Constitutional law ‑
Constitution ‑ Interpretation ‑
Plaintiff seeking interpretation
of Constitution 1992 ‑ No
grievance or remedy sought ‑
Whether court may grant
declaration.
The plaintiff issued a writ of
summons in the Supreme Court for
certain declarations under
section 34 of the transitional
provisions of the Constitution
1992, of the Republic of Ghana.
In his statement of claim the
plaintiff explained that the
meaning of the section was
unclear, hence the action. The
defendant contended that the
writ did not disclose a cause of
action and ought to be
dismissed.
Held,
the duty of the court was to
interpret the constitution in
the context of disputes, not to
tender advice to prospective
litigants, which was the role of
solicitors in private practice.
The plaintiff did not claim that
his right had been infringed or
threatened. The court could not
make declarations in a vacuum.
The plaintiff would have been
entitled to seek an
interpretation of the section if
he had instituted the action
against a particular person in
respect of an act or omission
and such person sought shelter
under the section. On the
pleadings, any declaration made
would be in vacuo. The writ did
not disclose a cause of action
and would be dismissed.
ACTION by the plaintiff for
declarations under the 1992
constitution of Ghana.
Obeng Manu
(with Osei Acheampong)
for the plaintiff.
Martin Amidu,
Deputy Attorney-General (with
Mrs Adusa-Amankwah)
for the defendants.
ADADE JSC.
By his writ filed on
26/8/93, the plaintiff seeks:
“(a) A declaration
that upon the true and proper
interpretation of section 34 of
the transitional provisions of
the Constitution of the Republic
of Ghana 1992, only:
i. acts or omissions by persons
which brought about the
overthrow of the government of
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Republics
of Ghana;
ii. acts or omissions of persons
which occasioned the suspension
or abrogation of the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd constitutions of the
Republic of Ghana;
iii. acts or omissions of
persons which led to the
establishment of the military
regimes, namely, the National
Liberation Council (NLC), the
National Redemption Council
(NRC), the Supreme Military
Council (SMC I and II), the
Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC)
and persons who acted or omitted
to act on the instructions or
authority of any of the
aforementioned regimes, that are
indemnified but not otherwise.
(b) A declaration that it is
part of the fundamental human
rights and freedoms provided in
Chapter Five of the Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana 1992,
that:
i. all persons in Ghana are
equal before the law (article
17(1));
ii. persons aggrieved
by the acts or omissions of
others have the right to seek
redress before a court or a
tribunal (article 23);
iii. any enactment including the
said section 34 of the
transitional provisions which
expressly or by necessary
intendment seeks to impede the
citizens’ access to the courts,
or purports to take away the
citizens’ right to seek redress
before the courts or denies any
citizen the benefit or enjoyment
of the said constitutional
provision of equality before the
law is contrary to the rule of
law, unconstitutional and void.”
The plaintiff attached to his
writ a statement of his case,
which, because of its brevity, I
find necessary to reproduce in
full.
“STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S
CASE
1. The plaintiff is a citizen of
Ghana and lives in Kumasi,
Ashanti.
2. The plaintiff is a medical
practitioner and an
industrialist.
3. The plaintiff brings this
action in his capacity as a
citizen of Ghana.
4. The plaintiff says that the
defendant is a Minister of
State, the Attorney-General and
the principal legal adviser to
the Government.
5. The plaintiff says that in
the First Schedule of the
transitional provisions of the
Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana 1992 is section 34, the
side-note of which is one word,
namely, ‘indemnity’.
6. The plaintiff says that this
section 34 has as many as five
(5) subsections whose meaning is
unclear.
7. The plaintiff contends that
upon the true and proper
interpretation of the whole of
the said section 34 persons
whose acts and omissions are so
indemnified are those specified
in relief
(a) of the writ herein and not
otherwise. Further it is in the
plaintiff’s interest and the
interest of the public generally
that the said section be
interpreted.
8. The plaintiff says that the
said section 34 of the
transitional provisions of the
Constitution 1992 to the extent
that it seeks either expressly
or by implication to negate
provisions relating to the
fundamental human rights and
freedoms in Chapter Five of the
Constitution 1992, generally and
in particular articles 17(1) and
23 and the rule of law in the
preamble to the Constitution is
void and of no effect whatsoever
as specified in relief (b) of
the writ herein.
9. Wherefore the plaintiff
claims as per the writ the
reliefs thereon endorsed under
article 130(1)(a) and 2(1)(a) of
the Constitution of the Republic
of Ghana 1992.”
The defendant has filed a
defence to this action, the main
thrust of which is that the
plaintiff’s writ does not
disclose a cause of action, and
should be dismissed. I read the
plaintiff’s writ and statement
of case, and I ask myself a
simple question: Has any
occasion arisen to necessitate
the call for interpretation?
Does the writ, or the writ and
statement of case together,
disclose any occasion? Take, for
instance, the declaration sought
under paragraph (b) of the writ.
The plaintiff wants the court to
declare that: “all persons in
Ghana are equal before the law”
and he himself says that the
statement is in article 17(1) of
the constitution. I agree that
article 17(1) says so. But
does the court have to declare
that the article says so?
In any case, where will such a
declaration take the plaintiff
or anyone else? Again, has any
person impeded the plaintiff’s
access to the law courts? In the
absence of an allegation to that
effect, what is the point in
merely repeating the second limb
of article 23 in the form of a
declaration? See claim
(b)(ii).
Claim (b)(iii) and the whole of
claim ie (a)(i), (ii) and (iii),
are no more than section 34 of
the transitional provisions,
dismembered. Assembled together
they constitute section 34. Here
again agreeing with the
plaintiff amounts to no more
than saying that what he has
written is indeed section 34 of
the transitional provisions,
which is not saying much.
The plaintiff will be on course
to seek an interpretation of
section 34, or an aspect of it,
if he moves against a particular
person in respect of an act or
omission of that person, and he,
for a defence, seeks shelter
under section 34. It is then
that is will be profitable for
the court to determine whether
the defendant or his act or
omission is covered by section
34 or not. It is then that an
interpretation or a declaration
may be called for. On the
pleadings as they now stand, any
declaration made will be an
empty declaration, a declaration
in a vacuum.
Ours is to interpret the
constitution in the context of
disputes. Ours is not to
tender advice to prospective
litigants; that is the role of
solicitors in private practice.
I agree with the defendant in
this case that the plaintiff’s
writ does not disclose a cause
of action. I will dismiss it. In
the circumstances, it becomes
unnecessary to discuss and
determine the points of law
raised by the defendant as to
whether the plaintiff has
capacity, or whether the
transitional provisions are
enactments or not.
WIREDU JSC.
I agree.
KPEGAH JSC.
By his writ invoking the
original jurisdiction of this
court, the plaintiff is seeking
the following reliefs:
“(a) A declaration
that upon the true and proper
interpretation of section 34 of
the transitional provisions of
the Constitution of the Republic
of Ghana 1992 only;
i. acts or omissions by persons
which brought about the
overthrow of the government of
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Constitutions of the Republic of
Ghana;
ii. acts or omissions
by persons which occasioned the
suspension or abrogation of the
1st, 2nd and 3rd constitutions
of the Republic of Ghana;
iii. acts or omissions of
persons which led to the
establishment of the Military
Regimes, namely, the National
Liberation Council (NLC), the
National Redemption Council
(NRC), the Supreme Military
Council (SMC I and II), the
Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC)
and persons who acted or omitted
to act on the instructions or
authority of any of the
aforementioned regimes, that are
indemnified but not otherwise.
(b) A declaration that it is
part of the fundamental human
rights and freedoms provided in
Chapter 5 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Ghana 1992,
that:
i. all persons in Ghana are
equal before the law (article
17(1)).
ii. persons aggrieved
by the acts or omissions of
others have the right to seek
redress before a court or
tribunal (article 23);
iii. any enactment including the
said section 34 of the
transitional provisions which
expressly or by necessary
intendment seeks to impede the
citizens’ access to the courts,
or purports to take away the
citizen’s right to seek redress
before the courts or denies any
citizen the benefit or enjoyment
of the said constitutional
provision of equality before the
law is contrary to the rule of
law, unconstitutional and void.”
The statement of the plaintiff’s
case also filed the same day
indicates in paragraphs 5, 6, 7
the reasons for seeking the
reliefs quoted above. I will
quote the said paragraphs.
“5. The plaintiff says that in
the First Schedule of the
transitional provisions of the
Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana 1992 is
section 34, the side note of
which is one word, namely,
‘indemnity’.
6. The plaintiff says that
section 34 has as many as five
(5) subsections whose meaning is
unclear.
7. The plaintiff contends that
upon the true and proper
interpretation of the whole of
the said section 34 persons
whose acts and omissions are so
indemnified are those specified
in relief (a) of the writ herein
and not otherwise. Further it is
in the plaintiff’s interest and
the interest of the public
generally that the said section
be interpreted.”
The reasons given by the
plaintiff which could be said to
be the ground for seeking relief
(b) is contained in paragraph 8
of the statement of case. This
is what it says:
“8. The plaintiff says that the
said section 34 of the said
transitional provisions of the
Constitution 1992 to the extent
that it seeks either expressly
or by implication to negate
provisions relating to the
fundamental human rights and
freedoms in Chapter 5 of the
Constitution 1992 generally and
in particular article 17(1) and
23 and the rule of law in the
preamble to the Constitution is
void and of no effect whatsoever
as specified in relief (b) of
the writ herein.”
In effect, therefore, the
plaintiff is saying that after
reading section 34 of the
transitional provisions he found
the said provisions ambiguous
and unclear. He then proceeded
to give his understanding of the
provisions of section 34 and is
seeking the judicial blessing
from this court, in the form of
declaratory reliefs, that his
formulated version is the
correct interpretation of
section 34 of the transitional
provisions.
Although it may be right to say
that there is no law which
inhibits the jurisdiction of
this court in matters involving
the interpretation of the
constitution, I think it will be
worth while applying the concept
of judicial self-governance or
self-restraint in such matters.
The judicial authority of which
this court is the beneficiary or
endowed with is essentially
jurisdiction to deal with real
or substantial disputes which
affect the legal rights or
obligations of parties who
appear before us, and whose
interest are adverse to each
other. These competing interests
will necessarily call for
specific reliefs through
conclusive and certain judicial
decree or decrees. In these
circumstances the matter could
be said to be justiciable and
not otherwise. The principle of
justiciability precludes us from
giving advisory opinions based
on hypothetical facts which are
not part of an existing
controversy.
The plaintiff is not claiming
any right of his has been
infringed or is being threatened
with infringement. We cannot
make a declaration in a vacuum.
This is exactly what the
plaintiff is asking us to do and
we must decline any such
invitation. The plaintiff, in my
view, has no standing and his
suit must be dismissed.
HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.
I am in agreement with the
reasons given and the conclusion
arrived at by my learned and
respected brothers, Adade and
Kpegah JJSC. The plaintiff
invites this court to give him
judgment upon proof of axioms.
The answers to his plaints are
obvious, self-evident and
unambiguously stated in the
various articles of the
Constitution of 1992 to which
the plaintiff himself has
referred. This court cannot
accede to sterile claims in
which the defendant is bound to
agree with the plaintiff.
I will also dismiss the writ.
AMPIAH JSC.
I also agree.
Action dismissed.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner |