Action by
Successor of a deceased-Deceased
son of a slave girl-Preservation
of slave's rights after
abolition of slavery-Ownership
of a house built on ruins of a
family house-Appeal allowed in
respect of such house-in other
respects Appeal dismissed.
Held: (1)
Custom that the child of a slave
woman is considered for purposes
of succession and otherwise to
be a member of the father's
family upheld.
(2) The mere
using of a family site on which
to build a house does not brand
the house with the stamp of
family property if built by
independent effort and without
family building materials .
.
The facts are fully set out in
the judgment.
Ofei A
were for Appellants.
A. M.
Akiwunmi (with him Dr.
J. B. Danquah) for
Respondent.
The following
judgment, with which the other
members of the Court were in
agreement, was delivered :-
STROTHER-STEWART,
].. GOLD COAST.
This is an
appeal from a judgment of
Cooper, Ag. J. The
plaintiff-respondent claimed, as
successor to one Kwaku Adae, in
accordance with the native
customary law of Akyem Abuakwa,
eighteen farms and two houses
from the defendants-appellants
who on the other hand claimed
them, as self-acquired property
of the said Kwaku Adae passing
under the Will of the said Kwaku
Adae, dated the 14th day of
December, 1934, Probate of which
was granted to the
defendants-appellants on the
26th day of January, 1935, and
of which Will the
defendants-appellants are the
Executors and Trustees.
The mother of
the said Kwaku Adae was a slave
girl from the Northern
Territories, who had been bought
some 70 or 80 years ago by one
Gyasihene Nana Ayimadu, who was
the head of the Asonna Mabaduam
family, and to whom the said
slave girl bore several
children, of whom the late Kwaku
Adae was the last survivor. I
think these facts are sufficient
to enable the points of
substance in this appeal to be
understood.
It was argued
on behalf of
defendants-appellants that
plaintiffrespondent was not the
proper person to bring the
action, that if it could be
brought at all, it could only be
brought by the head of
plaintiff's family. In support
of this Rule 1 of Order 3 of
Schedule 3 of the Courts
Ordinance (Cap. 4) was quoted. I
do not agree with this
contention because it is well
established that a successor can
sue. J. A. Asiedu v. Kwabena
Ofori (not reported) suit
97/1932; Chief A mega Henodji
II v. Seshine SaUah
(Divisional Court 1931-37 p.
158); Nee Mensah Larkai v.
Amorkor (1 W.A.C.A. p. 323).
According to
the learned author of Akan
Laws and Customs and the Akim
Abuakwa constitution, on
page 184, " the inheritor enters
automatically into possession of
all the property owned by the
deceased." Sarbah in Fanti
Customary Laws in the 1897
Edition on page 83 says" The
owner of self acquired property
can in his lifetime deal with it
as he pleases, and where he
intends to give the whole or a
portion of it to his child by a
free-born wife, Adihiwa, or to
any person not a member of his
family, he does so before his
death. As soon as h~ dies, his
successor is entitled to all the
property he died possessed of,
as heritable, and ancestral
estate, subject to the usual
rules of inheritance."
He has many
duties to perform. He has to pay
the debts of the person to whom
he succeeds, and to collect all
assets. He wOl1ld also be
responsible for holding such of
the property of the person to
whom he succeeds as family
property, if such was its
nature.
The learned
acting trial Judge found that
plaintiff was a member of the
said Asonna Mabaduam family, and
was the properly appointed
successor to the said Kwaku Adae
according to the law and custom
of Akyem Abuakwa, and that as
such successor he could sue in
his own name as an individual. I
am not disposed to quarrel with
any of these findings. I may
mention that it is clear that
the action of
plaintiff-respondent was with
the full knowledge and approval
of the present head of the
Asonna Mabaduam Family, Yao
Ohemeng, who gave evidence for
plaintiffrespondent.
The-second
point of substance argued by
defendants-appellants was that
the said Kwaku Adae, being the
son of a slave, could not be a
member of the said Asonna
Mabaduam family, as his mother,
being a stranger, could not
transmit the blood of that
family. If he was not a member
of the Asonna Mabaduam family,
he could not hold family
property as such, nor pass on
such property to his successor
on his death. It was also argued
that to recognise the rights of
the Asonna Mabaduam family, in
any property he died possessed
of, would be to recognise a
custom associated with slavery,
which had long been abolished in
this Colony.
With respect
to this I would point out that
although slavery was abolished
as from December 17th 1874, by
Ordinances 1 and 2 of that year,
it was expressly provided that
"nothing shall be construed to
diminish or derogate from the
rights and obligations, not
being repugnant to the law of
England, arising out of the
family and tribal relations
customarily used and observed in
the Protected Territories." In
Eccuah Bimba v. Effuah Mansah,
reported on pages 116 to 121
of Sarbah's "Fanti Cust'lmary
Laws" already referred to,
Hayes Redwar, Acting Judge,
says, with reference to such
proviso, " The true construction
of that section is, in my
opinion, that slavery, being
repugnant to the law of England,
is abolished by that enactment,
but that any privileges or
rights which the slave may have
had before the passing of the
Ordinances are saved, provided
those privileges or rights are
not in themselves repugnant to
English law."
The
advantages to the son of a slave
of being able to acquire the
status attached to a family are
manifold. He has a Head of his
family to look after his
interests. He has the right to
live on, and cultivate the
family land; his debts, if he
cannot pay them, will be paid
for him when he dies, and he
will be properly buried.
The learned
acting trial Judge said in his
judgment" I find it proved that
the custom is that the child of
a slave woman is considered for
purposes of succession and
otherwise to be a member of the
father's family, and this custom
is a good and valid custom,
benevolent in its intention and
one which should be recognised
by the Court,"
There was
evidence on which the learned
trial Judge could so find, and I
do not see how this Court can
disturb his finding, even if it
wished to do so.
It was
admitted by the
plaintiff-respondent that four
of the farms the subject of this
action were self-acquired by the
said K waku Adae. The learned
acting Judge gave
defendants-appellants judgment
for such farms, and also for one
of the two houses, namely, the
one described as " an upstairs
house." He found with reference
to the other fourteen farms that
there was no sufficient evidence
to show that they were
self-acquired and to rebut the
presumption that they were
family property. I agree with
him. It is amazing how little
evidence was adduced to show how
and when such farms were
acquired by the said Kwaku Adae,
if indeed, they were so
acquired. I am therefore of
opinion that the appeal fails in
respect of these fourteen farms.
The question
of the remaining house, namely
the one described as "a store"
is more difficult. The learned
trial Judge gave
plaintiff-respondent a
declaration that he was entitled
to this house, the ratio
deciaendi being " the house
described as a store seems to
have been built on the site of
the ruins of a family house, and
is therefore family property."
I cannot
agree with this reasoning. No
custom was proved that when a
house is built on the site of
the ruins of a family house it
becomes family property, and I
know of no such custom. The
general rule is that which the
learned Trial Judge applied in
this case of the other house,
"namely that if a house is built
by the unaided efforts of the
deceased and without using any
family building materials, it is
regarded as his self-acquired
property and will pass under his
Will. In the case of the store,
if it had been proved that a
single brick from the ruins of
the former family house had been
used by the deceased in building
the store, the store would be
family property; but this was
not proved. There was nothing
before the Court to show the
material of which the original
house was built; if it was only
a mud house it is unlikely that
there. would be anything left of
it. I can find no authority for
the proposition that the mere
using of the site brands tl1e
house with the stamp of family
property; although, of course,
the site on which the house is
built remains family land.