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Property – Ownership –
Confiscated Asserts - Statute of
limitations – Conflict of law -
Letters of Administration -
Powers of Attorney –
Validity of - Whether or
not the plaintiffs are deficient
of capacity to bring this action
- Whether plaintiffs are clothed
with legal capacity to mount an
action in respect of their
mothers estate without obtaining
Letters of Administration.
HEADNOTES
The
plaintiffs/appellants/respondents
(the plaintiffs) are Italian
nationals who have, through a
lawful attorney, sued in the
High Court, Sekondi to recover
House No. 15, Whin Layout, Beach
Road, Takoradi which is in the
possession of the
defendants/respondents/appellants
(the defendants). The
plaintiffs’ case is that the
house was acquired by their
Italian mother who died
intestate on 24th
March, 2010 in Genova, Italy
but used to live in Ghana where
she was into timber business.
They state that their mother was
compelled by circumstances to
flee back to Italy in 1982 when
her business was confiscated at
the height of the revolution.
The defendants took possession
of the house believing it was
part of the confiscated assets
of Subin Timber Company
Limited/Central Logging and
Sawmills Ltd but the plaintiffs
contend that it was not and that
all along it remained the
personal property of their
mother. However, the plaintiffs
have been met with some legal
defences as the defendants
challenged their capacity to
mount the action and also
pleaded the statute of
limitations, Midway in the trial
in the High Court the judge
entertained an application by
the defendants praying that the
suit be dismissed on ground of
want of capacity of the
plaintiffs. The trial judge
granted the application and
dismissed the suit but the
plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeal who reversed the High
Court and restored the case to
the list
HELD
In the face of our
interpretation of section 1(2)
of Act 549 as explained above,
the defendants’ challenge to the
validity of the power of
attorney of Isaac Benjamin
Clement is no longer tenable.
The statutory declaration by
which the power was given to him
was signed by the plaintiffs on
pain of penal sanctions under
Italian law, in the presence of
a Notary Public who has attested
that the instrument was signed
before her. The power of
attorney satisfies section 1(2)
of Act 549 and is valid.
In conclusion, the
appeal against the decision of
the Court of Appeal dated 4th
December, 2019 fails and is
dismissed. The case is to be
remitted to the High Court
Sekondi for the trial of the
remaining issues set down for
determination
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Supreme Court Rules, 1996
(C.I.16).
Administration of Estates Act,
1961 (Act 63).
Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846-64.
Powers of Attorney Act, 1998
(Act 549).
Illiterates Protection Ordinance
(CAP 262) (1951 Rev)
Oaths Act, 1972 (NRCD 6)
Criminal and Other Offences Act,
1960 (Act 29)
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
GIHOC v Hanna Asi [2005-2006]
SCGLR 458
Atta Kwadwo v Badu [1977] 1 GLR
1. CA.
Joseph v Okomfoankye [2013-2014]
1 SCGLR 267
Akrong v Bulley [1965] GLR 469
Conney v Bentum-Williams
[1984-86] 2 GLR 301
Youhana v Abboud [1974] 2 GLR
201
Asante-Appiah v Amponsah [2009]
SCGLR 90
Abu Ramadan & Nimako v EC & A-G
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1654.
Zambrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR
221
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised
Fourth Edition
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
PWAMANG, JSC:-
COUNSEL
JOHN MERCER ESQ FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS
SAMUEL YALLEY ESQ FOR 1ST
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
GEORGE TETTEH SACKEY ESQ
PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY (PSA)
FOR 2ND AND 3RD
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS
WITH HIM EMMANUELLA SARA ASMAH,
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY (ASA)
AND ADELAINE OWUSUWAA ASANTE,
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY (ASA)
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________
PWAMANG, JSC:-
The
plaintiffs/appellants/respondents
(the plaintiffs) are Italian
nationals who have, through a
lawful attorney, sued in the
High Court, Sekondi to recover
House No. 15, Whin Layout, Beach
Road, Takoradi which is in the
possession of the
defendants/respondents/appellants
(the defendants). The
plaintiffs’ case is that the
house was acquired by their
Italian mother who died
intestate on 24th
March, 2010 in Genova, Italy
but used to live in Ghana where
she was into timber business.
They state that their mother was
compelled by circumstances to
flee back to Italy in 1982 when
her business was confiscated at
the height of the revolution.
The defendants took possession
of the house believing it was
part of the confiscated assets
of Subin Timber Company
Limited/Central Logging and
Sawmills Ltd but the plaintiffs
contend that it was not and that
all along it remained the
personal property of their
mother.
The facts here appears to be
similar to those in the case of
GIHOC
v Hanna Asi reported in
[2005-2006] SCGLR 458
where the Supreme Court held
that GIHOC was a licensee of the
original owner of the property.
However, the plaintiffs have
been met with some legal
defences as the defendants
challenged their capacity to
mount the action and also
pleaded the statute of
limitations.
Midway in
the trial in the High Court the
judge entertained an application
by the defendants praying that
the suit be dismissed on ground
of want of capacity of the
plaintiffs. The trial judge
granted the application and
dismissed the suit but the
plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeal who reversed the High
Court and restored the case to
the list. The 1st
defendant has appealed from the
decision of the Court of Appeal
and is supported ably by the 2nd
and 3rd defendants
per their counsel, Mr George
Sackey Esq, Principal State
Attorney.
The issue for our decision is
whether
the plaintiffs are deficient of
capacity to bring this action.
However, at the hearing of the
appeal we requested the parties
to address us on the question
whether the decision of the
Court of Appeal on appeal is an
interlocutory or a final one.
This point arises from the fact
that the judgment appealed from
dated 4th December,
2019 directed the trial to
continue, thereby giving it the
semblance of an interlocutory
order. Meanwhile, the notice of
appeal was filed on 4th
February, 2020, more than 21
days from the date of the Court
of Appeal judgment as required
by Rule 8(1)(a) of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1996
(C.I.16). If that
decision is classified as
interlocutory that would render
the notice of appeal incompetent
for being filed out of time. We
have considered the submissions
of the parties on the issue and
are of the view that as the
decision of the High Court
dismissed the entire suit, that
decision was final. See
Atta
Kwadwo v Badu [1977] 1 GLR 1. CA.
In Joseph v Okomfoankye
[2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 267 at p
270, the Supreme Court
speaking through Gbadegbe, JSC
said as follows; “As an
interim relief it cannot, in our
thinking, be transformed into a
final order of the court by
virtue only of an appeal
therefrom to a higher court”.
By parity of reasoning, the
final order of the High Court in
this case does not turn into an
interlocutory order on its way
up the ladder of the courts
structure by the appeal process.
It remains a final order not
withstanding the appeals.
Consequently, in our opinion,
this is a final appeal and the
notice of appeal before us is
competent.
On the main issue, the
defendants challenge the
capacity of the plaintiffs on
two fronts. First, they have no
letters of administration over
the estate of their mother and
second, the power of attorney on
basis of which the action was
commenced by Isaac Benjamin
Clement was only notarised by a
Notary Public without any
witness. In respect of the first
leg, Mr E. K Amuah Sakyi Esq,
learned counsel for the 1st
defendant submits in his
statement of case as follows;
“It was thus our contention that
since the property was situate
in Ghana and they had brought
this action in a Ghanaian court
by law they ought to have
obtained Letters of
Administration before they could
be clothed with any capacity to
mount any action in respect of
the Estate of the deceased. The
trial judge found merit in this
argument and accordingly struck
out the suit for want of
capacity.” (emphasis supplied).
The Ghana law that, according to
the defendants, makes letters of
administration a mandatory
requirement for the plaintiffs
to sue in court is Sections 1(1)
and 108 of the
Administration of Estates Act,
1961 (Act 63). They are
as follows;
1(1) The moveable and immoveable
property of a deceased person
shall devolve on the personal
representatives of the deceased
person with effect from the date
of death.
Section 108 defines personal
representative as “the
executor, original or by
representation, or administrator
for the time being of a deceased
person”.
Counsel further quoted and
relied on the following
statement in the Headnote of the
report of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in
Akrong
v Bulley [1965] GLR 469;
“Since at the time the
plaintiff issued her writ she
had not taken out Letters of
Administration she lacked
capacity to sue”.
But Counsel in quoting from the
Headnote failed to quote the
whole sentence which is as
follows; “1) since at the
time the plaintiff issued her
writ she had not taken out
letters of administration, she
lacked capacity to sue under
the Fatal
Accidents Acts, 1846-64.”
(emphasis supplied). So,
the Supreme Court in Akrong v
Bulley never laid down a general
requirement for letters of
administration before a party
can sue in respect of property
that belonged to a deceased
person. It is important to
situate the decision in Akrong v
Bulley within the confines of
what the court actually said
speaking through Apaloo, JSC (as
he then was). He said as
follows at p 474 of the Report;
“As the plaintiff was suing
in a representative capacity
she was obliged by the mandatory
provisions of Order 3, r. 4 of
the Supreme [High] Court (Civil
Procedure) Rules, 19547 to show
in the endorsement to the writ
in what capacity she brought the
action. The plaintiff stated
her capacity in the writ as
"successor and next-of-kin." In
the case of Dotwaah v. Afriyie,
this court held in its judgment
of 12 April 1965 that upon the
appointment of a successor, the
self-acquired property of the
deceased to whom he succeeded
vests in him for and on behalf
of the family and he is thereby
entitled, in place of the head
of the family, to litigate the
family's title to the property.
A successor as such has a
locus standi. This
principle is clearly
inapplicable to this case which
is in no way concerned with
family property. In my opinion,
no question of customary law is
involved in this case. Whether
or not the endorsement on the
writ discloses a valid capacity
to sue depends solely on the
provisions of the Fatal
Accidents Acts and such
interpretation as is put on
those Acts by judicial
decisions. The only persons
statutorily clothed with
capacity to sue under those Acts
are executors and administrators
and latterly, in certain
circumstances, the
dependants.”(emphasis supplied).
From the above, the plaintiff in
that case was suing in a
representative capacity and the
trite learning is that such
party must state so in the
endorsement on the writ of
summons and must prove that
capacity. Secondly, in Akrong v
Bulley the persons with locus
standing to sue was provided for
in the statues under which the
action was brought, the Fatal
Accidents Acts. It is pertinent
to recognize that though
capacity and locus standi
are closely related and in many
instances arise together in
cases in court they are separate
legal concepts. Capacity
properly so called relates to
the juristic persona and
competence to sue in a court of
law and it becomes an issue
where an individual sues not in
her own personal right but
states a certain capacity on
account of which she is
proceeding in court. But locus
standing relates to the legal
interest that a party claims in
the subject matter of a suit in
court. This may be dependent on
the provisions of the statute
that confers the right to sue,
such as the Fatal Accidents Acts
in Akrong v Bulley. Otherwise,
generally locus standing depends
on whether the party has a legal
or equitable right that she
seeks to enforce or protect by
suing in court. In Akrong v
Bulley the statute conferred
locus standing on only
executors, administrators and
dependants but the plaintiff
stated that she was suing as
“successor and next-of kin” so
the court held that she had no
locus standing as she did not
take letters of administration
before commencing the action
which would have clothed her
with capacity as administrator.
In this case, apart from the
lawful attorney who sued in a
representative capacity and has
stated it on the writ of summons
(we shall deal with the
challenge to that capacity
later), the two plaintiffs are
not suing in a representative
capacity. It is vital to observe
that they have not sued on
behalf of the estate of their
deceased mother either but they
say that the property has
devolved on them by operation of
Italian law. At paragraph 9 of
their statement of claim they
averred as follows;
“Upon the death of the deceased
the property in issue devolved
by the law of Italy onto the
plaintiffs.”
Under those circumstances, they
have locus standing to sue in
their own right. The substance
of the challenge of the
defendants is more as to the
locus standing of the plaintiffs
than capacity since they have
not pleaded a representative
capacity and are not claiming
the property on behalf of the
estate of their mother.
My Lords, when the defendants
claim that “by law” the
plaintiffs require letters of
administration before they can
sue in this case the foremost
question is which law, Italian
Law or Ghana Law? Ghana law as
stated above provides that on
the death of a person her
property devolves on her
personal representative and so
the argument may be made that it
is the personal representative
who has locus standing to sue in
court in respect of property
that belonged to the deceased.
That is not necessarily what
Italian Law provides. The
plaintiffs contend, through the
Statutory Declaration at page 52
of the record that by Italian
Law, they “are the heirs
according to law” and “there are
no other heirs legal or by
reserve quota” of their deceased
mother. The defendants do not
challenge this deposition as to
the content of Italian Law. In
fact, the 1st
defendant stated as follows in
his statement of case; “Nobody
is challenging the right of the
plaintiffs to inherit or succeed
their mother and therefore
inherit her estate.” The first
defendant then submits that
“The issue is to do with
whether
they are clothed with legal
capacity to mount an action in
respect of her estate without
obtaining Letters of
Administration.” By this the
1st defendant is
presuming that Act 63 is
applicable in this case but that
presumption is where his fallacy
is. If Italian law is the
applicable law the plaintiffs
would not require letters of
administration in order to gain
locus standing to sue because
the property of their mother on
her death did not vest in her
personal representative. It
ought to be noted that before
the passage of Act 63 the law
applicable in Ghana was also
that upon death of a person her
property vested directly in her
heirs and not in any personal
representative. See
Conney
v Bentum-Williams [1984-86] 2
GLR 301.
Therefore, contrary to the
position of the defendants, the
germane question in this case
is, as stated by Mr John Mercer
Esq, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs, which law is to be
applied here?
The question of choice of law in
Ghana relating to a deceased
foreigner’s estate, which is
determined by the
conflict
of law rules, has been
settled in the case of
Youhana v Abboud [1974] 2 GLR
201 to be the law of the
domicile of the deceased at the
time of death which in this case
is Italian Law. The defendants
do not dispute this but have
kept repeating their submission
that the issue in this case is
not about choice of law and
conflict of laws but they are
grossly mistaken and do not
appear to appreciate the nature
of the case of the plaintiffs.
The law on the devolution of
property on the death of a
person is a rule of substantive
law and not that of procedure so
it is determined by the domicile
of the deceased foreigner at the
time of her death. It appears
that the defendants think the
issue is procedural hence their
contention that once the
plaintiffs are suing in Ghana
they require letters of
administration but that is
erroneous. Even under Ghana law,
it is not in all instances
involving the property of a
deceased person that
letters
of administration or probate
are required before a party can
sue. For the reasons explained
above, the challenge to the
capacity of the plaintiffs for
failing to obtain letters of
administration before proceeding
to sue is misconceived and same
is rejected.
We shall next consider the
challenge to the validity of the
power of attorney in this case
which the defendants claim does
not satisfy the requirement of
witness under Section 1(2) of
the
Powers of Attorney Act, 1998
(Act 549). The 1st
defendant relies on the
following passage in the
judgment of this court in the
case of
Asante-Appiah v Amponsah
[2009] SCGLR 90 at
page 94;
“The parties were agreeable that
the appellant was at all
material times during the
litigation resident in England
but sued through Nana Kwasi Twum
Barima by the use of a power of
attorney which was exhibited at
page fifteen of the record of
proceedings. That power of
attorney was fatally flawed for
two reasons. Firstly, the rule
as contained in Act 549, s. 1(2)
is that
“Where the instrument is signed
by the author of the power one
witness shall be present and
shall attest the instrument.”
It is patent on the instrument
that no one signed it as a
witness. The Court of Appeal
rightly rejected the argument of
counsel for the appellant that
the Commissioner for Oath
doubled as both the witness and
the person before whom the power
was executed. There is no legal
or statutory basis for that
argument. It would be observed
that the provision is couched in
imperative terms. In so far that
the power of attorney in
question was not signed by any
witness, it was not valid.”
From the above statement, the
Supreme Court basically endorsed
the reasoning of the Court of
Appeal in that case. We
therefore consider it useful to
quote what the Court of Appeal
itself said in their judgment in
respect of the issue of
validity
of the power of attorney.
The court said;
“The defendant next highlighted
an infringement, this time, of
the mandatory provisions of the
Power of Attorneys Act (Act
549). The defendant’s concern is
that the plaintiff’s power of
attorney infringes the mandatory
provision of section 1 (2) of
Act 549 which states as follows:
“2.Where the instrument is
signed by the donor of the power
one witness shall be present and
shall attest the instrument.”
It is obvious that the power of
attorney exhibited at page 15 of
the record was not witnessed by
any person even though provision
was made for witnessing. When
the attention of Asante Ansong,
Esq. of counsel for the
plaintiff was drawn, not only to
his failure to respond to the
point in his written statement
but also for any explanation, he
submitted in court that the
commissioner for oaths dabbled
as a commissioner and a witness.
Unfortunately this submission is
not borne out by the contents of
the document. The commissioner
for oaths simply signed as such
commissioner before whom the
power of attorney was executed
and no more. The submission can
thus be described as an
afterthought and should not be
relied upon. By this failure
even if the plaintiff had
endorsed his writ appropriately
his claim must necessarily fail,
for the power of attorney upon
which it was founded was void
for lack of witnessing. The
result is that the plaintiff had
not established his capacity for
issuing the writ as he did.”
My Lords, the provision in
operation here is very simple,
it says that where the donor of
the power signs the instrument
creating the power of attorney
it shall be signed in the
presence of one witness who
shall attest the instrument. The
plain purpose of the presence of
the witness is to attest the
instrument. Attest is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised
Fourth Edition as
follows;
“ATTEST. To bear witness to; to
bear witness to a fact; to
affirm to be true or genuine; to
act as a witness to; to certify;
to certify to the verity of a
copy of a public document;
formally by signature; to make
solemn declaration in words or
writing to support a fact; to
signify by subscription of his
name that the signer has
witnessed the execution of the
particular instrument.(emphasis
supplied).”
So, attest may entail different
actions but all are to be done
by a witness for the purpose of
affirming that indeed and in
truth the thing was done in her
presence. On a reading of
section 1(2) of Act 549 it
appears that it is the last part
of the definition of attest
quoted above that was intended
by the legislator, that is the
witness should not only see the
donor sign the instrument, but
must sign her name to signify
that she saw the donor execute
the particular instrument. We
have read all the seven sections
of the Act and no where does it
state any special criteria for a
person to qualify to witness a
power of attorney and it also
does not disqualify any group of
persons from acting as witness
to the execution of a power of
attorney. In our understanding,
the critical fact to look for
when the validity of a power of
attorney is questioned on ground
that it has not been witnessed
is for the court to satisfy
itself that the donor signed the
instrument in the presence of a
witness and that that witness
signed the instrument signifying
that she was present at the
execution of the instrument by
the donor. In the case under
reference, the Court of Appeal
stated that the Commissioner for
Oaths signed as the person
before whom the instrument was
signed. The question then is,
in substance, how is that
different from attesting the
instrument as a witness as
required by section 1(2) of the
Act? It appears to us that both
the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court in Asante-Appiah v
Amponsah were looking for a
magic word “witness” with a
signature against it on the
document. This approach places
form over substance but there is
no basis for such an extreme
literalist interpretation from
even a casual reading of the Act
as a whole. The Act contains a
precedent form for a general
power of attorney as a Schudule
to section 6 of the Act. That
precedent form is very simple
and no portion with the word
witness is to be found on it. In
the interpretation of statutes,
a court ought to render an
interpretation that would
achieve the purpose of the
enactment and not to defeat it.
See
Abu Ramadan & Nimako v EC & A-G
[2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1654.
In the case of
Zambrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR
221, the Court of Appeal
rejected a suggestion by counsel
that the absence of a jurat
on the face of a document
executed by an illiterate
invalidated the document because
section 4(1) of the
Illiterates Protection Ordinance
(CAP 262) (1951 Rev)
provides as follows;
4. (1) Every person writing a
letter or other document for or
at the request of an illiterate
person, whether gratuitously or
for a reward shall—
(1)
Clearly and correctly read over
and explain such letter or
document or cause the same to be
read over and explained to the
illiterate person.
The court held that it is a
question of fact to be proved by
admissible evidence whether the
document had been read and
explained to the illiterate
person in a language he
understood and that the presence
of a jurat is but only
one of such admissible evidence.
Commissioners of Oaths are
appointed by the Chief Justice
pursuant to the
Oaths
Act, 1972 (NRCD 6) and
they are sworn before they are
given authority to administer
oaths. Their normal function in
the legal system is to
administer oaths and attesting
same by signing and affixing
their stamps on affidavits and
statutory declarations signed by
deponents before them. Their
appointments can be revoked if
they misconduct themselves and
they can even be charged under
section 191 of the
Criminal and Other Offences Act,
1960 (Act 29) for
administering an unlawful oath.
Though Act 549 does not require
a power of attorney to be made
in any particular form, so it
must not be made under oath,
but then nothing in the Act
debars the making of a power of
attorney under oath. From the
judgment of the Court of Appeal
in Asante-Appiah v Amponsah it
does appear that the power of
attorney in that case was not
made under oath and that the
commissioner for oaths was not
performing his normal function
of administering an oath but
acted as a witness, just as any
person could do so it is
difficult for us to understand
why it was said he could not be
the attesting witness to the
execution of the instrument.
By that decision the court
appears to imply that if the
instrument had been signed by
any one else, no matter who,
provided she signed against the
designation “witness” that would
have satisfied the provision.
But the purpose of the presence
of the witness is to attest to
the due execution of the
instrument, therefore, in our
view, a commissioner for oaths
is even better qualified to
witness and attest a power of
attorney than a person who
cannot be easily traced and
whose credibility cannot be
vouched for. A commissioner for
oaths performs his duties on
pain of clear legal sanctions
and it is easy to trace her in
case there is a dispute about
the due execution of the power
of attorney. In our opinion, the
Court of Appeal did not
correctly decide the issue of
the validity of the power of
attorney in Asante-Appiah v
Amponsah and when the case came
before this court on appeal the
court regrettably did not
thoroughly consider the full
ambit and purpose of the Act as
a whole before endorsing the
view of the Court of Appeal.
That holding, in our clear
thinking, is not right and just
having regard to the purpose and
plain meaning of the provisions
of Act 549 as a whole. If our
decision in Asante-Appiah v
Amponsah has been interpreted as
disqualifying a commissioner for
oaths from acting as a witness
to a power of attorney, or to
mean that a power of attorney
cannot be validly constituted by
a statutory declaration sworn to
before a commissioner for oaths,
then we hereby depart from that
decision pursuant to Article
129(3) of the Constitution. In
our view, a power of attorney
constituted by a statutory
declaration attested by a
commissioner for oaths or Notary
Public has more gravitas than
one stated on a paper signed by
the donor and attested by a
witness without
an oath
so it cannot be right and just
to hold such a power of attorney
invalid.
In the face of our
interpretation of section 1(2)
of Act 549 as explained above,
the defendants’ challenge to the
validity of the power of
attorney of Isaac Benjamin
Clement is no longer tenable.
The statutory declaration by
which the power was given to him
was signed by the plaintiffs on
pain of penal sanctions under
Italian law, in the presence of
a Notary Public who has attested
that the instrument was signed
before her. The power of
attorney satisfies section 1(2)
of Act 549 and is valid.
In conclusion, the appeal
against the decision of the
Court of Appeal dated 4th
December, 2019 fails and is
dismissed. The case is to be
remitted to the High Court
Sekondi for the trial of the
remaining issues set down for
determination appearing at page
31 of the Record of Appeal.
G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
Y.
APPAU
(JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT)
A.
M. A. DORDZIE (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
LOVELACE-JOHNSON
(MS.)
(JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I.O TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
JOHN MERCER ESQ FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS
SAMUEL YALLEY ESQ FOR 1ST
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
GEORGE TETTEH SACKEY ESQ
PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY (PSA)
FOR 2ND AND 3RD
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS
WITH HIM EMMANUELLA SARA ASMAH,
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY (ASA)
AND ADELAINE OWUSUWAA ASANTE,
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY (ASA) |
