Appeal
Court,
13th May, 1939.
L
.
Section
10 of Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance.
Compensation Appeal from
payable in respect of property
acquired by
Government-Compensation fixed by
the trial Judge lower than that
offered by the Court.
Government-l0 per cent added for
compulsory purchase.
Held: (1) That it was always
open to the Court to fix
compensation at a figure lower
than that offered by Government.
(2) That there was no authority
in the Public Lands Acquisition
Ordinance for a 10 per cent
addition to the assessed value
for compulsory purchase and that
any such addition was
gratuitous.
(3) That the trial Judge had
erred in disregarding the
evidence of three witnesses
called by plaintiff as to the
present value of the premises in
fa\"our of the evidence of a
witness who spoke only to its
value ten years ago.
Appeal allowed and compensation
assessed at £1,148. The facts
are sufficiently set forth in
the judgments.
L. B. Agusto
for Defendant-Appellant.
C.
N. S. Pollard
for Plaintiff-Respondent. The
following judgments were
delivered.
BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C ]., NIGERIA.
This is an appeal against a
decision of the Supreme. Court
on a summons taken out under
section 10 of the Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance (Cap. 88)
to determine the compensation
payable in respect of the
property known as No. ] Brown
Street, Lagos, which is being
acquired by Government.
The final offer of Government
was £1,148. The learned trial
judge assessed the compensation
to be given to the defendant at
£866 5s.
The grounds of appeal are that
:-
1. the trial Judge was wrong in
disregarding the evidence called
by the plaintiff himself to show
that the figure of £1,148
offered by him was a reasonable
one;
2. it was not open to him to
award less than the sum offered,
viz., £1,148 ;
.
3. the trial judge was wrong in
not adhering to the well
established practice of adding
10 per cent for compulsory
acquisition.
Counsel for the Appellant
contended that as the final
offer made by Government was
£1,148, that sum should have
been the lowest assessment
awarded by the Court; he relied
on section 19 of the Ordinance
which says that where the sum
awarded does not exceed the sum
offered (and no lower sum can be
awarded) such person shall pay
the costs. This section relates
to costs only and in no way
controls section
15 ; it is in the opinion of
this Court always open to the
trial judge to assess the
compensation at a lower figure
than the amount offered.
t
was next argued that the
Commissioner of Lands produced
expert witnesses to the value of
the property and the Court threw
the whole of this evidence
overboard and preferred an
arbitrary figure taken from the
evidence of the Bank witness who
was not an expert in the
particular matter before the
Court and whose estimate was
based on an inadequately
assessed value of some years
before; also that the trial
judge did not distinguish
between the buildings and the
land. Counsel further claimed
that the
10 per cent addition on the
assessed value which it has been
(and still is) the practice to
make was compulsory. With regard
to this we say that the practice
has no authority in the Public
Lands Acquisition Ordinance and
any such payment is gratuitous.
We have nothing to add to what
was said in the judgment in
Commissioner of Lands v. E.
F.
A. Adeleye*
that" an allowance for
compulsory purchase is not
recognised by the Ordinance and
cannot be claimed as a right,"
and agree with the reasons set
out in that judgment.
The learned Counsel for the
Respondent argued that there was
evidence (especially that of the
Bank Manager Mr. Oliver) as to
the value of the property which
was accepted by the Court below
in preference to that of the
expert witnesses called for the
plaintiff. He referred to the
text books as to the
unreliability of the evidence of
expert witnesses, drew
particular attention to the
freak nature of the buildings
(in which he seeks to discredit
his own witnesses) which
precluded the application of any
rule of thumb method and quoted
cases purporting to support his
contention that the Court is not
bound to act on the evidence of
experts, or on the evidence of
an offer and the Appeal Court is
not entitled to upset the
finding of the Court below where
it is based on some direct
evidence.
We cannot agree that these cases
are on all fours with the
present one or that in the
particular circumstances in this
case the Court below was
justified in entirely
disregarding the evidence of the
witnesses
called for the Plaintiff
to show the value of the
property, all of which
approximated to the amount of
the Commissioner's offer, and
substituting therefor a value
assessed on the peculiar
conditions existing in
1924, and the special
circumstances in which the Bank
then assessed the consideration.
Section 15 says that the Court
shall assess the compensation
according to what it shall find
to have been the value at the
time the notices were served.
In this case it preferred such
evidence as that of the Bank
Manager to the evidence of the
experts called by the plaintiff.
We think however that the
learned trial Judge was wrong in
disregarding the evidence of the
three witnesses called by
plaintiff as to the value of the
premises to-day in favour of
that of a witness who spoke only
to its value more than 10 years
ago.
The lowest figure' given by any
of these witnesses was that
given by Mr. Waide himself a
Government expert, namely £850
for the building alone and £194
16s. for the land a total of
£1,044 16s. and the others gave
figures somewhat higher.
We think that on the evidence
before him the learned trial
Judge ought to have come to the
conclusion that the figure
offered by Government was a
reasonable one and fully
represented the value of the
premises at the time of the
acquisition and that he should
have assessed the compensation
at that figure namely £1,148.
The appeal must be allowed and
the judgment varied accordingly.
STROTHER-STEWART, ACTING C.J.,
GOLD COAST.
I concur.
BROOKE, J.
I concur.
The Court added :-
We consider that we are bound by
the terms of section 19 and that
this appeal must be held to come
within the meaning of the words"
all proceedings, etc."
We therefore award the
respondent costs assessed at
fifteen guineas.
