pg 204
Appeal Court, 16th Dec.,
1941
Declaration of title-Family
property.
Jurisdiction-Sections 48
(2) (c) and (f) of the
Native (Cap. 76).
Administration Ordinance
Claim as head of family to
declaration that plaintiff
is entitled to possession
and receipt of rents of
family property: the
defendants claimed that the
plaintiff is not head of the
family and that they were
entitled to share similar
rights. Judgment was given
in the Provincial
Commissioner's Court in
favour of plaintiff.
Question of .jurisdiction
was raised on appeal
viz
that the suit not being one
relating to ownership
possession or occupation of
land within the meaning of
section 48 (2)
(c)
of the Native Administration
Ordinance by virtue of the
effect of sections 79 and
128.\ the Provincial
Commissioner's Court had no
jurisdiction.
Held:
The issue between the parties
was one as to succession ·to
property within the meaning of
section 48 (2) (f), and the only
right of appeal lay to the Court
of the District Commissioner.
The Court of the Provincial
Commissioner therefore had .no
jurisdiction 'to try the suit
and the judgment of that Court
is set aside.
EfJuah Adum and ors; v. George
Hagan and ors
and
Arabah Tanuah v. George Hagan
and ors.
in Privy Council reported in 5 ·W.A.C.A
.. · 35 followed.
C. F. H. Benjarnin
for Appellants.
F. A. Williams
for Respondent.
The
following joint judgment was
delivered:-
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES,
C.J., GOLD COAST AND
M'CARTHY, J.
In
this case the plaintiff claimed
as' follows:-
The plaintiffs' claim is for a
declaration. against the I.
defendants that Ekuah Mansah as
head of and as successor
"according to Native Custom of
the late Isaac Benjamin
pg
206
Ephraim (Kwesi Effrim)
(Deceased) is entitled to th
possession and to the receipt of
the rents of the family
"properties (lands and houses)
particularly the premises
situate between Lagoon Road and.
Sixth-Street, Dutch Sekondi,
generally known as Ephraim's
Family property: "And for an
injunction restraining the
defendants their .-"servants;
agents and people from
interfering with the possession
of the said premises and ·the
receipt of the rents
of the said properties by the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs also claim such
further and other relief "as
they may be entitled in the
premises- against the "
defendants."
Unfortunately the opening
statements of counsel in the·
Court below containing the pleas
of the parties-were not
recorded. However, statements
as to these have been made to
this Court by Mr Williams,
counsel for the
plaintiff-respondent both in the
Court below and on the appeal,
and by Mr Blay who, though he no
longer represents the
defendants-appellants, appeared
for them in -the Court below.
Mr Williams's statement did not
add materially to the claim as
set out in the writ of summons
and particulars of claim. In
them the plaintiff as head and
successor of 1. B. Ephraim on
behalf of herself and the elders
of her family claims a
declaration that she is entitled
to possession and receipt of the
rents of the family properties
(lands and houses) and
particularly of certain
premises' in Sekondi known as "
Ephraim's family property."
The pleas by Mr Blay for the
defendants were as follows:
(1) Members of deceased's family
entitled to enjoy house and
proceeds.
(2) Plaintiff is not head of the
family. (3) Defendants share
similar rights.
Judgment was given in the
Provincial Commissioner's Court
in favour of the plaintiff. In
other words her claim succeeded.
In this Court it was in the
first place submitted on behalf
of the defendants-appellants
that this is a suit relating to
succession to property within
the meaning of section 48 (2) U)
of the Native Administration
Ordinance (Cap. 76), and that
not being one relating to the
ownership, possession or
occupation of land within the
meaning of section 48 (2)
(c)
of the Ordinance, by virtue of
the combined effect of sections
79 and 128,\ of the Ordinance,
the Provincial Commissioner's
Court had no jurisdiction to try
the suit. It. is common ground
that the appropriate Tribunal is
not functioning and that section
128,\ applies. The plaintiff
respondent contends that the
suit is one relating to the
ownership, possession or
occupation of lands, and that by
virtue of the combined effect of
sections 80 and 128. the
Provincial Commissioner's Court
had jurisdiction.
pg 206
The claim of the plaintiff
in her capacity~· as
successor to Ephraim
suggests that though the
property in dispute was
family property, it was
property in which she had a
special interest. According
to the evidence the property
actually in: dispute is a
compound which formerly
'belonged to the
plaintiff-respondent and to
her brothers 1. B. Ephraim,
deceased, and D. Ephraim ••
deceased (the latter
pre-deceased the former).
The compound contains a
storey house built by the
two brothers. When D.
Ephraim died it would seem
that 1. B. Ephraim succeeded
him as to his share in the
house. When 1. B. Ephraim
died the sister, the
defendant-appellant was
appointed to succeed to the
self acquired property of
the deceased, and to the
house.
In her evidence the
plaintiff stated:-
" When EJ1hraim died I was
appointed successor and a8 "
such I made application to
the Divisional Court and
obtained " Letters of
Administration to his
estate."
The application of course
only concerned his separate
personal property.
In cross-examination the
plaintiff stated:-
" The compound is mine. The
compound is for myself " and
deceased, and not for
anybody elge."
In re-examination she said:-
" I claim for myself and the
blood cycle of my family"
whatever that may mean.
Kwasi
.Awotwi,
who claims to have been
appointed' head of the
family' to act for the
plaintiff-respondent because
of her age, said both in
cross-examination and in
re-examination that the
property belongs to the
plaintiff and not to the
family .. In reexamination
he said that the plaintiff
can if she wishes give the
family some of the rent.
The defendants contended
that the property simply
became the property of the
whole family. They admitted
that the plaintiff was
appointed successor to
Ephraim's personal property,
but they say that when
Awotwi, who according to
them was then the head of
the family allowed the
plaintiff-respondent as
Ephraim's successor to
collect the rents of the
house, he was destooled. It
may be added that Eku Sado,
plaintiff-respondent's
daughter, stated in evidence
that one uncle got money to
build (the hou8e) from one
Aba Kufua (a member of the
family), the other uncle and
her mother. She also stated
that the defendants
contributed to the building
of the house.
There would appear therefore
to have been a definite
question as to succession.
It is true that the
plaintiff-respondent
purported to sue' as head of
the family as well as
successor to Ephraim, but
this hardly affects the
question. The elders may
have approved of the
plaintiff-respondent's
claim; the fact remains that
the pg
207
defendants-appellants
repudiated it. They
contended that the property
was family property to which
the plaintiff-respondent had
no special right of
succession, and they claim
that they with other members
of the family had an equal
beneficial interest in the
property.
The Provincial Commissioner
held that though the
plaintiff was in a way
correct in averring that the
property was " for her alone
", he considered that there
was ample evidence to show
that she was acting for and
with the authority of the
family. He held that there
was no doubt as to her
lawful inheritance of the
property as Ephraim's
successor, and that she is
entitled to collect the
rents just as Ephraim did,
though she has her duty to
do to her family such as
rendering account of monies
accruing from the property
to the family. Rut, it may
be observed, this would not
be of much satisfaction to
the defendants-appellants if
the other members of the
family share the view of
Awotwi that the
plaintiff-respondent is
alone entitled to the
proceeds of the property.
Whether the
defendants-appellants have
any right to oppose the
wishes of the elders in this
matter is a question that
does not now arise. It
appears to be clear that the
issue between the parties
was one as to succession to
property within the meaning
of section
48 (2) (f).
It is now necessary to
examine the submission made
on behalf of the
defendants-appellants that
it follows, if the Court
finds that the suit relates
to the succession to
property, that, by virtue of
the provisions of sections
79 and
128A,
an appeal from the judgment
of the appropriate Tribunal,
if it were functioning,
would lie only to the
District Commissioner's
Court and that accordingly
the Court of the Provincial
Commissioner had no
jurisdiction. In a suit
entitled
Effuah Admn and Other.~ v.
George Hagan and Oth('.r.~,
instituterl in t.he Effutu
Tribunal, the plaintiff, the
domestic "slave-wife" of
Thomas Hagan rleceased,
called on the defendants,
the brothers and sister of
the deceased, to declare the
value of the estate of the
deceased, and to show cause
why her share and that of
her children in the estate,
consisting of houses and
personal property, should
not be designated. The
defendants appealed from the
jurlgment of the Tribunal to
the Provincial
Commissioner's Court, which
sustained an objection that
the appeal was not competent
in that Court and dismissed
the appeal. On an appeal,
this decision was affirmed
by this Court on the 19th
December, 1935, when the
following judgment was
delivered:-
The question in this case is
whether or not the suit in "
the Tribunal of the
Paramount Chief of the
Effutu Division " is a suit.
or matter relating to the
ownership, possession or "
occupation of any land
within the meaning of
section 75 of "the Native
Administration Ordinance
(pap. 111). The "Court of
the Provincial Commissioner
of the Central " Province
has held that it is not and
we think that it is
pg 208
right in so holding
because the suit does not
relate to the " ownership,
possession or occupation of
any particular piece " of
land, it only relates
generally to the question of
how the "estate, real and
personal, of the deceased
man, Thomas "Hagan, should
be shared j in other words
it comes under "sub-section
(I) and not
(c)
of section 43 (2) of the
Native "Administration
Ordinance.
" The appeal is accordingly
dismissed with costs
assessed " at £21 16s 0d."
The defendants-appellants
appealed to the Privy
Council from this judgment
and from a judgment given in
another suit,
Arabah Tanuah v. George
Hagan and Others
in connection with the same
estate. The two appeals were
consolidated in the Privy
Council which affirmed the
said decision of this Court
In its judgment the Board
held that the suit was one
relating to the succession
to property within the
meaning of head (I) of
section 43 (2) (now 48 (2».
The Board also dealt with
two further submissions, one
that the suit was a personal
suit for more than £100, and
that the jurisdiction of the
Native Tribunal was
therefore excluded by the
terms of head
(e)
of section 48 (2), the other
that, it being admitted that
two houses which formed part
of the succession were not
situated within the State,
jurisdiction was excluded by
the terms of head
(c)
of section 48 (2). The Board
held that, while each of the
heads
(a)
to
(g)
is subject to the provisions
of subsection (1) of
section 48, each head in
sub-section (2) affords a
self-contained subject of
jurisdiction, which is
independent of the other
heads, and that it is
illegitimate to import the
qualifications or conditions
expressed in one of the
heads into any of the other
heads. The Board was of
opinion that as the suit
fell within head (I), and
satisfied the provisions of
sub-section (1), heads
(c)
and
(e)
of sub-section (2) were
irrelevant on the question
of jurisdiction.
'1'he Board further remarked
that the appeal to the Court
of the Provincial
Commissioner was dismissed
on the ground that the suit
was one relating to the
succession to property, in
regard to which the only
right of appeal lay to the
Court of the District
Commissioner under section
74 (now section 79) of the
Ordinance, and that it was
not a suit or matter
relating to the ownership,
possession, or occupation of
any lands, i~ which case an
appeal would lie to the
Court 'of the Provincial
Commissioner under section
75 (now section 80). The
Board expressed approval of
these reasons for the
decision.
In view of the above Privy
Council judgment, we are of
opinion that inasmuch as the
present suit was one
relating to the succession
to property, the only right
of appeal lay to the Court
of the' District
Commissioner, and that it
was not a suit relating to
the ownership, possession or
occupation of land within
the meaning of head
(c)
of section 48 (2).
pg 209