Appeal Court. 19 November l934.
Appeal from Supreme Court
Declaration of Boundary- Weight
of Evidence.
Held: There was ample evidence
to support the judgment of the
trial Judge in favour of the
respondent and the appeal is
dismissed.
The facts are sufficiently set
out in the judgment.
Wells-Palmer
for the Appellant.
A. Soetan
for the Respondent.
The following judgment was
delivered:-
DEANE, C.J., GOLD COAST.
This is a matter in which the
plaintiff on behalf of the Ogidi
people sued the defendant on
behalf of the Obunike people for
a declaration that the boundary
between the Ogidi and Obunike
people is the old Awka road.
The matter first came before
Butler Lloyd, J., who on a
preliminary objection on 27th
August, 1931, found that it was
a
res judicata
and gave judgment for the
defendant. The plaintiffs then
appealed to the Full Court which
on 14th March, 1933 held that
the matter was not
res judicata,
the judgment of the Native
Council of Ogidi in the matter
of
Arinze v. Ok eke Agbonwonu and
another,
on which the plea was founded,
being ambiguous, and it not
haying been proved that the
subject matter of the suits was
the same or that the parties
were the same in the two
suits-and made all order
remitting the case for a new
trial by a Judge who had not yet
dealt with the matter.
The case then came before Graham
Paul, J., who, having heard the
parties and their witnesses, on
19th February, 1934 gave
judgment for the plaintiffs for.
the declaration asked viz: -that
the old Awka-Onitsha road, as
shown in the plan Exhibit A, was
the boundary between Nkwelli
Ogidj land and Obunike land.
Against that judgment the appeal
has been brought.
A number of reasons of appeal
were filed but learned Counsel
for the defendants (the
appellants) on opening his
appeal abandoned all save the
6th ground of appeal, that the
judgment was against the weight
of evidence. As the other
grounds were practically all of
them attacks upon the judgment
of the Full Court, which was the
Appeal Court of the Colony
before the institution of this
Court. the judgment of which
this Court would have no
jurisdiction to set aside, he
was of course fully justified in
abandoning them. But although he
felt no doubt that it was
useless to attack the judgment
of the :Full Court, or to argue
further that the judgment of the
Native Court acted as an
estoppel by
res judicata
,:0 that the plaintiffs could
not succeed, his main argument
against the present judgment was
in fact to point out the evil
results that were, he contended,
likely to ensue if the judgment
were upheld and litigants- ·were
enabled under a change of name
to raise anew· questions that
had already been decided. This
was, of course, argument on the
assumption that the same
question which had been
litigated in the Native Court
was again being litigated in
this Court between the same
parties or their privies-an
assumption which in theory, the
judgment of the Full Court
precluded him from making. As it
happens, however, the ease
presented by the plaintiffs in
the Court below, and supported
by reliable testimony on their
behalf, does not attack the
judgment of the Native Court on
which defendants rely. On the-
contrary it accepts it: the
contention being that the
judgment of the Native Court was
misunderstood by a District
Officer, Mr. Gardiner, who in
execution of it, as he thought,
proceeded to put up pillars
along the line of the new Awka
road to mark the boundary
between the two peoples, when in
fact the boundary referred to in
the judgment of the Native Court
was the old Awka road. The
learned trial .Judge accepted
this contention and found for
plaintiffs, being of opinion
that this mistake of the
District Officer had been the
basis of all the subsequent
litigation and fighting between
the parties.
In coming to that conclusion he
examined what. he referred to as
the intrinsic evidence in the
case in the light of a visit
paid b~' himself to the
loclls in quo, and there is
one fact among many to which he
refers which to my mind is very
convincing-it is admitted, he
says, that the particular piece
of land on which the Ogidis were
charged with trespassing in the
case heard before the Native
Court in 1914 was just over the
boundary on the Obunike side:
the Native Court in giving its
reasons for the judgment against
the Ogidis had said that the
land was a long way from Ogidi
anrl comparatively close to
Obunike town-the new road
actually ran through Ogidi town
and therefore the description of
the land as being a long way
from Ogidi and comparatively
close to Obunike town would have
been quite inappropriate to
describe land just over the new
road-that rleRcription, however,
he states obviously fits Iand
just north of the old Awka road.
The learned Judge had moreover
very reliable evidence to
support the conviction at. which
he arrived-there was especially
the evidence of Archdeacon
Rasden, the evidence of the Eze
Ani of Ozeh, the evidence of
Benjamin Amobi, and the evidence
of Obianyu who had actually been
the President of the Native
Court when it decided the case
of
A.rinze v. Ok eke Agbonwonu and
another.
Archdeacon Basden is a
missionary who has been in
Nigeria since September, 1900,
knows the country of the Ogidis
and Obunikes well and speaks the
language of the people: he is a
fellow of the Royal Geographical
Society on whom a fellowship has
been conferred in recognition of
the geographical work which he
has done; he made maps of the
district when there were no
roads, and his maps have been
taken over by the
Surveyor-General. He is,
therefore, not only a man in the
truthfulness of whose evidence
the -fullest confidence may be
felt, but also a witness of
exceptional knowledge with
regard to the matters about
which he testifies..
He stated: "I know the boundary
between Obunike and Nlnvelli
Ogidi-l cross it several times a
week. The he was a mark-a stump
and a path many years ago before
the old Awka road was made-then
old Awka road was boundary. The
original Awka road passed by old
barracks-it followed the line of
the original path I have
referred to. It was absorbed in
the old Awka road which was
simply the o.ld foot path
widened. The new Awka road is on
quite a different principle-l
never heard the new Awka road
was a boundary. It runs right
through Ogidi town-the old road
went along the boundary.
I remember a portion of Nkwelli
Ogidi had case with Obunike.
The District Officer after that.
case market} the boundary on the
new Awka road. It was a mistake
to mark the boundary in the new
road. The old Awka road is the
correct one to be used as
boundary-the effect of fixing
the boundary on the new road was
to deprive Ogidis of their
homes."
All that Counsel for the
appellants can find to say
against this evidence is to ask
why it was not given before?
He was not asked about this in
the Court below but the answer
to my mind is obvious-because
Mr. Basden was not summoned
before as a witness. One can
quite understand that a
missionary living and working
among both tribes would not be
eager to identify himself with
one side in a controversy such
as this, as he would inevitably
have been held by the other side
to be doing, if he hall
interfered in the matter and
would leave to the Courts the
business of deciding the
dispute-now that he has been
subpoenaed he has given
evidence.
Then there is the evidence of
Ofodile, the Eze Ani of Ozehan
old man apparently of over
seventy years of age-who stated
that he had known the old A wka
road as the Nkwelli Ogidi
boundary all his life. He
is an independent chief, not
connected with either side, and
the learned ,Judge believed his
evidence-no argument has been
addressed to us why he should
not. have believed him.
Again there is the evidence of
Benjamin Amobi, a chief and a
member of the l,egislative
Council; he is also a presiding
chief in the Ogidi Native Court
as his father before him was-a
man therefore of considerable
standing in the community and
presumably a reliable
witness-his evidence supports
the old Awka road as the
boundary-the learned Judge
accepted it.
Counsel for defendants asks us
to reject his evidence as being
unworthy of credence-he points
out that this very gentleman was
a member of an Ogidi Native
Court in 1927, which 'convicted
an Ogidi man at the instance of
an Obunike man for trespass on
the land in dispute, and asks if
he was likely to do so knowing
that the land was Ogidi land.
The proceedings referred to are
exhibited as "]j''' -they showed
that on 25th January, 1927, one
Anierobi of Ogidi was chargeJ by
Agba.puonwu of Ogbunike for
"acting in a manner likely to
cause a breach of the peace by
trespassing into land thereby
injured the complainants
property valued about £15
wilfully."
From a statement made by the
accused Ogidi man when called
upon it appears that this was
one of the many cases which were
before the Courts from time to
time in consequence of the
mistake made by the District
Officer in fixing the boundary.
" According to the boundary
fixed," said the defendant, " we
are in their land, but my people
are not satisfied with such
judgment, and we have now
summoned Chief J. Ejiofo before
the Judge and Lawyers but this
was not heard yet." It is to be
noticed that this was not a
civil case of trespass, but a
criminal charge of acting in a
manner likely to cause a breach
of the peace, and in my judgment
the witness has given a
reasonable explanation why he
agreed to punish the defendant
although no doubt he knew of
this claim of the Ogidis to the
land. He was asked about the
matter at the trial and said: "
We decided to punish the accused
because he had gone and cut
grass Itulu against District
Officer's orders-we did not
decide on Full Court judgment-in
the 1927 case I didn't inspect
the land. I don't know where the
land in question in that case
was-every time Obunike or Ogidi
went to cut Itulu there was a
riot, so District Officer
forbade cutting."
The witness in fact took the
view that if defendant even had
a claim to the land which he was
prosecuting before the Courts he
was wrong in disobeying the
orders of the District Officer
issued to prevent the constant
rioting and should not have gone
on the land.
That this explanation is the
truth, moreover, is apparent
from a note in Exhibit" F "
itself from which it appears
that at the close of the
evidence the Court" Adjourned
till District Officer's opinion
is required (sic:) into-Hearing
resumed 27th January, 1927."
The District Officer's opinion
is that the chiefs should give
their " decision" -from which it
is quite clear that disobedience
to an order of the District
Officer rather than trespass was
the real issue dealt with by the
Court.
Lastly, there was the evidence
of Obianyu who, as I have said
above, was the President of the
Native Court which gave the
judgment in 1914 on which the
defendants rely. He stated: "
The District Officer fixed
boundary but not where we gave
judgment in a different part
altogether-he fixed the
boundary in the middle of
Nkwelli and not old Awka road-he
fixed boundary on wire road
instead of on old Awka road-wire
road is different: it is the new
Awka road-(By Court)-the
District Officer told us to go
and wait on spot. where judgment
given. We went on old Awka road
and waited there at Ebenebe
tree-in evening we heard people
shouting-we were not present at
the wire road when District.
Officer fixed boundary there."
No argument was addressed to us
why this witness should not have
been believed.
In conclusion there is ample
evidence to support the finding
of the learned trial Judge--he
heard the witnesses in the case
and was in a much better
position than is this Court to
judge of their credibility-no
sufficient reason has been
advanced to us to induce us to
set aside this judgment on the
ground that. it. is against the
weight of evidence.
The appeal must be dismissed
with costs.
WEBBER, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
I concur.
BUTLER-LLOYD, ACTING C.J.
I concur in the judgment which
has just been read. It now
appears that the whole of this
long and expensive litigation
was due to the mistake of a
Political Officer in demarcating
the boundary fixed by the Native
Court in the case of 1914.
It is extremely regrettable that
when the cross actions came
before me in 1931 no hearing' on
the merits took place. Both
sides preferred to set up an
estoppel based on the Native
Court judgment and must share
the responsibility for the delay
and expense which has ensued.