Practice and procedure –
Pleadings – Striking out –
Application to dismiss action as
disclosing no cause of action –
Affidavit evidence not
admissible – Circumstances in
which power may be exercised by
court – Or 25 r 4, High Court
(Civil Procedure) Rules 1954 (LN
140A).
Practice and procedure –
Pleadings – Admissions – What
amounts to admission – Or 19 r
4, Or 32 r 6, High Court (Civil
Procedure) Rules 1954 (LN 140A).
Practice and procedure – Parties
– Capacity – Plaintiff to prove
headship if denied and authority
to institute action.
Practice and procedure – Summons
for directions – Issues – Any
other issues raised on the
pleadings – Meaning and effect.
The plaintiff, suing as the
family head of the Asenie family
of Abenase, pleaded that the
defendant and his sibbling were
issues of a slave woman bought
into the family but the
defendant made a statutory
declaration claiming membership
of the Bretuo clan of Mampong,
thus disclaiming his slave
descent and membership of the
plaintiff’s family. The
plaintiff claimed that the
denunciation constituted
severance of ties with the
Asenie family and that the
defendant was liable to
surrender all properties that
went into his possession as the
customary successor of his
brothers by the appointment of
the Asenie family. The defendant
denied his slave descent and
maintained his claim to
membership of the Bretuo clan of
Mampong. He however denied the
alleged statutory declaration
and disputed the plaintiff’s
claim as the family head or that
the action was brought on behalf
of the family. Three years after
summons for directions was taken
the defendant applied to dismiss
the action on the ground that it
disclosed no reasonable cause or
action. The court granted the
application and dismissed the
action. The plaintiff appealed
successfully to the Court of
Appeal and the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held:
(1) In an application under
Order 25 rule 4, the court ought
to concern itself only with the
allegations contained in the
pleadings. No evidence was
admissible; only the pleadings
should be looked at in order to
determine whether a reasonable
cause of action was disclosed.
(2) What amounted to an
admission of fact in a pleading
was defined in Order 19 rule 14
as an allegation of fact not
denied specifically or by
implication. Under Order 32 rule
6 judgment would not be entered
unless the admission was clear
and unequivocal, even so
judgment was not automatic; the
court must consider it just in
the circumstances to do so.
Where there were issues for
trial it would not be just to
exercise the power. The
appellant having denied all the
material facts pleaded in the
statement of claim, including
the plaintiff’s capacity, the
application was unfounded.
Pomaa v Fosuhene [1987-88] 1
GLR 244 referred to.
(3) Generally the head of
family, as a representative of
the family, was the proper
person to sue and be sued in
respect of family properties but
where his authority was disputed
he must prove not only his
headship but also the authority
to institute the action.
Kwakye v Tuba [1961] GLR 535
referred to.
(4) Order 25 rule 4 and Order 32
rule 6 were designed for the
summary determination of cases
that were manifestly frivolous
and vexatious. Those rules
vested the court with discretion
to be exercised at any stage of
the proceedings but sparingly
and only in plain, obvious and
simple cases, not to in cases
involving arguments on serious
points of law or disputed facts
that would require evidence. The
weakness of a case or defence
was no ground for the exercise
of the power. There was an issue
whether in Ashanti custom, a
statutory declaration without
the customary performance of
cutting ekar sufficed to sever
family ties. Attorney General
of the Duchy of Lancaster v
London and North Western Railway
Company [1892] 3 Ch 274, CA,
Hubbuck and Sons v Heywood
[1899] 1 QB 86, CA, Bank of
West Africa Ltd v Holdbrook
[1966] GLR 164, Ghana Muslim
Representative Council v Salifu
[1975] 2 GLR 246 CA,
Amoabimaa v Badu (1956) 1
WALR 227 referred to.
Cases referred to:
Amoabimaa v Badu
(1956) 1 WALR 227.
Armah v Addoquaye
[1972] GLR 109, CA.
Attorney General of the Duchy of
Lancaster v London and North
Western Railway Co
[1892] 3 Ch 274, 62 LJCh 271, 67
LT 810, 2 R 84, CA.
Bank of West Africa Ltd v
Holdbrook
[1966] GLR 164.
Ghana Muslim Representative
Council v Salifu
[1975] 2 GLR 246, CA.
Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson,
Heywood & Clark Ltd
[1899] 1 QB 86, [1895-9] All ER
Rep 244, 68 LJQB 34, 79 LT 429,
15 TLR 29, 43 Sol Jo 41, CA.
Kwakye v Tuba [1961] GLR
535.
Pomaa v Fosuhene
[1987-88] 1 GLR 244, SC.
APPEAL to the Supreme Court
against the judgment of the
Court of Appeal.
K Kodua
for the appellant.
Peter Adjetey
with him, William Addo
for the respondent.
ABBAN JSC.
The Court of Appeal on 24
January 1991 reversed the ruling
of the High Court, Kumasi given
in favour of the appellant. It
is against that decision of the
Court of Appeal that the
appellant appealed to this
court.
The appellant was a defendant in
the High Court. The respondent
(hereinafter referred to as the
plaintiff) by his writ of
summons claimed:
“(a) A declaration that one Yaw
Manu (deceased) late of
Abenase-Ejisu and Yaw Mensah
(deceased) late of Abenase-Ejisu
the uterine brothers of the
defendant were members of the
plaintiff’s maternal family.
(b) A declaration that
consequent upon a statutory
declaration by the defendant, of
unknown date, by which the
defendant renounced any or all
family ties with the plaintiff,
the properties of Yaw Manu
(deceased) and Yaw Mensah
(deceased) which become the
family properties of the
plaintiff and which were handed
over to the defendant as
customary successor of the said
Yaw Mensah (deceased) should be
surrendered by the defendant to
the plaintiff.”
The plaintiff sued as the head
of the maternal family of one
Kwabena Dua Agyemang of Asenie
clan of Abenase village in the
Ejisu Traditional area. He
alleged in his statement of
claim that the defendant and his
uterine brothers, Yaw Manu and
Yaw Mensah both deceased were
children of one Adwoa Tawiah;
and the latter, Adwoa Tawiah,
was a slave and was purchased
into the plaintiff’s family. So
by virtue of the said purchase
the defendant’s mother became a
member of the plaintiff’s family
and so the defendant and his
deceased brothers also became
members of the said family.
It was further alleged by the
plaintiff that the defendant was
customarily appointed by the
plaintiff’s family to succeed to
the properties of his two
uterine brothers, Yaw Manu and
Yaw Mensah both of whom died
intestate and were buried at
Abenase.
In paragraph 9 of the statement
of claim the plaintiff pleaded
as follows:
“9. On some date in 1976, which
is not known to the plaintiff,
the defendant hereto in an
affidavit made a statutory
declaration to the effect that
the defendant and his brothers
and sisters hailed from Mampong,
Ashanti, and that the
defendant’s mother belonged to
the Bretuo clan, defendant in
effect denounced that the
defendant was a member of the
plaintiff’s family.”
In his statement of defence the
defendant denied the plaintiff’s
capacity to sue in the first
place; he further disputed that
the plaintiff brought the action
for and on behalf of the
plaintiff’s family as alleged in
the statement of claim. The
relevance of these denials will
be seen in due course.
The defendant also denied that
his mother was ever bought as a
slave into the plaintiff’s
family and averred that she was
a member of the Bretuo family of
Ashanti Mampong and gave the
circumstances under which the
mother came to settle at Abenase
where she was later married.
Again, in paragraph 8 of the
defence he denied that it was
the plaintiff’s family that
appointed or made him (the
defendant) the customary
successor to the movable and
immovable properties of the
defendant’s two uterine
brothers. It is also important
to note the defendant’s
averments as contained in his
statement of defence, paragraph
9; it is stated as follows:
“9. The defendant denies the
averments contained in
paragraphs 8 and 9 and 10 of the
plaintiff’s statement of claim
and at the trial will put the
plaintiff to strict proof.”
In others words, the defendant
was denying in the above
paragraph 9 that he had made
such statutory declaration of
the sort or of the kind alluded
to by the plaintiff in his
statement of claim. Therefore
the defendant intended, at the
trial, to demand from the
plaintiff strict proof of that
allegation.
The plaintiff filed a short
reply in which he simply stated
that he “joins issue with the
defendant on the material
averment in the defendant’s
statement of defence.” I must
observe that from the pleadings
several issues ought to have
been set out in the summons for
directions but only one issue
was set down by counsel for the
plaintiff. That was not
satisfactory. However the
plaintiff’s counsel covered
himself by adding the usual
phrase “any other issues raised
by the pleadings.”
On 24 April 1977, the case came
before the court and in the
presence of counsel for the
parties the issues as set out in
the summons for directions were
accepted by the High Court judge
and adopted for trial. The
learned High Court judge on the
same date directed the registrar
to fix a date for the trial. The
case was fixed for trial on 13
July 1977 by the registrar in
compliance with the order of the
High Court judge. But it was
adjourned. Indeed, the trial of
the case was adjourned on
several occasions.
While the parties were still
looking forward to a day when
the trial would begin the
defendant, on 14 February 1980,
that is, some three years after
the issues had been agreed upon,
filed motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s action. The
defendant’s main ground for
asking for an order of dismissal
was that the case “disclosed no
reasonable cause or action.”
On 26 August 1980, the learned
High Court judge in a considered
ruling acceded to the
defendant’s request, and ruled
in favour of the
defendant and dismissed the
action of the plaintiff. The
operative part of the said
ruling read:
“The writ is therefore dismissed
as being unmeritorious and as
disclosing no reasonable cause
of action.”
The plaintiff appealed against
the decision of the High Court
judge, Kumasi to the Court of
Appeal and as I said earlier on
the latter, on 24 January 1991,
allowed the appeal, overturned
the decision of the High Court
judge and held, inter alia, that
without evidence the trial High
Court could not “pronounce that
there had been severance of
family ties”; and that the
plaintiff was therefore
“entitled to be given a chance
to prove his case.” The
defendant-appellant, still bent
on having a short-cut to end the
proceedings, appealed to this
court challenging the decision
of the Court of Appeal.
The defendant-appellant in his
motion before the High Court,
Kumasi, stated that he was
moving for the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s action under Order
25 rule 4, Order 32 rule 6 and
under Order 63 rule 6 of the
Supreme Court (High Court) Civil
Procedure Rules 1954 (LN 140A).
For the sake of convenience I
will set out in full all the
three different rules. Order 25
rule 4 provides that:
“The Court or a Judge may order
any pleading to be struck out,
on the ground that it discloses
no reasonable cause of action or
answer, and in any such case
or in case of the action or
defence being shown by the
pleadings to be frivolous or
vexatious, the Court or a
Judge may order the action to be
stayed or dismissed, or judgment
to be entered accordingly, as
may be just.” (My emphasis.)
Order 32 rule 6 states:
“Any party may at any stage of a
cause or matter, where
admissions of facts have been
made, either on the pleadings,
or otherwise, apply to the Court
or a Judge for such judgment or
order as upon such admissions he
may be entitled to, without
waiting for the determination of
any other question between the
parties; and the Court or a
Judge may upon such application
make such order, or give such
judgment, as the Court or Judge
may think just.”
Order 63 rule 6 also provides
that:
“Subject to particular rules,
the Court may in all causes and
matters make any order which it
considers necessary for doing
justice, whether such order has
been expressly asked for by the
person entitled to the benefit
of the order or not.”
Order 63 rule 6, in my view, is
not relevant to the present case
and I will not therefore give
much attention to it. However,
how the power under Order 25
rule 4 and under Order 32 rule 6
should be exercised will be
dealt with shortly.
The defendant-appellant
challenged the decision of the
Court of Appeal on about three
main grounds. In the first
ground, it was contended that
the Court of Appeal erred (in
the light of the pleadings and
in the light of the authorities)
in holding that the fact of
severance which the plaintiff
respondent had “unequivocally
and positively admitted in his
plaint and pleadings and which
was the foundation” of the
plaintiff-respondent’s action
was still in issue and that
evidence was still required to
prove it.
Learned counsel for the
defendant-appellant relied on
the case of Armah v Addoquaye
[1972] GLR 109 and submitted
that the defendant in Armah’s
case failed to deny the
allegation of fact pleaded by
the plaintiff in that case and
that was held to amount to an
admission and therefore no
further evidence was necessary
to prove or establish that fact.
Counsel further submitted that
the facts in the present case
were even stronger than those in
Armah’s case because in
the present case, it was the
plaintiff-respondent himself who
founded his action on the
admission of severance and yet
the Court of Appeal held that
the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to lead evidence to
prove the said fact of
severance. Learned counsel then
contended that since the
plaintiff-respondent admitted
the severance and founded or
based his action on it, there
was not need for any further
evidence to be led to prove it.
I will consider the submissions
so far advanced. I must make it
clear at this stage that in
dealing with applications under
Order 25 rule 4, where the
defendant is contending that the
statement of claim does not
disclose any reasonable cause of
action, the court should concern
itself only with the allegations
as contained in the pleadings.
No evidence is admissible. Only
the pleadings should be looked
at to determine whether or not
they disclose reasonable cause
of action.
Did the plaintiff-respondent in
his statement of claim make
“positive and unequivocal”
admission of material facts?
What amounts to an admissions of
fact in a pleading is defined by
Order 19 rule 14 which states:
“Every allegation of fact in any
pleading, not being a petition
or summons, if not denied
specifically or by necessary
implication, or stated to be not
admitted in the pleading of the
opposite party, shall be taken
to be admitted except as against
an infant, lunatic, or person of
unsound mind not so found by
inquisition.”
Applying this rule to the
pleadings in the present case, I
found it difficult to accept the
submissions of learned counsel
for the defendant-appellant.
From the pleadings, portions of
which I set out earlier on in
this judgment, the
defendant-appellant himself
denied almost all the important
and material facts which the
plaintiff-respondent pleaded in
his statement of claim.
It was true that the
plaintiff-respondent alleged
severance of family ties in his
statement of claim paragraph 9.
But this was never admitted by
the defendant-appellant. The
defendant-appellant
categorically denied and
disputed any severance in
paragraph 9 of his statement of
defence and went on to contend
that “at the trial [he would]
put the plaintiff to strict
proof.” So the severance of
family ties became an issue
which could only be resolved,
one way or the other, after
hearing evidence on it. It was
therefore a fallacy to contend
that on the pleadings there was
positive and unequivocal
admission of the severance of
family ties.”
There were other facts in the
plaintiff-respondent’s statement
of claim which were also never
admitted by the
defendant-appellant and
therefore became issues. For
instance, in paragraphs 1 and 2
of his statement of claim, the
plaintiff pleaded that he was
head of his “maternal family”
and that he was instituting the
action “for himself and on
behalf of the members of the
plaintiff’s family” to recover
the properties in dispute from
the defendant-appellant. But in
his paragraph 1 of defence, the
defendant-appellant vehemently
denied that allegation. In the
said paragraph 1 the defendant
averred:
“The defendant denies that the
plaintiff is the head of his
family and he further denies
that the action was instituted
on behalf of the family.”
It was therefore clear that the
defendant even challenged the
plaintiff-respondent’s right to
bring the action in the first
place. Thus the
plaintiff-respondent’s capacity
to sue became an issue to be
tried; and so the
plaintiff-respondent had the
burden of establishing his locus
standi.
The general rule is that the
head of a family, as a
representative of the family, is
the proper person to sue and be
sued in respect of family
properties. Thus where his
authority to sue in a
representative capacity is
disputed, as in the present
case, the burden is upon him to
prove not only that he is the
head but also that he had been
duly authorised or empowered to
take the action.
He could not succeed on the
merits without satisfying the
court on that important
preliminary issue: See Kwakye
v Tuba [1961] GLR 535 at
539. So how could the
plaintiff-respondent discharge
this onus without leading cogent
evidence to establish his
capacity which the
defendant-respondent had
challenged?
It could therefore be seen that
with all these matters in
dispute the learned High Court
judge, with due respect, ought
not to have exercised judicial
discretion in favour of the
defendant-appellant under Order
25 rule 4 or under Order 32 rule
6 and thereby, so to speak,
throw the plaintiff-respondent
out of court.
Apart from everything, the
plaintiff-respondent’s case, on
the pleadings, was not frivolous
and vexatious.
May I observe that the combined
object of Order 25 rule 4 and
Order 32 rule 6 is to put a
summary end to cases which are
manifestly frivolous and
vexatious and which therefore do
not admit of any argument. These
rules give the court judicial
discretion to take that course
at any stage of the proceedings,
and in appropriate cases. But
the judicial discretion, given
by these rules, ought to be
exercised sparingly and only in
plain, obvious and simple cases.
These rules do not apply to
cases which are susceptible not
only to arguments on serious
points of law but also they do
not extend to cases which, from
the pleadings, the facts are in
dispute and therefore require
evidence to resolve them.
Thus so long as the pleadings
raise some questions fit to be
decided by evidence as in the
present case, the mere fact that
a party’s case or defence may be
weak is no ground for striking
it out under these rules. A L
Smith LJ in the Attorney
General of the Duchy of
Lancaster v London and North
Western Railway Company
[1892] 3 Ch 274 CA at page 278
made the following observation:
“It seems to me that when there
is an application to strike out
a pleading and you have to go to
extrinsic evidence to show that
the pleading is bad, that rule
does not apply. It is only when
upon the face of it, it is shown
that the pleading discloses no
cause of action or defence or it
is frivolous and vexatious, that
the rule applies”.
Similar views were expressed in
Hubbuck and Sons v Wilkinson,
Heywood and Clark [1899] 1
QB 86, CA. At page 91 of the
report Lindley MR also explained
that:
“The use of the expression
“reasonable cause of action” in
rule 4 [English Order 25 rule 4
which was exactly the same in
wording as our Order 25 rule 4]
shows that the summary procedure
there introduced is only
intended to be had recourse to
in plain and obvious cases.”
See also Bank of West Africa
Ltd v Holdbrook [1966] GLR
164 and Ghana Muslim
Representative Council v Salifu
[1975] 2 GLR 246 CA.
As already stated, no “positive
and unequivocal admissions” were
made on the face of the
pleadings. Thus the learned
trial judge wrongly exercised
his judicial discretion against
the plaintiff-respondent. Indeed
there was no justification
whatsoever for the view the
learned High Court judge took of
the matter.
Recently, the Supreme Court also
had the occasion to discuss
Order 32 rule 6 in Pomaa v
Fosuhene GLR [1987-88] 1 GLR
244 and rightly held that a
“judgment would not be given
under Order 32 rule 6 unless the
admission was clear and
unequivocal and that even if “an
admission” was clear and
unequivocal a judgment under
Order 32 rule was not automatic.
It must be given only if the
court thought it just; and it
might not be just if there were
other issues to be tried on the
pleadings,” as it happened
in the present.
The learned High Court judge
also based part of his decision
on wrong premises. For example,
in his ruling he said:
“The applicant has deposed to an
affidavit in which he says the
respondent had denounced his
family before the chief of
Abenase and offered drinks to
the said chief in severance of
his ties with the applicant’s
family. It is this severance of
the family ties by the
respondent which prodded the
applicant to commence these
proceedings to protect what he
deems to be the interest of his
family in the properties, the
subject-matter of this suit.
There is no doubt therefore that
both parties accept that there
has been a severance of family
ties”. (My emphasis.)
With due respect that was a very
serious error for, no such
inference could be drawn from
the pleadings. As I have already
demonstrated, the
defendant-appellant never
accepted or admitted even the
existence of any family ties
between the defendant’s family
and the plaintiff’s family, and
so to the defendant the question
of severance of family ties
could not have even arisen.
Indeed the said statutory
declaration in question as can
be found at page 30 of the
record gave a complete lie to
the above inference and also to
the submissions in support of
ground one.
The so called statutory
declaration which had been the
defendant’s trump-card rather
showed that there had never been
in existence any family ties
between the plaintiff’s family
and that of the defendant’s. In
the statutory declaration the
defendant-appellant himself gave
an explanation why he offered
the drinks. The drinks were not
presented in order to sever
family ties. They were
presented, according to him, as
thanks-offering to the
plaintiff’s family for having
lived with the defendant’s
family peacefully for years. At
page 30 of the record where the
so called statutory declaration
appeared, its paragraph 8
explained the purpose of
presenting the drinks in the
manner as follows:
“…[I] presented one bottle of
whisky and two size bottles of
schnapps to the chief of Abenase
and his elders for the purposes
of thanking them for having
lived with me for such a long
time and also bidding them
farewell as I have expressed my
wish to move from Abenase family
to live with my family at
Ashanti Mampong.
In paragraph 11 of the same
declaration the
defendant-appellant continued:
“I have not been assimilated
into any group of family or
families at Abenase and the only
family I belong to is my
matrilineal family at Ashanti
Mampong headed by my cousin the
said Kwaku Addai.”
So the defendant-appellant not
having admitted the existence of
family ties, not having also
admitted any severance of family
ties in the statutory
declaration and in the statement
of defence, it was wrong, for
the learned trial judges to
conclude that “there is no doubt
… but both parties accept that
there has been a severance of
family ties” and by this wrong
conclusion the learned judge
completely disabled himself from
exercising properly, the
judicial discretion which is
conferred upon him by Order 25
rule 4 and Order 32 rule 6.
Again the learned trial judge
missed a vital point in the
matter. In Amoabimaa v Badu
(1956) 1 WALR 227 the severance
was not by a statutory
declaration in the nature of an
affidavit. The severance was
performed in a customary manner
by the cutting of ekar. So there
was again an issue on that
aspect of the matter for him to
try, namely, whether in the
Ashanti custom, a mere statutory
declaration before a
Commissioner of Oath without
performing the custom of cutting
ekar was an effective manner of
severing family ties. Because
what the parties might have
thought amounted to an effective
severance of family ties might
not be so in the eyes of the
law. Thus there were very
serious matters of law to be
considered, and in such
situation, the case should not
have been disposed of in a
summary fashion.
I come now to ground two of the
grounds of appeal which
contended that the judgment of
Amuah JA was irrelevant to the
question at issue. Learned
counsel for the
defendant-appellant submitted
that Amuah JA’s judgment
concentrated only on an
application for interim
injunction which was brought in
the High Court by the
plaintiff-respondent which was
refused. In my view, that was an
unfair criticism which should
not be countenanced. For
although Amuah JA’s judgment
discussed the interim
injunction, it later went on and
dealt with matters relevant in
the case and concluded as
follows:
“This does not enable judgment
to be obtained on the pleadings.
See Orders 25 and 32 rule 6 of
LN 140A. There is controversy, a
question of fact to be resolved
by evidence. The ruling given by
the trial court is void because
it is not warranted by the rules
of procedure and the party
affected is entitled to apply to
set it aside.”
I think ground two was totally
misconceived. In ground three it
was contended that the Court of
Appeal erred in law when it
failed to consider and rule on
the case law authorities cited
by counsel for the
defendant-appellant and which
were binding on the Court of
Appeal. With due respect to
learned counsel for the
defendant-appellant there was no
necessity for the Court of
Appeal to indulge in that futile
and unprofitable exercise when
those authorities cited had no
relevance to the real issue in
controversy in the appeal.
Those authorities became
relevant and could then be
discussed and considered if on
the pleadings there had been
truly a “clear, positive and
unequivocal admission of
severance of family ties within
the meaning of Order 19 rule 14,
which I have already set out
elsewhere in this judgment.
The additional ground of appeal
which was filed later dealt with
the Slaves Emancipation
Ordinance, Cap 108 which
abolished slavery. Learned
counsel for the
defendant-appellant, in a
nutshell, contended that the
plaintiff-respondent’s action in
the High Court was founded on
slavery which had been abolished
and therefore the action was
illegal from its very inception
and on that basis alone the
action was properly dismissed by
the learned High Court judge and
the Court of Appeal was
therefore wrong when that court,
in effect, sought to resurrect
the illegal action.
It is true that the
plaintiff-respondent alleged
that the defendant-appellant’s
mother became a member of the
plaintiff’s family by virtue of
being purchased as a slave into
the family but that allegation,
which was denied by the
defendant-appellant, was not the
basis of the plaintiff’s claim
for the recovery of those
properties alleged to be family
properties. The basis of the
plaintiff’s claim was that the
defendant-appellant had
allegedly severed family ties
with the plaintiff’s family and
so the defendant-appellant must
give up the properties allegedly
belonging to the plaintiff’s
family and which properties were
in the defendant’s hands.
It may be remarked that there
are many ways by which persons
can join families. A typical
example is what happened in the
case of Amoabimaa v Badu
and which the learned trial
judge referred to in his ruling
and which I have also mentioned
above. In that case the
ancestors of the parties
migrated in four or five
distinct families from different
parts of Ashanti and settled at
Agona Nyakrom in the Central
Region. At Nyakrom they found
that they were all of one clan,
the Yego clan. They therefore
joined together in their place
of abode as one composite
family. So the mere fact that
the present plaintiff-respondent
in his statement of claim tried
to show how the defendant’s
family came to join the
plaintiff’s family did not
necessarily imply that the
action was being founded on
slavery.
Indeed the defendant-appellant
himself in his Ground One
clearly admitted that “the
severance of family ties between
the defendant and the
plaintiff’s family…indeed, was
the basis or foundation of the
plaintiff’s action herein ...”
So on the defendant-appellant’s
own showing his additional
ground was also misconceived.
For the above reasons, we
conclude that there is no merit
in the appeal and it must
therefore be dismissed with
costs; and the case be remitted
back to the High Court Kumasi to
be heard on its merits.
(Sgd) FRANCOIS JSC.
(Sgd) AMUA-SEKYI JSC.
(Sgd) AIKINS JSC.
(Sgd) WIREDU JSC.
(Sgd) BAMFORD-ADDO JSC.
(Sgd) HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.
Appeal dismissed.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner |
