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JUDGMENT:
In 1958 the family of the
Plaintiff executed a Deed of
Lease in which the said family
leased to R.T. Briscoe (Ghana)
Limited a parcel of land
situate, lying and being in
Accra which was then part of the
Eastern Region of Ghana.
Subsequently, in 1976 the
Government of Ghana acquired and
vested in the State of Ghana all
rights, assets and properties of
the company called R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Limited. Later, the
Government of Ghana transferred
the said assets, rights and
properties of R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Limited, which had been
acquired and vested in the State
to a company called Automotive
and Technical Services Limited
(hereinafter referred to as ATSL).
ATSL was subsequently placed on
divestiture by the Divestiture
Implementation Committee
(hereinafter referred to as
DIC). The 1st
Defendant thereafter acquired
ATSL. Before the acquisition by
the 1st Defendant
however, the Plaintiff’s family
had sued ATSL at the High Court
Accra to which action, DIC and
the 1st Defendant
applied successfully to join.
The 1st Defendant and
the Plaintiff settled the case
as between them and filed terms
of settlement which was adopted
by the court as consent
judgment. In the course of
time, DIC sued the 1st
Defendant which also filed a
counter claim and later obtained
judgment in the said suit. The 2nd
Defendant herein in his capacity
as the Registrar of the Court
was ordered to execute a Deed of
Assignment of the properties
subject matter of the 1958 lease
in favour of the 1st
Defendant.
It is the execution of the Deed
of Assignment by the 2nd
Defendant herein and the
purported takeover of the
properties in question by the 1st
Defendant herein that drove the
within named Plaintiff to issue
the instant writ of summons
claiming against the Defendants:
“i. A declaration that
the Akilakpa Sawyerr Family,
represented by Mrs. Charlotte
Amy Sawyerr are owners of the
property registered in the Deeds
Registry, Accra as DR
No.2693/1958.
ii. Delivery up and
cancellation of an Assignment
executed by the Chief Registrar
of the High Court, Fast Track
Division as being in excess of
the direction of Justice N.M.C.
Abodakpi on the 13th
August 2009, following the
judgment of 15th
August 2009 by Justice P.K.
Gyaesayor in Suit No. AC71/04
instituted Divestiture
Implementation Committee vs.
Sabat Motors Ltd. & other.
iii. Perpetual injunction
to restrain Sabat Motors Ltd.
its agents, assigns workers and
servants from interfering with
ownership of the Akilakpa
Sawyerr Family in the property
registered in the Deeds
Registry, Accra, as DR.
No.2693/1958.
iv. Damages flowing from
the creation of the purported
Assignment”.
The case was practically fought
against the 1st and
the 2nd Defendants
who filed their statements of
defence after entering
Appearance. The 1st
Defendant also counterclaimed
for:
i)
“Punitive and exemplary damages
for trespass.
ii)
Perpetual Injunction restraining
the Plaintiff from interfering
with 1st Defendant’s
right to the use of the premises
covered by the lease between the
Plaintiff and R.T. Briscoe.
iii)
An order for the demolition of
unlawful structures erected on
the premises by the Plaintiff.
iv)
Legal Costs”.
At the close of pleadings the
following issues and additional
issues were filed and adopted
for determination by the court.
That is to say:
i.
Whether or not the confiscation
of assets of R.T. Briscoe by the
SMC included Christiana House
and its outhouses on the area of
Land covering 2.55 acres in the
1958 Lease between Gosford
Collins Akilakpa Sawyerr and the
erstwhile R.T. Briscoe.
ii.
Whether or not Christiana House
comprises only the mansion known
as Christiana House or the
mansion as well as the land and
outhouses thereon.
iii.
Whether or not Suit No. L279/96
commenced before the purchase
agreement of 21st
February, 1997 was executed in
favour of the 1st
Defendant.
iv.
Whether or not the consent
judgment of 24th
April, 2001 is valid in law.
v.
Whether or not the 1st
Defendant perpetrated FRAUD in
obtaining judgment on their
counterclaim in Suit No. AC
71/2005 instituted D.I.C. vs.
Sabat Motors & ors.
vi.
Whether or not by the Terms of
the Settlement of 24th
April, 2001, the 1st
Defendant herein undertook to
deliver up to the plaintiff
vacant possession of the
property in dispute described as
Christiana House, Adjabeng Road,
Accra on or before 30th
April, 2001.
vii.
Whether or not the 1st
defendant herein accepted that
the consent judgment and it’s
delivery up of possession to the
plaintiff brought the 1958 lease
to an end.
viii.
Whether or not the letter of 5th
September, 2001, per the 1st
Defendant’s Managing Director
Edward Nanka-Bruce confirmed the
plaintiff’s takeover of
Christiana House and its
adjoining properties.
ix.
Whether for three years after
the consent judgment the 1st
defendant herein persistently
interfered with plaintiff’s
occupation of parts of the
property, wherefore the
plaintiff initiated contempt
proceedings in Suit No. L279/96
against directors of the 1st
defendant for their
non-compliance with the consent
judgment by His Lordship Justice
R.K. Apaloo.
x.
Whether or not plaintiff
abandoned the said contempt
proceedings and in its place
applied for, and was granted, a
writ of possession as per the
terms of settlement which had
been entered as consent
judgment.
xi.
Whether the purported Assignment
of land in the 1958 lease was
made without the knowledge and
consent of either the plaintiff
or the family of the late
Gosford Collins Akilakpa
Sawyerr, owners of the land.
xii.
Any other issues arising out of
the pleadings”.
And:
“Whether or not;
i)
The plaintiff is bound by the
1958 lease executed between
herself, as Charlotte Amy
Sawyerr, jointly with Georgina
Sawyerr Rose, as Co-Lessors
and R.T. Briscoe as the
Lessee and which lease was to
expire in the year 2023.
ii)
By the terms of the Lease, the
said lease comprises the
hereditaments and premises
demised by and comprised in the
lease (together with other
premises adjoining as therein
mentioned) as they became vested
in the company, R.T. Briscoe.
iii)
By the terms of the said lease,
the house, Christiana House, was
one of the existing adjoining
houses by the terms of the
lease.
iv)
Plaintiff can impute any fraud
or absence of knowledge to the
execution and the existence of
that lease and its full effects.
v)
Any proceedings ending ‘sine
die’ can be described as a
judgment”.
On the strength of a Power of
Attorney exhibit A herein, the
Plaintiff gave evidence through
one Mrs. Justice Selassie
Sawyerr Williams and closed her
case. The 1st
Defendant’s representative who
described himself as the
Managing Director thereof also
testified on behalf of the 1st
Defendant Company and closed the
case for the 1st
Defendant. The Registrar of the
Fast Track High Court also
testified on behalf of the 2nd
Defendant and announced the
closure of the case of the 2nd
Defendant.
In respect of the first two
issues set out on the
application for directions the
court finds that the 1st
Defendant has not infact denied
the averments leading to the
setting down of those issues.
Indeed, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6
and 7 of the statement of claim
are devoted to averments on
those issues. In these
paragraphs the Plaintiff has
pleaded a lease of the property
known as Christiana House with
its adjoining outhouses to R.T.
Briscoe by a Deed of Lease
bearing registration
No.2693/1958. The lease was for
a period of a little over 65
years and it was to commence on
the 1st January, 1958
to expire on the 14th
June, 2023.
The Plaintiff has pleaded at
paragraph 3 of the statement of
claim that the lease in question
was dated 10th April
1958. This is the only issue
which the 1st
Defendant sought to correct by
its averment in paragraph 3 of
its statement of defence to say
that the lease was to commence
from 1st January 1958
instead of 10th April
1958 as pleaded by the
Plaintiff. Ironically, the
Plaintiff has pleaded in
paragraph 4 of her statement of
claim about the same lease that
it indeed commenced on the 1st
January 1958. Save this little
misreading on the part of the
within named Plaintiff there is
virtually no contentious issue
between the Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant about the lease as far
as the commencement date and the
fact of confiscation by the
State are concerned.
The 2nd Defendant
does not admit the Plaintiff’s
averment in respect of the lease
between the Plaintiff and R.T.
Briscoe (Ghana) Limited and has
called for a strict proof from
the Plaintiff. In proof
however, the Plaintiff’s
Attorney tendered in evidence
exhibit ‘B’ which is the lease
in question. I find from the
evidence that Christiana House
which is the subject matter of
exhibit ‘B’ comprised of
buildings sitting on a piece of
land measuring about 2.551
acres. It is this property that
was leased to R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Limited and subsequently
confiscated by the Ghana
Government by virtue of the R.T.
Briscoe (Ghana) Limited
(Transfer of Assets) Decree,
1976 (SMCD 65). The 1st
Defendant has not denied the
fact that the said property was
leased to R.T. Briscoe (Ghana)
Limited by the Plaintiff. Again
the 1st Defendant has
not denied the fact that the
said property was confiscated by
the Government of Ghana as a
result of the confiscation of
the assets of R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Limited in 1976.
The Court finds from the
evidence on record that by the
Transfer of Shares and Merger
Decree 1979 AFRCD. 60, the
assets originally held by R.T.
Briscoe (Ghana) Limited together
with the assets of other
companies were all transferred
to a company called Automotive
and Technical Services Limited
(ATSL). This happened in 1979.
I find that by Suit No.
L.279/96, the within named
Plaintiff instituted an action
at the High Court Accra against
ATSL claiming against them an
order for the recovery of
possession of the property
leased to R.T. Briscoe (Ghana)
Limited under exhibit ‘B’ among
other reliefs. There is also
evidence on record to the effect
that around the same time, ATSL
was placed on divestiture by the
Government of Ghana and managed
by the Divestiture
Implementation Committee.
I find from exhibit ‘F’ that
whiles Suit No.L279/96 was
pending the 1st
Defendant herein applied
successfully to be joined as a
Co-Defendant in that suit.
Again the Divesture
Implementation Committee was
also joined as a second
co-defendant by the court. See
exhibit ‘G’ herein.
I find that on the 12th
day of April, 2001 the Plaintiff
herein and the 1st
Defendant herein who were the
Plaintiff and the 1st
co-defendant in Suit No.L279/96
settled the case between them
and filed terms of settlement on
the 20th April,
2001. This is evidenced by
exhibit ‘H’ tendered in this
suit by the Plaintiff’s
Attorney. I also find that the
said terms of settlement exhibit
‘H’ was entered by the
Honourable Court as consent
judgment between the Plaintiff
and the 1st Defendant
herein. This is supported by
exhibit ‘J’ tendered by the
Plaintiff’s Attorney in the
instant action.
The 1st Defendant
herein has argued that the terms
of settlement entered into
between the Plaintiff and the 1st
Co-Defendant in Suit No.L279/96
did not operate to completely
determine the suit between the
parties because the other
parties to the suit did not
partake in the settlement.
Whilst it can be argued that the
settlement exhibit ’H’ did not
end the suit between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant as
well as the 2nd
Co-Defendant in Suit No.L279/96,
the Court is of the view that
exhibit ‘H’, the terms of
settlement reached between the
Plaintiff and the 1st
Co-Defendant who is the 1st
Defendant herein settled to
conclusion, the dispute between
the Plaintiff and the 1st
Co-Defendant in Suit No.L279/96.
In the Republic vs. High
Court, Cape Coast; Ex parte
Ghana Cocoa Board (Apotoi III
Interested Party) [2009] SCGLR
603 the court pointed out
that:
‘Terms of settlement of an
action were contractual, and for
that reason, the courts would
hardly interfere with them when
submitted for adoption as
consent judgment. Thus the
parties could compromise an
action or even a judgment of a
competent court. In that event,
the parties would be held to
their bargain in place of such
action or judgment. But the
terms of settlement, must be
certain, at least, as to its
essential terms so as to bind
the parties. And where there had
been part performance, the
agreement would survive as a
contract’.
Another issue raised by the 1st
Defendant herein against the
terms of settlement is that the
1st Defendant is a
limited liability company and
that there is no record that the
rest of the directors have
mandated any one director to
execute the terms of settlement
on behalf of the company. The
court however finds no evidence
that the Plaintiff is a member
or director of the 1st
Defendant Company. The Plaintiff
has every right to assume that
all official duties by the
company and all internal
mechanisms of the company have
been duly complied with. It is
not for the Plaintiff to go
asking whether or not a Managing
Director of the 1st
Defendant Company has the
authority and mandate of the
company to execute terms of
settlement for and on behalf of
the company. Sections 139 and
142 of the Companies Act of 1963
(Act 179) states clearly that:
139. Acts of the company
(1) An act of the members in
general meeting, the board of
directors, or a managing
director while carrying on in
the usual way the business of
the company shall be treated as
the act of the company itself;
and accordingly the company
shall be criminally and civilly
liable for that act to the same
extent as if it were a natural
person.
142. Presumption of regularity
(1) A person having dealings
with a company or with someone
deriving title under the company
is entitled to assume,
(a) that the
company’s Regulations have been
duly complied with;
(b) that a
person described in the
particulars filed with the
Registrar pursuant to sections
27 and 197 as a director,
managing director or secretary
of the company, or represented
by the company, acting through
its members in general meeting,
board of directors, or managing
director, as an officer or agent
of the company, has been duly
appointed and has authority to
exercise the powers and perform
the functions customarily
exercised or performed by a
director, managing director, or
secretary of a company carrying
on business of the type carried
on by the company or customarily
exercised or performed by an
officer or agent of the type
concerned.
In Godka Group of Companies
vs. P S International Ltd.
[2001-2002] SCGLR 918 SC.
the court held that:
“Under section 144 of the
Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179),
a company might enter into a
contract in the same way as an
individual might. In any case,
a person contracting with a
company was not required to
demand the production of a
resolution authorizing the
board, the general meeting, an
officer or agent of the company,
as the case might be, to enter
into the contract. And under
the Rule in Turquand’s Case or
the “Indoor Management” Rule, a
person dealing with a company
was entitled to assume, in the
absence of facts putting him on
notice or inquiry, that there
had been due compliance with all
matters of internal management
and procedure required by the
regulations of the company. The
rule had been codified in
sections 139-143 of Act 179.
Under section 142(2), if the
company had held out someone as
its agent, it would be estopped
from denying the appointment;
and a de jure or de facto
officer of the company could be
assumed to have the usual powers
and duties of that sort of
officer”.
The court holds that the terms
of settlement executed by the
Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant Company herein
represented by its Managing
Director Mr. Ahadzi, in Suit
No.L279/96 is binding on the 1st
Defendant and it also settled to
finality the dispute between the
Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant in that suit.
The consent judgment entered
pursuant to the terms of
settlement exhibit ‘G’ herein
erases all doubts in respect of
the conclusion of the dispute
between the Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant. It states that:-
“Let the terms of settlement as
between the Plaintiff and
Co-defendant filed on the 20th
day of April, 2001 be the basis
for the determination of the
action between them”.
Indeed, it is the action between
the Plaintiff and the other
Defendants who were not parties
to the execution of the consent
judgment which was adjourned
sine die and that does not mean
that the action between the
Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant herein was not
determined to finality as argued
by the 1st Defendant
herein.
Now it is the case of the
Plaintiff that after the
settlement of the matter between
the Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant in Suit No.L279/96,
the 1st Defendant
handed over the properties in
question to the Plaintiff
herein.
The Plaintiff has tendered in
evidence exhibit ‘L’ which is a
letter written by the 1st
Defendant Company in September
2001 and signed by E. Nanka
Bruce then Managing Director of
the 1st Defendant
Company. This letter was
addressed to the General Manager
of Weitnauer & GTDC Limited who
was then a tenant occupying part
of the premises. It is very
instructive to note that by
exhibit ‘L’ the 1st
Defendant asked Weitnauer & GTDC
Limited to thenceforth atone
tenancy to the Plaintiff in view
of the fact that the 1st
Defendant Sabat Motors
“have delivered up the property
to the owners Charlotte Amy
Sawyerr as the lease of the
property to Briscoe/Sabat has
been consummated, we are no
longer the landlords”.
There is evidence on record to
the effect that after the
consent judgment, the Plaintiff
assumed management of the
property in question by entering
into various tenancy agreements
with various companies including
Enaf Gas, Falcon Coatings
Limited, Otemns Company Limited
among others. This finding is
supported by exhibits M, M1 and
M2 herein. It follows therefore
that the fact that the Plaintiff
entered into possession of the
property herein after the entry
of the consent judgment admits
of no reasonable challenge and
this is further confirmed by
exhibit ‘N’ an order of the
Court which authorized the
Plaintiff to go into possession
following the consent judgment.
In January 2005, the DIC brought
an action at the High Court Suit
No. AC.71/2005 against the 1st
Defendant in this matter seeking
to set aside a Sale and Purchase
Agreement it had entered into
with the 1st
Defendant in respect of the R.T.
Briscoe segment of the
properties of ATSL. The 1st
Defendant filed a counterclaim
and managed to get the Court to
dismiss the claims of the DIC
while granting the counterclaim
filed by the 1st
Defendant herein in that action.
Pursuant to the judgment
obtained by the 1st
Defendant in the suit mounted by
the DIC, evidenced by exhibit
‘P’ herein, the 1st
Defendant obtained yet another
order of the High Court exhibit
‘1’ herein in which the
Registrar of the Court, 2nd
Defendant herein, was ordered to
execute a lease in respect of
the land subject of the lease
between the Plaintiff and R.T.
Briscoe (Ghana) Limited made in
1958. The order directed that a
lease be executed by the
Registrar in the stead of DIC in
favour of the 1st
Defendant in the instant matter.
Consequent upon the order
exhibits ‘1’ and ‘1A’, the 2nd
Defendant executed exhibit ‘2’
in favour of the 1st
Defendant. Before the execution
of exhibit ‘2’ the 2nd
Defendant had executed exhibit
‘S’ in favour of the 1st
Defendant.
The original lease made between
the Plaintiff and R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Limited was to expire in
the year 2023. Nevertheless,
the 2nd Defendant in
executing exhibit ‘S’ in favour
of the 1st Defendant
had purported to extend the term
of the original lease to the
year 2074. The Registrar gave
evidence to the effect, which
the Court accepts, that exhibit
‘S’ was a mistake and when he
became aware of it, he corrected
the mistake by the execution of
exhibit ‘2’.
Be that as it may, the main
contention of the Plaintiff in
this matter is not so much about
the extension of the term of the
lease by the Registrar as shown
in exhibit ‘S’.
The main concern of the
Plaintiff, as I gather from the
pleadings, is that the judgment
obtained by the 1st
Defendant herein on their
counterclaim in Suit No. AC71/05
against the Divestiture
Implementation Committee in
which the Plaintiff therein was
ordered to execute a lease
affecting the property in
question in favour of the 1st
Defendant herein was indeed
obtained by fraud. In
particular the Plaintiff has
pleaded in paragraph 31 of her
statement of claim as follows:
“31. The
Plaintiff avers that the 1st
Defendant herein acted
fraudulently in seeking and
obtaining the said Assignment
for 65 years of the land in the
1958 lease.
PARTICULARS OF THE
FRAUD
i.
The 1st Defendant
herein was the 1st
Co-defendant in Suit No.L.279/96
instituted Charlotte Amy Sawyerr
vs. Automotive & Technical
Services Limited & Ors. And knew
the reliefs sought in that case,
which included recovery of
possession of land in the 1958
lease.
ii.
The 1st Defendant
herein and its Solicitor Nelson
Agbesi were signatories to
Notice of Terms of Settlement
executed on 20th
April, 2009.
iii.
The 1st Defendant
herein knew that in a consent
judgment by His Lordship Justice
R.K. Apaloo, as he then was, on
24th April, 2001, the
Terms of Settlement were entered
as the basis for the final
settlement of the action between
the Plaintiff, Charlotte Amy
Sawyerr and the 1st
Defendant herein.
iv.
The 1st Defendant
herein gave up possession of the
1958 lease to the Plaintiff and
in a letter dated September 5,
2001 its Managing Director
informed the General Manager of
Weitnauer & GTDC Ltd. a tenant
of a warehouse on the land in
the 1958 lease, that the 1st
Defendant herein, having
delivered up the property to the
owners
Charlotte Amy Sawyerr, was no
longer the landlord, wherefore
the said Weitnauer was to deal
directly with the Sawyerr
family.
v.
Since the handing over of the
property, the 1st
Defendant herein has not
interfered with the Plaintiff
collecting rent from tenants on
the land in the 1958 lease.
vi.
The 1st Defendant
herein knowing at all times that
the expiry date of the 1958
lease was 2023, nevertheless
surreptitiously and without
recourse to the Sawyerr family,
owners of the property, sought
and obtained in August 2009, a
purported Assignment of the land
comprised in the said lease for
65 years, expiring in 2074”.
From the totality of the
evidence before me I hold that
all the allegations of fraud
made by the Plaintiff against
the 1st Defendant
have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt as required by
law. For, the 1st
Defendant has never denied that
it was the Co-Defendant in Suit
No.L279/96 and that it knew of
the reliefs sought by the
Plaintiff therein which included
the relief of recovery of
possession.
There is evidence that the 1st
Defendant and its solicitors
executed terms of settlement on
the 12th day of
April, 2001 evidenced by exhibit
‘H’. It ought to be re-iterated
that paragraph 1 of exhibit ‘H’
states that:
‘The 1st
Co-Defendant, Sabat Motors do
hereby undertake to deliver up
to the Plaintiff, vacant
possession of the property ,
Christiana House, Adjabeng Road
Accra on or before the 30th
day of April, 2001’
The 1st Defendant is
aware and indeed there is
evidence on record to show that
the terms of settlement was
entered as consent judgment by
the High Court on the 24th
April 2001 in the presence of
Mr. Nelson Agbesi the Lawyer for
the 1st Defendant
then. There is ample evidence
on record that consequent upon
the consent judgment, the 1st
Defendant surrendered the whole
property now in dispute to the
Plaintiff herein and even the
Managing Director of the 1st
Defendant in the person of Mr.
Edward Nanka Bruce swore to an
affidavit on the 18th
August, 2004, exhibit ‘Q’
herein, in which he deposed at
paragraph 16 that:
‘That I maintain that Sabat
Motors did hand over all the
Akilakpa Sawyerr premises to
them in the presence of Mr.
Nelson Agbesi our lawyer, Messrs
Bossman and Heward-Mills lawyers
for the Plaintiff Mrs. Justice
Sawyerr Williams and Mrs.
Christine Kwawukume daughters of
the Plaintiff, Mr. Allotey our
Financial Controller and
myself’.
With all these knowledge at the
disposal of the 1st
Defendant therefore how can the
1st Defendant obtain
judgment of the Court for an
order that the property in
question be leased to it? For,
this is the very property that
the 1st Defendant
entered into settlement and upon
which consent judgment was
entered and for which it had
given up possession which was
later confirmed by the affidavit
of its Managing Director Mr.
Edward Nanka Bruce. The 1st
Defendant herein is, in the
opinion of this court estopped
from raising the counterclaim in
that suit. For, section 26 of
the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD 323
provides that:
‘26. Estoppel by own statement
or conduct
Except as otherwise provided by
law, including a rule of equity,
when a party has, by that
party’s own statement, act or
omission, intentionally and
deliberately caused or permitted
another person to believe a
thing to be true and to act upon
that belief, the truth of the
thing shall be conclusively
presumed against that party or
the successors in interest of
that party in proceedings
between
(a) that party
or the successors in interest of
that party, and
(b) the
relying person or successors in
interest of that person.’
Equitable fraud does not lend
itself to a particular
definition. It comes in
different shapes and forms but
it is constituted in a set of
facts or conducts, actions or
inactions which the courts will
normally refuse its blessing and
most often abhor. On this one
can do no better than refer to
the observation of Lord
MacNaghten in Reddaway vs.
Bonham [1896] AC199 @221
which was quoted with approval
by the Supreme Court in Fofie
vs. Zanyo [1992] 2 GLR
475 @492 where the Lord
Justice stated that:
“. . . fraud is infinite in
variety; sometimes it is
audacious and unblushing;
sometimes it pays a sort of
homage to virtue, and then it is
modest and retiring; it would be
honesty itself if it could only
afford it. But fraud is fraud
all the same, and it is the
fraud, not the manner of it,
which calls for the
interposition of the Court.”
I hold that the judgment
obtained by the 1st
Defendant in Suit No.AC.71/2005
on its counterclaim was obtained
by fraud in view of the reasons
hereinbefore stated.
In FRIMPONG vs. NYARKO
[1999-2000] 1 GLR 429 at 437
the Supreme Court stated that:
“Fraud as is well-known,
vitiates everything, and when a
court of law in the course of
its proceedings, has cause to
believe that fraud had been
committed, the court is
duty-bound to quash whatever had
been done on the strength of
that fraud”
Consequently, I proceed to set
aside the judgment entered in
favour of the 1st
Defendant in Suit No. AC.71/05.
I also proceed to cancel and set
aside as having been obtained by
fraud the Deed of Assignment
executed in favour of the 1st
Defendant by the 2nd
Defendant by which a purported
residue of the 1958 lease
between the Plaintiff and R.T.
Briscoe (Ghana) Limited was
assigned for the benefit of the
1st Defendant herein.
I declare that the Plaintiff and
her family are the owners of the
property registered in the Deeds
Registry Accra as No. DR.
No.2693/1958.
I will also perpetually restrain
the 1st Defendant
Sabat Motors and its agents,
assigns, workers, servants and
all others claiming through them
from interfering with the
property in question.
I will award the sum of GH¢20,000
damages in favour of the
Plaintiff against the 1st
Defendant. There will not be
any award against the 2nd
Defendant since he acted on the
orders of a Court of competent
jurisdiction.
The court will award costs
assessed as GH¢10,000 in favour
of the Plaintiff against the 1st
Defendant. There will be no cost
against the 2nd
Defendant.
[SIGNED]
SAMUEL K. A. ASIEDU
JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT |
