Appeal Court.
19 November 1934
Appeal from Supreme Court.
.Joinder
of Joint and Several Claims-Set
oil not specifically applied for
or pleaded-Separate debts set
oil against a joint claim-Set
oil and a Claim for trust
moneys-plea of Statute of
Limitations.
Held: Separate debts cannot be
set off against a joint claim.
Statute of Limitations not
applicable in this case.
The facts of the case are
sufficiently set out in the
judgment.
A. Soetan
for Appellants.
J. C. Zizer
for Respondents.
The following judgment was
delivered:-
WEBBER, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
This is an appeal from the
decision of Graham Paul, J., who
gave judgment for the
plaintiffs-appellants for £38
2s. 6d. but ordered them to pay
costs assessed at forty guineas.
This judgment was in respect of
a joint claim against the
defendants as the Administrators
of the Estate of their (the
defendant's) father, the late
David Augustus Taylor, who died
on ,28th April, 1932. He was the
uncle of the plaintiffs, and he
dealt with the Estate of Thomas
Taylor senior, the plaintiffs'
grandfather, who died in 18~2.
The plaintiffs claimed jointly
the sum of £553 6s. 8d. being'
one-third share of certain
specified rents for the period
1922·1925 said to have been
collected by the late, D. A.
Taylor in his capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of
the late Thomas Taylor senior,
the plaintiffs claiming as
beneficiaries in that Estate,
and there is an extra sum
claimed, namely £78
11s.
1O;d., being second plaintiff's
share of the distribution of the
said Estate effected by the
Administrator in 1922. '
On this claim as it stands the
learned Judge found for the
plaintiff as per the claim but
made two reductions-namely £40
being certain rents not actually
received by the late D. A.
Taylor, and £78 11s. l0;d. which
the learned Judge found as the
second plaintiff's share as
claimed but against which he set
off that amount by a credit
entry in the second plaintiff's
account at page 13 of the
Ledger.
The plaintiffs agree to the
reduction of £40 but deny the
right
of the defendants to set off a
sum equivalent to the amount £78
Us. l0ld. as claimed.
I agree with the Judge's
reduction of the sum of £78 11s.
10~d. and for these reasons-this
part of the plaintiffs
particulars of their claim
refers to the second plaintiff's
share and had nothing to do with
the joint claim and he has
rightly held that this has been
settled. It was rightly set off
.on the ground that the second
plaintiff agreed to the set off
of £67 and actually received
payment of the balance. In
Exhibit " E " in a letter dated
5th August, 1H22, the late D. A.
Taylor wrote to second plaintiff
as follows; "Against your own
share of £78 11s. l0~d. I have
advanced of £67," and in reply a
week after second plaintiff
asked permission to have ~he
balance £11 11s. l0d. shown in
his favour and this was paid to
him. by cheque B.B'-W.A. No.
B.281461. It was not part of the
joint claim, and it was settled
in the matter indicated. I agree
with the ,judge' s finding that
on. the joint claim as before
the Court a sum of £513 is
owing.
In t he course of the
proceedings there emerged a set
off against this joint claim on
the cross-examination of the
first witness, and then followed
as much, if not more, evidence
about the individual debts owing
by the plaintiffs individually
to the late D. A. Taylor as
about the claim actually before
the Court.
The defendants pleaded
(a)
the Statute of Limitations and
(b)
not indebted.
There was no plea of set off nor
was the Judge ever asked to
allow it. The case however
proceeded, and the main issue at
the con elusion was the right of
the defendants to set off the
individual debts of the
plaintiffs against their joint
claim.
The learned ,Judge after finding
for the plaintiffs for £513 then
proceeded to adjudicate on the
set, off which emerged during
the proceeding's, the Total
amount of which was not
ascertainable until the
conclusion of the defendants'
case wa8 reached.
He found that the plaintiffs
were individually owing the late
D. A. Taylor sums amounting to
£413 68. 8d. leaving a balance
in favour of the plaintiffs of
£100, and then deducted a
further sum of £61 17s. 6d.
owing by the 1st plaintiff to D.
A. Taylor and finally gave
judgment for £38 2s. 6d.
There were several grounds of
appeal but it is sufficient to .
deal only with grounds 2 anD 7.
Ground 2 reads as follows;-
" The learned Judge was wrong in
law and in fact in allowing set
off by the defendants in this
action on the following
grounds-
(a)
" The defendants did not
specifically plead set off nor
filed any notice thereof or made
any definite or proper
application to the Court in
respect thereof;
(b)
The debts set off were statute
barred and not actionable at
date of writ;
(c)
Set off is not allowed against a
claim for money held in trust;
(d)
Separate debts ought not to be
set off against a joint claim ".
As to
(a)
the Counsel for appellants is
correct in saying that no set
off was pleaded-nor was there at
any stage of proceedings any
application made to set up any
such set off-at no stage of the
proceedings did the learned
Judge specifically permit it,
but apart from the embarrassment
which the introduction of such
extraneous matters during the
proceedings must have caused the
plaintiffs, I am of opinion that
(d)
of ground 2, namely that
separate debts ought not to be
set off against a joint claim is
a good ground for disallowing
the set off calculated by the
Learned Judge in this case.
A joint debt and Q several debt
cannot be set off against each
other
(Ex parte Twogood
1805 11
Ves
517). This is exactly what has
happened in this case. The
defendants have sought to set
off debts owing by the
plaintiffs individually to the
late D. A. Taylor against a
joint debt due to them from the
Estate. I do not see how any of
the cases quoted by the
respondents' Counsel applies.
Equity does not allow a set off
of debts accruing in different
rights (as in this case) unless
there is a series of transaction
clearly showing that joint
credit was given on account of
the separate debt
.(V1tlliamy v. Noble
1817 3
Mer
593. 618).
In Hanson ex parte
34 E.R. 305, quoted by Counsel
for respondents, the joint debt
was nothing- more than a
security for the separate debt
which is not so in this case,
the debts having been incurred
before the rents accrued, and I
am unable to hold that the facts
in this case are strong enough
to raise any presumption of an
agreement. to Ret off. In fact.
they tend. to negative such a
presumption. In December'. 1
!)25. first plaintiff ask/! for
his and his brother's share due
out of the Estate (Exhibit" B ")
and the late D. A. Taylor
replies agreeing that something
must be done. He does not refer
to transaction which happened
seven years before this nor does
he suggest any set off.
The plaintiffs patiently waited
for four years, and in May,
1930, they addressed a formal
letter to him "Dear Sir"
demanding a general account of
the Family Estate. There does
not appear to have been any
answer to this.
In my opinion the proper
procedure in this case, owing to
its importance, was to direct
pleadings--after pleadings there
were bound to follow two
counterclaims, one against each
plaintiff, and pleadings on the
counterclaims. It is true that
the plaintiff did not. demur to
the procedure adopted in this
case in bringing into issue the
indebtedness of the plaintiffs
to the late D. A. Taylor who was
the manager of the Trust Estate,
and they may be said to have to
some extent acquiesced in such a
procedure; but I think it would
be equitable to give the
plaintiffs every opportunity of
meeting such claims should the
defendants decide to pursue them
by a separate action against
each. Although there has been no
appeal by the respondents on the
ruling of the learned Judge on
the plea of the Statute of
Limitations, we have he en asked
to decide whether such a plea is
a good one, assuming that the
Statute of Limitations applies
to native8 in Nigeria. I agree
with the learned Judge that the
Trustee Act of 1888 in England
covers the position of the late
D. A. Taylor in regard to the
subject matter of this claim
which seeks to recover the
proceeds of trust property in
his hands.
He could not, in my opinion, have
pleaded the Statute nor could the
defendants, who are in the same
p08ition ..
Having regard to all the
circumstances of this case I think
the judgment of the Court below
should be varied and judgment
should be entered for the
plaintiffs for the sum of £513
18s. 6d.
As to the question of costs, the
order of the learned Judge cannot,
in my opinion, stand; on the claim
before the Court the
plaintiff8-appellants have
substantially succeeded, and they
should have the costs of
this Court together with costs in
the Court below to be paid out of
the Estate.
Under the circumstances I think
the plaintiffs are entitled to
have the payment of £38 2s. 6d.
and the costs of the action and of
this appeal paid to them
forthwith; execution as to the
balance of the judgment, namely
£475, should be stayed for six
months t<> enable the defendants,
if they think fit, to prosecute
their claims against the
plaintiffs for moneys due by each
of them to the Estate.
DEANE, C.J .. GOLD COAST.
I
agree.
RU'l'LER-LLOYD, ACTING C.J.,
NIGERIA.
I agree.
|