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Contract of
sale - Property. - Joint
ownership - Matrimonial assets,
- Bona fide purchaser for value
- Declaration of title -
Perpetual injunction - Whether
or not the Respondent did not
hold the subject property as a
trustee for and on behalf of
himself and the Plaintiff -
HEADNOTES
The facts
which led to the commencement of
the action in the High Court are
indeed very simple and not at
all complex. The 1st
defendant has been married to
the appellant for some thirty
years. The couple is blessed
with six children. The 1st
defendant sold a store No. 18
Railway Quarters, Kumasi, the
subject property of this appeal,
to the respondent, for valuable
consideration of GHC40, 000. She
went into possession after the
vendor had transferred the
property to her upon payment of
the full purchase price and
subsequently registered as a
member of the Railway Traders
Association. A couple of months
thereafter the appellant,
claiming to be a joint owner of
store No 18, and yet whose
consent and concurrence was
never secured before the sale,
sued to have the sale set aside
and to repossess the property.
The 1st defendant
admitted these facts, but the
respondent challenged inter
alia, the claim of joint
ownership and asserted that due
diligent searches she conducted
prior to the purchase did not
disclose that the property was
jointly acquired by the couple.
She contended that, to the
contrary, these showed that
store number 18 was the
exclusive property of the
vendor; hence her plea in
defence that she was a bona fide
purchaser for value without
notice. She therefore
counterclaimed in that capacity
for declaration of title and an
order for perpetual injunction
to restrain the couple from
interfering with her quiet
enjoyment of the subject
property. Both the trial and
appellate courts in exercising
their respective jurisdictions
had very little difficulty in
finding for the respondent both
on the facts and the law.
Dissatisfied, the appellant has
appealed to us in this court; to
set aside the findings and
conclusions of the two lower
courts, substitute these with
those findings and conclusions
that will ultimately secure
judgment in her favour.
HELD
This instant
case was fought on the basis
that the appellant contributed
to its acquisition, which we
understood from the pleadings as
some direct financial
contribution. This basic fact we
have found to be unproven. It
was never fought on the basis
and proven that the respondent
even knew of the existence of
the marriage union and further
that she knew that the property
was indeed jointly acquired
during this period as family
property. Consequently Mensah v
Mensah (supra) and Quartson v
Quartson (supra) has no bearing
and is clearly inapplicable to
the peculiar facts of this
case. To hold otherwise would
have amounted to substituting a
case different from that which
the appellant herself put up,
conduct which is clearly
deprecated by the principle
enunciated in the case of Dam v
Addo GLR [1962] 342 and cited
with approval in a host of other
cases. (See Bisi v Tabiri alias
Asare [1987-88] 1 GLR SC and
Kwame Serwah [1993-4]1 GLR 360
and Antie & Adjuwuah v Ogbo
[2005-2006] SCGLR 494. In the
result the appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed.
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Evidence Act,
1975, NRCD 323.
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Achoro and
Another v. Akanfela and Another
[1996-97] SCGLR 209
Obrasiwa 11
and others v Otu and Another
[1996-7] SCGLR 618,
Kpakpo v
Brown [2001-2002] SCGLR 876
Musah v Musah
[2011] SCGLR 819,
Fabrina Ltd v
Shell Ghana Ltd [2011] SCGLR
429, at 449
Fosua and Adu
–Poku v Dufie (Deceased) and Adu-
Poku v Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310,
Gregory v
Tandoh IV & Hanson [2010] SCGLR
971,
Obeng &
Others v Assemblies of God
Church, Ghana [2010] SCGLR 300
at 409 and
Mensah v
Mensah [2012] 1SCGLR 300
Ntiri v
Essien [2001-2002] SCGLR 459;
Sarkodie v F
K A Co Ltd [2009] SCGLR 79;
Jass Co Ltd v
Appau [20009] SCGLR 266
Awuku-Sao v
Ghana Supply Co Ltd [2009] SCGLR
713.
Gregory v
Tandoh IV [2010] SCGLR 971,
West African
Enterprise Ltd. v Western
Hardwood Ltd. [1995-6] 1 GLR 153
Mensah v
Mensah [2012] SCGLR 391, and
Quartson v Quartson [2012]
2SCGLR 1077
In re Asere
Stool; Nikoi Olai Amontia IV
(substituted by Tafo Amon II) v
Akotia Oworsika III (
substituted by) Laryea Ayiku III
[2005-2006] SCGLR,
Kusi & Kusi v
Bonsu [2010] SCGLR 65
Dam v Addo
GLR [1962] 342
Bisi v Tabiri
alias Asare [1987-88] 1 GLR SC
413
Kwame Serwah
[1993-4]1 GLR 360
Antie &
Adjuwuah v Ogbo [2005-2006]
SCGLR 494.
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
WOOD (MRS)
C.J
COUNSEL
MUJEEB RAHMAN
AHMED (WITH HIM KWABENA ATTA
AGYEI, NANA KWASI BOATENG AND
DR. FRANK ANKOBEA) FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT/ APPELLANT.
MARIAM
AGYEMAN GYASI JAWHARY ESQ. (
WITH HER SOLOMON OPPONG TWUMASI)
FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT /RESPONDENT/
RESPONDENT.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMNET
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WOOD (MRS)
C.J
This court
has clearly set out the legal
principles governing appeals
against the concurrent findings
of fact and conclusions of two
lower courts. The principle is
that ordinarily, a second
appellate court, such as this
honourable court, would not
interfere with the findings of
fact made by a trial court and
confirmed on appeal by a first
appellate court. A second
appellate court would overturn
such findings and conclusions
only in exceptional cases. The
circumstance under which such an
intervention may be legally
permissible or justifiable is
borne out in such cases as:
Achoro and
Another v. Akanfela and Another
[1996-97] SCGLR 209, at 214 we
reasoned that the finding would
be interfered with where;
“It was
established with absolute
clearness that some blunder or
error resulting in a miscarriage
of justice, was apparent in the
way in which the lower tribunals
had dealt with the facts. It
must be established, e.g., that
the lower courts had clearly
erred in the face of a crucial
documentary evidence, or that
the principle of evidence had
not been properly applied; or
that the finding was so based on
erroneous proposition of law
that if that proposition be
corrected, the finding will
disappear … It must be
demonstrated that the judgments
of the courts below were clearly
wrong.”
Obrasiwa 11
and others v Otu and Another
[1996-7] SCGLR 618, at 624
affirmed the above legal
proposition.
In Kpakpo v
Brown [2001-2002] SCGLR 876, we
observed that where the findings
and conclusions are supported by
the record and no miscarriage of
justice has resulted from the
decisions; the second appellate
court would have no choice but
to confirm those findings and
conclusions.
The following
cases:
Musah v Musah
[2011] SCGLR 819,
Fabrina Ltd v
Shell Ghana Ltd [2011] SCGLR
429, at 449
Fosua and Adu
–Poku v Dufie (Deceased) and Adu-
Poku v Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310,
Gregory v
Tandoh IV & Hanson [2010] SCGLR
971,
Obeng &
Others v Assemblies of God
Church, Ghana [2010] SCGLR 300
at 409 and
Mensah v
Mensah [2012] 1SCGLR 300
bring out
other circumstances under which
a second appellate court’s
interference would be justified.
On each occasion, this court
speaking through our respected
brother Dotse JSC carved out
some of the exceptions to the
general rule of non
interference. Our learned
brother expressed the position
in Obeng v Assemblies of God
Church (supra), thus:
“…where
findings of fact have been made
by a trial court and concurred
in by the first appellate court,
then the second appellate court
like this court, must be slow in
coming to different conclusions
unless it was satisfied that
there were strong pieces of
evidence on record which made it
manifestly clear that the
findings by the trial court were
perverse”, or strong pieces of
evidence, where the trial court
failed to properly to evaluate
the evidence or make proper use
of seeing or hearing the
witnesses at the trial.
We thus
applied these principles to
affirm findings and conclusions
of the two lower courts in Ntiri
v Essien [2001-2002] SCGLR 459;
Sarkodie v F K A Co Ltd [2009]
SCGLR 79; Jass Co Ltd v Appau
[20009] SCGLR 266 and Awuku-Sao
v Ghana Supply Co Ltd [2009]
SCGLR 713.
Gregory v
Tandoh IV [2010] SCGLR 971,
(supra) however merited a
different treatment. The court
decided in the interest of
justice to overturn the
concurrent findings of fact, and
therefore had to set out the
limits of its jurisdiction in
that particular instance. The
court observed:
“It is
therefore clear that, a second
appellate court, like this
Supreme Court, can and is
entitled to depart from findings
of fact made by the trial court
and concurred in by the first
appellate court under the
following circumstances: First,
where from the record of appeal,
the findings of fact by the
trial court are clearly not
supported by evidence on record
and the reasons in support of
the findings are unsatisfactory;
second, where the findings of
fact by the trial court can be
seen from the record of appeal
to be either perverse or
inconsistent with the totality
of evidence led by the witness
and the surrounding
circumstances of the entire
evidence on record of appeal;
third, where the findings of
fact made by the trial court are
consistently inconsistent with
important documentary evidence
on record; where the first
appellate court had wrongly
applied the principle of law
(see Achoro v Akanfela) (supra)
and other decided cases on the
principle) the second appellate
court must feel free to
interfere with the said findings
of fact in order to ensure that
absolute justice is done in the
case.”
These
represent only some of the
grounds on which an appellate
court may disturb the concurrent
findings of two or more lower
courts; they do not present a
closed category. And so it
happens that since this appeal
principally turns on just one or
two fundamental issues of fact,
which issues both lower courts
resolved in the respondent’s
favour, in this court, the
appellant bears the rather
onerous burden of dislodging the
general legal proposition by
situating her case within any of
the known exceptions or
providing some other compelling
reason that would justify a
departure from the general rule.
This
inevitably leads to an
examination of the main facts
culminating in this instant
appeal. The facts which led to
the commencement of the action
in the High Court are indeed
very simple and not at all
complex. The 1st
defendant has been married to
the appellant for some thirty
years. The couple is blessed
with six children. The 1st
defendant sold a store No. 18
Railway Quarters, Kumasi, the
subject property of this appeal,
to the respondent, for valuable
consideration of GHC40, 000. She
went into possession after the
vendor had transferred the
property to her upon payment of
the full purchase price and
subsequently registered as a
member of the Railway Traders
Association. A couple of months
thereafter the appellant,
claiming to be a joint owner of
store No 18, and yet whose
consent and concurrence was
never secured before the sale,
sued to have the sale set aside
and to repossess the property.
The 1st
defendant admitted these facts,
but the respondent challenged
inter alia, the claim of joint
ownership and asserted that due
diligent searches she conducted
prior to the purchase did not
disclose that the property was
jointly acquired by the couple.
She contended that, to the
contrary, these showed that
store number 18 was the
exclusive property of the
vendor; hence her plea in
defence that she was a bona fide
purchaser for value without
notice. She therefore
counterclaimed in that capacity
for declaration of title and an
order for perpetual injunction
to restrain the couple from
interfering with her quiet
enjoyment of the subject
property.
Both the
trial and appellate courts in
exercising their respective
jurisdictions had very little
difficulty in finding for the
respondent both on the facts and
the law. Dissatisfied, the
appellant has appealed to us in
this court; to set aside the
findings and conclusions of the
two lower courts, substitute
these with those findings and
conclusions that will ultimately
secure judgment in her favour.
The grounds
on which the appellant impugned
the decision of the court of
appeal include the oft used
omnibus appeal ground- the
judgment is against the weight
of evidence. I find this ground
rather superfluous given the
other specific grounds filed.
But we cannot begrudge the
appellant, who is obviously
desirous of ensuring that
nothing is left to chance and
that none of her complaints were
left unaddressed in this appeal
in which as already noted,
essentially hinges, on a couple
of rather narrow questions of
fact. The other appeal grounds
are:
i.
“The
Court of Appeal erred when it
held that the subject property
is owned solely by the 1st
Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
in the face of clear admissions
by the 1st
Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
himself, to the contrary.
ii.
The
Court of Appeal was wrong in law
when it held that the 1st
Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
did not hold the subject
property as a trustee for and on
behalf of himself and the
Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant.
iii.
The
Court of Appeal erred when it
held that the learned trial
court was right, when it
declined to order the
Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant to
refund the purchase price, with
interest (at the prevailing bank
rate) as well as other
incidental expenses merely
because the
Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant
had not claimed these reliefs in
the suit.
iv.
The
Court of Appeal was wrong in law
in holding that the subject
property belonged solely to the
1st
Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
in the light of well settled
judicial dicta, and as such same
was given contrary to law.”
The complaint
I have against these other
appeal grounds is that these
could have conveniently been
reduced into two main grounds.
Grounds (ii) - (v) are
repetitions. They all somehow
convey similar thought; only
that they are couched
differently. Be that as this
may, the appellant has invited
us to overturn the judgment of
the two lower courts and
substitute them with an order
setting aside the purported
sale.
GROUNDS (ii-
iv)
At both the
trial and appeal hearings, the
learned justices after reviewing
the evidence on the record,
decidedly concluded that the
store No. 18 was solely acquired
by the 1st defendant
and not jointly as part of the
couple’s matrimonial property
as contended by the appellant.
Her principal complaint against
this primary finding, as may be
gathered from these three
grounds of appeal, is that the
court’s finding on this critical
issue was patently in error,
given that as is borne out by
the record, the 1st
defendant as per his statement
of defence, unequivocally
admitted her (appellant’s)
assertion that this asset was
acquired from the joint
resources of the couple.
Appellant counsel thus argued
that the trial court and indeed
the appellate court really had
no option and on the authority
of West African Enterprise Ltd.
v Western Hardwood Ltd. [1995-6]
1 GLR 153, was bound to accept
joint ownership as the proven
fact and ought properly to have
found for the appellant on this
issue. The argument further
went that, had the two courts
adopted this approach, and been
guided by the line of cases such
as Mensah v Mensah [2012] SCGLR
391, and Quartson v Quartson
[2012] 2SCGLR 1077, they (the
two lower courts) would have
come to the undoubted conclusion
that the 1st
defendant held the property in
their joint names as part of
their matrimonial assets, and
thus nullified the sale, which
the evidence clearly showed was
effected without her consent and
concurrence.
The
respondent counsel had urged
that we dismiss these arguments
given that the appellant failed
to discharge the evidential
burden which rested on her on
account of the state of the
pleadings, more particularly,
given that the 1st
defendant’s admissions were not
binding on the respondent.
Mensah v Mensah (supra) and
Quartson v Quartson (supra),
which dealt with the acquisition
of matrimonial property during
marriage, he urged, were clearly
distinguishable from this
instant case.
Now, the
appellant as plaintiff had
pleaded per the paragraph 4 of
her twenty paragraphed statement
of claim as follows:
“The
plaintiff states that she and 1st
defendant pooled their resources
together to acquire property
including a house numbered plot
94, F-line at Buokrom Estate,
Kumasi, where they reside and
store No. 18, situated at the
railway Quarters Shopping Mall,
Kumasi.”
It is not
disputed that the 1st
defendant had in a terse two
paragraphed statement of
defence admitted every single
fact pleaded by the wife, the
appellant.
Undoubtedly,
the appellant’s main argument is
premised on the 1st
defendant’s admissions. It is
noteworthy that the appellant
for reasons best known to her
sued the husband as 1st
defendant. She could have called
him as her witness, whereupon he
could still have had opportunity
to confess to his sins in
disposing of their jointly
acquired property without her
consent. But she avoided that
route as indeed was her
constitutional right, choosing
rather to make the love of her
life her opponent; but perhaps
for only that period they were
to find themselves embroiled in
this legal duel. That may well
have been her fundamental right
but then, she cannot escape the
legal consequences flowing from
that singular choice. The 1st
defendant in his statement of
defence as noted, admitted the
appellant’s assertion that the
store was jointly owned by the
two of them, leaving the
appellant to argue that these
plainly admitted facts inured to
her benefit as they are
sufficient to support a positive
finding in her favour without
more, and placing her under no
legal obligation to provide
further evidence in proof of
ownership. True, in the case of
In re Asere Stool; Nikoi Olai
Amontia IV (substituted by Tafo
Amon II) v Akotia Oworsika III (
substituted by) Laryea Ayiku III
[2005-2006] SCGLR, this court
laid down the following salutary
rule of law, namely that:
“Where an
adversary has admitted a fact
advantageous to the cause of a
party, the party does not need
any better evidence to establish
that fact than by relying on
such admission, which is an
example of estoppel by conduct.”
But will
this general legal principle
apply in this instant case? Can
the 1st defendant
properly, on the peculiar facts
of this case, be described as
appellant’s adversary? We do
think the rule will not apply in
certain cases such as for
example where fraud or collusion
is alleged and or proved. The
appellant’s arguments invite
this further question: what is
the legal import and probative
value of the 1st
defendant’s admission relative
to the appellant’s claim, given
that the respondent, who was
joined to the suit in her
independent and separate
capacity as 2nd
defendant, disputed the
assertion of joint ownership,
joined issue with appellant on
this crucial fact and put her to
its strict proof?
Where two or
more persons are sued not even
jointly but severally only, that
is in their separate capacities,
as in this instant case, any
admission by a defendant binds
only that defendant making it.
It does not bind another
defendant who has challenged the
assertion and called for its
strict proof. Furthermore, since
no issue is joined as between
the plaintiff asserting the fact
and the defendant admitting it,
no duty will be cast on the
former to lead evidence on the
admitted fact.
But the same
cannot be said of another
defendant who denies the
assertion. Under such
circumstances, a court is under
a duty to treat the case of each
defendant separately viz a viz
the plaintiff’s case on the
merits and as relates to the
fact in issue. (See Kusi & Kusi
v Bonsu [2010] SCGLR 65).
Another
equally pertinent question is
this; what is the duty of a
court when faced with a
situation where a defendant’s
admission conflicts with the
evidence of the another
defendant who joins issue with
the plaintiff on the assertion,
such as in this instant case
where 1st defendant’s
admission is directly in
conflict with the evidence
supplied by the respondent at
the trial? Which of the two
conflicting versions must a
court accept and consequently as
being either clearly
advantageous or disadvantageous
to the plaintiff’s case?
Frankly, this is the difficulty
the appellant finds herself in.
We think it
is impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rules, rules cast
in stone in respect of matters
of this nature. These are
matters better left to a court’s
judgment on the merits of each
given case. Of course in
evaluating the respective weight
to be given to the conflicting
positions of the defendants, the
court will be guided by the law
and the same considerations that
courts employ in “attacking or
supporting credibility” as
provided under s 80 of the
Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323.
Thus for
example if one defendant admits
facts, and the other defendant
challenges the fact asserted
and yet is unable to lead
sufficient evidence in disproof
of the fact, the admitted facts
would weigh in plaintiff’s
favour.
As far as
this appeal is concerned, we are
of the opinion that the 1st
defendant’s admission does not
aid the appellant’s case in any
material way. There is more to
this case than the 1st
Defendant’s admissions.
The appellant had a duty to make
a solid case against the
respondent, independently of the
1st defendant’s
admissions. If it were not so,
why did the she not cut matters
short by simply taking advantage
of the admissions and move the
court for judgment and
altogether avoid a full scale
trial?
Unfortunately, the appellant
merely relied on this admission
as concrete proof of joint
ownership, whereas the
respondent did not merely
challenge the fact, but as
rightly found by the court below
proceeded to adduce evidence,
which on the balance of
probabilities, proved that the
property was owned exclusively
by the 1st defendant
and further that in any event
she was a bona fide or innocent
purchaser for value without
notice. The evidence proved that
the appellant herself had
previously owned one of those
stores- registered in her sole
name-, which she has in any
event disposed of. Also, the
evidence spelt out in great
detail how the respondent came
to purchase the property and the
due diligence conducted thereto.
Evidence
which came from a clearly
disinterested witness, the DW4
the Vice-Chair of the Railway
Quarters Association to which
both the appellant and the 1st
defendant belonged, proved that
contrary to the appellant’s
assertion, the Association have
instances where stores have been
registered in the name of more
than one person, thus completely
discrediting the appellant’s
explanation as to why the
property was not in their joint
names but the sole name of the 1st
defendant. All these credible
pieces of evidence effectively
neutralized the 1st
defendant’s bare admissions via
the pleadings, and which the
appellant is clutching at as
proof of joint ownership.
Truthfully
speaking, the appellant did not
benefit, not even minimally,
from the admission of the 1st
defendant, the defendant who
tactically failed to present
himself at the trial so that, he
could if for nothing at all,
seek leave to cross-examine the
respondent and demonstrate the
improbability of her claim to
bona fides. Certainly, if he
thought the best strategy was
simply to admit the facts and
disappear from the court’s radar
altogether, that rather was the
appellant’s undoing. She was
caught in a rather anomalous and
most awkward position; one from
which she could extricate
herself if only she additionally
led sufficient evidence, to
displace the respondent’s case.
Even if to start with, she could
seek solace in the 1st
defendant’s admission, given the
state of the respondent’s
defence and counterclaim, she
bore an evidential burden which
she failed to discharge. She
cannot therefore simply rely on
the bare admission of her
husband to succeed.
The
concurrent findings are not
perverse; they are amply
supported by the record, and
clearly consistent with the
totality of the evidence. No
miscarriage of justice has been
occasioned by these findings and
conclusions and it would be most
unjust on our part, to interfere
with them.
GROUND (v)
The appellant
counsel’s argument in under this
ground of appeal is untenable.
We do not think this court’s
thinking on the status of
property acquired during the
existence of any marriage is
shrouded in confusion.
Indisputably, during the
existence of the marriage union,
it is most desirable that the
couple pool their resources
together to jointly acquire
property for the full enjoyment
of all members of the nuclear
family in particular. But, the
decided cases envisage
situations where within the
union parties may still acquire
property in their individual
capacities as indeed is their
guaranteed fundamental right as
clearly enshrined under article
18 of the 1992 Constitution, in
which case they would also have
the legal capacity to validly
dispose of same by way of sale,
for example, as happened in this
instant case. No court in such
clear cases would invalidate a
sale transaction on the sole
legal ground that the consent
and concurrence of the other
spouse was not obtained. We
would however subject these
views we have expressed to this
sound caution. Since, the peace,
tranquility, harmony, stability
and indeed the health and
general well being of any
marriage union thrives best in
the environment of mutual
affection, trust and respect for
each other as well as
transparency; we think a spouse
in such a case is under a moral
obligation at any given time,
(indeed it is most expedient and
fair) to apprise the other
spouse of the intention to
acquire and dispose of self
acquired properties at all
material times. This is clearly
implicit from this court’s view
expressed in Quartson v Quartson
(supra), namely that:
“The Supreme
Court’s previous decision in
Mensah v Mensah …, is not to be
taken as a blanket ruling that
affords spouses unwarranted
access to property when it is
clear on the evidence that they
are not so entitled. Its
application and effect will
continue to be shaped and
defined to cater for the
specifics of each case.”
This instant
case was fought on the basis
that the appellant contributed
to its acquisition, which we
understood from the pleadings as
some direct financial
contribution. This basic fact we
have found to be unproven. It
was never fought on the basis
and proven that the respondent
even knew of the existence of
the marriage union and further
that she knew that the property
was indeed jointly acquired
during this period as family
property. Consequently Mensah v
Mensah (supra) and Quartson v
Quartson (supra) has no bearing
and is clearly inapplicable to
the peculiar facts of this
case. To hold otherwise would
have amounted to substituting a
case different from that which
the appellant herself put up,
conduct which is clearly
deprecated by the principle
enunciated in the case of Dam v
Addo GLR [1962] 342 and cited
with approval in a host of other
cases. (See Bisi v Tabiri alias
Asare [1987-88] 1 GLR SC and
Kwame Serwah [1993-4]1 GLR 360
and Antie & Adjuwuah v Ogbo
[2005-2006] SCGLR 494. In the
result the appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed.
,
(SGD) G. T. WOOD
(MRS)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(SGD)
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) P. BAFFOE
BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
(SGD) J. B. AKAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
COUNSEL
MUJEEB RAHMAN
AHMED (WITH HIM KWABENA ATTA
AGYEI, NANA KWASI BOATENG AND
DR. FRANK ANKOBEA) FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
MARIAM
AGYEMAN GYASI JAWHARY ESQ. (
WITH HER SOLOMON OPPONG TWUMASI)
FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT /RESPONDENT/
RESPONDENT. |
