Constitutional law –
Interpretation - Presidential
and Parliamentary elections -
Registration of Voters -
Identification of persons as
voters – Whether or not the
compilation of a new register of
voters by the 2nd
Defendant would be inconsistent
with or in violation of the
Constitution - Whether or not
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card and
birth certificate as documents
for the identification of
persons who apply for
registration as voters under
C.I.126, is inconsistent with or
in contravention of the
Constitution - section 2(a) of
the Electoral Commission Act,
1993 (Act 451) - article 45 (a)
of the Constitution
HEADNOTES
The antecedent facts of the case
are that the 2nd
Defendant had indicated that in
preparation for the 2020
presidential and parliamentary
elections it would compile a new
register of voters. In
preparation for the compilation
of the new register of voters,
the 2nd Defendant
gave gazette notification for
the making of Regulations
intituled Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
(Amendment) Regulations on 3
March 2020. This Instrument did
not provide for the inclusion of
the current voter identification
card as a document for the
identification of persons who
apply for registration as voters
On 19th March, 2020, the
National Democratic Party (1st
Plaintiff), a major political
party, issued a writ against the
Attorney General (1st
Defendant) and the Electoral
Commission (2nd
Defendant) invoking the original
jurisdiction of this court to
interpret and enforce the
Constitution under articles 2
(1) and 130 (1) thereof On 19
June 2020, an application for
leave to file an amicus brief
was filed by four (4)
applicants, namely; Imani Centre
for Policy and Education,
Conservative Policy Research
Centre, Alliance for Social
Equity and Public Accountability
(ASEPA) and Institute for
Liberty and Policy Innovation.
In view of the lateness of the
application and the fact that
the draft amicus brief attached
to the application did not
provide any new, relevant
information, this Court refused
the application.
HELD
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) (Amendment)
Regulations, 2020 (C.I.126)
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) Regulations, 2016
(C.I. 91)
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) Regulations, 2012
(C.I. 72)
Electoral Commission Act, 1993
(Act 451),
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
J.H. Mensah v. Attorney-General
[1996-97] SCGLR 320
Abu Ramadan and Another v. The
Electoral Commission and Another
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1654 (Abu
Ramadan (No1)
Abu Ramadan and Another v.
Electoral Commission and Another
[2015-16] 1 SCGLR 1(Abu Ramadan
(No2)
Tehn-Addy v. Electoral
Commission [1996-9] SCGLR 589;
Apaloo v. Electoral Commission
[2001-2002] SCGLR 1
Abu Ramadan and Nimako (No.3) v
Electoral Commission and
Attorney General (No.3)
[2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 77 (Abu
Ramadan (No.3)
Ransford France (No 3) v.
Electoral Commission & Attorney
General [2012] 1 SCGLR 705; Abu
Ramadan (No 1), supra; and Abu
Ramadan (No2) supra.
Apaloo v. Electoral Commission
[2000-2001] SCGLR 1
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
PROF. KOTEY, JSC:-
COUNSEL
GODWIN TAMAKLOE FOR THE
PLAINTIFF IN J1/9/2020 WITH HIM
SETH NYAABA.
GODFRED YEBOAH DAME, DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT IN J1/9/2020 AND 2ND
DEFENDANT IN J1/12/2020 WITH HIM
CLARENCE KUWORNU, CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY.
JUSTIN AMENUVOR FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT IN J1/9/2020 AND 1ST
DEFENDANT IN J1/12/2020 WITH HIM
HOPE AGBOADO.
COSMAS ANPENGNUO FOR THE
PLAINTIFF IN J1/12/2020.
PROF. KOTEY, JSC:-
1. Introduction
On 25th June 2020, we gave
judgment in these consolidated
suits but deferred our reasons,
which we now give.
We unanimously dismissed the
principal reliefs of the
plaintiffs in the two
consolidated suits. We denied
the claims of the plaintiffs for
a declaration of
unconstitutionality regarding
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card and
birth certificate for the
purpose of identification of a
person who applies for
registration as a voter in the
voter registration process to be
undertaken by the Electoral
Commission (2nd
Defendant). We also dismissed
the reliefs of the plaintiffs
challenging the
constitutionality of the
compilation of a new register of
voters by the Electoral
Commission. We finally upheld
the constitutionality of the
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) (Amendment)
Regulations, 2020 (C.I.126) and
ordered all stakeholders and
Ghanaian eligible voters to
comply with the terms thereof.
We partly granted two reliefs of
the plaintiff in Writ No.
J1/9/2020 subject to the
operation of C.I.126. Those two
reliefs, effectively, were a
statement of the meaning and
effect of the constitutional
provisions stated therein and
did not convey substantive
rights enforceable by the
plaintiffs.
The antecedent facts of the case
are that the 2nd
Defendant had indicated that in
preparation for the 2020
presidential and parliamentary
elections it would compile a new
register of voters. In
preparation for the compilation
of the new register of voters,
the 2nd Defendant
gave gazette notification for
the making of Regulations
intituled Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
(Amendment) Regulations on 3
March 2020. This Instrument did
not provide for the inclusion of
the current voter identification
card as a document for the
identification of persons who
apply for registration as
voters.
On 19th March, 2020, the
National Democratic Party (1st
Plaintiff), a major political
party, issued a writ against the
Attorney General (1st
Defendant) and the Electoral
Commission (2nd
Defendant) invoking the original
jurisdiction of this court to
interpret and enforce the
Constitution under articles 2
(1) and 130 (1) thereof.
The 1st Plaintiff
sought the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of Article 45(a) of the 1992
Constitution, 2nd
Defendant has the constitutional
power to, and can compile a
register of voters only once,
and thereafter revise it
periodically, as may be
determined by law. Accordingly,
2nd Defendant can
only revise the existing
register of voters, and lacks
power to prepare a fresh
register of voters, for the
conduct of the December 2020
Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
2. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the provisions of the
Constitution, specifically
article 51, read conjointly with
article 42 of the Constitution,
the power of the 2nd
Defendant to compile and review
the voters’ register must be
exercised subject to respect for
and the protection of the right
to vote;
3. A declaration that on a true
and proper interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution,
particularly article 42, upon
the registration of and issuance
of a voter identification card
to a person, that person has an
accrued right to vote which
cannot be divested in an
arbitrary and capricious manner;
4. A declaration that, upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly
article 42, of the Constitution,
all existing voter
identification cards duly issued
by the 2nd Defendant
to registered voters are valid
for purposes of identifying such
persons in the exercise of their
right to vote;
5. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the Constitution,
specifically Article 42, the 2nd
Defendant’s purported amendment
of regulation 1 sub-regulation 3
of the Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
(Amendment) Regulations, 2020 to
exclude existing voter
identification cards as proof of
identification to enable a
person apply for registration as
a voter, is unconstitutional,
null and void and of no effect
whatsoever;
6. A declaration that the 2nd
Defendant, in purporting to
exercise its powers pursuant to
article 51 of the 1992
Constitution to exclude the
existing voter identification
cards from the documents
required as proof of
identification to enable a
person register as a voter
without any justification, is
arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable and contrary to
article 296 of the 1992
Constitution;
7. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the Constitution,
specifically Article 42 of the
1992 Constitution, proof of
identification for registration
as a voter should not be limited
by the provisions of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020;
8. An order directed at the 2nd
Defendant to include all
existing voter identification
cards duly issued by the 2nd
Defendant as one of the
documents serving as proof of
identification for registration
as a voter for the purposes of
public elections;
9. Any other order or orders as
this Honourable Court would deem
fit in the circumstances.
In compliance with the relevant
rules of the court, the parties
subsequently filed their
respective Statements of Case.
No Joint Memorandum of Agreed
Issues was filed by the parties
as required by the rules and the
practice of the Court. On the
contrary, the 1st and
2nd Defendants filed
a “proposed joint memorandum of
issues” on 20 May 2020 and the 1st
Plaintiff filed its memorandum
of issues on 4 June 2020. On 4
June 2020, the Court directed
the 2nd Defendant to
file a supplementary Statement
of Case to provide the legal
basis for the non-inclusion of
the current voter identification
card as a document to be used
for the identification of a
person who applies to be
registered as a voter in the
compilation of a new register of
voters. Option was given to the
other parties to file
supplementary Statements of Case
if they so desired. All the
parties duly filed supplementary
Statements of Case. On 10 June
2020, the Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
(Amendment) Regulations,2020
(C.I 126) came in force. On the
11th June 2020, after
being put to its election by the
Court, the 1st
Plaintiff abandoned its relief 1
and the same was struck out as
withdrawn. The said relief 1 was
for:
1. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of Article 45(a) of the 1992
Constitution, 2nd
Defendant has the constitutional
power to, and can compile a
register of voters only once,
and thereafter revise it
periodically, as may be
determined by law. Accordingly,
2nd Defendant can
only revise the existing
register of voters, and lacks
power to prepare a fresh
register of voters for the
conduct of the December 2020
Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections.
On 12 June 2020, a day after the
1st Defendant had
abandoned its relief 1, a new
writ was issued by Mark
Takyi-Banson (2nd
Plaintiff) against the 1st
and 2nd Defendants
seeking the following reliefs:
i. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of article 45(a) of the 1992
Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana, the Electoral
Commission’s constitutional and
statutory mandate to compile the
register of voters for the
conduct and supervision of all
public elections and referenda
is spent, saving only the power
reserved in the Commission to
revise and expand the register
of voters at such periods as may
be determined by law.
ii. A declaration that the
Electoral Commission’s decision
to compile a new register of
voters is inconsistent with and
in violation of article 45(a) of
the 1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana.
iii. A declaration that
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I 126) is inconsistent
with and violates the provisions
of article 42 and 45 (e) of the
1992 Constitution to the extent
that it excludes Birth
Certificates issued to Ghanaians
as a mode of identification
and/or establishment of
qualification to be registered
in the register of voters.
iv. A declaration that
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I. 126) is inconsistent
with and violates the provisions
of article 42 and 45 (e) of the
1992 Constitution to the extent
that it excludes the existing
Voter Identification Card as a
mode of identification and/or
establishing qualification to be
registered in the register of
voters.
v. An order directed at 1st
Defendant to include under
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I 126), the existing
voter Identification Card issued
by 1st Defendant as
evidence of identification.
vi. An order directed at 1st
Defendant to include under
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I. 126) birth
certificates as evidence of
identification.
vii. Any other order or orders
as to this Honourable Court may
deem fit.
On 19 June 2020, upon an
application by the 1st
Defendant for the consolidation
of the two suits, this court
upon determining that the two
suits raised substantially the
same issues, made an order for
the consolidation of the two
suits. The court also made an
order for the abridgement of
time for filing of the
respective Statements of Case of
the parties. All the parties
complied with the order and
filed their respective
Statements of Case.
On 19 June 2020, an application
for leave to file an amicus
brief was filed by four (4)
applicants, namely; Imani Centre
for Policy and Education,
Conservative Policy Research
Centre, Alliance for Social
Equity and Public Accountability
(ASEPA) and Institute for
Liberty and Policy Innovation.
In view of the lateness of the
application and the fact that
the draft amicus brief attached
to the application did not
provide any new, relevant
information, this Court refused
the application.
From the reliefs indorsed on the
two Writs and after a careful
consideration of the facts, the
processes filed by the parties
and the relevant law, two (2)
issues arise for determination
in this action. These are:
i. Whether or not the
compilation of a new register of
voters by the 2nd
Defendant would be inconsistent
with or in violation of the
Constitution, and
ii. Whether or not the
non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card and
birth certificate as documents
for the identification of
persons who apply for
registration as voters under
C.I.126, is inconsistent with or
in contravention of the
Constitution.
2. The Constitutionality or
Otherwise of the Compilation of
a New Register of Voters
As has been noted, the first
relief indorsed on the Writ of
the 1st Plaintiff is
for;
“A declaration that upon a true
and proper interpretation of
Article 45 (a) of the 1992
Constitution, 2nd
Defendant has the Constitutional
power to, and can compile the
register of voters only once and
thereafter revise it
periodically, as may be
determined by Law. Accordingly,
2nd Defendant can
only revise the existing
register of voters, and lacks
the power to prepare a fresh
register of voters for the
conduct of the December 2020
Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections”.
This relief, as has been noted,
was abandoned by the 1st
Plaintiff and struck out as
abandoned by the Court. But this
issue was resurrected by the 2nd
Plaintiff. Reliefs 1 and 2
indorsed on the 2nd
Plaintiff’s Writ are as follows:
i. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of article 45(a) of the 1992
Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana, the Electoral
Commission’s constitutional and
statutory mandate to compile the
register of voters for the
conduct and supervision of all
public elections and referenda
is spent saving only the power
reserved in the Commission to
revise and expand the register
of voters at such periods as may
be determined by law.
ii. A declaration that the
Electoral Commission’s decision
to compile a new register of
voters is inconsistent with and
a violation of article 45(a) of
the 1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana.
The relevant provision of the
Constitution is article 45(a),
which provides as follows:
“The Electoral Commission shall
have the following functions –
(a) To compile the register of
voters and revise it as such
periods as may be determined by
law.”
The 2nd Plaintiff
contends that on a true and
proper interpretation of article
45 (a), the 2nd
Defendant’s power to compile a
new register of voters can be
exercised only once and that
after the compilation of a new
register, the register can
subsequently only be revised.
The 2nd Plaintiff
submitted that the words
“compile” and “revise” in
article 45 (a) “do not mean the
same thing” or “have the same
effect or result”. He concludes,
“that the purposive
interpretation and effect of
Article 45 (a) of the 1992
Constitution, as restated in
section 2(a) of the Electoral
Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451),
is that the constitutional
statutory mandate of the 1st
Defendant (The Electoral
Commission) to compile the
register of voters for elections
and referenda is spent save the
mandate to revise the register
of voters.”
The 1st and 2nd
Defendant take issue with the 2nd
Plaintiff on his interpretation
of article 45 (a) of the
Constitution. They both contend
that under and by virtue of
article 45 (a), the 2nd
Defendant has power to compile a
new register of voters, and that
the authority to compile a new
register is not a one-off power,
but is a power that may be
exercised periodically as and
when determined by the 2nd
Defendant and in accordance with
law. Counsel for the 1st
Defendant submitted that the 2nd
Plaintiff’s interpretation of
article 45 (a) is strained and
farfetched. He contended that on
a plain reading of article 45
(a), the 2nd
Defendant may “compile the
register of voters and revise it
as such periods as may be
determined by law”. He submits
that the phrase “at such periods
as may be determined by law”
applies both to the compilation
of a new register and its
revision. He noted the absence
of any punctuation in article 45
(a) and submitted, “Quite
clearly therefore without any
difficulty, the words must be
read together. There’s no need
to disaggregate them”. Counsel
for the 1st Defendant
further submitted that by
article 297 (b) of the
Constitution, where a power to
do an act is conferred on a
person, that power or duty may
be exercised or discharged from
time to time as necessary and
that the power of the 2nd
Defendant to compile a new
register of voters may be
exercised from time to time, and
not only once.
The 2nd Defendant
also submitted that article 45
(a) does not confer a single-use
mandate but provides for a role
of a continuing nature. It
further submitted that the
Constitution must be read as a
whole and that when article 45
(a) is read together with
article 297 (c), it is clear
that the power of the 2nd
Defendant to compile a new
register of voters is not a
one-off power but can be
exercised as and when determined
by the 2nd Defendant and in
accordance with law.
We have carefully considered the
contentions of the parties, the
submissions of counsel and the
relevant provisions of the
Constitution on this issue and
are of the considered opinion
that there is no merit in the
contention of the 2nd
Plaintiff that the power of the
2nd Defendant to
compile a new register of voters
can only be exercised once and
that thereafter it only has
power to revise the register
from time to time, but not to
compile a new one.
We uphold the submissions of
counsel for the 2nd
Defendant that the power vested
in the 2nd Defendant
by article 45 (a) “to compile
the register of voters and
revise it at such periods as may
be determined” is clear and
unambiguous and means that the 2nd
Defendant may compile a new
register of voters or revise it
from time to time as it deems
necessary and in accordance with
law. The interpretation urged by
the 2nd Plaintiff is
strained and farfetched and is
rejected.
The Constitution must be read as
a whole. As this Court stated in
J.H. Mensah v. Attorney-General
[1996-97] SCGLR 320, by
Acquah JSC (as he then was);
“I think it is now firmly
settled that the better approach
to the interpretation of the
1992 Constitution is to
interpret the provision in
relation to the other provisions
of the Constitution so as to
render the interpretation
consistent with the other
provisions and the overall
spirit of the Constitution. An
interpretation based solely on a
particular provision without
reference to the other provision
is likely to lead to a wrong
appreciation of the true meaning
and import of the provision.”
In this case, the related
constitutional provision which
we believe will enhance the
appreciation of the true import
of article 45(a) is article
297(b), which makes provision
for implied powers and other
matters relating to the scope
and implications of powers
conferred under the
Constitution. Article 297(b) of
the Constitution provides that,
“in this Constitution and in any
other law, (b) where a power is
inferred or duty is imposed, the
power may be exercised and duty
shall be performed, from time to
time, as occasion requires”.
We therefore hold that when
article 45 (a) is read together
with article 297 (b), as it
must, it is clear that the power
of the 2nd Defendant
to compile a new register of
voters may be exercised from
time to time as occasion
requires and in accordance with
law.
Additionally, the power of the 2nd
Defendant to compile a new
register is recognized by the
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) Regulations, 2016
(C.I. 91) which has just been
amended by C.I.126. Regulation
33 of C.I. 91, on revocation and
saving, provided as follows:
“33. (1) The Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
Regulations, 2012 (C.I. 72) is
hereby revoked.
(2) Despite the revocation under
sub regulation (1), the existing
register of voters is saved
under these Regulations until
the new one is compiled by the
Commission (emphasis
supplied).
Lastly, we note that as a matter
of fact, this is not the first
time that a new register of
voters would be compiled since
the coming into force of the
1992 Constitution. A new
register of voters was in fact
compiled by the 2nd
Defendant in 2012 under C.I. 72.
In light of the foregoing, we
hold that the compilation of a
new register of voters by the 2nd
Defendant is not inconsistent
with or in contravention of the
Constitution or any other law.
We now proceed to examine
whether the non-inclusion by C.I
126 of the current voter
identification card and birth
certificate as documents for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as
voter is inconsistent with or in
contravention of the
Constitution.
3.0 The Constitutionality or
Otherwise of Non-Inclusion of
the current Voter Identification
Card and Birth Certificate as
Identification Documents
Regulation 1 of C.I. 126
provides as follows:
“1. The Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
Regulations, 2016 (C.I. (91) is
amended in regulation 1
(a) by the substitution for
subregulation (3), of
“(3) A person who applies for
registration as a voter shall
provide as evidence of
identification one of the
following:
(a)
a passport;
(b)
a national identification card
issued by the National
Identification Authority; or
(c)
one voter registration
identification guarantee form as
set out in Form One of the
Schedule that has been completed
and signed by the two registered
voters.”; and
(b) by the substitution for
subregulation (4), of
“(4) Despite paragraph (c) of
subregulation (3), a registered
voter shall not guarantee the
identity of more than ten
persons.””
C.I. 126 does not therefore
include the current voter
identification card and birth
certificate as one of the
documents to be used for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter.
The 1st and 2nd
Plaintiffs contend that the
non-inclusion of the voter
identification card as a
document of identification
violates the Constitution, while
the 2nd Plaintiff
contends, additionally, that the
non- inclusion of birth
certificate contravenes the
Constitution.
We will now examine these
contentions beginning with the
non-inclusion of the voter
identification card.
3.1 Non-Inclusion of Voter
Identification Card
Reliefs (4), (5) and (6)
indorsed on the 1st
Plaintiff’s Writ provide as
follows:
4. A declaration that, upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly
article 42, of the Constitution,
all existing voter
identification cards duly issued
by the 2nd Defendant
to registered voters are valid
for purposes of identifying such
persons in the exercise of their
right to vote;
5. A declaration that upon a
true and proper interpretation
of the Constitution,
specifically Article 42, the 2nd
Defendant’s purported amendment
of regulation 1 subregulation 3
of the Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
(Amendment) Regulations, 2020 to
exclude existing voter
identification cards as proof of
identification to enable a
person apply for registration as
a voter is unconstitutional,
null and void and of no effect
whatsoever;
6. A declaration that the 2nd
Defendant, in purporting to
exercise its powers pursuant to
article 51 of the 1992
Constitution to exclude the
existing voter identification
cards from the documents
required as proof of
identification to enable a
person register as a voter
without any justification is
arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable and contrary to
article 296 of the 1992
Constitution;
Relief 4 indorsed on the 2nd
Plaintiff’s Writ is for;
A declaration that Regulation
1(3) of the (Amendment)
Regulations, 2020 (C.I.126) is
inconsistent with and violates
the provisions of article 42 and
45(e) of the 1992 Constitution
to the extent that it excludes
the existing Voter
Identification Card as a mode of
identification to be registered
in the register of voters.
By Relief 5 he seeks;
An order directed at the 1st
Defendant to include under
Regulation 1(3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I.126), the existing
voter Identification Card issued
by the 1st Defendant
as evidence of Identification.
In support of its contention,
counsel for the 1st
Plaintiff made a number of
submissions.
First, counsel submitted that
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card is a
violation of the right to vote
as enshrined in article 42 of
the Constitution. Counsel argued
that embedded in the right to
vote is a correlative right of
every Ghanaian of eighteen years
of age and above and of sound
mind to register as a voter.
Counsel relied on Abu Ramadan
and Another v. The Electoral
Commission and Another
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1654 (Abu
Ramadan (No1); where Wood
C.J stated at page 1670 as
follows:
“If the right to vote is
important in participatory
democracy, the right to register
as even more fundamental and
critical. It is the golden key
that opens the door to
exercising the right to vote.”
Counsel also cited Abu
Ramadan and Another v. Electoral
Commission and Another [2015-16]
1 SCGLR 1(Abu Ramadan (No2);
Tehn-Addy v. Electoral
Commission [1996-9] SCGLR 589;
and Apaloo v. Electoral
Commission [2001-2002] SCGLR 1
in support of this
submission.
Second, counsel for the 1st
Plaintiff submitted that
previous Regulations such as the
Public Elections (Regulations of
Voters) Regulations, 2012 (C.I.
72) and the Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
Regulations, 2016 (C.I. 91) had
included the existing voter
identification card as one of
the documents for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter.
Counsel for the 2nd
Plaintiff submitted that once a
person has been registered as a
voter and holds a voter
identification card, the 2nd
Defendant has no constitutional
right to introduce a new
regulation which does not
include the current voter
identification card as one of
the documents that may be used
in the identification of a
person who applies to be
registered as a voter.
Not surprisingly, Counsels for
the 1st and 2nd
Defendants disagreed with
Counsels for the 1st
and 2nd Plaintiffs.
Counsel for the 1st
Defendant submitted that
non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card as one
of the documents for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter is not in violation of the
right to vote as enshrined in
article 42 of the Constitution.
Counsel argued that in
determining which documents
would be used in identifying
applicants, the 2nd
Defendant must be guided by
article 42 and the need to
establish a credible and
reliable register and
structures, systems and
processes that would guard,
protect and preserve the
sanctity and credibility of the
right to vote. Counsel relied on
Abu Ramadan (No2) supra,
for this submission.
Counsel for the 1st
Defendant also argued that the
Electoral Commission is an
independent constitutional body
and that the power of the Courts
to review its decisions is
circumscribed and limited to
clear cases of
unconstitutionality or
illegality. Counsel submitted
that non-inclusion of the
current voter identification
card as an identification
document is not patently
unconstitutional or illegal, but
the exercise of a discretion
vested in the 2nd
Defendant. Counsel therefore
submitted that this exercise of
discretion is not in violation
of article 296 of the
Constitution and should not be
overturned by this Court.
Counsel relied on Abu Ramadan
(No2), supra for his
submission.
Lastly, counsel for the 1st
Defendant submitted that the
onus of proving
unreasonableness, capriciousness
or arbitrariness rests only on
the Plaintiffs, and not on the 2nd
Defendant.
Counsel for the 2nd
Defendant, the Electoral
Commission, contended that the 2nd
Defendant had legitimate reasons
for not including the current
voter identification card as a
document to be used for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter. Counsel submitted that
the processes that resulted in
the issuance of the current
voter identification card were
fundamentally flawed and in
violation of the right to vote
as enshrined in article 42 of
the Constitution.
We now proceed to evaluate the
submissions of counsel and make
a determination on the
constitutionality or otherwise
of the non-inclusion of the
current voter identification
card as a document for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter.
We will do this under two
subheadings, which are:
i.
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card and
the right to vote, and
ii.
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card and
the exercise of discretionary
power.
3.2 Non-Inclusion of the Current
Voter Identification Card and
the Right to Vote
Article 42 of the Constitution
provides that;
“Every citizen of Ghana of
eighteen years and above and of
sound mind has the right to vote
and is entitled to be registered
as a voter for the purposes of
public elections and referenda.”
Therefore, persons with the
right to vote and entitled to be
registered must be;
i.
citizens of Ghana,
ii.
eighteen years of age or above,
and
iii.
of sound mind.
It is clear that to be
registered as a voter, an
applicant must provide evidence
of his identity, i.e. that he or
she is who he or she claims to
be. The applicant must also
provide evidence that he or she
is a citizen of Ghana. Thirdly,
an applicant must provide
evidence that he or she is
eighteen years or above. Lastly,
an applicant must not be
obviously of unsound mind.
In Abu Ramadan (No 1),
supra, at page 1673, this Court
emphasized that “these criteria
must be jealously guarded and
protected if we must succeed in
protecting the
constitutionally-entrenched
right to vote”.
In seeking to actualize article
42, C.I 126 provides that;
“1. The Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
Regulations, 2016 (C.I. (91) is
amended in regulation 1
(a) by the substitution for
subregulation (3), of
“(3) A person who applies for
registration as a voter shall
provide as evidence of
identification one of the
following:
(d)
a passport;
(e)
a national identification card
issued by the National
Identification Authority; or
(f)
one voter registration
identification guarantee form as
set out in Form One of the
Schedule that has been completed
and signed by the two registered
voters.”; and
(b) by the substitution for
subregulation (4), of
“(4) Despite paragraph (c) of
subregulation (3), a registered
voter shall not guarantee the
identity for more than ten
persons.””
This Court has held that in
actualizing and giving effect to
article 42, the 2nd
Defendant is, of necessity,
called upon to make certain
vital decisions and choices on
how to guarantee the right of
all Ghanaian citizens of
eighteen years of age and above
to vote whilst keeping out those
not qualified to vote.
In Abu Ramadan (No 1)
supra, the Court speaking
through Wood C.J. stated the
position as follows at page
1671;
“A meaningful actualization of
article 42 rights requires,
inter alia, that the 2nd
Defendant Electoral Commission
establishes credible and
reliable structures, systems,
processes and procedures for
translating the
constitutionally-guaranteed
rights into reality. These
mechanisms, structures, systems,
processes and procedures guard
and protect and preserve the
sanctity and credibility of the
rights guaranteed thereunder. A
perfect electoral system is
obviously utopian; hence the
notion that the structure should
on balance, not undermine,
detract from, dilute nor whittle
down the right to qualify to be
registered, the first crucial
step that would enable that
citizen to vote.”
Chief Justice Wood continued at
pages 1672 to 1673;
“Voter registration is crucial
to the success of the entire
electoral process for it
establishes the eligibility of
citizens to the franchise. It is
the gateway to the right to vote
- the open door to participation
in the governance process.
Safeguarding the entire
registration process, which
process includes the
qualification criteria, is
therefore key to securing the
legitimacy of the entire
electoral process and by logical
reasoning the sovereignty of the
state. The registration process
must therefore be protected from
under-age persons, non-citizens
and voter-fraudsters alike.”
In choosing the three modes of
identification, this Court
believes that C.I 126 is seeking
the most effective way of
actualizing article 42, ensuring
that those with the right to
vote are able to register whilst
keeping out those without the
right to vote and who are not
entitled to register.
Additionally, there is evidence
before us that there are serious
questions about the legitimacy
of the processes which led to
the issuing of the current voter
identification cards.
First of all, the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) Regulations, 1995
(C.I.12) did not require that
any identification document be
provided by a person who applies
for registration as a voter.
Subsequent Constitutional
Instruments, the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) Regulations, 2012
(C.I.72) and the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) Regulations, 2016
(C.I.91), have sought to correct
this anomaly.
Regulation 1(5) of C.I.72
provided that;
“A person who applies for
registration as a voter shall
provide as evidence of
identification one of the
following.
(a) a passport;
(b) A driver’s licence;
(c) National Identification
card;
(d) A National Health Insurance
Card;
(e) An existing voter
identification card; or
(f) One voter registration
identification guarantee form as
set out in Form One of Schedule
that has been completed and
signed by two registered voters.
Similarly, regulation 1(3) of
C.I.91 provided that;
“A person who applies for
registration as a voter shall
provide as evidence of
identification one of the
following;
(a) a passport;
(b) a driver’s licence;
(c) a national identification
card;
(d) an existing voter
identification card; or
(e) One voter registration
identification guarantee form as
set out in form completed and
signed by two registered
voters.”
However, there is evidence
before us that the registration
exercises undertaken under the
Regulations of C.I. 72 and C.I.
91 did not comply with the
requirements imposed by these
Regulations. It is noted that
the Registration Officials
Manual used by the 2nd
Defendant in the registration
exercise in 2012 contained this
startling statement at page 16:
“Presenting a proof is however
not mandatory, even though it
will help speed up the process.”
Therefore, though C.I.72 had
provided that a person who
applies for registration must
provide an identification
document or guarantor form, the
registration officials were
guided by the instruction that
proof of eligibility was not
mandatory. This had the effect
of subverting the right to vote
as enshrined article 42 of the
Constitution.
These anomalies in the 1995 and
2012 registration exercises were
carried through into the 2016
registration exercise, because
both C.I.72 and C.I.91 provided
for the use of the existing
voter identification card as a
document for the identification
of a person who applies for
registration as a voter. It is
the resultant situation which
led to the Abu Ramadan
series of cases. The issue in
controversy in these cases was
the constitutionality of the use
of National Health Insurance
(NHI) card as evidence of
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter. In Abu Ramadan (No1)
supra, this court held that upon
a true and proper interpretation
of the right to vote as
enshrined in article 42, the use
of the NHI card as an
identification document by
Regulation 1(3)(d) of C.I. 72
was inconsistent with and in
contravention of article 42.
Additionally, the court granted
an order of perpetual injunction
restraining the Electoral
Commission from using the NHI
card for the identification of
persons who apply for
registration as voters. The
reason for the decision of the
Court was that the NHI card was
based on residence and does not
provide evidence of citizenship,
a fundamental requirement of
article 42.
After the Plaintiffs in Abu
Ramadan (No1) had failed to
get the Electoral Commission to
compile a new register of voters
or clean up the existing
register by removing the names
of persons who had registered
with the NHI card, they
instituted another action,
Abu Ramadan (No2), seeking
compliance with the decision of
the court in Abu Ramadan
(No1). Abu Ramadan (No2)
was therefore about the
production of “a reasonably
accurate or credible” register.
This Court held at page 43,
“that the current register of
voters which contains names of
persons who have not established
qualification to be registered
is not reasonably accurate or
credible”. It further held “that
the current register of voters
which contains the names of
persons who are deceased is not
reasonably accurate or
credible”.
It therefore ordered that;
“(a) that the Electoral
Commission takes steps
immediately to delete or as
popularly known “clean” the
current register of voters to
comply with the provisions of
the Constitution and applicable
laws of Ghana”.
The Electoral Commission did not
comply with the orders of the
Court. This necessitated the
plaintiffs to bring a
post-judgment application in
this Court for clarification and
further directions in respect of
the orders given by the Court.
In the course of the hearing of
the application in Abu
Ramadan and Nimako (No.3) v
Electoral Commission and
Attorney General(No.3)
[2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 77 (Abu
Ramadan (No.3),
this Court by an interim order,
directed the Electoral
Commission to provide in writing
to the court the full list of
persons who had utilised the NHI
card as a means of
identification to register and
also to submit in writing to the
court the modalities it intended
to apply to ensure full
compliance with the court’s
consequential orders made in
Abu Ramadan (No.2).
The Electoral Commission
submitted to the court the names
of 56,739 as the list of persons
on the register of voters who
had used the NHI card as a
document of identification. The
plaintiffs/applicants in
Abu Ramadan (No.3)
challenged and raised objections
to the accuracy and credibility
of the list filed by Electoral
Commission as the total number
of persons who had used the NHI
card. This Court held (holding
5) as follows:
“(5) After due consideration of
the objections by the applicants
tendered in the list of persons
being NHI registrants on the
electoral roll submitted by the
first defendant Electoral
Commission, in compliance with
the court’s order, the Supreme
Court would hold that it was
precluded in the instant
post-judgment application for
clarification from veering into
issues that were not immediately
covered by the application…
Per curiam: We are of the
opinion that an inquiry into the
authenticity and credibility of
the list submitted might result
in the modification or
alteration of the substance of
the judgment.”
All these events demonstrate
that the Electoral Commission
could not or was disabled from
conducting a thorough cleaning
of the voters register in 2016.
Overall, there are serious
questions and doubts about the
legitimacy of the processes
which led to the issuing of the
current voter identification
cards. In recognition of this
fact, we are satisfied that the
2nd Defendant, in
deciding not to include the
current voter identification
card as a document to be used in
identifying applicants for voter
registration, was guided by the
need to establish a credible and
reliable voters register that
would guard, protect and
preserve the sanctity and
credibility of the right to
vote.
We therefore hold that the
non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card as one
of the documents to be used for
the identification of a person
who applies for registration as
a voter is not in violation of
the right to vote as enshrined
in article 42 of the
Constitution.
3.3 Non-Inclusion of the Current
Voter Identification Card and
Discretionary Power
The 1st Plaintiff
contends that the non-inclusion
of the current voter
identification card as a basic
document for the identification
of a person who applies for
registration as a voter by C.I.
126 and the 2nd
Defendant Electoral Commission
is unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious and is in violation
of article 296 of the
Constitution.
Counsel argued that the
non-inclusion of the voter
identification card in C.I. 126
is unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious and in violation of
article 296 of the Constitution.
Counsel submitted that even
though the 2nd
Defendant is entrusted by the
Constitution with the power to
make Regulations for the conduct
of public elections, it must act
in accordance with the
Constitution. Counsel further
submitted that the onus of
proving the reasonableness and
fairness of the non-inclusion of
the voter identification card as
a basic document for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as
voter is on the 2nd
Defendant.
Lastly, counsel for the 1st
Plaintiff submitted that
previous Regulations such as the
Public Elections (Regulations of
Voters) Regulations, 2012 (C.I.
72) and the Public Elections
(Registration of Voters)
Regulations, 2016 (C.I. 91) had
included the existing voter
identification card as one of
the documents for the
identification of a person who
applies for registration as a
voter. Counsel contended that
the non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card would
result in the disenfranchisement
of many eligible voters.
Counsel for the 2nd
Plaintiff submitted that once a
person has been registered as a
voter and holds a voter
identification card, the 2nd
Defendant has no constitutional
right to introduce a new
regulation which does not
include the current voter
identification card as one of
the documents that may be used
in the identification of a
person who applies for
registration as a voter.
Counsel for the 2nd
Plaintiff also submitted that
once a person has been
registered as a voter and issued
with a voter identification
card, the non-inclusion of the
card for the identification of a
person who applies for
registration “for the revision
of the register is
unconstitutional, illegal,
arbitrary and unreasonable.”
Article 296 of the Constitution
provides that:
“Where in this Constitution or
in any other law discretionary
power is vested in any person or
authority;
(a) that discretionary power
shall be deemed to imply a duty
to be fair and candid;
(b) the exercise of the
discretionary power shall not be
arbitrary, capricious and biased
either by resentment, prejudice
or personal dislike and shall be
in accordance with due process
of law; and
(c) where the person or
authority is not a judge or
other judicial officer, there
shall be published by
constitutional instrument or
statutory instrument,
regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions
of this Constitution or that
other law to govern the exercise
of the discretionary power.”
Attention is also drawn to
article 46 of the Constitution,
which provides for the
independence and autonomy of the
2nd Defendant
Electoral Commission as follows;
“Except as provided in this
Constitution or in any law not
inconsistent with this
Constitution, in the performance
of its functions, the Electoral
Commission shall not be subject
to the direction or control of
any person or authority.”
The issue under consideration,
the circumstances in which the
exercise of discretion by the 2nd
Defendant Electoral Commission
may be declared unconstitutional
by this Court, is not novel and
has been dealt with in a number
of cases including Ransford
France (No 3) v. Electoral
Commission & Attorney General
[2012] 1 SCGLR 705; Abu Ramadan
(No 1), supra; and Abu
Ramadan(No2) supra.
This Court has consistently held
that it would be loath to
declare the decisions and
actions of the 2nd
Defendant Electoral Commission
unconstitutional and would only
do so in clear cases of patent
unconstitutionality or
illegality. This Court would be
even more reluctant where the
decision and actions of the
repository of the power take the
form of subsidiary legislation,
such as C.I. 126.
First, in Abu Ramadan (No2)
supra, this Court held that the
burden of establishing
unreasonableness, arbitrariness
or capriciousness is on the
Plaintiffs. Benin JSC stated the
position thus at page 50;
“With these regulations in
place, the Plaintiffs assume the
initial burden of convincing the
court that the 1st
Defendant Electoral Commission
has taken any step in the
process of cleaning up the
register which is not governed
by the repealed C.I. 72 but now
by C.I. 92.
The Plaintiffs also have to
satisfy this Court that the 1st
Defendant has abused the
discretionary power vested in it
by article 296 of the
Constitution 1992 by taking
steps which are arbitrary,
capricious or unwarranted by the
law of regulations.”
This Court has also held that
where a number of choices are
open to 2nd Defendant
Electoral Commission, the
decision as to which option(s)
to choose is one for the 2nd
Defendant, and this will not be
interfered with by this Court
unless it is patently
unconstitutional or unlawful. In
Abu Ramadan (No2), supra,
this court stated per Gbadegbe
JSC at page 39 as follows;
“…where the Constitution
intended the exercise of any of
the functions conferred on the
Electoral Commission to be
subject to any other person or
law, it is so provided.
Accordingly, where no such
provisions have been
specifically made, the effect is
that the Constitution intended
the Electoral Commission to
exercise its discretion without
the control or direction of any
person or authority. This Court
being the ultimate judicial
authority in the country must
endeavor to respect the
boundaries of the jurisdiction
conferred on it in order to give
effect to the supremacy of the
Constitution.”
Benin JSC, stated the law as
follows at page 51;
“…. the court has no power to
compel or even direct the first
defendant as to how to exercise
its constitutional mandate to
produce a credible register; it
is the end that justifies the
means. I must emphasize that
even if there is provision in
the law and/or regulations for
validation, the Court cannot
compel the first defendant to
follow that method unless it is
the only mode that is sanctioned
by the law or regulations. If
the law provides for alternative
ways of performing the task, the
discretion is vested in the
actor in deciding within the
limits imposed by article 296 of
the Constitution as to which one
of them would best suit the task
on hand…. As long as the process
it has chosen to clean up the
register is authorized by the
law or regulations, they cannot
be faulted, even if it is
considered that a more efficient
mode exists.”
The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs have
failed to discharge the burden
of establishing
unreasonableness, arbitrariness
or capriciousness. In addition
to a passport or national
identification card issued by
the National Identification
Authority, C.I. 126 provides for
the guarantor system as a mode
of identification. Under the
guarantor system an applicant
for registration may be
identified by a voter
identification form signed by
two registered voters.
Furthermore, the evidence before
this court provided by the
National Identification
Authority is that, as at 2nd
June 2020, the national identity
card had been issued to
10,026,276 citizens of Ghana of
eighteen years of age and above.
The Government Statistician also
provided evidence to the court
that from the projections of his
office the total population of
Ghananians as at June 2020 is
30,201,691.
Of this total number, the
population of Ghanaians of
eighteen years and above is
projected as 16,650,476. These
pieces of evidence were not
contradicted or challenged by
the 1st and 2nd
Plaintiffs and are of decisive
effect in the determination of
the matters before us.
We have also demonstrated in
section 3.2 of this judgment
that there are serious
legitimate questions about the
utility of the current voter
identification card as a means
of identification of persons
qualified to be registered as
voters.
Thus, the 2nd
Defendant’s decision not to
include the current voter
identification card as a
document to be used for the
identification of an applicant
for registration as a voter by
C.I.126 is clearly guided by the
need to ensure a credible voters
register and we are satisfied
that this decision is fair and
reasonable.
The 1st and 2nd
Plaintiffs have therefore failed
to satisfy this Court that the
non-inclusion of the current
voter identification card as a
document for the identification
of a person who applies for
registration is, in all the
circumstances of this case,
unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. We therefore hold
that the non-inclusion by C.I.
126 of the current voter
identification card as basic
document for the identification
of a person who applies for
registration as a voter is not
inconsistent with article 296 of
the Constitution or any other
Law.
3.4 The Constitutionality or
Otherwise of the Non-Inclusion
of Birth Certificate
The 2nd Plaintiff
contends that the non-inclusion
by C.I.126 of birth certificate
as one of the documents to be
used for identification of a
person who applies for
registration as a voter is in
contravention of and
inconsistent with the
Constitution.
Reliefs iii and vi indorsed on
the 2nd Defendant’s
Writ are for;
iii. A declaration that
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I. 126) is inconsistent
with and violates the provisions
of article 42 and 45 (e) of the
1992 Constitution to the extent
that it excludes Birth
Certificates issued to Ghanaians
as a mode of identification
and/or establishment of
qualification to be registered
in the register of voters.
vi. An order directed at 1st
Defendant to include under
Regulation 1 (3) of the Public
Elections (Registration of
Voters) (Amendment) Regulations,
2020 (C.I. 126) birth
certificates as evidence of
identification.
We find no merit whatsoever in
the 2nd Defendant’s
contention. It flies in the face
of article 42 of the
Constitution and the decisions
of this court in Abu Ramadan
(No1), supra and Abu
Ramadan (No2), supra. A
birth certificate is not a form
of identification. It does not
establish the identity of the
bearer. Nor does it link the
holder with the information on
the certificate. Quite
obviously, it provides no
evidence of citizenship. It
therefore does not satisfy the
requirements of the article 42
of the Constitution. In fact, as
a form of identification, it is
worse than the NHI card which
was held to be unconstitutional
as evidence of identification of
a person who applies for
registration as a voter in
Abu Ramadan (No1), supra and
Abu Ramadan (No.2),
supra.
In Abu Ramadan (No1),
supra this Court per Wood C.J at
page 1674, held in respect to
the NHI card as follows;
“…the term ‘evidence for
identification’ as used in
regulation 1(3) is referable,
not in the strict and narrow
sense as advocated by the
defendants, to a person’s mere
‘identity’ by name and face
only, but the more important
constitutional criteria that
qualify a person for
registration as provided under
the primary source, i.e. article
42 of the Constitution and
repeated under regulation of
C.I. 72.”
Chief Justice Wood continued at
page 1675;
“… among the lot that does not
provide undoubted information on
the holder’s nationality, …It
identifies the holder by the
name and face alright, but makes
no disclosure about the holder’s
identification… and thus fails
to meet the citizenship
restriction test.”
In
Apaloo v. Electoral Commission
[2000-2001] SCGLR 1,
Atuguba JSC
underscored the importance of
the identification of a voter in
the following words;
“The ascertainment of the
identity of a prospective voter
is part of the conduct of public
elections and as the
Constitution places that duty on
the Electoral Commission, it can
only do so by itself and its
proper agents… to surrender the
judgment of the presiding
officer as to the identity of a
voter to the candidate’s polling
agents, is in effect, to
delegate that function to those
agents, contrary to articles 45
(c) and 46 of the
Constitution.”
It is little wonder that a birth
certificate has never been
included as one of the documents
to be used as evidence of
identification by a person who
applies to be registered as a
voter. We have quoted the
relevant provisions of C.I. 72
and C.I. 91 in this judgment.
None of these specify a birth
certificate as an identification
document. Its introduction would
be a retrograde step.
We, therefore, hold that
non-inclusion of birth
certificate as a document for
the identification of a person
who applies for registration as
a voter by C.I. 126 is not
inconsistent with or in
contravention of the
Constitution, or any other law.
4.0 Conclusion
It is for the above reasons that
we substantially dismissed the
claims of the 1st and
2nd Plaintiffs and
upheld the constitutionality of
the compilation of a new
register of voters and of the
Public Elections (Registration
of Voters) (Amendments)
Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 126) and
the latter’s non-inclusion of
the current Voter Identification
card and birth certificate as
documents for the identification
of persons who apply for
registration as voters.
PROF. N. A. KOTEY
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ANIN YEBOAH
(CHIEF JUSTICE)
V. J. M. DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
P. BAFFOE-BONNIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
N. S. GBADEGBE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
S. K. MARFUL-SAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
N. A. AMEGATCHER
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
GODWIN TAMAKLOE FOR THE
PLAINTIFF IN J1/9/2020 WITH HIM
SETH NYAABA.
GODFRED YEBOAH DAME, DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 1ST
DEFENDANT IN J1/9/2020 AND 2ND
DEFENDANT IN J1/12/2020 WITH HIM
CLARENCE KUWORNU, CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY.
JUSTIN AMENUVOR FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT IN J1/9/2020 AND 1ST
DEFENDANT IN J1/12/2020 WITH HIM
HOPE AGBOADO.
COSMAS ANPENGNUO FOR THE
PLAINTIFF IN J1/12/2020.
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