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    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT

                     OF JUSTICE (LAND COURT DIVISION) HELD IN ACCRA ON

                    WEDNESDAY 6TH JUNE, 2011 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP

                                           JUSTICE ANTHONY OPPONG  J.

       _______________________________________________________________

 

SUIT NO.  L 127/99

 

FLORENCE EFFAH                                        }      PLAINTIFF

                                                             

                             VS.

 

              PHILIP ARYAH HAMMOND                           }    DEFENDANTS

 

             _____________________________________________________________________

 

                                                   J     U     D     G    M   E    N   T

            ______________________________________________________________________

 

              Per an amended writ of summons filed on 24th January 2011, plaintiff claimed from the defendant the under mentioned reliefs:-

                          “1.        Declaration of title to land situate and lying at

                                 Oblojo near Weija-Accra in the Greater

                                 Accra Region containing an approximate area

                                 of 1,52 acres more or less and bounded on the

                                 North West by Oblojo-Weija road measuring

                                440 feet more or less on the North East by lessor’s

land measuring 150 feet more or less on the South

West by proposed road measuring 150 feet more or

less on the South East by lessor’s land measuring

440 feet more or less;

                          2.         Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his

agents and assigns from interfering with the said

land and

                          3.         General damages for trespass to the said land.

              Plaintiff’s case as pleaded was that she acquired the land in dispute from William Nii Kpakpa Quartey (to be hereinafter called Quartey) in 1985. She claimed to have assigned a portion of the acquired land to two persons and also developed a portion of the land and the rest of the land was shared among her children some of whom started developing same.

Plaintiff then made a case that defendant has unlawfully entered the land and shown every desire of intensifying his trespassory acts on the land by constructing a building on the land, hence the institution of the action.

Defendant denied the claim of plaintiff. Although defendant conceded that Quartey was the original owner of the disputed land, plaintiff obtained her grant not from Quartey but from one Francis Ogbarmey Ashong, aka, Nii Armah Cobblah (hereinafter called Ashong).

However, defendant stated that, after the death of Ashong, plaintiff took steps to regularize the grant by getting the true owner of the land, Quartey to ratify that grant.

Defendant claims he obtained his grant of the land from the selfsame Quartey and the land, the subject matter of his grant is L-shaped and same is documented. He indicated that the land is depicted in a document dated

14th December 1987, stamped as AR/31140/91 as well as the Right of Entry dated

        21st June 1985.

Defendant averred further that in the lifetime of Quartey, there arose an occasion whereby Quartey proclaimed in the presence of plaintiff and others that he gave the land to defendant.

Defendant stated that plaintiff demolished his store room/site shed for no just cause, contending that where plaintiff’s land lies is different from his and that plaintiff  had made full use of her land and cannot claim his as part of her land.

            Claiming that he is damnified by the demolition, defendant counterclaimed for:-

                                               “(a)      A declaration of title to the plot of land as

                                                  evidenced by indenture dated 14th December 1987,

                                                  Right of Entry dated 21st June 1985,

                                               (b)       Damages for trespass,

                                        (c)  Special Damages for demolition of store

                                                  room/site shed”

Besides the testimony of plaintiff, she called two witnesses and defendant also testified and called three witnesses.

Plaintiff testified that she first bought the disputed land from James Town Stool but later learnt that the land actually belonged to Quartey. She therefore re-acquired the land from Quartey who gave her Exhibit ‘A’ dated 15th February 1985. Plaintiff also tendered Exhibit ‘A1’ “Right of Entry” also dated 15th February 1985.

Quite clearly, both Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A1’ are dated 15th February 1985. The fact that these two documents bear the same date raises eyebrow especially if one considers that in one of the documents, that is Exhibit ‘A1’, it was stated that: “ a deed of conveyance in respect of the land sold to the purchaser (plaintiff) is in course of preparation for execution for Mrs. Florence Effah (plaintiff)”. This should mean that Exhibit ‘A1’ was first in time and same was executed on 15th February 1985. In Exhibit ‘A1’ it was indicated that Exhibit ‘A’ was being prepared and yet when Exhibit ‘A’ was finally prepared and executed, it was so done on the same 15th February 1985. How incredulous!

It is significant to observe that defendant also tendered Exhibit ‘6’ which appeared to be the same as Exhibit ‘A1’. I have critically examined the two documents and it appears to me that Exhibit ‘A1’ is doctored to throw dust into the eyes of the court. It is stated in Exhibit ‘6’ that: “the approximate area covered by the sale is five (5) plots of land each measuring 100 x 70”. This statement in quotation has been doctored perhaps to overreach the justice of the case.

What I see in Exhibit ‘A1’ reads:-

“The approximate area covered by the sale is 1.52 acres of land measuring

150’ x 440’ ”. It can be observed that ‘1.52’ has been doctored, “each” has been cancelled and ‘150’x440’ has also been doctored.

              Having analyzed Exhibit ‘A1’ and Exhibit ‘6’, I find that the land sold to plaintiff consisted of five (5) plots.

              In addition, I find that it was Ashong who executed both Exhibits ‘A1’ and ‘6’ granting right of entry to the land in favour of plaintiff.

              Defendant made a fuss about the land not having been granted to plaintiff by Quarter, the original owner but by Ashong, contending that it made the grant of the land to plaintiff fundamentally flawed. By defendant’s own showing, this so-called irregularity was ratified by Quartey. (see paragraph 5 of the statement of defence filed on 30th May 2000).

              At any rate, a close study of  the evidence on record as a whole and Exhibit ‘7’ dated 14th April 1980 in particular reveal that Quartey delegated powers of dealing in the land to Ashong for a good reason or legally speaking for a good consideration.

              For full effect I crave indulgence to produce verbatim the relevant extracts from Exhibit ‘7’ as to the reason why Quartey delegated powers to “Ashong:-

                                      “2.        Through the untiring efforts of the said
                                                  Francis Ogbarmey Ashong, he has procured

                                            for me legal document stamped and registered

                                           with the Lands Registry, Accra as No. 577/1980

                                           to validate my ownership.

3.         The care and management of the said tract of land has been undertaken by Francis Ogbarmey Ashong and that to the time of the execution of this agreement, Francis Ogbarmey Ashong has expended his personal money of thousands of cedis in respect of the maintenance and otherwise of the said tract of land.

5.         I have also irrevocably agreed that Francis Ogbarmey Ashong will be entitled to a one-for the (1/4) share of all monies accruing from the sale of otherwise of that tract of land….”

This shows that by virtue of the instrumentality of Ashong in protecting the interest of Quartey in the land, Quartey allowed Ashong to play an integral part in the administration of the land.

Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that in 1985 when Ashong executed Exhibit ‘6’ or Exhibit ‘A’ in favour of plaintiff he had the legitimacy and power to do so on behalf of Quartey.

I just made the point a while ago that the land, the subject matter of the right of entry as granted to plaintiff consisted of five plots.

Plaintiff made a case that she has given one plot of the land to her son who has put up his building on it. Another son of plaintiff was also developing another plot. Besides these two sons of plaintiff, she has sold four plots to police officers who have developed them and are staying in them. For its full force and effect, I deem it relevant to reproduce the cross-examination of plaintiff:-

“Q.       Do you have children?

A.        Yes, I have children, five of them.

Q.        Are  any of these children connected to this land in any way?

A.        The senior one has put up a building on his.

Q.        Is that all?

A.        And the forth one was developing the land when this case came on.

Q.        Apart from your children is anybody doing anything on the land with your consent.

A.        Yes, in 1996, I sold four plots to some CID men; they are staying in their houses.

Q.        They have completed the houses and staying in them.

A.        Yes, they completed them in 1996”.

From this intercourse, one wonders whether plaintiff has not utilized his entire 1.52 acre land or the 5 plots of land. This is because by 1996, granted that the land plaintiff acquired could be divided into 6 plots as against even the 5 plots as explicitly stated in Exhibit ‘6’, plaintiff had used up all the land. The question then is what part of the plaintiff’s land did defendant enter to develop, when she appears to have used up her entire land?

In any event, the law requires that a plaintiff who sues for trespass is enjoined to prove not only the identity of the subject matter but also the exact area and extent of the trespass.

In this case plaintiff failed to prove, with any degree of certainty, that where defendant has developed his house is part of the land she acquired.

It is worthy of note that when plaintiff went to Quartey to enquire whether he had sold any part of his land to defendant, Quartey told plaintiff that he had sold one plot of land to defendant. The significant thing Quartey added was that the land he had sold to defendant was not part of the land he had given to plaintiff.

In cross-examination, plaintiff  Exhibited ignorance as to the size of her land yet she claims that defendant has trespassed on her land. Even under the heat of cross-examination, plaintiff could not tell the court the number of plots her children and herself had developed. Her reluctance to state the number of plots being developed or should I say plaintiff’s feigned ignorance of the number of plots being developed or developed was a deliberate attempt to hide the true state of affairs from the court.

I cannot also be oblivious of plaintiff’s testimony that defendant’s building is on Quartey Papafio’s land and that the building is not on her land. This emerged from re-examination and I quote same hereunder:-

“Q.         Look at the picture (Exhibit ‘1A’); you see a building; can you tell the court the relationship between where the building is situate and the area in litigation before the court (Exhibit ‘1A’shown to plaintiff)

A.        My Lord, the building is on Quartey Papafio’s land.

Q.        So it is not on your land?

A.        No. it is not on my land”

Defendant was categorical that he had developed his building on the land in dispute and that is where he lives. Exhibit ‘1A’ was a photograph of defendant’s building.

In effect plaintiff wanted the court to believe that where defendant has put up his building is not on her land, and I have every reason to believe that plaintiff is right and besides herself in corroborating defendant’s case. Yet plaintiff has sued defendant for trespass unto her land and would not show which part of her land defendant trespassed upon. This renders the suit mounted by plaintiff nothing but vexatious.

In contradistinction, defendant showed clearly that he obtained the grant of the land from Quartey who happened to be the same grantor as plaintiff. Exhibit’9’, a conveyance of the plot of land given by Quartey to defendant has as its integral part of site plan which is the same as Exhibit ‘5’. It is significant to observe that Quartey endorsed the site plan which confirms that the subject matter of the conveyance was approved as the very land granted to defendant.

Plaintiff wanted the court to believe that the signature of Quartey on the documents tendered by defendant which are supportive of his case is forged. Forgery is quite a serious allegation to make in attacking the genuiness of a document and as such it is expected that proof of such allegation must be strict. In this case, plaintiff and her witness (PW1) made no attempt to proving that the signature of Quartey on the Exhibits tendered by defendant was forged.

At any rate I have critically looked at the signature of Quartey in all documents Exhibited in this case including even the documents plaintiff relied on and I do not have any cause to doubt the genuiness of the signature of Quartey on them.

On the preponderance of the probabilities, I am satisfied that defendant adduced cogent and sufficient evidence to establish that he deserves to be decreed the owner of the land delineated in Exhibit ‘5’ and as evidenced by Exhibit ‘9’. In effect defendant is entitled to his counterclaim in respect of the declaratory relief sought.

The evidence showed that the interference on defendant’s land was perpetuated by a son of plaintiff. Indeed, it was the son of plaintiff who demolished the site shed defendant had developed on the land.

Although defendant claimed for special damages for the demolition of the site shed, no evidence was adduced as to how much defendant expended in putting up the said site shed; neither did defendant tell the court the cost of the site shed. In any event, since the evidence was that it was the son of plaintiff who caused the demolition to be done, defendant cannot claim damages from plaintiff. This is because, plaintiff’s son should have been sued or joined to this suit to answer for his acts. Plaintiff cannot be saddled with the responsibility of paying compensation in the nature of damages for unlawful acts perpetuated by her son who is of full age and is suable.

In conclusion since a vital document plaintiff relied on in proof of her title appeared doctored and tampered with coupled with the uncertainties as to whether she has not fully used up the land she purportedly acquired, the size of the land she is claiming and importantly her inability to prove trespass by defendant, I will dismiss her action.

I enter judgment for defendant and declare him the owner of all that piece of parcel of building plot indicated in Exhibit ‘9’ and particularly depicted in Exhibit ‘5’. His claim for general and special damages is however, for reasons stated supra, dismissed. Defendant is awarded costs of GH¢5,000.

 

                                                                      (SGD) ANTHONY OPPONG J

  JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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