it. In the opinion of the Ghana Police, the real issue in dispute is the ownership of the plot of land therefore advised the rival parties to seek redress in a civil  court. None of the parties acted on the advice of the Ghana Police.

Sometime in 1981, the defendant commenced building operations on the plot of land. The plaintiff again made a complaint of trespass against the defendant. In the meantime the plaintiff sued the defendant in the High Court Accra and claimed  the reliefs stated in the writ. The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the plot of land was originally allocated to his mother on the occasion 30 members of Manche Ankrah family were allocated plots of land, including the plot in dispute, by the Manche Ankrah family. He pleaded that his mother had remained in possession of the plot since the said allocation. In due course, one Nii Ayi Ankrah applied to be joined as co-defendant. He gave two main reasons to support his application. The first was that the plot of land in dispute was part of Manche Ankrah family land. The other reason was that the plot of land was customarily granted to defendant's mother by Manche Ankrah family.

In a summons for directions filed by the lawyer for plaintiff the real issue in dispute was whether the plot of land was granted to the plaintiff or was allocated to the mother of the defendant. I must draw attention to the fact that the plaintiff sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession of the land in dispute the defendant and co-defendant did not counterclaim for a declaration of title to the plot of land in dispute.

The plaintiff gave evidence and called four witnesses including two members of Manche Ankrah family. The defendant gave evidence but did not call any witness. The co-defendant did not give evidence. The trial judge gave judgment for plaintiff and granted the reliefs he sought. The defendant was aggrieved by the judgment and appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal of the defendant was dismissed in a unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal. The defendant was dissatisfied and aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Appeal and appealed to this Court.

Counsel for defendant argued ground (ii) first. He submitted that the Court of Appeal was wrong in giving judgment for the plaintiff when "he did not establish that his alleged grant of one of the 30 plots in 1962 by the same family preceded the grant of 30 plots to the displaced 30 members for their resettlement at New Awudome." He contended that on the evidence on record the plot in dispute, that is plot No.10, was allocated to one Adotey Quarshi. He argued, however, that "there was no basis for what PW3 implied that simply because Adotey Quarshi was No.10 on the list of persons plot No.10 necessarily was allocated to him, and that plot No.5 also went to Lamley Lamptey because she is No.5 on the list". He conceded that Lamley Lamptey's name  appeared at No.5 but argued that the entry "No.5 was a slight error". Dealing with the case of the plaintiff he contended that on the evidence on record he was not one of the 30 persons to whom the 30 plots of land was allocated. He argued that Exhibit E the Conveyance executed in 1979 on which plaintiff relied as evidence of his title to the land, did not in law pass any title to him because his grantors did not have legal capacity to convey the plot to him. He stated that plaintiff failed to establish and prove that the Manche Ankrah family made a customary grant of the plot of land to him.

In reply counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant failed to establish and prove by evidence the identity of the land he claimed, the date and time of his grant and the nature of his grant. He argued that the documentary evidence, in particular, Exhibits C l and E related to plot No.5 and not to plot No.10 which was allocated to one Adotey Quarshi. He contended that the documents put in evidence by the defendant through the surveyor appointed by the court did not identify the plot of land claimed by the defendant.

The complaint against the judgment of the Court of Appeal as formulated under ground (ii) on the notice of appeal must be carefully and critically examined. The gravamen of the complaint was expressed as follows:

"........the Court of Appeal was wrong in giving judgment in favour of the plaintiff when he did not establish that his alleged grant of one of the 30 plots in 1962 by the same family preceded the grant of the 30 plots to the displaced 30 members for their settlement at New Awudome"

I have critically read and examined the judgment of the Court of Appeal. For the avoidance of doubt and purpose of clarity I reproduce the passage from the judgment of Afreh JA:-

...I have no doubt that the respondent (plaintiff) discharged the onus on him. His evidence that he obtained the land in 1962 from the then undisputed Head of Manche Ankrah Family, Nii Ardey Ankrah, was fully supported by the evidence of four witnesses including three members of the Ankrah family. In my opinion that grant made by Nii Ardey Ankrah was a valid customary grant."

There is no reference by the learned judge to 30 plots and the allocation thereof in the passage. It was not the case of the plaintiff that he was one of the 30 persons each of  whom was allocated one of the 30 plots. It was the defendant who claimed the plot in dispute through his late mother Lamley Lamptey. The case of the defendant was that his late mother was one of 30 persons to each of whom was allocated one plot out of the 30 plots. The Court of Appeal duly considered the case of the defendant on record. In its unanimous judgment the court speaking through Afreh, JA stated:

"It is significant that although the appellant (defendant) said his mother was one of 30 persons who was allocated land at Awudome on their resettlement, he was unable to bring any one to give evidence in support of his claim that his mother was allocated one of the 30 plots...."

It is clear from the passages reproduced from the judgment of the Court of Appeal that counsel for defendant misconceived findings of fact made by the appellate court.

The Court of Appeal raised serious issues to expose the weaknesses in the case of the defendant. The defendant did not call any of the boundary owners whose names he had supplied to the surveyor appointed by the court. When it is pointed out that the two documents, Exhibit C and Exhibit C l which defendant handed over to the surveyor for purposes of identifying and plotting the land he claimed showed two different and separate plots, the failure on the part of the defendant to offer any credible evidence of what he called "a small error" was fatal, in the sense that he failed clearly and concisely to identify the plot of land he claimed to be his mother's. I do not intend to burden this opinion with a list of cases on this issue.

Again, in the survey instructions filed by lawyers for defendant, the names of adjoining boundary owners were stated as follows - (1) Aku Ankrah on east; (2) Laryea Mensah on the north and (3) Aku Thompson on the south. The defendant closed his case and did not call any of them. He did not offer any explanation for his omission or failure to call his boundary owners.

I note that counsel for defendant impeached portions of the evidence of PW3 and concluded that his evidence in substance destroyed the case of the plaintiff. He did not go further to state that the evidence of PW3 corroborated that of the defendant. It is therefore necessary to examine the evidence of PW3 at length. The evidence of PW3 on the issue of ownership of the plot of land in dispute reads as follows:-

"The land was granted to the plaintiff in 1962. The land was granted to the plaintiff  by the late head of Manche Ankrah family Robert Nii Ardey Ankrah after plaintiff had presented a bottle of schnapps or gin and £50....."

PW3 was not an ordinary witness. He testified as follows:

"I am a Ga. I belong to the Manche Ankrah family. I am the treasurer of the Manche Ankrah family. I was acting secretary for the family and I was at all meetings of the family. My house is just about 200 yards from the land in dispute".

The evidence of PW3 was not disputed nor discredited by cross-examination. His evidence corroborated the evidence of plaintiff of the issue of ownership of the land in dispute.

This very witness, PW3 testified about the land allocated to the mother of defendant. Lamley Lamptey. He stated:

"I know the defendant has not been given land near the area in dispute. I know defendant's mother was once offered a piece of land, but she did not accept it. I know plot No.5 was allocated to Lamley Lamptey as shown on Exhibit C l."

It is clear from the above that the defendant was allocated plot No.5 as shown on Exhibit C l which document defendant handed over to the court surveyor. As pointed out elsewhere in this opinion, defendant sought to reject his own document on the unexplained ground that Exhibit C l contained a small error.

The evidence on record supports the finding by the trial Judge that the plaintiff successfully discharged the burden he assumed. The plaintiff did not seek to prop up his case by any weakness in the case of the defendant.

In this action, the case of the defendant consisted only in repeating what he pleaded on oath. He did not call any evidence to corroborate his own evidence. The witnesses from Manche Ankrah family by their testimony supported and corroborated the evidence of the plaintiff and not that of the defendant.

Counsel for defendant dealt at great length with Exhibit C and Exhibit Cl. I need not deal with the issues raised because counsel misconceived the contents of these two documents. As pointed out earlier, the plaintiff had nothing to do with the preparation and or production of these two documents. The plaintiff did not put these two documents in evidence. These two documents were documents which the defendant used to describe and identify the land he claimed. The evidence of the court surveyor who tendered Exhibit C and Exhibit Cl left the trial court in no doubt that Exhibit C identified a plot quite distinct from the plot of land on Exhibit Cl. The trial judge made finding on this issue. The finding was supported by the evidence on record. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding. Before us, it has not been shown that the finding cannot be supported by the evidence.

Ground (iii) on the notice of appeal reads:

(iii) The Court of Appeal erred in accepting and relying on the evidence of PW3 to the effect that although the plaintiff's (defendant's) mother was one of the 30 persons allocated the 30 plots she disclaimed it although the plaintiff nowhere confessed in his pleadings that the defendant's mother was one of the 30 members who were allocated these plots but she rejected that plot given to her"

Arguing this ground, counsel for defendant contended that the plaintiff did not plead this substantial and material fact. He argued that the plaintiff should have pleaded this fact and given evidence on it. Since the plaintiff did not do this counsel for defendant submitted that the Court of Appeal should have ignored the evidence of PW3 on this issue and not used in its judgment in particular, when the Court of Appeal held that the defendant should have contradicted or denied the evidence that his mother rejected and disclaimed plot No.5.

In reply, counsel for plaintiff submitting that the law enjoined the defendant to object to inadmissible evidence at the time it was tendered. He cited S. 6(1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) and also the cases of Asomah vrs. Sevordzie (1987-88) 1 GLR 67 and Atta vs. Adu (1987-88) 1 GLR 233.

It is necessary to reproduce S 6(1) of NRCD 323 as follows:

"6(1) in every action and at every stage thereof, any objection to the admissibility of the evidence by a party affected thereby shall be made at the time the evidence is offered".

This rule was considered by the Supreme Court in Asomah vs. Sevordzie (1987-88) 1 GLR 67. At holding (1) appears the interpretation of the sub-rule.

"...(i) therefore if at the trial evidence being given by a party had no bearing on the facts he had pleaded it was the duty of opposing counsel to object to that evidence and exclude it. If that was not done, and the evidence got on the record, then a court could not shut its eyes to it in considering the case as a whole, especially if it was against the party that led it..."

The decision in the Asomah case was given on 19th March 1987. Some three months later, on 15 June 1987, the Supreme Court in Atta and another v. Adu  (1987-88) 1GLR 233 held at holding (1) that:

"(1) The Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD 323) S.6(1) provided that where evidence was not pleaded but let in at the trial, the court was obliged to consider the matter so let in..."

The above interpretation of S.6(1) of NRCD 323 is sound and cannot be questioned. I find no merit in this ground of appeal.

Counsel for defendant next argued ground (one) on the notice of appeal.

It reads:

"(1) The Court of Appeal erred in law in rejecting the proposition put forward on behalf of the appellant to the effect that where a plaintiff seeks recovery of possession of land from a defendant who is in possession the plaintiff has the burden of proving a better title to the land and succeeding on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant's case."

In arguing this ground of appeal, counsel for defendant sought to rely on ss. 21, 24 and 48(1) of NRCD 323. He contended that since the evidence on record established that the defendant was the party in actual possession of the land in dispute the plaintiff could only succeed if the plaintiff proved and established a better title to the plot of land. He did not refer to the pieces of evidence which established and proved that the defendant was the person in actual possession. This was pointed out in the reply of counsel for plaintiff, namely "that no basis exist for this contention".

The law on the burden of persuasion has received respected judicial interpretation. I need not burden this opinion by compiling a list of them. I find that counsel for defendant, did not refer to any evidence to prove and establish that defendant was in possession. In his evidence-in-chief the defendant testified as follows:

"At that time, that is when the grant was made to my mother, the grantor was Nii Ardey Ankrah who was the chief or manche......... The area was properly laid out and my mother's plot was No. 10".

I must immediately point out that the defendant did not tell the court when the grant was made by Nii Ardey Ankrah to his mother. The statement of defence did not indicate when the grant was made to the mother of the defendant. Unlike the defendant the plaintiff pleaded at paragraph 3 of the Statement Claim that Nii Ardey Ankrah in or about 1962 made a grant of the land in dispute to him. The plaintiff repeated this averment on oath. The plaintiff provided corroborative evidence of his grant. The defendant as pointed out already, failed and omitted to produce evidence to corroborate his bare and ambiguous evidence that the land was granted to his mother by the very person, Nii Ardey Ankrah. The Court of Appeal was right in law in rejecting the uncorroborated and imprecise evidence of the defendant. Clearly and plainly the sections of NRCD 323 relied on as well as the case law cited by counsel for defence do not apply in the instant case.

Counsel for defendant did not argue the remaining grounds and gave reasons for so doing. I agree that the arguments and submissions to be canvassed and made had been taken care of. No useful purpose would be served in repeating them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the findings of fact made by the trial judge were supported by the evidence on record. Before us, counsel for the defendant did not succeed in demonstrating and establishing that the evidence on record do not support the findings of fact. The Court of Appeal concluded its judgment as follows:

"The issues before the trial court were issues of fact. He adequately considered the evidence before him.... There is evidence to support his conclusions. It is trite law that an appellate court should not reverse findings of fact made by a trial judge unless there are good reasons for doing that".

I am in entire agreement with the above statement of law. The findings of fact are supported by the evidence on record. I find that grounds (iv), (v) (vi) and (vii) raised issues and matters that have been sufficiently and adequately dealt with in this opinion. No useful purpose would be served if I repeated myself. In the result, I would dismiss the appeal.

GEORGE LAMPTEY,

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

AMPIAH, JSC:

I agree.

A. K. B. AMPIAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

KPEGAH, JSC:

I agree

F. Y. KPEGAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

ADJABENG, JSC:

I agree

E. D. K. ADJABENG

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

ADZOE, JSC:

I also agree.

T. K. ADZOE

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

COUNSEL

MR. JAMES AHENKORAH FOR THE APPELLANTS

MR. CHARLES HAYIBOR FOR RESPONDENTS

 

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