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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION) HELD IN ACCRA ON TUESDAY, THE 31ST DAY OF MAY, 2011, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, JUSTICE UUTER PAUL DERY, HIGH COURT JUDGE.

SUIT NO. HRC 15/10

GEORGE ADDO                                                                              - PLAINTIFF

VRS.  

1. DR. H. HOLDBROOK-SMITH

2. KOFI BOAKYE               

3. F. K. A. AMOA-AWUA                                                                - DEFENDANTS

4. PATRICK KWAKYE

5. ABRAHAM ODAI

(Executive Officers and members

of the Disciplinary Committee respectively

of the Accra Lawn Tennis Club

sued on behalf of themselves and

on behalf of and as representing

 the Accra Lawn Tennis Club)         

 

         

JUDGMENT

By his writ of summons, filed on 27-01-2010, the plaintiff, George Addo, who is a member of the Accra Lawn Tennis Club, sued the defendants, who are executive members and members of the disciplinary committee of the same club and are being sued in their respective capacities and as representing the said club. The plaintiff claims the following reliefs against the defendants:

“i. Declaration that the defendants and each of them is in breach of the club’s constitution and bye-laws in dismissing the plaintiff’s counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants without an investigation.

ii. Declaration that the 3rd defendant or alternatively the club’s disciplinary committee’s decision to determine the case against the plaintiff if he absented himself from its sitting on Wednesday, 27th January, 2010, constitutes an infringement of the plaintiff’s human rights and a flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice as well as clause 14 of the club’s bye-laws.

iii. Declaration that the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants lack the requisite fair-mindedness, neutrality and independence to sit as impartial arbiters or tribunal in any case involving or affecting the plaintiff.

iv. Alternatively, the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants are incapable of holding the scales of justice evenly as between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant.

v. An order of injunction restraining the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants from sitting as the disciplinary committee of the club in any matter affecting or involving the plaintiff on the ground of unmitigated bias.”

The undisputed facts of this case are that the plaintiff became a member of the Accra Lawn Tennis Club on 15-02-2005. Dr. H. Holdbrook-Smith and Mr. Kofi Boakye (the 1st and 2nd defendants, respectively) have since March, 2006, been the chairman and secretary, respectively, of the same club and, together with three others, they constitute the executive committee of the club. Mr. F. K. A. Amoa-Awua, Mr. Patrick Kwakye and Mr. Abraham Odai, at all material times of this case, were the members of the disciplinary committee of the club upon their appointment by the executive committee.

The Accra Lawn Tennis Club and its members are governed by a constitution as well as bye-laws as amended from time to time. By clause 13(ii) of the club’s bye-laws, the disciplinary committee is responsible for dealing with breaches of the club’s constitution and bye-laws and any other matters referred to it by the executive committee or a member.

It is, further, provided in clause 14(vi), (vii), (viii) and (ix) of the bye-laws of the club that if a person, into whose conduct an enquiry is to be held, does not appear at the time, date and place appointed for the conduct of an enquiry, the enquiry would proceed in his absence. The person under enquiry may appear in person or may send a written reply to the charge or complaint. The disciplinary committee may also receive any such oral or other evidence as would be necessary for the determination of the issue. After holding the enquiry, the disciplinary committee would make a finding and recommendation to the executive committee for necessary action in accordance with the bye-laws and constitution of the club.

What brought about the dispute between the parties started sometime in November, 2009, when the 2nd defendant lodged a complaint of assault against the plaintiff which complaint went before the disciplinary committee as required by the constitution and bye-laws of the club. The plaintiff was, accordingly, invited to attend the disciplinary enquiry on 14-11-2009 but he did not attend on that date and on subsequent adjourned dates.

It is the case of the plaintiff that he instructed his solicitor, who by a letter of 20-01-2010, wrote to the Disciplinary Committee through the 3rd defendant in which he denied the 2nd defendant’s allegation of assault; lodged a complaint or a counter-complaint of misconduct against the 1st and 2nd defendants; requested that the disciplinary committee investigate the two complaints together; raised a jurisdictional objection to the composition of the disciplinary committee; and, finally, indicated his preparedness to appear before the disciplinary committee to answer the charges against him by the 2nd defendant in the event that the disciplinary committee dismissed his jurisdictional objection.

According to the plaintiff, the response he had to his solicitor’s letter was that the defendants, also acting by their solicitor, dismissed his claims, including the allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants and evinced a clear intention not to investigate his counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants for they concluded that they were hallucinations.

It is, further, the case of the plaintiff that the disciplinary committee, by letter dated 20-01-2010 and signed by the 3rd defendant, gave a strict warning to the plaintiff to appear before the committee on Wednesday, 27th January, 2010, for the hearing of the 2nd defendant’s complaint, failing which the committee would proceed to determine the case against him. Thus, his action.

It is the case of the defendants that the disciplinary committee, on 12-11-2009, sent a letter of invitation to the plaintiff notifying him of the complaint and asking him to appear on 14-11-2009 to answer the charges the 2nd defendant brought against him. At its sitting on 14-11-2009, the plaintiff did not appear but sent a letter requesting for an adjournment which was granted and he was informed in another letter that the hearing had been adjourned to 23-11-2009. However, the hearing could not come on the said 23-11-2009 because the plaintiff had instituted an action and obtained an interim injunction against the 1st and 3rd defendants, herein, at the District Court, at Osu, which was later dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The disciplinary committee, thereafter, notified the plaintiff in a letter of the hearing of the matter on 20-01-2010 but the plaintiff failed or refused to appear.

The defendants admit that the plaintiff caused his solicitors to write a letter, on 20-01-2010, to the disciplinary committee in which he denied the charge of assault, raised a jurisdictional objection to the composition of the disciplinary committee with the caveat that he was prepared to appear before the committee in the event that the committee dismissed his jurisdictional objection. The defendants, however, deny that the plaintiff made any complaint or counter-complaint. The defendants contend that the disciplinary committee is a standing committee formed by the executive committee at the beginning of its tenure to hear any disciplinary issue that may arise and it is not an ad hoc committee set up solely for the hearing of the complaint against the plaintiff. The defendants, on the 21-01-2010, responded to the plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter dismissing all the plaintiff’s claims and stated that the said letter only talked about a wish to pursue counter-charges, which was not stated, against the 1st and 2nd defendants.

The defendants admit, further, that, by a letter of 20-01-2010, the disciplinary committee wrote to the plaintiff and gave him a strict warning to appear before it on Wednesday, 27-01-2010, for the hearing of the 2nd defendant’s complaint, failing which the committee would proceed to determine the case against him. The defendants contend that they have, throughout the pendency of the matter, scrupulously observed the constitution and bye-laws of the club and also the rules of natural justice.

The committee even bent the rules to accommodate the plaintiff and have gone to great lengths to afford him a hearing. The 4th defendant too has stepped down from the disciplinary committee because of his heavy schedule and has been replaced by Major Gyasi.

The defendants thus contend that there is nothing in the plaintiff’s pleadings which remotely support or grounds the reliefs he is seeking and his action is, therefore, misconceived, vexatious, unmeritorious and an abuse of the processes of the court as such plaintiff is not entitled to his claims.

In reply, the plaintiff joins issues with the defendants on their defence and state in particular that the mere stepping down of the chairman of the disciplinary committee will not restore the committee to its proper status as an impartial arbiter.

At the application for directions, the following issues were set down for trial:

“i. Whether or not the disciplinary committee’s claim that a decision would be given against the plaintiff if he fails to attend the committee’s hearing constitutes an infringement of the club’s constitution and violates the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice;

ii. Whether or not the plaintiff made counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants which merited an enquiry by the disciplinary committee;

iii. Whether or not the defendants acting by their lawyer dismissed the plaintiff’s counter-allegations against the defendants as being without merit;

iv. Whether or not the disciplinary committee as it is presently constituted can sit as impartial arbiters over the plaintiff in relation to the 2nd defendant’s complaint.

v. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings.”

I would proceed to determine these issues in the order in which they have been set down.

Whether or not the disciplinary committee’s claim that a decision would be given against the plaintiff if he fails to attend the committee’s hearing constitutes an infringement of the club’s constitution and violates the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice.

By article 10 of the constitution for the Accra Lawn Tennis Club (Exhibit A) disciplinary matters are conducted in accordance with the bye-laws of the club (Exhibit B). By regulation 13 of the bye-laws, the executive committee of the club appoints a disciplinary committee which is responsible for dealing with breaches of the club’s constitution, bye-laws and other matters referred to it by the executive committee or a member.

In the instant case, the 2nd defendant, who, at the material time of this case, was the General Secretary, reported a case of assault on him by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant, the then chairman of the club, and the latter referred the case to the disciplinary committee which consisted of the other three defendants with the 3rd defendant as its chairman.

Regulation 14 of the bye-laws provides for the procedure to be adopted in respect of disciplinary proceedings. By way of a summary, any member of the club who is aggrieved by the conduct of another member makes a complaint to the executive and the latter refers the matter to the disciplinary committee which enquires into the alleged misconduct.

The enquiry takes this procedure:

The disciplinary committee serves the alleged culprit with a written notice specifying the nature of the complaint and stating the day, time and place at which the enquiry is to be held. If the alleged culprit does not appear for the inquiry, the disciplinary committee proceeds in his absence unless it is satisfied that the absence is excusable.

The alleged culprit may appear in person or he may send a written reply to the charge or complaint. After holding an enquiry, the disciplinary committee makes a finding and makes recommendation to the executive committee for necessary action in accordance with the bye-laws and constitution of the club.

In the instant case, the evidence is clear that the 2nd defendant reported the case to the executive committee which referred the matter to the disciplinary committee. The disciplinary committee, on 11-11-2009, notified the plaintiff in writing of the complaint and fixed 14-11-2009 for the enquiry. In reply, the plaintiff asked for a copy of the 2nd defendant’s complaint and an adjournment of the enquiry. The disciplinary committee obliged and served him a copy of the complaint and postponed the enquiry to 23-11-2009 (Exhibit E).

Before 23-11-2009, the 2nd defendant reported the same case to the police and the plaintiff was arrested and put before court for trial. The plaintiff pleaded with the 1st defendant to have the criminal trial settled amicably so that they deal with the matter at the club level but he refused. The plaintiff, on 16-11-2009, got an interim injunction order from the Osu District Court restraining the disciplinary committee from investigating the case against him. The order, which was obtained by an ex-parte motion, was to last for 10 days (Exhibit F). The defendants got the order set aside on 13-01-2010 and then, by a letter, the disciplinary committee wrote to the plaintiff to appear before it on 20-01-2010 for the enquiry (Exhibit G).

Upon receiving the invitation for hearing, the plaintiff caused his solicitor to reply to the said letter on the same 20-01-2010 (Exhibit H). In Exhibit H, the plaintiff, among other things, denied the charge against him and stated that the allegation is “a ploy and part of a well-rehearsed and orchestrated plan hatched by (the 2nd defendant) with the active connivance of (the 1st defendant), for the deliberate purpose of pushing an on-going agenda to expel (the plaintiff) from the club, consequent upon unsuccessful attempts in the past”. 

The plaintiff, furthermore, significantly stated the following in Exhibit H: 

“ vi. In the circumstances, it is our client’s wish to pursue counter-charges against the said Mr. Kofi Boakye and Dr. Henry Holdbrook-Smith.

vii. Our clients therefore propose that the allegations of Mr. Kofi Boakye as well as his counter-charges be investigated together and findings of facts made, on the basis of which the Club will take vital decisions regarding appropriate sanctions to be meted out, as against our client or as against the said Mr. Kofi Boakye and Dr. Henry Holdbrook-Smith if our client claims are proved.

ix. As things stand now, there is a great possibility that the present work of the Disciplinary Committee will be vitiated and rendered a nullity by reason of the fact that it was constituted by Executive Committee including Dr. Henry Holdbrook-Smith and Mr. Kofi Boakye who have an axe to grind with our client.  In the circumstance, the Disciplinary Committee will be perceived as being judges in their own cause and whatever decision it takes will offend the nemo judex in causa sua rule of natural justice. 

xv.  If upon sober reflection you are still of the view that there is a strong reason for you to continue with your hearing, our client will avail himself at the hearing and vigorously defend himself, both on the substantive charges as well as the procedural objections.”

On 21- 01- 2010, the Accra Lawn Tennis Club caused its solicitor to reply to the plaintiff solicitor’s letter. In the response (Exhibit J), the club stated among others that the purported facts on which the plaintiff relied to challenge the integrity of the disciplinary committee were hollow and that the 1st and 2nd defendants are not members of the disciplinary committee. The response informed the plaintiff’s solicitor that the disciplinary hearing had been scheduled for 27- 01- 2010 of which notice had been given to the plaintiff. The notice by the disciplinary committee, dated 20- 01- 2010 (Exhibit K), to the plaintiff to appear before it stated in paragraph 4 thus:

“The Disciplinary Committee has decided to offer you one last chance to appear before it, failing which the Disciplinary Committee will proceed to determine the case against you.”

The first issue thus stems from this paragraph 4 of Exhibit K. It is submitted by counsel for the plaintiff that the disciplinary committee was going to pronounce the plaintiff guilty without hearing the 2nd defendant who is his accuser. This, according to counsel, was against the principles enshrined in criminal trials which entails the accuser to give evidence to prove the charge, even in the absence of the accused.

With respect, counsel for the plaintiff has construed the said paragraph 4 out of context. This is a case in which the plaintiff had been invited for hearing of the complaint of the 2nd defendant, several times. And each time the plaintiff found a way of not appearing. If the whole of Exhibit K is read, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was invited for the hearing of the charge the 2nd defendant leveled against him. It is a short letter and I would, hereunder, reproduce it in full. It states thus:

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST MR. GEORGE ADDO LODGED BY MR. KOFI BOAKYE, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE ACCRA LAWN TENNIS CLUB (ALTC)

The Disciplinary Committee invited you to appear before it on Wednesday 20th January, 2010 to help examine the complaint lodged against you by Mr. Kofi Boakye, a member of the Accra Lawn Tennis Club.

2. You have failed to appear before the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee sat from 5:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. on 20th January, 2010.

3. This constitutes the third time that you have failed to honour the invitation of the Disciplinary Committee to appear before it.

4. The Disciplinary Committee has decided to offer you one last chance to appear before it, failing which the Disciplinary Committee will proceed to determine the case against you.

5. The Disciplinary Committee hereby invites you to appear before it a week today i.e. on Wednesday, 27th January, 2010 at 5:30 p.m. at the Hall of ALTC.”

An overall reading of the above letter cannot be construed to mean that the disciplinary committee, automatically, would not take evidence from the 2nd defendant before determining the case, if the plaintiff is absent. With respect to counsel for the plaintiff, he is only being pre-emptive of the conduct of the committee. In any case, the plaintiff himself, to whom the letter was addressed, did not understand it the way counsel construed the same letter. In the plaintiff’s evidence-in-chief, this is what transpired between him and his counsel.

Counsel: What is it about Exhibit K that made you give instructions for this action to be commenced against the defendants?

Plaintiff: My Lordship, it is provocative and it makes as if they are trying to force me to do what is not right and they have stepped on my human right.

Counsel: I will like you to refer specifically to the contents of Exhibit K and refer to anything …?

Plaintiff: Yes, my Lordship, paragraph 4. With the permission of the court, I will like to read. ‘The Disciplinary Committee has decided to offer you one last chance to appear before it failing which the Disciplinary Committee will proceed to determine the case against.’

Counsel: What is not good about that expression?

Plaintiff: My Lord, that statement in the context in our constitution and the bye-laws, you cannot proceed or do anything or decision without the presence of the person who has been accused, in which I felt is not fair for them to put in that paragraph.”

So, the plaintiff understanding of paragraph 4 of Exhibit K is that it is contrary to the club’s constitution and bye-laws for the disciplinary committee to hear a disciplinary case in the absence of the accused. However, regulation 14(vi) of the club’s bye-laws betrays the falsehood of the plaintiff’s understanding of his own club’s bye-laws. The said regulation states, thus:

“If a person does not appear at the time, date and place appointed, the enquiry shall proceed in his absence unless the committee is satisfied that his absence has been caused by an occurrence which was beyond his control.”

So, by this regulation, the disciplinary committee was entitled to proceed with the hearing of the 2nd defendant complaint against the plaintiff in the latter’s absence. And this was conveyed to the plaintiff in paragraph 4 of Exhibit K. The plaintiff, who perhaps did not avert his mind to regulation 14(vi) of the club’s bye-laws or was simply adamant, refused to appear and instituted the instant action.

It is thus not the case that the disciplinary committee decided to find the plaintiff guilty if he did not appear for the hearing on 27-01-2010, even without taking evidence from the plaintiff. The disciplinary committee has shown by all the happenings in this case that it was going to take evidence. For instance, by its first invitation to the parties by notice, dated 11-11-2009 (Exhibit C) for the hearing, the disciplinary committee stated, among other things, thus:

“I am by this letter inviting you and the mentioned witnesses and any other persons who might have witnessed the incident to meet the Disciplinary Committee at 4:00 p.m. on Saturday 14th November, 2009, in the conference room of the Club House of ALTC.

Please do not fail to meet with the disciplinary committee to enable the complaint be fully examined.”

The disciplinary committee has shown that it would take evidence from all parties and witnesses who would appear.

ii. Whether or not the plaintiff made counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants which merited an enquiry by the disciplinary committee.

By the plaintiff solicitor’s letter, dated 20-01-2010 (Exhibit H), the plaintiff made allegations of bias against the 1st and 2nd defendants and gave details of the facts supporting the allegations. The plaintiff expressed the wish to pursue counter-charges against the 1st and 2nd defendants based on the said allegations and proposed that the said allegations and counter-charges be investigated together with the 2nd defendant’s case.

Exhibit H is so explicit on the counter allegations the plaintiff made against the 1st and 2nd defendants which cannot genuinely be denied.

However, the plaintiff’s counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants has nothing to do with the disciplinary committee’s competency to hear the 2nd defendant’s case against the plaintiff for reasons that were well stated by the letter of the club’s solicitor in response (Exhibit J).

By the constitution and bye-laws of the club, which the plaintiff was expected to have known before becoming a member or should have known upon becoming a member, it is the chairman elect who appoints a standing disciplinary committee for his tenure of office and none of the executive committee members is party to any disciplinary proceedings. As such, the allegation of bias against the 1st and 2nd defendants in their positions as chairman and general secretary of the club cannot be transferred to the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants who constitute the disciplinary committee. The plaintiff’s allegations did not, therefore, merit investigations by the disciplinary committee along with that of the 2nd defendant complaint.

iii. Whether or not the defendants, acting by their lawyer, dismissed the plaintiff’s counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants as being without merit.

From Exhibit J, aforementioned, the defendants’ solicitors rightly dismissed the plaintiff’s counter-allegations against the 1st and 2nd defendants as same is without merit for the reasons above stated. The plaintiff’s allegations had nothing to do with the disciplinary committee and its work by the constitution and bye-laws of the club.

iv. Whether or not the disciplinary committee, as it is presently constituted, can sit as impartial arbiters over the plaintiff in relation to the 2nd defendant’s complaint.

As stated earlier on in this judgment, the constitution and bye-laws of the club gave the chairman of the club power to appoint a standing disciplinary committee for the same tenure as the executive committee to handle disciplinary matters. The disciplinary committee is not set up on ad hoc basis as and when disciplinary matters arise. The 1st defendant, in due exercise of his constitutional functions, appointed the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as the disciplinary committee of the club.

The allegations of bias the plaintiff made are not against any of the members of the disciplinary committee. So, it cannot be said that any of the disciplinary committee members or the whole disciplinary committee is sitting on his or their own cause or matter contrary to the nemo judex in cause sua principle of natural justice.

The disciplinary committee, as constituted, can, therefore, sit as an impartial arbiter over the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant’s case.

From the above, therefore, the reliefs the plaintiff seeks from this court are unmeritorious and same are hereby dismissed.

 

COUNSEL:

1. Mr. Kweku Paintsil for the Plaintiff

2. Mr. Edward Anokye for the Defendant.

 

 

(SGD.) UUTER PAUL DERY

JUSTICE OF HIGH COURT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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