Appellants. v.

KNELl E~ENE AND 30 OTInms ... Defendants-Respondents.

Claim for Damage:; aJ'i:;ing from criminal acts for which Convictions already seclli'ed~sllch convictions admissible in ci1.,il proceedings a.~ pr·e:;umpti1.)e pr'oof of cr,;mmission of cri'ff/.e.~~ase remitted for re-trial.

The facts of this case are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

S. iI .. L. Macalllay for Appellants. C. W. Clinton for Respondents.

The following judgment was delivered:-

KINGDON, C.J., NIGEIUA.

In this case the plaintiffs claimed in the High Court of the Onitsha Judicial Division the sum of £1,935 lIs. lId. special damage being value of their properties alleged to have been wilfully destroyed and looted by defendants. '1'he claim' was dismissed and the plaintiffs now appeal to this Court, the main ground of appeal being that the learned trial Judge refused to receive in evidence the certified copy of criminal proceedings in which the defendants were convicted in respect of the same acts on which· the present proceedings are grounded. 'these criminal proceedings were twice tendered and each time rejected.

The reasons of the Court below for dismissing the plaintiffs' claim are given in the following passage from the judgment:-

"There is no doubt that all the defendants except Obiasulu (23rd witness for D.) were convicted for riot. A number of witnesses for the plaintiffs admit that they were convicted for the same offence. If it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendants were the people who took part in the riot in which the plaintiffs' goods were damaged then the plaintiffs are entitled to some damages. The evidence before the Court on this point is-that of Peter Ezeani (6th witness for P .), Victor Maduka (9th witness for P .), and Okafor Mokah (9th witness for P) They allege they saw a certain number of the defendants actually breaking down and carrying away the materials from the plaintiffs' houses. Their evidence is given in such a manner as to be most unreliable and therefore cannot be accepted. On this

'point hinges the whole result of the suit. It is quite obvious that these witnesses were only naming persons they knew to have been convicted of riot from the Adazi quarter. There were Umueri people convicted of taking part in the same riot. If the Court accepts the the order that the conviction for riot proves that those convicted were essentially the persons who committed the damage complained of, then Umueri people are liable for damages also. This theory, however, is not accepted as the convictions do not prove anything except the convictions themselves."

:From this it is clear that the learned trial .Judge rejected the claim because it was not proved to his satisfaction that the defendants were the people who took part in the riot ill which the plaintiffs' goods were damaged. This being so it is dear that, if the criminal proceedings which were rejected ought to have been admitted, and admitted to prove not only the fact of the conviction hut also as presumptive proof of the commission of the offences, and if the convictions were (as appellant alleges) not merely for the riot hut for the commission of the actual damage in respect of which the civil remedy is now being pursued, then the admission of the certified copy of the criminal proceeding's was absolutely vital to the plaintiffs-appellants' case, it would have supplied exactly the evidence which was lacking and for want of which the claim was rejected.

The trial .Judge was at a disadvantage in having to decide the difficult question of the admissibility or otherwise of the document in question mainly owing to the absence of an adequate library and up-to-date text books. Counsel for the defendants quoted to him a passage from the 8th Edition of Best on Evidence in support of the contention that the document was inadmissible; and no doubt the Judge accepted that as a correct exposition of the law and based his decision upon it. But that edition was published in1893 and since then the law has undergone modification. In 1911 in the case of Re Crippen [(1911) P. p. 108.] It was held that-

" Where a convicted felon, or the personal representative of a convicted murderer who has been executed brings any civil proceeding to establish claims or to enforce rights, which result to the felon or 'to the convicted testator, from his own crime. the conviction is admissible in evidence, not merely as proof of the conviction, but also as presumptive proof of the commission of the crime."

and in the subsequent case. of. Mash v. Darley [(1914) 1 K.B. ] 1 Ridley, J. held that the principle that the conviction is admissible not only to prove the conviction but also as presumptive proof of the commission of the crime applied generally.

Accepting this as a correct statement of the present law. it follows that the document should have been admitted in the Court below and admitted to prove not only the fact of the convictions hut as presumptive proof of the commission by the defendant' of the acts for which the convictions were had .. This being so this Court has, in my opinion, no option but to send the case back to the Court below for re-trial.