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Courts – Jurisdiction – Objection – May be taken at any time, anyhow, without entry of conditional appearance.

Courts – Jurisdiction – Land suits – Whether courts have jurisdiction over land suits in registration districts – Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) s 12(1).

Section 12(1) of Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) provided that: “No action concerning any land or interest therein in a registration district shall be commenced in any Court until the procedures for settling disputes under this Law have been exhausted.”

The plaintiffs sued in the High Court for a declaration of title to the disputed land and applied for interim injunction, which the 1st defendants opposed on the ground that under section 12(1) PNDCL 152, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action as the disputed area had been declared in LI 1521 as a registration district. The trial judge rejected the contention and granted the application and the 1st defendant appealed. Meanwhile the 1st defendant omitted to file a defence to the action and the plaintiffs applied for judgment in default of defence. At the hearing of the application for judgment the 1st defendant repeated the objection to jurisdiction but the court granted the application and entered judgment. The 1st defendant argued on appeal that an objection to jurisdiction could be raised at any time, anyhow, even in the affidavit in opposition to the application for interim injunction. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the trial judge had jurisdiction because the adjudication committees set up under the Law did not have power to deal with equitable reliefs such as interim injunctions, specific performance, interpleader suits, and claims for damages.

Held: (1) An objection to jurisdiction could be raised at anytime and anyhow, and not necessarily in a statement of defence. Although the appellant neither entered conditional appearance nor raised the objection by motion, it was sufficient that it did so in the affidavit in opposition to the motions for interim injunction and final judgment. Republic v High Court, Denu, ex parte Avadali IV [1993-94] 1 GLR 561 referred to.

(2) Although the adjudicating committees under PNDCL 152 had no jurisdiction to give declaratory judgments or grant injunction neither the High Court nor any other court had jurisdiction to determine a claim for declaration of title to or interest in land in a registration district declared under PNDCL 152. The plaintiffs’ claims were all caught by section 12(1) of PNDCL 152. In the circumstances the High Court had no jurisdiction. Mireku v Amar [1992-93] GBR 1094, CA, Raziel Construction Ltd v Kasser Ltd (No 2) [1992-93] GBR 512, SC, Republic v Court of Appeal, ex parte Ekuntan II [1989-90] 2 GLR 168, SC referred to.

Cases referred to:

Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd (No 2) [1992-93] GBR 512, SC.

Mireku v Amar [1992-93] GBR 1094, CA.

Republic v Court of Appeal, ex parte Ekuntan II [1989-90] 2 GLR 168, SC.

Republic v High Court, Denu, ex parte Avadali IV [1993-94] 1 GLR 561 sub nom Avadali IV v Avadali II [1992-93] GBR 733, SC.

APPEAL against the ruling of the High Court to the Court of Appeal.

W A N Adumua-Bossman for the 1st appellant.

L N Otoo (with him Willie Fugar) for the respondent.

Editorial note: For a contrary decision of the court, see Ghanatta v Board of Trustees of Nichiren Shoshu Soka Gakkai [1992-93] GBR 1532, CA.

ADJABENG JA. On 14 October 1992, the plaintiffs-respondents herein took action against the lst defendant-appellant herein and one other at the High Court, Accra. The plaintiffs-respondent by their writ of summons claimed the following reliefs:

“(1) A declaration of title to plots nos 86 and 87 Amissa Gon, Dansoman, Accra, together with all the buildings thereon and on which the Kaikan (centre for worship) of the plaintiff is situated.

(2).Recovery of possession of the disputed property.

(3) Recall and cancellation of any document affecting the land, prepared by the 2nd defendant purporting to vest the property in the 1st defendant or any other person or persons.

(4) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant his agents, servants, workmen or assigns or any associations or bodies formed by him from interfering in any way with the property in dispute.”

In a statement of claim subsequently filed by the plaintiffs they averred that the plaintiffs, a religious body, were originally established under the name Nichiren Shoshu of Ghana in 1968 as a branch of Soka Gakkai organisation in Ghana. This organisation was registered in 1975 under the Trustees Act 1962 (Act 106) and in 1977 acquired the property now in dispute for the purpose of building thereon their place of worship known as the “Kaikan”. The name of the organisation was in 1989 changed from Nichiren Shoshu of Ghana to Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai of Ghana and was re-registered as such under the Religious Bodies (Registration) Law 1989 (PNDCL 221). The plaintiffs averred that owing to some leadership changes which were made in April 1990, before the re-registration under PNDCL 221, a few members of the organisation, led by the 1st defendant-appellant herein, decided to disrupt the activities in the organisation; that even though the plaintiffs had requested the 2nd defendants, the original owners of the land, to prepare the documents on the land in the new name of the plaintiffs, they rather chose to do so in the old name of the organisation and released them to the 1st defendant-appellant and his break-away group. The plaintiffs therefore contended in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 of their statement of claim as follows:

“27. The 1st defendant and his group are not yet registered and they do not constitute the old group to claim any title to the property.

28. The plaintiff will contend that the conduct of the 2nd defendant is wrong, unlawful and constitutes fraud on the plaintiffs.

29. The plaintiff will further contend that the 1st defendant either alone or together with his break-away group have no title to the property in dispute: Nichiren Shoshu of Ghana ceased to exist with the registration of the plaintiff’s religious body.”

When the writ of summons and the statement of claim were served on the two defendants they both entered appearance but while the 2nd defendant filed a statement of defence, the 1st defendant-appellant did not file any. Meanwhile the plaintiffs filed a motion for interim injunction. The appellant opposed the application on the grounds, firstly, that he was not the proper person to be sued as the property in dispute was not vested in him but in the Board of Trustees of the Nichiren Shoshu of Ghana. Secondly, that by virtue of section 12(1) of the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152), the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action as the area in dispute forms part of the Dansoman area which had by the Land Title Registration - Declaration of Registration District (Accra District 04) Instrument (LI 1521) been declared a registration district for the purpose of land title registration.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s arguments, granted the application for interim injunction and ordered the National Commission on Culture to take over the place of worship, the bone

“I do not think that when the Land Title Registration Law 1986 was passed, it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts to determine ownership of land. It is my view that the said Law was passed to establish the land title registry, which was charged with the responsibility of ensuring the registration of lands within declared areas. It is my further view that the Adjudication Committee, which is to be set up under the Land Title Registration Law can deal only with disputes relating to registration of land. It has not been given jurisdiction to try cases of title to land or recovery of possession of land.

Even if I am wrong in my view of the law, it is clear from the plaintiffs’ writ of summons and the affidavit filed by them, that they have brought the instant motion against the 1st and 2nd defendants because of a threatened intention by the latter to deprive them of their place of worship. It must be observed therefore that the relief before the court, being an equitable one and acts of interference with their property having been alleged against the 1st defendant, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to hear the matter in order to ensure that justice is done.”

The trial court also held in respect of the other argument canvassed on behalf of the applicant as follows:

“Concerning the 1st defendant it is obvious that he is not claiming ownership of the property. He is a stranger to the property. And although he claims that the property belongs to Nichiren Shoshu of Ghana no member of that organisation and no member of the Board of Trustees of the said body has filed any affidavit in support of his claim. Besides the trustees of the said body, if they exist, have not sought to join the suit. It seems therefore to me that the 1st defendant would not suffer any hardship if the application is granted, rather than refused.”

The 1st defendant-appellant who was not satisfied with the court’s ruling filed an interlocutory appeal against the said ruling. Despite the ruling of the court that it had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ action, the 1st defendant-appellant still did not find it necessary or advisable to file a statement of defence. Consequently, the plaintiffs-respondents moved the court for final judgment on their claim. Even though the appellant opposed the application, using the same arguments he had canvassed during the hearing of the earlier motion, the court granted the application and entered judgment for the plaintiffs on their claims. The 1st defendant again appealed to this court. Before us, counsel for the appellant argued first the interlocutory appeal against the order of interim injunction and then the appeal against the final judgment.

In respect of the interlocutory appeal, counsel argued grounds (ii), (iii) and (iv) of his grounds of appeal filed in that appeal. These grounds read as follows:

“(ii) The learned judge overlooked or alternatively ignored the Land Title Registration - Declaration of Registration District (Accra District 04) Instrument (LI 1521), and its inclusion of the Dansoman land in dispute in Registration District Accra 04.

(iii) The learned judge misdirected himself on the applicability of section 12 of the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152).

(iv) The learned judge erred in law by failing to appreciate that the 1st defendant had been sued in a purely personal and not a representative capacity; consequently he had no jurisdiction to make on the said motion any order against any person or religious body such as the Nichren Shoshu of Ghana who were not parties or privies of either defendant.”

In respect of grounds (ii) and (iii), quoted above, which were argued together, counsel for the 1st defendant-appellant submitted that since the land the subject-matter of dispute formed part of Dansoman which had been declared a registration district under the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152), the trial judge was by section 12(1) of the said Law deprived of jurisdiction to entertain the application. As regards ground (iv) above, the gist of counsel’s argument seems to be that the order of interim injunction made against the appellant was wrong because he, the appellant, had not done anything to warrant the order, and that the trial judge’s assumption that the property had passed to the plaintiffs, the rival group, was not borne out by the material before him.

I must say at once that I do not find any merit in this latter argument in respect of the appellant’s ground (iv) of the appeal. This is because the purpose of an order of interim injunction is to preserve the property in dispute pending the final determination of the matters in dispute. And I have no doubt that was exactly what the trial judge did, based on the evidence before him. The trial judge went further to entrust the place of worship on the land, which was the real bone of contention, to a neutral body, the National Commission on Culture, to care for pending the determination of the suit. What then is the basis of the appellant’s complaint in this regard? The only point raised by the appellant therefore which in my view is worthy of consideration, is the issue of jurisdiction, which I have earlier mentioned.

The issue of jurisdiction also featured prominently in the appellant’s complaint against the final judgment of the court. The appellant’s complaint here is contained in his additional ground of appeal which was the only ground argued against the final judgment. It reads:

“The 1st defendant-appellant was entitled to apply at the earliest possible stage to dismiss the suit on the jurisdictional ground that it was caught by section 12 of the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152) and not to wait until subsequently raising such ground in his statement of defence as the only place where such objection can be raised.”

Arguing this ground of appeal counsel for the appellant submitted that an issue of jurisdiction could be raised at any time and anyhow, and not necessarily in a statement of defence. It was proper, therefore, for the appellant to raise the issue in his affidavit in opposition. Counsel supported this argument with the recent Supreme Court decision in Republic v High Court, Denu, ex parte Avadali IV [1993-94] 1 GLR 561. Counsel also submitted, as he did earlier, that the court’s jurisdiction was ousted by section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 and so the trial judge did not have jurisdiction to enter final judgment in the matter and thereafter he was wrong in so doing in favour of the respondents.

No one can legitimately quarrel with the submission that an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime and anyhow, and not necessarily in a statement of defence. Adade and Ampiah, JJSC amply support this view, in their opinions in the case of ex parte Avadali IV (supra). Adade JSC in his opinion at page 566 of the judgement dealt with “the general law that objections to jurisdiction may be taken at any time…” Ampiah JSC was more elaborate. At page 589 of the said judgment, he observed as follows:

“An issue of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If in fact the claim was “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy”, then the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it and the issue can be raised at any time after the writ has been filed. That issue was fundamental to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. … On the evidence before the court, I hold that the applicant was entitled to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the manner he did. At that stage all that was required of him was to make an affidavit to support the grounds of his objection. The plaintiffs were entitled to contest the issue by affidavit. It was not necessary that the defendant should have pleaded want of jurisdiction at that stage before he is permitted to raise the issue.”

Even though the defendant-applicant in the Supreme Court case referred to above raised the issue of jurisdiction in a motion filed to set aside the writ after he had entered conditional appearance to the writ in that case (which was not the case in the present case before us), one cannot disagree with the general rule that an issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In the present case, therefore, even though the appellant had not entered conditional appearance to the writ of summons, nor had he filed a motion for the purpose of raising this objection, yet it was sufficient that he raised it in his affidavit in opposition to the respondents’ motion for interim injunction, and in a similar affidavit in the motion for final judgment. It is not surprising, therefore, that the trial judge did not disallow the objection but dealt with it in his ruling. He dismissed it and ruled that he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Was he right?

In his reply to the submissions made by the appellants, counsel for the respondent submitted that the trial judge had jurisdiction to deal with the matters before him. In his view, it was clear from the memorandum to PNDCL 152, and section 12(1) and 22 thereof, that the purpose of the Law was to deal with the registration of title to, and interest in, land. Counsel argued that the adjudication committees set up under the Law would, in the circumstances, not have power to deal with equitable reliefs such as interim injunctions, specific performance, interpleader suits, and claims for damages.

This court and the Supreme Court have made some pronouncements on PNDCL 152, especially section 12(1) thereof which this court cannot overlook since this court is bound by its previous decisions and those of the Supreme Court. Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 provides that:

“No action concerning any land or interest therein in a registration district shall be commenced in any Court until the procedure for settling disputes under this Law have been exhausted.” (The emphasis is mine.)

In Mireku v Amar [1992-93] GBR 1094, this court held at page 1098 of the report as follows:

“Taking the pleadings as they stand, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff’s claim before the High Court seeks certain declaratory orders. The adjudicating committees, which are to be set up under PNDCL 152 in my opinion, have no jurisdiction to give such declaratory judgments. … Furthermore there is a counterclaim for an order for perpetual injunction to restrain the plaintiffs from interfering with the defendants’ enjoyment of house No C 345/4. Here again I do not think that the adjudicating committee set up under Law 152 has jurisdiction to make such orders. … The defendant also counterclaims for a declaration of title to house No C 345/4, Kokomlemle. This claim cannot be dealt with by the High Court. It is caught by section 12(1) of PNDCL 152....”

It must be said that the court made reference in the above case to the opinion of Aikins JSC, which formed part of the majority decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd (No 2) [1992-93] GBR 512, in which opinion the learned judge had discussed sections 12(1), 11, 13 and 22 of PNDCL 152. It is clear from the last two paragraphs of the judgment of this court in the Amar case quoted above that the court’s decision was that the High Court, or for that matter any other court, would not have jurisdiction to deal with any claim involving the declaration of title to land or interest in land in a registration district declared under PNDCL 152.

Going by this decision which is binding on the court, it seems to me that at least the first three claims of the plaintiffs-respondents, by which they sought a declaration of title to two plots of land at Dansoman which, it is undisputed, has been declared a registration district under PNDCL 152, recovery of possession of the said plots, and the recall and cancellation of the document on the said land, are all caught squarely by section 12(1) of PNDCL 152. In the circumstances, the High court had no jurisdiction to entertain and or deal with these claims. It is trite learning that a court cannot assume jurisdiction where the jurisdiction of the court has been taken away by statute. See Republic v Court of Appeal, ex parte Ekuntan II [1989-90] 2 GLR 168, SC.

It is my view, therefore, that the orders made by the High Court in the instant case entering judgment in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents were a nullity and must be so declared. The respondent must comply with section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 before any court can have jurisdiction in the matter as provided by the said section 12(1). The appeal accordingly succeeds.