Appeal Court
11th March, 1940. Appeal from
decision of Commissioner of the
Western Province.
Original
trial in State Council-Appeal
therefrom to Provincial
Commissioner's Court-Applic1tion
for conditional lea.1.'e to
appeal made ex parte within time
but notice of appeal to
Respondent given out of
time-Appeal dismissed.
Held: The
application did not amount to •.
Notice of Appeal" within the
meaning of section 76 (1) of the
Native Administration Ordinance
(Cap. 111) which was the law in
force at the time of the
proceedings so far set out.
Ohene
Moore v. Akesseh Tayee (2.
W.A.C.A. 43) and Egyir Ababio
v. J(wtldwo Tsia and others
(3. W.A.C.A. 110) followed.
The facts are
fully set out in the judgment.
F. Awoonor
Williams for Appellant.
R. S. Blay
for Respondent.
The following
judgment, ,with which the other
members of the Court were in
agreement, was delivered :--
DOORLY, J.,
GOLD COAST.
This is an
appeal from the judgment of the
Commissioner of the Western
Province dated 26th January,
1939, whereby he dismissed an
appeal by the present appellant
from a judgment of the State
Council of Western Nzima in
favour of the present respondent
..
The
Provincial Commissioner held
that the appeal was not properly
before him for the reason that
the predecessor of the
Commissioner, having before him
an application by the appellant
for leave to appeal after
refusal (as he held) of such
leave by the State Council, did
not deal with the application
but merely invited the State
Council to grant leave. This the
Commissioner considered to be
contrary to law as by such a
request his predecessor removed
from the State Council the
discretionary power given to it
by section 77 of the Native
Administration Ordinance
(Colony) (Cap. III 1928 Laws,
now section 82 of Cap. 76 of the
1936 Laws.)
The
proceedings as shown by the
record were as follows :The
State Council gave judgment on
the 22nd Decemter, 1934; on the
22nd January, 1935, a motion
ex parte for leave to appeal
was filed by the present
appellant in the State Council.
There is nothing to show that
that motion was heard until a
considerable time later.
In reply to a
letter dated the 1st February,
1935, from the appellant (which
has not been made an exhibit),
the President of the State
Council sent a letter to the
appellant dated 4th February;
1935, in which he stated that"
neither copy of conditions or
certified copy of proceedings
can be furnished to you until
you have paid .. £50 as per
paragraph 3 of the bye-laws
passed by the State Council of
Western Nzima on 5th day of
September, 1934." On the 13th
February, 1935, the appellant
filed a motion ex parte
in the Court of the Commissioner
of the Western Province for
conditional leave to appeal and
stated that the State Council
had refused to grant such leave.
This motion came on on the 20th
February, 1935, and, after the
appellant had produced the
letter of 4th February, 1935,
from the President of the State
Councils the motion was
adjourned for the production of
the bye-law, referred to
therein. On the 30th May, 1935,
the motion was heard and after
taking the evidence of the clerk
to the State Council and
perusing the Bye-law No.3, the
Commissioner held that the
byelaw was not valid and"
asked" the State Council to
grant leave to the appellant to
appeal.
The motion of
the appellant in the State
Council for conditional leave
was then heard. It is stated in
the record to have been filed on
the 31st January, 1935, but this
is in direct contradiction of
the original motion-paper which
contains the note of the
Registrar
. of the
Council that it was filed on the
22nd January, 1935.
There can,
however, be little doubt that it
was the original motion for
conditional leave that Was
heard. This was on the 1st July,
1935, and conditional leave was
granted three months being given
by the State State Council! to
fulfil the conditions, the third
of which was to give notice of
appeal to all parties directly
affected by the appeal.
Notice of
appeal was filed on the 18th
July, 1935, and was served on
the respondent on the 26th July,
1935. Final leave was granted
ex parte to the appellant on
the 24th August, 1935.
All motions
up to this date had been ex
parte the respondent.
Thus the
judgment sought to be appealed
against was dated 28th December,
1934, and the first notice which
the respondent had of the
proposed appeal was on the 26th
July, 1935, over six months from
the date of judgment:
Section 76 of
the Native Administration
Ordinance (Cap, III of 1928
Laws), which was the law In
force at the time of the
proceedings so far set out,
reads as follows :-.
': 76. No
appeal shall lie under section
73, section 74, or section 75
unless the party appealing shall
give notice of appeal within the
proper periods hereinafter in
this section prescribed,
reckoning from the date of the
decision appealed against,
namely:
" (1)
*
*
*
" (2) *
*
*
"(3) From a
Paramount Chief's Tribunal to
the Provincial Commissioner's
Court, within six months ".
The meaning
of the words "give notice of
appeal" was considered by this
Court in the case of Egyir
Abanio v. Kwadwo Tsia and Others
(III W.A.C.A. p. 110), when
it was held that the words have
their natural and ordinary
meaning i.e. that they refer to
the notice of appeal which in
all appeal proceedings has
,sooner or later to be given to
the respondent, and that ex
parte applications to the
Court do not fulfil the
requirement.
Section 90 of
the Native Administration
Ordinance (Gap. III I92R Laws
now section 95 Cap. 76) provides
(After setting out the
jurisdiction of a State Council)
:--
" (1) ................ in the
exercise of, or for the purposes
of, such
jurisdiction the State Council
shall be guided, as near as may
be, and subject to the
provisions of any regulations,
by the procedure followed in a
Paramount Chief's Tribunal. And,
save as may with respect to
certain particular cases
otherwise by express enactment
be provided, a State Council in
the exercise of, or for the
purposes of, its jurisdiction as
aforesaid shall have powers
corresponding to those of a
Paramount Chief's Tribunal.
" (2) The
like appeals shall lie from a
State Council as lie from a
Paramount Chief's Tribunal ..
No special
provision has been made in
respect of the time in which
appeals may be brought from a
State Council. It follows,
therefore, from section 90 (2)
that when and where an appeal
would not lie from a Paramount
Chief's Tribunal, it does not
lie from a State Council.
Had the trial
of this action been in a
Paramount Chief's Tribunal. the
appeal to the Provincial
Commissioner's Court would not
have lain for the reason that
notice of appeal was not given
within six months of the date of
the decision appealed against.
Similarly, the appeal did not
lie from the decision of the
State Council and for the same
reason.
No question
of extending the time can
possibly arise, for, by the
first proviso to section 83 (now
section 88 of Cap. 76), power to
extend time in the case of the
periods of time specified in
section 76 (now 81) is
specifically withheld.
It follows
that the position here is
precisely that found by Lord
Atkin in Ohene Moore v.
Akesse Tayee (2 W.A.C.A. p.
43) when he said" But the
objection lies in limine
in that the Provincial
Commissioner had no jurisdiction
at all . It is quite true that
their Lor9.ships, as every other
Court, attempt to do justice and
to avoid technicalities; but
their Lordships, like any other
Court, are bound by the statute
law, and if the statute law says
there shall be no jurisdiction
in a certain event, and that
event has occurred, then it is
impossible for their Lordships
or for any other Court to have
jurisdiction."