Wills - Validity - Mental
capacity - Burden of proof -
Burden on party alleging lack of
testamentary capacity - Burden
not discharged by repeating
pleadings on oath - Testator
admitted in hospital prior to
making will - Medical evidence
of state of mind of testator to
be produced
- Evidence Decree 1975, (NRCD
323) s 15(3).
Wills - Execution - Proof -
Burden on party proffering will
to prove due execution.
The plaintiffs, as executors,
sued the defendants, children of
the testator, for a declaration
in the High Court that the
testator had the mental capacity
to make the will in issue and
for recovery of all rents from
the estate and documents
relating to the estate. They
claimed also, perpetual
injunction to restrain the
defendants from interfering with
any properties not devised to
them. The defendants pleaded
that their late father was in
such a deteriorated state of
health that he could not
possibly have given instructions
to his lawyer for the
preparation of the alleged will
or executed same; that the will
was invalid in that the two
attesting witnesses were not
present at the same time when
the testator thumbprinted it.
They therefore counterclaimed
that a previous will of the
testator be admitted to probate.
The trial court found as a fact
that the testator was on
admission at the hospital for
sometime before he was
discharged and decreed that the
will be admitted to probate. The
defendants appealed to the Court
of Appeal.
Held
- (1) Section 15(3) of
the Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD
323) provided that unless and
until the burden shifted, a
party claiming that any person,
including himself, was or had
been insane or of unsound mind
had the burden of persuasion on
that issue. The defendants bore
the burden of showing that the
testator was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the
will. Akenten II v Osei
[1984-86] GLR 437 cited.
(2) The burden of persuasion
that a testator was of unsound
mind was not discharged by the
defendants repeating on oath the
allegations in their statement
of defence. Since the testator
was on admission at the hospital
for sometime before he was
discharged, it should not have
been difficult for the
defendants to obtain medical
evidence on his state of mind at
the time he executed the will.
(3) The burden was on the
plaintiffs to satisfy the court
at the trial of the due
execution of the will in
accordance with the Wills Act
1971 (Act 360). On the evidence
on record it could not be said
that the two attesting witnesses
were present when the testator
thumbprinted the will and the
appeal would therefore be
allowed.
Cases referred to:
Akenten II v Osei
[1984-86] 1 GLR 437.
Essien alias Baidoo (dec’d), In
re, Essien v Adisah
[1987-88] 1 GLR 539.
Kodua
for the defendants-appellants.
Akenteng
for the plaintiffs-respondents.
APPEAL from the judgment of the
High Court.
ESSIEM JA.
This is an appeal from the
judgment of the High Court,
Kumasi by which that court gave
judgment in favour of the
plaintiffs. The defendants,
being aggrieved by the said
judgment have appealed to this
court.
The case concerns the estate of
the late Nana Osei Akoto. The
said Nana Osei Akoto is alleged
to have died testate and the
action was for the following
reliefs:
“1. A declaration that the will
of the late Nana Osei Akoto
dated 13th June 1986 is valid.
2. A declaration that the late
Nana Osei Akoto was of a sound
mind and consequently had the
mental capacity to make the said
will dated 13th June 1986
without any pressure or
influence.
3. An order to surrender all
documents relating to the estate
of the deceased.
4. Recovery of all rents
commencing from 1st August 1986
to the date of judgment.
5. Perpetual injunction to
restrain the defendants, their
agents or servants from
interfering with or having any
dealings with any properties of
the late Nana Osei Akoto which
are not devised to them.”
The plaintiffs are the executors
of the will of the late Osei
Akoto and defendants were two of
the children of the deceased.
The defendants in their defence
pleaded that their late father
was at the time material to this
action in such a deteriorated
state of health that he could
not possibly have been in a
state of mind to have given
instructions to a lawyer for the
making of a will or to execute a
will as alleged by the
plaintiffs. As the defendants
alleged that their late father
had executed an earlier will
they counterclaimed for “a
declaration that it is the said
will of their said late father
dated August 1972, which is
valid and genuine and that that
is the only will which ought to
be admitted to probate”. The
trial court took evidence and
held that “there was nothing
objectionable about the will of
13 June 1986 and it ought to be
admitted to probate”. The
appellants were aggrieved by
this judgment and therefore
appealed to this court on a
number of grounds of appeal.
The arguments advanced in
support of the appeal may be
summed up briefly as follows:
that at the time of the alleged
execution of the will, the
testator was so ill that he
could not have executed the will
which implied that it was not
the testator who executed the
will; that the will was not
executed in accordance with the
law in that the two attesting
witnesses were not present at
the same time when the testator
thumbprinted the will. This, it
was submitted, was contrary to
section 2(3) of the Wills Act.
Finally, that the plaintiffs in
their evidence departed from the
statement of claim wherein they
had pleaded that:
“3. The plaintiffs say that on
or about the 13th of June, 1986
the late Nana Osei Akoto invited
a lawyer to his residence and
made the will which is the
subject matter of the suit.”
In their evidence they had
stated that the late Nana Osei
Akoto went to the office of
lawyer Duku, PW5, to instruct
him to prepare a will for him.
It was argued that the learned
trial judge was therefore wrong
in accepting the evidence of PW5
that the testator went to his
office to give him instructions
about the will. Finally it was
argued that from the evidence,
PW4 and PW3 were not present at
the same time when the testator
was alleged to have executed the
will in dispute. It was
contended on behalf of the
respondents that the appellants
had the burden of showing that
the testator was of unsound mind
at the time he executed the
will. This burden, counsel
contended, was not discharged by
the appellants. Counsel further
argued that on the charge of
fraud and undue influence the
appellants failed to comply with
Order 19 r 6 of the High Court
(Civil Procedure) Rules LN140A
in that they did not give
particulars of fraud or undue
influence and therefore any
evidence on it should be ignored
by the court. It was submitted,
in the alternative, that even if
there was undue influence, then
from the evidence it was against
the lawyer and not the testator;
that since the lawyer, PW5, was
an independent witness his
evidence should be accepted.
On the evidential burden on the
parties, the case of Akenten
II v Osei [1984-86] 2 GLR
437 at p 438 neatly sums up the
burden on both the plaintiff and
the defendants. In that case
Apaloo CJ, sitting as an
additional High Court judge,
expressed the opinion that:
“The evidential burden assumed
by each side in view of the
position taken by the parties,
was that the plaintiffs must
show that the document in
respect of which they sought
probate was the testamentary
wish of G; that he was compos
mentis at the date of its
execution and was a free agent
and lastly, that it was executed
and attested in accordance with
the requirement laid down in
section 2 of the Wills Act, 1971
(Act 360). Upon showing that,
the burden then shifted to the
defendant to prove the alleged
forgery.”
In the instant case the
appellants contend that the will
was not executed in accordance
with s 2(3) of the Wills Act
1971 (Act 360). That section
provides that:
“The signature of the testator
shall be made or acknowledged by
him in the presence of two or
more witnesses present at the
same time.”
In this appeal two issues are
crucial for determination by
this court: (a) was the testator
in such a state of health as to
be capable of executing a will?
and (b) was the will executed in
accordance with the law? As to
the mental state of the testator
at the time he executed the will
it seems to me that the
appellants had the burden of
showing that the testator was of
unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will for it is
provided by s 15(3) of the
Evidence Decree 1975 NRCD 323
that:
“Unless and until it is shifted,
the party claiming that any
person, including himself, is or
was insane or of unsound mind
has the burden of persuasion on
that issue.”
Reading through the evidence I
come to the conclusion that that
burden of proving that the
testator was of unsound mind at
the time he executed the will
was not discharged. That burden
is not discharged by repeating
on oath the allegations in the
statement of claim. At least
since the testator was on
admission at the Okomfo Anokye
Hospital for sometime before he
was discharged, it should not
have been difficult for the
appellants to have obtained
medical evidence on his state of
mind at the time he executed the
will.
The next burden on which the
respondent had to satisfy the
court at the trial was the due
execution of the will in
accordance with the Wills Act
1971 (Act 360). The evidence of
the attesting witnesses on this
is of crucial importance. PW2
and PW4 were the attesting
witnesses. In his
evidence-in-chief PW2 testified
as follows at p 50 of the
record:
“In June 1986 the late Nana Osei
Akoto sent for me to come and
see something. I went. He asked
me to witness him thumbprinting
a document and I did. When I
went to him one clerk was
present. Nana Osei Akoto said
that person was a lawyer ...
Apart from the lawyer, I also
saw an elderly person present.
The lawyer and the elderly man
were the only persons who were
with the testator. Owusu
Frimpong later came. In the
presence of those present Nana
Osei Akoto told me to thumbprint
the document as a witness for
him. When I finished I did not
see any person do anything in my
presence.”
Under cross-examination he
denied a suggestion that Owusu
Frimpong did not come to meet
him with Nana Osei Akoto. He
answered that he did. Then PW4
testified as follows in his
evidence-in-chief:
“I am Owusu Frimpong. I work at
Zenith Assurance as a Messenger.
I live at Odum. I know the late
Nana Osei Akoto of Offinso. He
is dead. I know PW3. One Friday
at about 10.30 Opanin Osei Akoto
sent for me. I went and met him.
I met Nana Osei Akoto with a
lawyer. Apart from the lawyer
there was no other person with
the deceased. He asked me to
witness a document he was
thumbprinting. I did so by
signing. After that he thanked
me and I went away. I notice my
signature on exhibit A.”
It is apparent from the evidence
that at the time the witness was
with the testator PW2 was not
present. He was not
cross-examined on this either.
In re Essien alias Baidoo
(deceased), Essien v Adisah
[1987-88] 1 GLR 539, a case
which involved the validity of a
will, the Court of Appeal held
at p 540 of the report that:
“(1) since the crux of the
matter was whether the will had
been signed by the testator, and
if so, whether it had been
properly executed by him in
accordance with the provisions
of the Wills Act, 1971 (Act
360), the proof of the
affirmative rather lay squarely
on those who propounded the
will. Consequently the court
could not presume that the will
had been signed by E and in the
presence of two witnesses in the
face of the positive evidence
from one of the attesting
witnesses that he never saw E
signing the will...
(3) The provisions of Act 360, s
2(1) and (3) would not be
complied with unless both
witnesses attested and
subscribed after the testator
had made his signature or had
acknowledged the same to them
when both were actually present
at the same time. However there
could not be acknowledgement
unless the witnesses either saw
or had the opportunity of seeing
the testator’s signature,
despite the fact that the
testator might have expressly
declared that the document to be
attested to was his will. Since
it was clear on the evidence
that the late E neither signed
the will in the presence of the
attesting witnesses nor was his
signature already on the will at
the time the attesting witnesses
subscribed to the will, the High
Court judge was right in
pronouncing against the validity
of the will.
(4) The court was enjoined to
decide the case in accordance
with the provisions of the Act
360, even though its decision
would have the effect of
defeating the purpose or
intentions of the testator.
Therefore although the court
always had a strong inclination
to carry into effect clear
intentions of deceased persons,
where the intentions were
contained in an instrument
purporting to be a will whose
execution did not comply with
the provisions of the law, there
was very little that could be
done but pronounce against it,
the extent of bequests and the
number of beneficiaries
notwithstanding.”
One must now return to the
evidence of the two attesting
witnesses. In assessing the
evidence of the two attesting
witnesses the learned High Court
judge made the following
observations:
“From the face of the evidence
in chief it is apparent the
witnesses did not see the
testator thumbprint the document
in their presence or acknowledge
his thumbprint in the presence
of the witnesses. The missing
link was however provided by the
examination of lawyer Duku, by
learned counsel for the
defendants. Lawyer Duku was
asked:
“Q. The elderly man and the
young man were never present at
the same time to see Nana Osei
Akoto thumbprint the document?”
Lawyer Duku’s answer was as
follows:
“A. They were present. The
elderly man first came in. Later
the young man also came. They
both met me into the room of
Nana Osei Akoto.”
He was then asked:
“Q. The old man (i.e. Nana Osei
Akoto) never thumbprinted
exhibit A in the presence of the
two attesting witnesses?”
To this lawyer Duku replied:
“The late Nana Osei Akoto first
thumbprinted the will thereafter
the elderly person thumbprinted.
The young man signed it after
the elderly man.”
The elderly man is Kwabena
Wiafe, PW3. The young man is
Owusu Frimpong PW4. Their
evidence shows that the testator
thumbprinted the document in
their presence. There is no
doubt therefore that the
formalities required by s 2 of
the Wills Act 1971 (Act 360)
were complied with. The testator
thumbprinted the will in the
presence of the two attesting
witnesses who in the presence of
the testator thumbprinted and
signed their names
respectively.”
With great respect to the
learned trial judge, the
evidence of the two witnesses
does not support this statement.
The evidence of PW4 especially
contradicts him. Part of his
evidence which I have already
referred to is that:
“Apart from the lawyer there was
no other person with the
deceased. He asked me to witness
a document he was thumbprinting.
I did so by signing. After that
he thanked me and I went away.”
As I have pointed out earlier
this shows that the two
attesting witnesses were never
present at the same time when
the testator thumbprinted the
alleged will. The learned trial
judge therefore was wrong in
stating that the two attesting
witnesses were present when the
testator thumbprinted the will.
This contradicts the evidence of
PW4. It is plain that the
evidence of PW5 and that of PW4
on the execution of the will is
contradictory. It was the duty
of the plaintiffs who were
propounding the will to lead
evidence to show that the will
they were propounding in solemn
form was executed in accordance
with the Wills Act.
Throughout the case the
appellants contended that the
late Baffour Akoto was at the
time he was alleged to have
executed the will so ill that he
was in no sound mind to execute
a will.
From the evidence of DW1, Dr
John Glover Addo Wood, the late
Baffour Osei Akoto was admitted
at the Okomfo Anokye Hospital,
Kumasi on 8 September 1985 and
discharged on 25 October 1985.
“When he came on 8th September
1985 he could not lift leg and
arm, but at the time he was
discharged he could raise the
left arm and leg a bit but he
would not stand. He was
re-admitted on 30th May 1986.
This time he had signs of
bronchia asthmalia heart failure
... The family wanted me to keep
him because of the paralysis but
I said that there was no point
in doing that.”
The evidence of PW5, the lawyer
who prepared the alleged will,
is that the testator went to his
office to instruct him to
prepare a will for him. He had
forgotten the date the testator
gave him the instructions but it
was about a month before the
will was executed on 13 June
1986. This means the witness
received his instructions about
13 May 1986. There is evidence
from the doctor who treated the
late Nana Akoto at the hospital
that the deceased was admitted
on 8 September 1985. He was
discharged on 25 October 1985.
He was re-admitted on 30 May
1986 and discharged on 31 May
1986. He was re-admitted on 5
July 1986 and died on 8 August
1986. From the evidence of this
witness the late Nana Akoto was
not on admission from 30 May
1986 to 4 July 1986. The
evidence of the attesting
witnesses, as already referred
to in this judgment, shows that
the late testator got PW2 to
witness his signature sometime
in June 1986. There is no
evidence as to when PW4 was
contacted but I have already
demonstrated that the two
attesting witnesses were never
present at the same time when
the testator was alleged to have
executed the will.
In my opinion having regard to
the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the will it was
incumbent upon the respondent to
prove conclusively that the will
was executed in accordance with
the Wills Act. In my humble
opinion they failed to do this.
I shall therefore allow the
appeal and declare that the will
of the late Nana Osei Akoto
dated 13 June 1986 was not
executed in accordance with the
law and is therefore invalid. I
therefore allow the appeal.
ADJABENG JA.
I agree.
FORSTER JA.
I also agree.
Appeal allowed.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner.