Appeal Court 21st May,
1935.
Appeal from Judgment of Supreme
Court
.
Trespass to Land-Action by owner
before entry-Act-ion by Co
owners and their tenants for
trespass in respect of undivided
.shares-Uncertm:nty as to
vesting -of interest as between
Co-Plaintiffs-Onus on
Plaint1:ffs to prove title.
Held: Action not maintainable
and appeal dismissed.
The facts of the case are
sufficiently set out in the
judgment.
A wooner Renner
in person.
D. Myles-Abadoo,
J nr. for Respondents.
The following judgment was
delivered:-
DEANE, C .. J.
This is an appeal against a
decision of Strother-8tewart,
.J. who gave judgment for
defendants on a claim against
them for damages for ". trespass
in the years 1932 and 1933 on a
portion of "plaintiffs' land
situate at Cape Coast commonly
known as " Prospect Hill which
said piece or parcel of land is
bounded on all " sides by
plaintiffs' land being part of
Prospect Hill aforesaid" and for
an injunction.
The plaintiffs are Mr. P. A.
Renner a practitioner in this
Court of over fifty years
standing and his wife; the
defendant Annan is the person
who claims to have bought the
piece of land aforedescribed in
the year 1904 and to have been
in possession of it ever since;
and the other defendants are his
agents and servants who have
acted under his orders.
A trespass to land is an entry
upon land or any direct and
immediate interference with the
possession of land. The
comprehensive way of describing
a trespass is to say that the
defendant broke and entered the
plaintiffs' close and' did
damage, and it follows that in
order to maintain an action for
trespass the plaintiff must have
a present possessory title-an
owner of land who is legally
entitled to possession not being
competent to maintain an action
for trespass before entry
(Wallis v. Hands,
1893, 2 Ch. 75). "Where indeed
both parties are in a field
claiming possession the
possession being disputed,
trespass will be at the suit of
that one who can show that the
title is in him-but that so far
as I have been able to follow
the evidence is not the case
here. As we have seen the writ
is for trespass to a specific
portion of land, which is said
to be surrounded by other parts
of plaintiffs' land known as
Prospect Hill; the evidence
shows clearly that the contest
is about a parcel of land 64 x
110 which came into the
possession of defendant in 1904
and of which he has been in
possession from that time up to
to-day-and the fact that
plaintiffs were later put into
possession of adjoining land
even if it surrounds the
defendants' land does not enable
them to say that they are in
possession of the piece of land
with regard to which the
trespass is alleged. The
plaintiffs' remedy was in my
opinion by an action for
ejectment if he could not get
possession of this parcel of
land and the action for trespass
will not lie.
Suppose however I am wrong in
this view of the "facts and the
law applicable to them, and that
it be held that plaintiffs'
possession of adjoining land
gives them the right to bring an
action for trespass, then the
position would be that the onus
would be upon the plaintiffs, in
view of the disputed possession,
to prove their title to the
close. They would in fact have
to prove that they were owners
of the close to enable them to
succeed, and they can only
succeed by the strength of their
title and not by weakness of the
defendants'. Can it be said they
have established a title in this
case? The root of the
plaintiffs' title is a deed of
mortgage dated 25th August,
1905, between Charles Arthur
Albert Barnes of the one part
and Peter Awoonor Renner (one of
the Co-plaintiffs) of the other
part registered on 9th August,
1907, and a foreclosure order
absolute made by Hall, J. dated
-4th September, 1924. A
reference to the mortgage,
Exhibit " A ", will show that by
it Charles Arthur Barnes
purported to convey to the said
Peter Awoonor Renner" his
undivided moiety or half part of
the estate "property lands and
hereditaments of Mary Barnes
late of " Prospect Hill Cape
Coast under the last Will and
Testaments " bearing date 27th
May, 1874, of. the said Mary
Barnes granted " bequeathed or
demised and being an those
pieces, and parcels " of land,
messuage dwelling house
herenitaments and premises " in
the said will named and
described and hereby set out in
the " schedule hereto attached,
being the premises and
hereditaments " now held and
enjoyed by virtue of and under
the Will of the " said Mary
Barnes by Christiana Mary Selby
and Charles Arthur " Albert
Barnes the mortgagor aforesaid
as the said Will provided " and
being now particularly described
in the plans hereto and " being
situate at Cape Coast in the
Gold Coast Colony aforesaid "
and known as Prospect Hill, De
Graft Hall, Sunnyside and Topp's
Yard" to secure repayment of a
loan of £250.
The verbiage is somewhat
complicated but it is pretty
clear that all that it can be
made to mean is that Barnes as
the owner of an undivided moiety
of certain properties bequeathed
to his wife and Christiana Selby
by the 'Will of "Mary Barnes,
which properties are named and
described in the will and
described in the schedule
attached to the deed, mortgaged
his half share in them as
security to P. A. Renner.
Now if we examine the deed the
first thing that is apparent is
that at the most Mr. Renner has
only the position of a co-tenant
with respect to the Prospect
Hill land-he could only acquire
by foreclosure, and in fact has
only acquired an undivided
moiety in the land. But a
co-tenant of land cannot bring
action for trespass against
another who establishes a right
to be on the land through the
owner of the other undivided
half. From the evidence given by
Mr. Kuofie, a witness for Mr.
Renner, it is clear that
defendant was put into
possession by him acting as
agent. for both Barnes and Mrs.
Selby-so that it follows this
action would not lie even if Mr.
Renner can show that 1le
acquired a half share in the
same land as the defendant
occupies.
But that is by no means proved.
The deed of mortgage for the
description of the land refers
to the Will: the Will has not
been exhibited. It also refers
to certain plans in the schedule
attached to it: when we turn to
the schedule we find a rough
sketch with no scale and no
measurements of any kind. Then
we have Mr. Renner telling us
that after the mortgage deed was
made Mr. Barnes--, who was a
Surveyor, pointed out to him
what land had been mortgaged,
and made a plan showing the area
for him. That plan has not been
produced. when cross-examined
about its non production Mr.
Renner admitted that he should
produce it but stated that lie
thought it was with the Court;
that it had been put in evidence
in the foreclosure proceedings
and he had not been able to get
it back. All that need be said
as to this is that there is no
mention of any such plan in the
foreclosure proceedings which
merely des<'1'ibcs the land
according to the description in
the mortgage deed. The failure
to produce this plan or even a
copy must tell heavily against
the plaintiffs. The very fact
that after the mortgage deed was
made Mr. Renner had to get
Barnes to show him what land had
been mortgaged and to make a
plan defining the area mortgaged
supports a strong inference that
before that he had no idea what
land was conveyed by the deed
under which he claims-while the
tact that the plan is not now
produced supports the inference
that if produced it would not
support plaintiffs' contention
that this' land in dispute was
included in the mortgage deed.
This inference is moreover
strengthened by the evidence of
Halm and of Kuofie both
witnesses for the plaintiffs.
The former, who was Mrs.
Renner's agent and took over for
her after the foreclosure,
makes it clear that when taking
over he was shown plots n
Prospect Hill by Acquah, the
caretaker, which had been sold
to outsiders and on which there
were erections, while the
latter, who was Barnes and Mrs.
Selby's caretaker, makes it
clear that the land on which
defendant has his building was
never included in the mortgage
Now it will be observed that
throughout the argument so far
it is always of Mr. Renner's
rights that mention has been
made: he however is only one
plaintiff-what of his
co-plaintiff his wife?
If we turn to the writ we find
her figuring as first plaintiff
while Mr. Renner occupies second
place. The matter goes even
Deane, further: the proceedings
show that the writ was first of
all taken out in the name of
Mrs. Renner alone through her
representative P. A. Henner, and
that it was some time after the
proceedings had been going on in
her name that an amendment to
the writ must have been made by
which he became a co-plaintiff.
I say must have been made
because there is no note on the
proceedings to show when the
actual amendment was made, but
that it was made at some time
after the proceedings were
started is clear from a note on
page 16 of the record. On the
2nd December the matter was
brought before the Court under
the caption P. A. Renner
representative of F. H. Awoonor
Renner
verS1LS
J. E. Annan and Others.
Mr. Hayfron Benjamin entered
appearance for Mr. Renner Mr.
Abadoo on behalf of the
defendants thereupon wished to
be enlightened as to who
actually was plaintiff-Mr. or
Mrs. Renner. Then we find this
note "Mr. Benjamin submits that
the real " plaintiff i8
disclosed on the face of the
writ namely, F. B. " Awoonor
Rcnner (Mrs. Renner)." But if
Mrs. Renner was at that time
sole plaintiff it follows that
Mr. Renner who admittedly file a
the action on her behalf must
have considered her at that time
to be the sole owner of the land
the subject of the trespass. It
was a matter of importance, as
he by his long legal experience
well knew, that the per80n suing
should be able to show at least
a right to possession and we
cannot therefore treat the fact
that the suit was first laid in
the name, of his wife alone as
being without significance
especially as his wife was away
from the Colony and so might be
called on to give security for
costs. On page 14 moreover in
an affidavit filed by Mr. Renner
while the suit was proceeding
under the caption P. A. Renner
representative of F. B. Awoonor
Renner
verses
.T. E. Annan and Others we find
Mr. Renner deposing
"5. That Peter Awoonor Renner
and F. B. Awoonor Renner " are
man and wife, the latter
residing at Freetown, but now "
absent and residing in England,
the former in the Gold Coast "
having the managing control of
the properties of the latter;
and " the subject matter of this
suit is one of the said
properties", so that the matter
goes beyond being a matter of
inference as to what Mr. Renner
believed at that date and
becomes a matter of certainty
when we find him actually
swearing that the land was his
wife's while he himself was in
the comparatively humble
position of her manager.
Then on page In of the record we
find Mr. Renner, who asked leave
to supplement his evidence which
had been closed, leaving his
title so far only that shown by
the deed of mortgage and
foreclosure, stating that in or
about 1928 while he was at
Sierra Leone he became ill and
executed an instrument in favour
of his wife and children. 'that
deed, he says, was sent to this
Colony by one Porter for
stamping and registration. Mr.
Renner says he is not sure if it
was registered but he produces a
receipt showing payment of a sum
of money by way of penalty for
late stamping. The deed itself
he does not produce although he
says he believes it is in one of
his safes in Sierra Leone, nor
has he made any attempt to
produce a certified copy from
the registry-he does not in
fact, he says, know if it has
been registered. Then having by
this evidence given the
impression that being in
indifferent health he
transferred the property to his
wife and children, under
cross-examination he further
stated" I think my
co-plaintiff was given an
interest and "made trustee for
my children. I did not convey my
whole "interest under the
mortgage, only a 'qualified
portion.' My " co-plaintiff's
right to the property will
depend upon my own "title." \Vhen
asked in Court about this Mr.
Renner developed this line of
thought by inviting the Court to
give judgment against his wife
and decide the case upon the
title conferred on him by the
mortgage deed of the 25th August
and the foreclosure, apparently
quite oblivious of the fact that
a deed once signed and delivered
takes effect, and that his
having originally entered the
suit in the name of his wife as
sole plaintiff pointed to his
belief that the land was vested
in her solely.
The position that results of
course is. that this Court is
left in the most complete fog as
to the person or persons in whom
the half share of the land
mortgaged by Barnes is at
present vested, whether it is
vested in Mr. Renner, Mrs.
Renner, their children or in any
combination of two or more of
the three.
It cannot act on the deed of
mortgage and foreclosure because
Mr. Renner has shown that his
title under them is affected by
a subsequent deed signed and
delivered by him; it cannot act
upon the later deed because it
has not been produced in
evidence, there is no proof that
it has been lost, no certified
copy of it is forthcoming and
no reliable secondary evidence
of the contents is before the
Court.
The learned trial Judge in his
judgment devoted a great deal of
time and attention to
sati\3fying himself that the
defendant had acquired a good
title to the land by a native
sale which was unaffected by Mr.
Renner's subsequent registration
of the mortgage deed, and being
so satisfied gave judgment for
defendant.
In my opinion with all respect he
approached the matter from a wrong
angle even although the conclusion
reached was correct. Had he
directed his attention to a
scrutiny of the plaintiffs' title
as he was bound to do, remembering
that the onus was upon them to
prove it before they could
succeed, the enquiry might have
been greatly shortened, since it
is apparent that the plaintiffs
have not established any title in
themselves or in either of them
which will entitle them to
maintain trespass against
defendants.
The appeal should be dismissed
with costs.
Order appeal dismissed with costs
assessed at £29 lIs. 6d.
KINGDON, C .• I., NIGERIA.
I
concur.
WERBER, C .. I., SIERRA LEONE.
I
concur.
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