Landlord and Tenant-Tenancy at
Will-Possession for twelve
years· without paying
rent-/:'imitation Acts,
1833 and 1874-No necessity
for adverse possession.
The Plaintiff was in the year
1913 put in occupation of
certain property rent free by
one Hall. Hall died in 1922. The
Plaintiff continued in
possession and in 1929 asked for
a declaration that the property
was hers
The Court below refused to make
the declaration sought on the
ground that, though she had been
in possession as a tenant at
will rent-free for the statutory
period, her possession had not
been adverse.
On appeal, this decision was
reversed on the ground that in
the case of a tenancy at will
the Statute begins to run
notwithstanding the permissive
character of the occupation.
E. S. Beoku-Betts
an'd
T. Amado Taywr
for the Plaintiff Appellant.
S. A. Benka-Coker
for the Defendant-Respondent.
The following judgments were
delivered:-
GARDINER-SMITH, J.
This is an appeal from the
judgment of the Acting Judge of
the Supreme Court of the Gambia,
dated the 16th of January,
1930.
The plaintiff's claim was
against the defendant Richard
James Hall as Executor of
Richard Calvert Hall, deceased,
for return to her of the title
deeds of No. 56 Leman Street,
Bathurst, and for damages for
detaining the same, or, in the
alternative, for a declaration
by the Court that No. 56 Leman
Street is the property of the
plaintiff.
As the said title deeds were in
possession of the Bathurst
Trading Company the trial Judge
ordered that Company to be
joined as a defendant.
After hearing evidence, the
learned Judge dismissed the
plaintiff's claim, and ordered
each party to pay his or her own
costs.
Five grounds of appeal were
lodged, but, at the hearing of
the appeal, learned Counsel for
the appellant reduced these to
two heads, viz:-
(1) That the land was purchased
with appellant's money.
(2) That the appellant had been
in possession of the property
for the statutory period of
twelve years, and so could claim
under the Statutes of
Limitation.
The first ground raises a pure
question of fact. The learned
Judge found that the appellant
did not purchase the property
out of her money. He based his
finding upon the documentary
evidence. Apart from the
receipts for rates, which,
although referred to in the
judgment, were not in evidence,
there was strong documentary
evidence that the property was
bought by R. C. Hall, and not by
the appellant. The receipt for
the purchase money and the
.conveyance are both in R. C.
Hall's name. The appellant, who
had cohabited with R. C. Hall,
alleged that the property was
purchased for her by R. C. Hall,
out of money deposited by her
with him, for safekeeping, and
the defendant Hall, who is
appellant's son, and was to all
intents and purposes her
witness, corroborated this, and
said that it was by mistake that
the receipt for the purchase
money and the conveyance were
taken in R. C. Hall's name.
Appellant, however, could not
tell what price was paid for the
property, and, although R. C.
Hall's will was not in evidence,
it was admitted by the appellant
that he dealt with the property
as his own and devised it to his
sons. Moreover, the defendant
Hall had previously asserted
that it was R. C. Hall's
property. There was, therefore,
in my opinion, evidence to
justify the learned Judge in
disbelieving the story that the
property was bought with the
appellant's money, and, on the
authority of the well known
cases of
The Colonial Securities Trust
Company v. Massey
(1896) I:
Q..B.
34, and
Khoo Sit Hoh
G
others v. Lim. Thean Tong (1912)
A.C.
323, I see no reason to disturb
his finding of fact.
Under the next main ground it
was argued that, even if the
appellant did not purchase the
property, she was a
tenant-at-will, and has acquired
a title under the Statutes of
Limitation. Learned Counsel for
the defendant Company, on the
other hand, submitted that the
appellant was a mere licensee.
The facts are that she was put
into occupation of this property
by the late R. C. Hall in 1913,
and has remained there ever
since, rent free. There is no
evidence that she was interfered
with in any way, and in my
opinion her position was that of
a tenant-at-will:
see
Lynes v. Snaith
(1899) 1
Q.B. 486.
If one person allows another to
remain in possession of land as
a tenant-at-will, for twelve
years, without payment of rent,
the other person becomes
entitled to the land. This is
the joint effect of the
Limitation Acts, 1833 (3 & 4
William IV, c.27) and 1874 (37 &
38 Vict. c.57). These Acts are
in force in the Gambia by virtue
of Cap. 5 section 17 of the
GaIIlbia Laws. The time
commences to run against the
landlord, either at the
determination of the
tenancy-at-will, or at the end
of one year from its
commencement. whichever event
first happens. Banning on the
Limitation of Actions, page 138;
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.
19, page 123, paragraph 230. In
this case the tenancy-at-will
would have determined at the
death of R. C. Hall in 1922,
therefore time commences to run
from the earlier date, viz.,
from the end of one year from
the commencement of the
tenancy-at-will, i.e. it runs
from 1914. The period of twelve
years was therefore complete by
1926, or four years before the
issue of the writ in this
action.
The learned Judge considered
that it was necessary that the
possession should be adverse.
This, however, is not the
present law~ As Channell J. said
in
Lynes v. Snaith-
No
doubt under the old law in force
before 1833, that possession
being permissive would have been
treated as non adverse, and the
defendant would have acquired no
title against the true owner.
But when the Statute of William
IV did away with the old
doctrine of adverse possession,
a provision was inserted in that
Statute that in the case of a
tenancy-at will the Statute
should begin to run
notwithstanding the permissive
character of the occupation, at
the expiration of one year next
after the commencement of the
tenancy."
In my opinion the appellant is
entitled to succeed on her
second main ground of appeal.
The judgment of the Court below
must therefore be reversed and
judgment substituted therefore
that the Court doth declare that
lot No. 56 Leman Street,
Bathurst, is the property of the
appellant.
Appellant to have costs, against
both respondents, of this
hearing of the appeal of this
Court, and costs in the Court
below. No costs allowed in
respect of the sitting of this
Court last year, when the appeal
was adjourned owing to want of
proof of notice to respondents.
The appellant having obtained
leave to appeal
in forma pauperis
will be allowed costs for one
Counsel only. Costs to be taxed.
Court below to carry out.
TURBETT, ACTING J.
I agree. The appellant in this
case was put into possession of
56 Leman Street by the late
Richard Calvert Hall in the year
1913 and has remained in
continuous and uninterrupted
possession of this property
until the present time. The
deceased erected a dwelling
house on this plot for the use
of the appellant, and the latter
built personally a shop on the
premises before the deceased's
death and has since built other
houses in the yard without any
interference from the Executor
or the devisees under the will
of the said deceased.
Counsel for the respondent
contends that the appellant was
in possession of these premises
as a licensee or guest. I cannot
find a scintilla of evidence in
support of that view. Counsel
further urges that the statement
of the appellant in her
evidence" I was living with him
as his wife up to his death" is
conclusive evidence that the
appellant had not exclusive
possession of the premises up to
the time of Richard Calvert
Hall's death. I have grave
doubts as to whether this
statement can only bear the
interpretation that has been
placed upon it by Counsel nor
does the judgment in the Court
below, in my opinion, find as a
fact that such was the case. In
this connection the learned
Judge states as follows •. I
think she, as the concubine of
Richard Calvert Hall deceased,
was provided with a residence."
The judgment then proceeds
further as follows, •• but it
never was hers in law. The
possession was never adverse,
she was there with the
permission of the late R. C.
Hall; and her claim under the
law of limitations fails." Now
this assumption of fact in the
judgment that the appellant had
no adverse possession and was in
possession with the permission
of the deceased is of no
consequence under the present
law. A very clear statement of
the existing position is set out
in Darby and Bosanquets Statutes
of Limitations (2nd edition)
page 353 :-
The doctrine of adverse
possession is, as before
observed, done away with by the
Act 3 & 4 William IV c.27. The
effect of the 2nd section of 3 &
4 William IV c.27 (now the first
section of 37 and 38 Vict. c.57)
is to put an end to all
questions and discussions
whether the possession in favour
of which the statute is to
operate be adverse or not. The
question is whether the
prescribed period has elapsed
since the right accrued,
whatever be the nature of the
possession. And the seventh
section of 3 & 4 William IV c.27
seems especially framed to
'prevent the principle being
infringed by the incidents of a
tenancy at will, and therefore
makes it for the purposes of the
act, totally immaterial whether
an occupation is permissive or
not, except for the period of
one year after its
commencement."
In my opinion the appellant
entered originally into
possession of these premises as
a tenant-at-will of the late
Richard Calvert Hall, and that
tenancy determined at the end of
the first year and not at the
date of death of Richard Calvert
Hal1. Time then commenced to run
against the owner, and by virtue
of the combined effect of
sections 2 and 7 of 3 & 4
William IV c.27 and of section I
of 37 and 38 Viet. c.57 which
has been substituted for the
said section 2, there being no
evidence whatever that the
occupation of the appellant had
in any way been interferred
with, the title of the landlord
and his personal representative
was extinguished at the end of
13 years from the date of entry.
That is in the year 1926-some
three or four years before the
date of commencement of this
action.