Land – Ownership - Lease -
Recovery of possession -
Execution - Stay of execution -
Compulsorily acquision – Article
20(5)(6) - 1992 Constitution -
Whether or not the the appeal
raises serious questions of law
- Whether or not the appeal
stands a reasonable chance of
success -
HEADNOTES
The facts culminating in this
application may be stated
briefly as follows. In or around
1958 the plaintiffs granted a
fifty year lease of the land in
dispute to the British Tobacco
Co. (1st defendant).
The plaintiffs acted in their
capacity as the representatives
of the Fieve State, owners of
the land. According to the
plaintiffs they did not intend
to renew the lease since they
had decided to use the land for
other purposes to serve the
community interest. However, to
cut a long story short, upon the
expiry of the lease, the lessees
did not restore the land to the
plaintiffs. Apparently the 1st
defendant had re-negotiated a
fresh lease with persons who had
not been authorised by the land
owners. It turned up that prior
to the 1958 lease agreement
between the plaintiffs and the 1st
defendant, the Government of the
then Gold Coast had compulsorily
acquired the land in dispute. So
in February 2008, the Government
of Ghana granted a fresh fifty
year lease to the 1st
defendant who in turn sub leased
the unexpired term to the 2nd
defendant. As a result the
defendants denied the title of
the plaintiffs to the land. For
the purposes of this decision
the brief facts recounted herein
will suffice. The High Court
gave judgment for the
plaintiffs, but this judgment
was reversed by the Court of
Appeal which accepted the
validity of the Government’s
acquisition of the land that had
effectively extinguished any
other interests in the land, as
held by the Court of Appeal.
HELD
On the question of greater
hardship, the undisputed
evidence is that the 1st
defendant erected some structure
on the land. This was passed on
to the 2nd defendant
when the 1st
defendant transferred title to
him. By granting this
application the 2nd
defendant will be deprived of
the benefit and use of the
structure on the land. And the
longer he stays out of the
property the more probable than
not that it will go to ruins.
And if he succeeds on appeal the
2nd defendant will
suffer greater hardship than the
plaintiffs who have invested
nothing there. The fact that the
plaintiffs intend to use the
land for a different purpose is
not weighty or reasonable enough
when compared to the 2nd
defendant who stands to lose the
benefit of his investment should
the property on the land be
allowed to go to ruins. For the
foregoing reasons I do not see
any merit in the application. I
hereby dismiss same accordingly.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1992
Constitution
Supremr Court
Rules , C. I. 16
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
BENIN JSC:
COUNSEL
ROBERTSON
KPATSA WITH HIM SENANU
ASHIAGBOR, AWUKU ATAKLI AND KOFI
KUKUBOR FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS/
APPLICANTS.
_______________________________________________________________
RULING
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ___________________________________________________________________
BENIN JSC:
This
is an application by the
plaintiffs/defendants for a stay
of execution of the judgment or
decision of the Court of Appeal
dated 23rd January,
2014 pending appeal to this
court against the said decision.
The Court of Appeal allowed the
appeal by the
defendants/respondents herein
and entered judgment in their
favour on their counterclaim.
The subject-matter of the
dispute is a piece and parcel of
land situate at Sogakope. Issues
of title and recovery of
possession, inter alia, were
raised. Following the Court of
Appeal’s decision the
plaintiffs/applicants herein
appealed to this Court, which is
not yet seised with the appeal.
So under the rules of Court, C.
I. 16, the plaintiffs/applicants
first made an application to the
Court of Appeal to stay
execution of the judgment, but
the Court of Appeal dismissed it
on 14th April, 2014.
Thus this is a repeat
application to this Court under
C. I. 16.
The facts culminating in this
application may be stated
briefly as follows. In or around
1958 the plaintiffs granted a
fifty year lease of the land in
dispute to the British Tobacco
Co. (1st defendant).
The plaintiffs acted in their
capacity as the representatives
of the Fieve State, owners of
the land. According to the
plaintiffs they did not intend
to renew the lease since they
had decided to use the land for
other purposes to serve the
community interest. However, to
cut a long story short, upon the
expiry of the lease, the lessees
did not restore the land to the
plaintiffs. Apparently the 1st
defendant had re-negotiated a
fresh lease with persons who had
not been authorised by the land
owners. It turned up that prior
to the 1958 lease agreement
between the plaintiffs and the 1st
defendant, the Government of the
then Gold Coast had compulsorily
acquired the land in dispute. So
in February 2008, the Government
of Ghana granted a fresh fifty
year lease to the 1st
defendant who in turn sub leased
the unexpired term to the 2nd
defendant. As a result the
defendants denied the title of
the plaintiffs to the land. For
the purposes of this decision
the brief facts recounted herein
will suffice.
The High Court gave judgment for
the plaintiffs, but this
judgment was reversed by the
Court of Appeal which accepted
the validity of the Government’s
acquisition of the land that had
effectively extinguished any
other interests in the land, as
held by the Court of Appeal.
Grounds for the application are
set out in paragraph 14 through
17 of the affidavit in support.
The key elements contained
therein are:
(i)
that the appeal raises serious
questions of law;
(ii)
that the appeal stands a
reasonable chance of success;
(iii)
that if a stay is not granted
the defendants/respondents will
alter the nature or character
of the land as to affect the
purpose for which they
(plaintiffs) have earmarked it;
(iv)
that there is likelihood of a
breach of the peace if the 2nd
defendant enters the land now
because citizens of Fieve will
likely resist him;
(v)
it is necessary to maintain the
status quo in order not to
render any judgment to be given
by this court nugatory;
(vi)
that greater hardship will be
caused to the
plaintiffs/applicants if the 2nd
defendant is allowed to develop
the land and the plaintiffs have
to restore the land to its
present state, as against the 2nd
defendant who loses nothing
since he is yet to develop the
land.
Respondents’ answer
The defendants/respondents
posited that the appeal has been
brought in bad faith and is
intended to deprive the
defendants of the fruits of
their victory. The reason being
that with the compulsory
acquisition of the land by the
Government of Ghana whatever
interest the plaintiffs had in
the land was extinguished. The
law was settled on this
according to the
defendants/respondents so the
appeal raises no serious legal
points to be argued, and it
stands no chance of success. The
defendants denied they intend to
alter the nature and character
of the land. In respect of the
allegation by the
plaintiffs/applicants that there
was a likelihood of a breach of
the peace should the 2nd
defendant be allowed to enter
the land, the
defendants/respondents deposed
in paragraph 43 of their
affidavit that this “cannot be
said to be a special or an
exceptional circumstance to
warrant the grant of a stay of
execution and same undermines
the judicial process”. They also
said that there is not the
likelihood that the appeal will
succeed so there is no judgment
that will be rendered nugatory
for which the status quo ought
to be maintained. On the
contrary it is rather the 2nd
defendant/appellant who will
suffer great hardship and
expense to refurbish the
property which is going into
ruins as a result of the
litigation, thus concluded the
affidavit in opposition.
Arguments by counsel
In his argument counsel for the
plaintiffs/applicants said the
appeal raises serious questions
of law in the sense that the
Court of Appeal failed to take
into account the provisions of
the 1992 Constitution, article
20(5)(6) thereof. On this point
counsel for the
defendants/respondents argued
that the provisions in the
Constitution cited by the
plaintiffs/respondents’ counsel
do not have retrospective
effect.
Besides this Constitutional
point, both Counsels dwelt on
the affidavit depositions in
making their submissions.
Consideration by the court
I begin with the claim by the
plaintiffs/applicants that
should the 2nd
defendant/respondent enter the
land there is a likelihood of a
breach of the peace since he may
be attacked by the citizens of
Fieve, and for that reason the
application to stay execution
should be granted. This claim is
outrageous, to say the least.
The plaintiffs/applicants are
telling the court that it should
restrain the owner of the land
(2nd defendant
herein) not to enter same
because he would be attacked by
a defeated party if he did. This
blackmails the court and throws
the entire judicial system into
disrepute. The plaintiffs, by
the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, have no right to enter
the land, let alone to cause
assault on any person there. The
intent of the plaintiffs either
by themselves or agents to
attack the 2nd
defendant is sufficient reason
to restrain them (plaintiffs)
from entering the land pending
appeal. This is because the 2nd
defendant/respondent has a
better and legitimate claim to
the land having been so declared
by the Court of Appeal as the
owner thereof.
The other ground that the appeal
raises serious questions of law
and stands a reasonable chance
of success are worth
considering. However, on the
facts of this case and given the
basis of the Court of Appeal
decision founded on the
Government’s superior title by
the compulsory acquisition, it
is difficult at this stage to
see a clear legal justification
for the appeal. The reliance on
article 20(5)(6) of the 1992
Constitution is not clear cut in
view of the available
authorities. In effect I do not
see myself to be in agreement
with the plaintiffs/applicants
that they have serious issues on
appeal, which stand a reasonable
chance have of success.
On the question of greater
hardship, the undisputed
evidence is that the 1st
defendant erected some structure
on the land. This was passed on
to the 2nd defendant
when the 1st
defendant transferred title to
him. By granting this
application the 2nd
defendant will be deprived of
the benefit and use of the
structure on the land. And the
longer he stays out of the
property the more probable than
not that it will go to ruins.
And if he succeeds on appeal the
2nd defendant will
suffer greater hardship than the
plaintiffs who have invested
nothing there. The fact that the
plaintiffs intend to use the
land for a different purpose is
not weighty or reasonable enough
when compared to the 2nd
defendant who stands to lose the
benefit of his investment should
the property on the land be
allowed to go to ruins.
For the foregoing reasons I do
not see any merit in the
application. I hereby dismiss
same accordingly.
(SGD) A. A. BENIN
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
COUNSEL
ROBERTSON
KPATSA WITH HIM SENANU ASHIAGBOR,
AWUKU ATAKLI AND KOFI KUKUBOR
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS/
APPLICANTS. |