This decision involves two findings, which are incorporated in the judgment of the Court, namely-

Firstly: -That the phrase" for the time being" in section 6 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1924, means the time when any event might occur in respect of which the law was to be administered-in this case the death of respondent's husband, intestate, in November, 1932; and

Secondly: -That the phrase "probate causes and proceed­ings" in the same section includes, in the words of the trial Judge "matters sui ,generis" -by implication the English Administration of Estates Act, 1925, which amongst other matters altered the law of devolution in intestacy, admittedly giving the grandniece in the circumstances of this case a right to share in the estate.

The grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows:-

(1) The phrase" for the time being" must be interpreted ill reference to its context, and to mean" at this time" i.e. the date of the Ordinance, namely, 30th May, 1904, thereby excluding the application of the Act of 1925.

(2) That the words "probate causes and proceedings" cannot include the law as to testamentary succession or as to distribution of estates on intestacy.

(3) Even if the English Administration of Estates Act, 1925, applies, the consent of the Court would not be required.

I am of opinion that the appellant succeeds on both points. Firstly, as to the meaning of "for the time being" in section 6 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1924, which reads as follows: -

" The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the Court in probate, divorce and matrimonial causes and proceed­ings may, subject to this Ordinance and to Rules of Court, be exercised by the Court in conformity with the law and practice for the time being in force in England."

Mr. Barlatt, for appellant, at first argued that the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1932, applied, but later agreed that it could not apply, as it only operates as from 1st January 1933 while the death took place in November, 1932.    "

!n his fourth ground of. appeal he argued " that the phrase is restricted from application in Its general sense" (i.e. ' from time to time ') by the context.

The learned trial Judge based his opinion of the meaning- of the phrase on a passage m Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Vol 3 p. 2059) which reads as follows:-   .'

" The phrase 'for the time being' may, according to the .context; mean the time present, or denote a single period of time; but Its general sense is that of time indefinite, and refers to an indefinite state of facts which will arise in the future, and which may (and probably will) vary from time to time,"

and apparently considered that the context did not affect its application. Here, with respect, I disagree with him. The cases referred to in Stroud do not include such a case as this, and it Stems to me that these words are not apt in a statute to apply laws which might be made in the future. I think the " time" must be taken to be the time when the Ordinance speaks, i.e. at its commencement.

Again, the phrase " from time to time" in the penultimate line of section 2 of the Ordinance is used to express the meaning of " for the time being" con tended for.

Those words might have been expected to be used here, and not the latter.

,Mr. Boston, for respondent, referred to the intention of the Ordinance and submitted that section 6 is in effect an exception to section 7. It appears to me that strong evidence would be required of the intention of the legislature to effect such an unusual purpose as the wholesale application of all future English law, whatever it might be, on the subject in question, as well as on those of divorce and matrimonial causes. No such evidence exists.

I am prepared to agree with Mr. Boston to this extent-that section 6, so far as it can be considered an exception to section 7, may affect it to the extent of applying the law at 30th May, 1904, instead of 1st January, 1880, but no further ..

This being so, by section 13 of Cap. 104 (the Intestate Estates Ordinance), the law as to distribution is the Statute of Distribution of Charles II and the grandniece has no interest.

This is sufficient to dispose of the case, it being admitted that if the grandniece has no interest the consent of the Court is unnecessary, and the respondent, the administratrix, would have no defence to the action.

Also, as to the meaning of " probate causes and proceedings" , Mr. Barlatt contended that the phrase cannot mean more than causes and proceedings connected with the grant or recall of probate or letters of administration, He pointed to the definition of " probate actions" in section 2, and argued that section 13 of the Intestate Estates Ordinance (Cap. 104), which provides that land should on intestacy be " divisible and distributable in the same manner as personal estate is now divisible and distributable, and amongst the same persons", was not affected. The effect of that section is to make land divisible and distributable according to the Statute of Distributions of Charles II. Mr. Boston argued that the phrase in question does include the law as to testamentary succession, devolution or intestacy and administration of assets; but that one effect of section.6 is, by the application of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, to repeal section 13 of the Intestate Estates Ordinance, and that section only. I am unable to agree with him; it seems to me it would follow that the whole Ordinance would stand repealed, with the result that section 24 requiring the consent of the Court to a sale of land would no longer be in force, and the defence to the action would disappear.

I am however of opinion that the phrase in question has the meaning contended for by appellant.

It would, I think, be contrary to general rules of interpret­ation of statutes to hold that by such words the law of devolution and distribution on intestacy is radically altered, and such an important Ordinance, the Intestate Estates Ordinance, which was passed in 1881 and has since been amended from time to time, is repealed. In the words of its long title it is " an Ordinance' to alter the succession to real estate, and to amend the law relating to the distribution and administration of the estate of intestates, and to provide for the due administration of estates whereof 'there is no administrator, and for other purposes." In my opinion the subject of such Ordinance is not included in the phrase " pr0bate matters and proceedings." This also disposes of the third ground of appeal to which I have referred, namely, that consent of the Court is not required if the Administration of Estates Act; 1925, is held to apply.

It follows that the consent of the Court to the sale is not required; and that the respondent has no defence to the action for specific performance.

The parties agree on £24 in respect of mesne profits.

In my opinion, therefore, the appeal should be allowed and there should be judgment that the appellant is entitled to specific performance; to the payment of £24 as mesne profits, and his costs in this Court and, the Court below.

BUTLER-LLOYD, J.

The facts of this case are not in dispute and are sufficiently set out in the judgment which has just been read and with which I fully concur. It seems to me however that the matter may be stated even more simply.

The appeal turns on the construction to be given to section 6 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, Cap. 205, which has already been read.

This Ordinance was passed in 1904 and it is argued for the respondent that by virtue of this section the English Adminis­tration of Estates Act of 1925 was in force in Sierra Leone at the material time, namely, 1932. It is admitted that if this is not the case the respondent must fail since by the Statute of Distribution 22 and 23 Car. 2 Cap. 10, which was applied to this Colony by section 13 of the Intestate Estates Ordinance, Cap. 104, the interest of the grandniece of deceased on which the defence is founded would not arise.