BENIN, JSC:-
The
Plaintiff/respondent/appellant,
hereinafter called the
Plaintiff, was in the employment
of the
Defendant/appellant/respondent,
hereinafter called the
Defendant, from October 2005
until his appointment was
terminated by letter on or about
4th April 2013. The reasons
assigned in the letter of
dismissal were negligence of
duty and causing financial loss
to the Defendant. The dismissal
letter further surcharged the
Plaintiff and one other named
person with the amount of GH₵41,195.66
which was said to have been lost
to the Defendant as a result of
Plaintiff's alleged negligence.
Not only was the Plaintiff
denied all his benefits, the
Defendant went further to deduct
the sum of GH₵23,507.27 from his
provident fund contributions to
defray part of the sum alleged
to have been lost to the
Defendant. The Plaintiff
maintained his innocence of all
allegations made against him by
the Defendant.
The whole matter arose from some
adverts placed by or on behalf
of the Electoral Commission (EC)
in the Daily Graphic. The bone
of contention was whether the
adverts were placed directly by
the EC or through a third party,
a company called Driwald
Advertising Agency; Driwald, for
short. The case set up by the
Plaintiff at the trial was that
the adverts were placed by
Driwald on behalf of the EC, for
which reason it was entitled to
a 10% discount, being a
registered agent of the
defendant. So he, as the Manager
in charge, granted the discount
to Driwald. This was contrary to
the position taken by the
Defendant which maintained that
the adverts were placed directly
by the EC so the Defendant was
negligent in performing his duty
and had thereby caused financial
loss to the Defendant. Following
investigations by a committee
set up by the Board of Directors
of the Defendant, the
Plaintiff's appointment was
terminated with loss of benefits
as earlier mentioned.
The Plaintiff therefore
instituted an action at the High
Court and claimed these reliefs:
a. General damages for wrongful
dismissal.
b. An order that the Plaintiff
be re-instated.
c. An order that the Plaintiff
be paid all salaries,
allowances, bonuses and any
other entitlements unpaid from
the date of the purported
dismissal of Plaintiff up to and
inclusive of the date of
re-instatement.
d. An order directed at the
Defendant to refund to the
Plaintiff the amount of
GH₵23,507.27 which the Defendant
unlawfully deducted from the
Plaintiff's provident fund
contribution.
e. Interest on all sums of money
at the commercial bank lending
rate from the date of the
purported dismissal to the date
of re-instatement.
f. Costs.
The trial High Court made
findings of fact on all core
issues against the Plaintiff.
However, the said court accepted
the submission by Plaintiff's
counsel that the investigative
proceedings were conducted in
violation of section 17.5 of the
Defendant's Management
Conditions of Service (MCS). The
reason was that since the
Plaintiff was in an executive
management position, it was the
duty of the Board to have heard
the case, and not a committee
appointed by the Board. For that
procedural non-compliance, the
trial court upheld the
Plaintiff's claim and made
certain awards in his favour.
The Defendant appealed to the
Court of Appeal. The Plaintiff
also applied for a variation of
the High Court's findings of
fact that Plaintiff was
negligent and also dishonest.
The appellate court upheld the
appeal, reasoning, inter alia,
that the Plaintiff never pleaded
the fact that the investigations
were procedurally flawed and
also under section 138 of the
Companies Act, 1963, Act 179,
the Board could act by a
committee of its members. The
court held that absence of
evidence on the composition of
the investigation committee was
not fatal to the respondent's
case. The court faulted the
trial court for relying on the
MCS. The Court refused to go
into the merits of the decision
of the Board reasoning that
judicial review was not
concerned with the merits of the
decision. For that reason too,
it refused to grant the order of
variation that the appellant
herein was seeking.
The Plaintiff has brought this
appeal praying this court to
reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeal on these
grounds:
(a) The learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal erred when they
held that the appellant's action
did not question the validity of
the procedure and substance of
respondent's disciplinary
proceedings that led to his
dismissal.
(b) The learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal erred when they
held that the respondent company
had no obligation to produce
evidence about the composition
of the disciplinary committee
when on record the said
committee's report was tendered
in evidence through the
respondent's witness without any
objection whatsoever.
(c) The learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal erred in holding
that the court cannot review the
merits of the dismissal of the
appellant when the respondent
had strenuously justified the
merits of its decision in the
trial court.
(d) The learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal erred in their
evaluation of exhibit F, the
Management Conditions of Service
document, in spite of the
overwhelming evidence that the
proceedings that resulted in the
dismissal of the appellant was
not determined by the Board of
the respondent company.
(e) The learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal erred when they
failed to decide on the
substance of the appellant's
prayer for variation of the
decision of the trial High Court
which found the appellant
negligent and dishonest.
(f) The judgment is against the
weight of the evidence.
It is clear from the grounds of
appeal, as argued, that this
appeal can be determined on two
broad fronts, namely:
(1) whether the findings of fact
made by the trial High Court and
endorsed by the Court of Appeal
could be supported by this
court, having regard to the
evidence on record; and
(2) whether the disciplinary
proceedings that resulted in the
dismissal of the Plaintiff
followed due process.
On the concurrent findings of
fact by the courts below, it has
been pointed out time without
number that the second appellate
court cannot substitute its own
views for those of the courts
below, even if given the same
facts the second appellate Court
would have reached a different
conclusion on the facts.
However, the second appellate
court can upset the findings of
fact if certain questions, or
some of them, are answered in
the affirmative. Did the court
fail to consider vital pieces of
evidence, oral as well as
documentary? Did the court take
into consideration and rely on
irrelevant and immaterial
evidence? Did the court rely on
legally inadmissible evidence?
Did the court wrongfully exclude
relevant, material and
admissible evidence? Did the
court fail to identify and
allocate the burden of producing
evidence and of persuasion and
thereby failed to consider the
party's case properly? Did the
court fail to identify the
standard of proof required on a
particular issue and thereby
failed to assess the party's
case accordingly? Did the court
embark upon a proper evaluation
of the evidence as a whole?
These are by no means
exhaustive. Answers to such
questions and others may guide
the court to reach a decision
whether to disturb the findings
of fact or otherwise.
Let us refer to the findings of
fact made by the trial court, to
begin with. We quote extensively
from the court's decision. The
court said:
“The facts as gathered from the
records that led to the loss of
the sum of GH₵41,195.66 is that
a business by name Driwald
Advertising Agency Limited
purported to be an agent of the
Electoral Commission having the
task of placing advertisement
with the Defendant on the
Commission's Biometric Voter
Registration. The Plaintiff
exercised his powers under the
Defendant's Credit Policy and
granted Driwald....10% volume
discount on the advertisements.
The question is, was
Driwald.....entitled to any
payment at all from the
Defendant?
Exhibit F Appendix 3 is a letter
from the Electoral Commission
dated 23-03-12 headed ‘Award of
Contract for the Placement of
Adverts. The first two
paragraphs read as follows:
'We refer to your
quotation for the placement of
adverts on the notice of
Biometric Voter Registration. We
wish to inform you that your
quotation exclusive of VAT and
NHIL, has been accepted.
You have therefore
been awarded the contract to
place Electoral Commission's
advert on the Notice of
Biometric Voter Registration in
the Daily Graphic.'
The letter dated 23-03-2012
refers to a quotation the
Electoral Commission received
from the Defendant and based
upon the quotation, the
Defendant was awarded the
contract on the said advert.
It is significant that the
letter from the Electoral
Commission was addressed to the
Defendant's Adverts and Business
Development Manager. That
position was held by one Mr. Ebo
Acquaye who worked under the
supervision of the General
Manager (Marketing and Public
Affairs) Mr. Frank Oduro, the
Plaintiff herein.
For a further letter dated
11-11-2012 from the Defendant,
in response to a request for
information by the Defendant,
the Electoral Commission had
this to say:
'I refer to your
letter dated 09-11-2012 on the
above subject and wish to
respond as follows:
*The Commission has not dealt
with or contracted any agent to
deal with the Graphic
Communications Group Limited on
its behalf. As a result, both
cheques issued for the Biometric
Voter Registration (BVR)
advertisement were written in
the name of Graphic
Communications Group Limited.*”
The trial court continued thus:
“Indeed, two invoices were sent
to the Electoral Commission
being Appendix 1 and 2 in
exhibit F. The invoice dated
19-03-2012 was supplied to the
Electoral Commission by Michael
Twum Barimah. The invoice dated
14-06-2012 was supplied to the
Electoral Commission by Ebo
Acquaye. Michael Twum Barimah
worked under the supervision of
the Plaintiff as the Defendant's
Assistant Marketing
Officer..............The
payments for the adverts were
received on behalf of the
Defendant in respect of cheque
number 158577178, amounting to
GHc35,642.64 by Ebo Acquaye
whilst cheque no. 581982183
amounting to GHc172,272.76, was
received by Frank Oduro, the
Plaintiff as per Appendix 10, in
exhibit F...........
In all these documentary
evidence proffered at the trial,
there was no mention of
Driwald.......whatsoever.”
The trial court then turned
attention to the role played by
the Plaintiff and his
justification for paying the
discount to Driwald. The court
continued thus:
“In respect of the clear
evidence that Driwald....was
never contracted by the
Electoral Commission to place
any advert with the Defendant on
the Biometric Registration
exercise, the plaintiff
conducted himself as per
paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the
statement of claim. The
plaintiff said:
'In respect of the
placement of the Adverts on the
BVR the Plaintiff was met in
Plaintiff's office by the Chief
Executive Officer of
Driwald.....in the presence of
the Adverts Manager.
The Plaintiff was
then shown a work order from
Driwald ....in respect of the
Adverts and informed that
Driwald......has requested for a
discount of 10% which could not
be granted by the Adverts
Manager according to the terms
of the Defendant's Credit
Policy.
It is the
Plaintiff's act of exercising
the.....powers under the
Defendant's Credit Policy to
grant Driwald.......the 10%
volume discount based on the
work order from Driwald.....in
respect of the Adverts for the
Biometric Registration exercise
which the Defendant alleges
amounts to negligence of duty
and for which the Defendant has
actually dismissed the
Plaintiff.'
The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's assertions above in
these words:
“Indeed, how ill it lies in the
mouth of the Plaintiff to be
talking like this. In my candid
opinion, Plaintiff was not only
negligent but downright
dishonest in his dealings with
the Defendant. Can the Plaintiff
be heard to be posturing himself
as meeting the Chief Executive
Officer of
Driwald.......with.......Mr. Ebo
Acquaye to whom the direct award
of the contract to the Defendant
was channeled or addressed
without knowing that
Driwald.....was not an agent of
the Electoral Commission?”
The trial court then proceeded
to draw inferences from the
evidence on record as follows:
“There is no doubt that under
the circumstances if the
Plaintiff did not know the
serious business happenings in
his department and concerning
Ebo Acquaye and Michael Twum
Barimah, then he was in breach
of the duty of care due from him
to the Defendant. But in any
event, it is not my view that
the Plaintiff never knew that
Driwald......was not an agent of
the Electoral Commission as he
strenuously seems to be holding
on to. My view is that he knew
that the advert was placed
directly by the Electoral
Commission to the Defendant and
this is evidenced by the fact
that the plaintiff himself
personally went to the Electoral
Commission for a payment of the
advert by a cheque drawn in the
Defendant's name without Driwald
stepping foot in the corridors
of the Electoral Commission to
do so. To authorize the payment
of monies to Driwald.......was
therefore a betrayable evidence
of the skill and competence
expected of the Plaintiff by the
Defendant. I have come to this
length to show that on the facts
before me, the Plaintiff's
action ought to have been
dismissed for being negligent,
to say the least, and causing
financial loss to the Defendant”
These findings of fact by the
trial court are based on solid
evidence on the record. The
Plaintiff's position based on a
supposed work order was rightly
rejected by the trial court. Was
the work order issued and
authorized by the Electoral
Commission, the contracting
party? Did the Electoral
Commission communicate the
supposed work order to the
Defendant through a letter or
other proper official
notification? Did Driwald
produce any contract between
them and the EC for this job?
Was it before or after the
Commission had notified the
defendant it was not using any
agent? These are questions the
Plaintiff ought to have
addressed to enable the court
place some weight on his
version.
Be that as it may, the Court was
not bound to accept what the
Defendant said, especially in
view of the material pieces of
evidence from the Defendant. The
Electoral Commission had made it
clear it was not using the
services of any agent in the
procurement of this contract, so
the Plaintiff was put on inquiry
as to any person who purported
to be working for the Electoral
Commission in respect of this
same contract. The Defendant
issued invoices directly to the
EC for payment. And the
Defendant, per the Plaintiff and
one other named staff, received
payment directly from the EC.
The Plaintiff has not been able
to demonstrate to this court
where the trial court went wrong
in the evaluation of the
evidence on record. The fact
that the courts below rejected
the Plaintiff's account or
version is not a good or
sufficient reason for this court
to intervene and substitute its
view for that of the courts
below. On the available evidence
before the trial court, it was
entitled to accept the
Defendant's version on a balance
of probabilities. And even if
the standard of proof required
was one beyond reasonable doubt,
the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy that standard, but this
was not the required standard of
proof in this case. The courts
below were right on the matters
of fact. The trial court's
conclusion that the Plaintiff
was negligent and downright
dishonest is fully supportable
on the evidence and we would
affirm same.
The other issue for
consideration in this appeal is
one of law, what proper
construction is to be placed on
clause 17.5 of the Management
Conditions of Service (MCS)
applicable to the Defendant and
its employees and whether due
process was followed. In
construing a section of a deed,
it may become necessary to make
reference to other provisions of
the same deed, and even to
statute law in order to render
the provision meaningful. That
is exactly the approach adopted
by the Court of Appeal, as
against the rather narrow and
restrictive approach adopted by
the trial High Court. Once more,
we have to refer to the trial
court's opinion on this. Having
made positive findings of fact
as recounted above, the court
decided, however, to enter
judgment for the Plaintiff on
account of procedural
infractions of the MCS. In the
words of the court,
“providence has come to the
rescue of the Plaintiff. In the
address........counsel for the
Plaintiff made submissions that
have weighed on my mind. Counsel
submitted........as follows:
'the record shows clearly that
the Plaintiff was an executive
manager that is the General
Manager Marketing and Public
Affairs............and by the
provisions of section 17.5 of
the MCS, it was the Board of the
Defendant itself that ought to
determine the Plaintiff's case
and not an investigative
committee. The Board had no
power under the conditions of
service to set up an
investigative committee to
investigate the Plaintiff, an
executive
manager..............the Board
breached section 17.5 in setting
up the investigative committee
and accepted its recommendations
to dismiss the Plaintiff. The
Defendant flagrantly violated
section 17.5 of the MCS.......'
I have critically read 17.5 of
the MCS, 2011..........I have
also gone back to the pleadings
of the plaintiff and nowhere did
he plead the foregoing as a
material fact. The rules,
specifically Order 11 rule 7 of
C. I. 47, requires no doubt,
that a material fact relied upon
in support of a claim or defence
must be pleaded. However, the
evidence of this unpleaded fact,
which is exhibit F, has gone on
record having been tendered in
evidence by the Plaintiff and
without objection from the
Defendant. It is therefore part
of the proceedings.”
Citing the case of Asamoah v.
Sevordzie (1987-88) 1 GLR 67 at
74, on reception of evidence
without objection, the trial
court felt bound to apply
section 17.5 of the MCS in
favour of the plaintiff. Indeed
the court considered sub-clauses
1, 2 and 4 of the MCS as well.
The provisions cited by the
court read:
17(1) The Disciplinary Authority
of the Company is vested in the
Board of Directors who may
exercise the authority either
directly or through an
individual or committee.
17(2) Pursuant to clause 17(1)
above, the Board of Directors
shall establish an
investigation/disciplinary
committee to which management
may refer any case requiring
action.
17(4) Where the alleged offence
is likely to result in
suspension or dismissal, the
investigative committee shall
investigate and/or hear the
matter and the Managing Director
shall refer the findings to the
Board of Directors.
17(5) In the case of an
Executive Manager, the Board
shall determine the entire
proceedings in cases which may
result in suspension or
dismissal.
Having examined these
provisions, the trial court
delivered itself as follows:
“Per Clause 17.5, the
proceedings in the Plaintiff's
case was mandatorily required
exclusively of the Board of
Directors to undertake without
reference to any committee
whatsoever. The Board's
investigative committee report,
which is exhibit D confirms in
its page one that the committee
was mandated by the Board to
investigate, make findings and
recommendations involving the
Plaintiff.
Exhibit E, the Plaintiff's
dismissal letter also stated
inter alia:
'The Board of Directors has
considered the reports of the
investigative committee of the
Board and has decided that you
be dismissed with immediate
effect........'
Exhibits D and E referred to
provide evidence of the breach
of the Defendant of Clause 17.5.
..........Under Clause 17.5, the
Board has no such delegating
powers and the committee that
investigated the Plaintiff
lacked capacity to do so and
therefore acted without
jurisdiction just as the Board.”
Consequently, the trial court
declared the proceedings null
and void, citing the popular
dictum by Lord Denning in Macfoy
v. UAC (1962) AC 152 at 160.
Apparently, the trial court's
decision was based on the law
that an administrative action
may be reviewed on ground of
procedural impropriety, see the
case of Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service (1985) AC 374, per Lord
Diplock at 411; (1984) 3 All ER
935 at 951. The impropriety may
arise from a failure to follow a
procedure expressly provided for
by statute or an instrument that
has the force of law.
The Court of Appeal examined the
rules on administrative justice
and the scope of judicial
review. They relied on cases
like Awuni v. West African
Examinations Council (2003-2004)
SCGLR 471; Aboagye v. Ghana
Commercial Bank (2001-2002)
SCGLR 797. The court below
explained the object of judicial
review. The court also explained
the function of pleadings and
why it was necessary for every
material fact to be pleaded. The
court made reference to the
trial court's admission that the
Plaintiff did not plead the
facts upon which the court
rested its judgment. On whether
or not there was a violation of
clause 17.5 of the MCS the Court
of Appeal agreed with counsel
for the Defendant that this
provision did not mean the
entire board should conduct the
investigations. And that by the
provisions of section 138 of Act
179, a committee of the Board
would suffice. It rejected the
submission by counsel for the
Plaintiff that the provisions in
section 138 of Act 179 should be
read as general provisions, as
against clause 17.5 of the MCS
which was specific. The court
also rejected the Plaintiff's
view that there was no evidence
on the record that the committee
members belonged to the Board,
reasoning that there were no
pleadings so this was not a
triable issue.
In resolving this issue, the
first observation is that in an
action for wrongful termination
of employment, the Plaintiff
must spell out his terms of
employment and go on to tell the
court where the employer has
gone wrong in relation to his
claim. This calls for the
pleadings to be explicit on what
issues the Plaintiff wants the
court to address. Where there is
a document that spells out the
terms and conditions of
employment, the plaintiff must
plead those provisions or facts
evincing intention to rely on
specific provisions of the
document. This will enable the
Defendant to know the nature of
the case he has to meet and
prepare his defence accordingly.
It is not enough to tender the
document in evidence and in
addressing the court point out
for the first time which
provision/s in the document the
Defendant is said to have been
in breach of, in the absence of
pleadings and more importantly
when there is no evidence on the
record to support the
submission.
In the instant case, all the
pleadings were directed at
whether or not the Plaintiff had
done anything wrong in relation
to the EC adverts. There was no
pleading that suggested even
remotely that the Defendant had
breached section 17.5 of the
MCS. The submission on breach of
clause 17.5 has been put in
because of the pleadings that it
was a committee of the board
that investigated the Plaintiff.
But that was not enough in view
of the fact that the Board is
entitled by law to act by a
committee of its members under
Section 138(a) of Act 179 which
provides that:
“Unless otherwise provided in
the regulations, the board of
directors
(a) may exercise their powers
through committees consisting of
such member or members of their
body as they think fit.”
Administrative rules and/or
regulations are subject to
various legislations and laws
recognized under article 11 of
the 1992 Constitution,
particularly the Constitution,
statute law and regulations
governing the organization must
be respected. The internal
contractual arrangements, like
the MCS, do not enjoy the status
of law, therefore any of its
provisions, which is in conflict
or appears to be in conflict
with any legislation, must be
construed in one of two ways.
The court will consider whether
the two provisions can be read
together and reconciled; if they
can, the statute will be
incorporated by reference into
the contract and the court will
give effect to both. If on the
other hand, they cannot be
reconciled, the provisions in
the contract will not be
enforced by the court, the
statute will prevail.
In the case of Republic v. High
Court, General Jurisdiction,
Accra; ex parte Zanetor
Rawlings, (Ashittey & National
Democratic Congress Interested
Parties) (2015-2016) SCGLR 53,
the argument was made that under
the constitution of the NDC the
applicant was disqualified from
contesting the parliamentary
primaries on the party’s ticket
because she was not a registered
voter in the records of the
Electoral Commission and in
terms of the NDC constitution.
When the matter landed in the
apex court, the court held that
a person was only disqualified
if he/she was not qualified in
terms of article 94 of the
Constitution. This decision
effectively meant that the NDC
could not draw up constitutional
provisions that took out
relevant provisions of the 1992
Constitution. Consequently, the
High Court was directed to
determine the party's
constitutional provisions on
primaries to elect parliamentary
candidates in the light of the
interpretation given to article
94 of the Constitution, in order
to bring the party constitution
to be in harmony with what the
national Constitution says.
Thus in this case, clause 17(1)
which entitles the Board to act
by a committee should be read as
one with clause 17(5) as well as
section 138(a) of Act 179 in
order to give effect to the
provisions of the MCS.
Therefore, if the Defendant
acted by a committee of members
of the Board, it would be
justified.
However, the Plaintiff is saying
that there is no evidence that
the committee members belonged
to the Board. This is where the
essence of pleadings becomes
critical. The Plaintiff did not
make section 17.5 an issue. He
did not plead any facts to
indicate that the committee was
improperly constituted and for
that reason it had no capacity.
The Defendant did not assume the
initial burden of producing
evidence on the capacity of the
committee members, since it did
not become an issue in the
case. In the case of Kusi v.
Kusi (2010) SCGLR 60, per
Georgina Wood CJ at 78, this
Court re-stated the rule of
evidence that “where no issues
are joined as between parties on
a specific question, issue or
fact, no duty was cast on the
party asserting it to lead
evidence in proof of that fact
or issue.” The learned judge
went on to caution that “most of
the delays associated with civil
trials would be avoided, if this
simple elementary evidentiary
rule were strictly adhered to.”
Indeed the principle applies to
every party in a case, he
assumes no burden to produce
evidence if no issue is joined
on a particular issue or matter.
All that the Defendant had to do
was that it set up a committee
of its members, as required by
section 138(a) of Act 179 and
clause 17(1) of the MCS. And
from the report of the
committee-exhibit D-as well as
the pleadings, the Court is able
to say, in the absence of
pleadings and evidence to the
contrary, that the Defendant
satisfied the requirement of the
law in the composition of the
committee.
To begin with, exhibit D is
titled “BOARD INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE”. Next the report
opens with the expression: “This
Committee of the Board.......”
When you turn to the second page
of the report, the
recommendation was made that the
Board was to conduct its own
investigation, hence the setting
up of the committee of the
Board. The plaintiff in
paragraph 7 of his own pleadings
described it as “the
Investigative Committee of the
Board”, and Defendant admitted
it in its statement of defence.
The parties were thus under no
illusion that the committee
comprised Board members. The
ordinary dictionary meaning of
the word ‘of' confirms this
construction. The Oxford
Dictionary of English gives the
meaning of the word ‘of’ as
“expressing the relationship
between a part and a whole”.
Thus the ordinary meaning
ascribed to the expression
“committee of the Board”, will
mean the committee is part of
the Board. Hence, the plaintiff
assumed the burden to prove the
contrary, since he was aware of
the report before he issued his
writ. On the other hand, if the
Plaintiff thought 'Investigative
Committee of the Board' meant
something different, he ought to
have pleaded the facts and made
the composition of the committee
a triable issue. As it turned
out, the Plaintiff contested the
case on grounds that he did not
commit the wrong attributed to
him. Not even when the
Defendant's representative
testified were these matters of
the composition of the committee
suggested to him in cross
examination. And the Defendant's
representative in answer to a
question that the Plaintiff had
said he was wrongly dismissed,
made this significant statement:
“the communication from the
board to management concerning
the matter indicated that due
process, in terms of cases of
such nature, was applied in
relation to the management
service conditions.” This was
not challenged under cross
examination, and the Plaintiff's
version in respect of due
process was not put across in
cross examination.
In concluding, we reiterate the
point that in the absence of
pleadings, the composition of
the investigative committee was
not an issue. And even if it
was, the ordinary construction
of the expression used in the
proceedings meant it was the
committee of the board. The
Defendant's evidence that due
process was observed in terms of
the MCS was not disputed. The
Plaintiff did not plead any
facts or lead any evidence from
which it could be concluded that
the composition of the committee
did not satisfy the requirement
of the law. Consequently, we
conclude that there is no merit
in the appeal and we dismiss
same accordingly.
A.
A. BENIN
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Benin,
JSC.
S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Benin,
JSC.
V. AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
APPAU, JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Benin,
JSC.
Y. APPAU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
PWAMANG, JSC:-
I agree with the conclusion and
reasoning of my brother Benin,
JSC.
G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
NANA YAA NARTEY FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT.
ANTHONY NAMOO FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.
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