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RULING
ATUGUBA, J.S.C:
I agree with the Ruling of my
able brother Dr. Date-Bah J.S.C.
However I find it necessary to
express my views on certain
aspects of t his case.
The first is the ambit of the
power of transfer of cases given
to the Chief Justice under
S.104(1) – (3) of the Courts
Act, 1993 (Act 459), as amended.
It provides thus:
“104 (1) Subject to the
provisions of the Constitution,
the Chief Justice may by order
under his hand transfer a case
at any stage of the Proceedings
from any Judge or Magistrate to
any other Judge or Magistrate
and from one court to another
court of competent jurisdiction
at any time or stage of the
proceedings and either with or
without an application from any
of the parties to the
proceedings.
(2) The order may be general or
special and shall state the
nature and extent of the
transfer and in any case of
urgency the power of transfer
may be exercised by means of a
telegraphic, telephonic or
electronic communication from
the Chief Justice.
(3) A transfer of a case made by
telegraph, telephone or
electronic communication and not
confirmed immediately by order
signed and sealed in a manner
specified by the Chief Justice
or any other person authorized
in that behalf by him shall be
of no effect.”
These provisions are not new:
They are a carry over from the
inception of our legal system.
They came up for consideration
in Osei v. The Republic
(1968) GLR 704 C.A. The issue
arose and was dealt with by
Apaloo J.A. (as he then was)
delivering the judgment of the
court at 711 as follows:
“The last submission which was
made on behalf of the first
appellant is supposed to be a
plea to the jurisdiction of the
court below as constituted. It
is said that as the case
originally came before the court
constituted by Edusei J. he was
lawfully “seised” of it and he
could therefore not be divested
of jurisdiction without a formal
order of transfer made by the
Chief Justice in accordance with
paragraph 38 of the Courts
Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84). As
no such order was made Amissah
J.A., who eventually heard the
case, had no jurisdiction.
This argument, whatever its
attraction, is not new. It was
made in almost identical
language in Akainyah v. The
Republic [1968] G.L.R. 548,
C.A., a case in which Mr. Adade
was junior counsel, and was
rejected in a judgment delivered
by this court on 1 July 1968.
Learned counsel for the first
appellant did not profess
ignorance of this decision. His
point is, that the Akainyah
decision claimed its authority
from a ruling of the full bench
in Asare v. The Republic
[1968] G.L.R. 37. Mr. Adade
says, the Asare ruling
did not decide the point and the
decision in the Akainyah
case on this point was therefore
given per incuriam.
Accordingly, Mr. Adade submits
in effect, that the point at
issue is re integra and
invited us to decide it afresh
We think, on reflection, that
the point in question was not
wholly decided in the Asare
ruling and some observations
made by the court on N.L.C.D.
84, para. 38, may well be
obiter in view of the ratio of
the ruling. But this court
expressed its independent view
in the Akainyah case and
used the Asare ruling as
merely fortifying it. It may be
the Asare ruling is not
as solid a fortress as the court
thought, but that seems a
different thing from saying that
the decision given in the
Akainyah case was per
incuriam.
In any event, what Mr. Adade
invited us to accept, was that
as the case appeared on the list
of Edusei J. he was either
“seised” of it or it was pending
before him and that unless
recourse is had by the Chief
Justice to his power under
paragraph 38 of the Courts
Decree, 1966, the case cannot
lawfully be “pending” before any
other judge of that court. And
in the submission of Mr. Adade,
the judge will be lawfully
“seised” of a case or it will be
pending before him, if it ever
appeared on his list for
whatever purpose. It is perhaps
a tribute to legal ingenuity
that a provision of an enactment
which confers absolute
discretion on the Chief Justice
to transfer a case from one
judge to another, is sought to
be interpreted to derogate from
the authority of judges whom
paragraph 29 of the courts
Decree, 1966, invests with
“equal power and jurisdiction.”
But in so far as the contention
of Mr. Adade is a temptation to
us to lay down when and in what
circumstances the power of
transfer conferred on the Chief
Justice by paragraph 38 of the
Courts Decree may be properly
exercised, we resist that
temptation. It would be unwise
to hamstring the exercise of a
blanket administrative power by
a needless judicial
interpretation. All we need do,
is to state what “seised” of or
“pending” of a case before a
judge can mean in the context of
the practice of our courts. In
our opinion, a case can only be
said to be properly “pending”
before a judge or “seised” of by
him if he actually commenced the
hearing thereof. We decline to
define the word “pending” or
“seised” in vacuo. It can be of
no assistance to anyone if we
did.
In this case, in so far as the
record of proceedings can be
said to be any guide, this case
appeared on the list of Edusei
J. on six occasions. He did no
more than adjourn it on each
such occasion. It then came on
the list of Azu Crabbe J.A. on
two occasions. It suffered the
same fate. In our view, this
case was at no time “pending”
before either of these judges
nor was it ever lawfully
“seised” of by them. What seems
incontrovertible, is that this
case was pending in the High
Court. There was therefore no
need for the Chief Justice to go
to the trouble of making a
formal order of transfer in
exercise of his power under
paragraph 38 of the Courts
Decree, 1966. We hold therefore
that Mr. Adade’s contention
fails and this disposes of the
appeal of the first appellant. ”
Sections 38 and 39 of N.L.C.D.
84 which wee involved in that
case provided as follows:
“The chief Justice may by order
under his hand at any time or
stage and either with or without
application from any of the
parties, transfer any cause or
matter from a judge of a Court
referred to in this Decree to
any other Judge of such Court
and from a Court referred to in
this Decree to any other
competent Court. The order may
be general or special, and shall
state the nature and extent of
such transfer, and in any case
of urgency the power of transfer
may be exercised by means of a
telegraphic or telephonic
communication from the Chief
Justice.
Nothing in this Part shall
validate the transfer of a cause
made by telegraphic or
telephonic communication and not
confirmed forthwith by order
signed and sealed in a manner
specified by the chief Justice
or any other person authorized
in that behalf by him.”
It is a trite rule of
construction of statutes that
when the same or similar words
of a statute which have received
construction by a superior court
are retained in a subsequent
statute in pari materia,
they are presumed to carry the
same meaning to which they were
earlier given. If this rule
were to be applied in this case
a different result would have
had to be reached. However the
said rule is not of inflexible
application.
Besides, this court is not bound
by the 1968 decisions of Osei v.
The Republic and
others, though they are of
persuasive authority, see In
re Agyepong (Decd);
Donkor v Agyepong (1973) I
GLR 326, C.A. But even if this
court were bound by those
decisions it could depart from
them if necessary under article
129(3) of the constitution.
With the greatest respect I find
the reasoning in Osei v. The
Republic to the effect that
in Ghana a judge is said to be
seised of a case or that it is
pending before him only when
the judge has actually
commenced hearing it difficult
to accept, at any rate in
relation to the power of
transfer of cases by the Chief
Justice. I should have thought
that a judge is seised of a case
when he has power to take any
step in relation to the case and
that such power begins from the
moment the case is listed before
him. Therefore in Durston v.
O’Keefe (1974) I WLR 775
Forbe J. even held that once the
registrar made an order
referring a cause to an official
referee he became seised of it.
See also Taylor J.S.C. in Darke
IX v. Darke IV (1984-86) IGLR
481 S.C. at 498. No such words
as “commenced” or “part-heard”
are used in s.104(1)-(3) of Act
459 and should not be read into
that section, see Republic v.
Fast Track High Court
Accra, Ex parte Daniel
(2003-2004) ISC GLR 364.
I should think that this view of
the matter is inherent in the
words “…transfer a case at
any stage of the Proceedings
[and]….at any time or stage of
the proceedings …” To
restrict these words to the
stage where a judge has actually
commenced the hearing of a case
would render these words partly
inoperative.
Since, however it appears that
no objection was taken to the
proceedings heard by Armissah
J.A. in the Osei case,
supra, they could have been
saved by the principle in
Price v. Humpries (1958) 2
Q.B. 353 applied in Ababio v.
Tutu (1962) IGLR 489 at 492
S.C. and Rupblic v. Ada
Traditional Council Ex partie
Nene Okunno II (1971) IGLR
412. In the latter case at
p.416 Abban, J commenting on
Price v. Humpries aforesaid,
stated: “The court made it
clear that where what is in
issue is simply the question
whether proceedings are properly
authorized, then it is a matter
of procedure. So that if
the defence was to challenge
that and take objection, the
objection should be taken before
the case for the prosecution is
closed….”. (e.s)
It is also known that these days
a lot of malpractices with
regard to listing cases before
judges occur in our courts. For
all the foregoing reasons I
would sill endorse the
principles with regard to the
transfer of cases by the Chief
Justice as stated in the case
copiously referred to by my
brother Dr. Date-Bah J.S.C.
As regards exceptional
circumstances that may be
outside the strict application
of section 104, the question of
urgency has been confessed and
provided for by S.104(2) of the
Courts Act, 1993.
Nonetheless in construing a
statute whether it concerns
jurisdiction or otherwise it is
always necessary to bear in mind
what Archer J.A said in
Shardey v. Adamptey and
Shardey v. Martey (1972) 2
GLR 380 C.A. At 386 he quotes
the words of Sir W. Scott in
The Reward (1818) 2 Dod. 265
at 269-270 that “the court is
not bound to a strictness at
once harsh and pedantic in the
application of statutes.”
(e.s)
One also has to bear in mind the
implications of s.104 conferring
the power of transfer on the
Chief Justice by the designation
of that office. Article 297(h)
of the constitution provides:
“In this constitution and in
any other law,
X
X
X
X
X X
(h) words directing or
empowering a public officer to
do any act or thing, or
otherwise applying to him by the
designation of his office,
include his successors in office
and all his deputies and all
other assistants;”
This adopts the position under
administrative law. See
Attorney-General of Gambia v.
N’jie (1961) 2 A11ER 504
P.C. and my views in Agbevor
v. Attorney-General (2000)
SC GLR 403.
However in this case there is no
satisfactory evidence of
authorization of transfer of the
case by the office of the Chief
Justice and the facts do not
also disclose any exceptional
circumstances so as to obviate
the application of s.104 (1) –
(3) of Act 459.
For all the foregoing reasons I
would also grant this
application.
W. A.
ATUGUBA,
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
DATE-BAH JSC:
The facts in this case are
undisputed and relatively
simple. The Interested Party in
this case applied to the High
Court to dismiss an action that
had been brought by the
applicant and other plaintiffs
in this case. Its reason for
bringing that application was
that because of the opinion
expressed by the Supreme Court
on 23rd July 2008 on
certain constitutional issues
referred to it by the High Court
in this case, no cause of action
survived that the applicant
could legitimately pursue.
Although the reference had been
made by His Lordship Justice
Abada, the Interested Party’s
application was placed before
His Lordship Justice Edward
Amoako Asante, by an order of
transfer made by the Chief
Justice. Justice Asante ruled
on 20th August 2008
upholding the Interested Party’s
application and characterising
the applicant’s suit in the
court below as ”unmeritorious
and an abuse of the judicial
process to unlawfully challenge
a legally sanctioned act.”
Aggrieved by this outcome, the
applicant filed an appeal and
filed an application for an
interim injunction on 21st
August 2008, which was fixed for
hearing on 3rd
September 2008. On 3rd
September 2008 the case was
called before Asante J, who
adjourned it to 22nd
October 2008 for hearing.
However, on the 22nd
October, when the applicant and
the other plaintiffs in the suit
appeared in the High Court, Fast
Track 1, Justice Asante was not
available and so his clerk
adjourned the case to 6th
November 2008. On the same day,
however, the case was also
called in the High Court, Fast
Track 2, presided over by
Justice Ofori-Atta. He heard
submissions by counsel for the
Interested Party, in the absence
of the applicant and its
counsel, and fixed 4th
November 2008 for his ruling.
On 4th November, the
applicant and its counsel
appeared before Ofori-Atta J and
raised an objection to his
delivering a ruling in the case
on the ground that the case had
not been transferred to him by
the Chief Justice. Justice
Ofori-Atta nevertheless
proceeded to give his ruling,
dismissing the application for
interim injunction. The
applicant contends that this
ruling and the hearing of the
application on 22nd
October should be quashed by
this Court as having been made
without jurisdiction by
Ofori-Atta J, since there was no
order of the Chief Justice
transferring the case from
Justice Asante to Justice
Ofori-Atta.
What this Court has to determine
is whether certiorari
lies to quash the proceedings of
22nd October and the
ruling delivered by Ofori-Atta J
on 4th November.
From the facts narrated above,
it would appear that
certiorari should lie,
unless a matter restraining the
exercise of this Court’s
jurisdiction can be
established. This is because
the clear meaning of section 104
(1) to (3) of the Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459), as amended by
the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002
(Act 620) section 7 and its
schedule is that the Chief
Justice may by an order under
his or her hand transfer a case
at any stage of proceedings
before any Judge or Magistrate.
The clear implication of this is
that nobody else, including
Registrars, is authorised to
transfer a case between judges
once proceedings have commenced
before them. The applicant has
relied on case law that
reinforces this necessary and
obvious implication. The cases
he cites are: Soro v Frans
[2005-2006] SCGLR 1003;
Republic v High Court, Kumasi;
Ex parte Mobil Oil (Ghana) Ltd.
(Hagan Interested Party)
[2005-2006] SCGLR 312 and
Republic v High Court Judge
(Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex
parte Quaye and Another (Yovonoo
and Others – Interested
Parties) [2005-2006] SCGLR
660. I am persuaded by section
104 of the Courts Act and the
cases cited above that a
Registrar, without an order from
the Chief Justice, has no
authority to move a case,
including interlocutory
applications, from one High
Court judge to another. If the
Registrar does that, the
receiving High Court judge
acquires no jurisdiction and
therefore proceedings before him
or her would be null and void.
In support of this proposition,
I would like to cite the
following passage from Wood
JSC’s judgment in Soro v
Frans (supra) at p. 1008,
where she says:
“The power to transfer and
thereby take away the
jurisdiction of any judge to
hear and determine any cause or
matter pending before him or
her, be it part-heard or a fresh
matter, is in stricto sensu
reserved exclusively in the
Chief Justice under section 104
of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act
459). A supervising High Court
Judge and the Chairman of the
Regional Tribunal are also
empowered to order the transfer
of cases, but their powers are
understandably subordinate to
that of the Chief Justice.”
The Interested Party seeks to
avert this logical conclusion by
asserting, through an
affidavit deposed to by its
counsel, that the action of the
Registrar in placing the case
before Ofori-Atta J was as a
result of directives received
from the Chief Justice’s
Secretariat. By a letter dated
9th January 2009,
which is annexed to the
affidavit of Mr Beyuo, counsel
for the Interested Party, Mr.
Rexford Gyimah, the Registrar,
states that:
“I was not specifically
instructed to transfer the suit,
the substantive suit was sat on
by His Lordship Justice E.
Amoako Asante sitting at court
one (1) of the Fast Track
Division of the High Court and
gave judgement.
A motion for Stay of Execution
pending Appeal was filed when
the said Judge was on leave.
I therefore referred the docket
to the Chief Justice Secretariat
for directives. Directives from
the Chief Justice Secretariat
indicated that the case be
assigned to His Lordship Ofori
Atta, J sitting at Fast Track
Two (2) who subsequently gave
his ruling on the motion.”
It seems clear from this
evidence that the directives
from the Chief Justice’s
Secretariat fell short of an
order of transfer from the Chief
Justice, within the intendment
of section 104(1) of the Courts
Act. Indeed, the facts
presented to the Chief Justice’s
Secretariat that elicited the
response referred to above were
inaccurate, since the affidavit
sworn to by the applicant’s
representative, which was
unchallenged, and indeed
confirmed, on this point by the
Interested Party, indicates that
the interim injunction
application was placed before
Justice Asante before he
proceeded on leave. The
Registrar seems to have conveyed
to the Chief Justice’s
Secretariat the impression that
the applicant had filed a motion
for stay of execution whilst
Justice Asante was on leave. It
would have been legitimate on
that assumption for the fresh
application to have been placed
before a different judge. But
those were not the true facts.
Is there then any factor that
should restrain this court from
exercising its discretion to
quash the proceedings of 22nd
October and the ruling of 4th
November? As is well-known,
certiorari is a
discretionary remedy and will
thus not be automatically
applied by this court, except
probably in cases of want of
jurisdiction. Acquah JSC, as he
then was, articulated this
principle well in Republic v
High Court, Accra; Ex parte
Attorney-General (Delta Foods
Ltd. – Interested Party)
[1999-2000] 1GLR 255, where he
says (at p. 273):
“From the above observations
what would be the benefit of
granting the prayer of the
Solicitor-General? No useful
purpose at all! It would be a
futile grant that would neither
vitiate the liability of the
State as same was conceded to by
the Solicitor-General and
pronounced in the judgment of
Akoto-Bamfo J, nor
advance the course of justice in
any way. It would rather lead to
unnecessary multiplicity of
suits.
It is indeed important to
appreciate that the prayer for
the grant of certiorari must be
considered from a very broad
perspective. -For. being a
discretionary remedy it must be,
demonstrated that there is real
justificationˇ and benefit for
its' grant.1
Accordingly, where the results
of granting the order achieves
no real or just result, the
discretion is not exercised.
Thus in Halsbury's Laws of
England (3rd ed,) Vol 11, p
141, para 266 it is stated:
"Where grounds are made out upon
which the Court might grant the
order, it will not do so where
DO benefit could arise from
granting it." See R v
Newborough (1869) LR 4 QB
585 at 589; R v
Bristol and Exeter Rail Co
(1838) 11 Ad & El 202,n;
R v Lancaster &
Preston Rail (1845) 6 QB
759; R v Unwin
(1839) 7 Dowl 578; Peak Joint
Planning Board v
Secretary State for Environment
(1980) 39 P & CR 361; and
Republic v Agboka IV; Ex
parte Deh III [1984-86] 1
GLR 581, CA.
Indeed, in Miller v
Weymouth and Melcombe Regis
Corporatian (1974) 27 P&CR
468 at 480-481, the court
refused to quash a void decision
because the applicant was in no
way prejudiced by the said
decision. Now by virtue of his
involvement as solicitor for the
minister, and further
participation even in the
out-of-court settlement, the
Attorney-General was in no way
prejudiced by the mere use of
the minister as the defendant.
Neither did the decision of Nana
Gyamera-Tawiah J.
In the circumstances, the
interest of justice dictates
that the proper course to take
is to amend the title by
substituting the
Attorney-General for the
minister as the defendant in
suit No C495/98 so as to save
the proceedings and the judgment
delivered therein. Especially as
such an amendment will not cause
any surprise, prejudice and
injustice to the
Attorney-General who was the
solicitor for the minister right
from the inception of the suit
to its conclusion. For as Bowen
LJ said in Cropper v
Smith (1884) 26 Ch D 700 at
710, CA: “... I know of no kind
of error or mistake which, if
not fraudulent or intended to
overreach, the Court ought not
to correct if it can be done
without injustice to the other
party."
Of course, if the error is
fundamental or goes to the
jurisdiction of the court in
that it exposes the court's lack
of jurisdiction in the matter,
then the court is incompetent to
correct the error. For a court
has no power to grant
itself jurisdiction or authority
where the statute creating it
did not vest it with that power.
For instance, if the Supreme
Court determines a civil appeal
from the circuit court, such an
error cannot be corrected to
save the judgment of the Supreme
Court since by statute the
appeal ought to have been
determined by the Court of
Appeal. Or again if a court
gives judgment against a
defendant who was never given
notice of, nor served with, the
writ of summons, the error
arising from lack of service or
notice of the writ,cannot be
corrected to save that judgment.
In the circumstances of this
case, the error arising from the
use of the minister as the
nominal defendant instead of the
Attorney-General as demonstrated
above. is neither fundamental
nor goes to the jurisdiction of
the High Court.”
The facts of the current case
are materially different from
those in which Acquah JSC made
these remarks. The most
significant difference is that
on the facts of the present case
we are dealing with a want of
jurisdiction by the High Court.
There is, moreover, a public
policy as well as a statutory
reason that justifies the want
of jurisdiction. In the
interest of the efficient
administration of justice,
discipline has to be applied to
the actions of the Registrars of
the High Courts, through
enforcing the regime established
by the Courts Act 1993.
In issue is whether there is any
sufficient counterbalancing
factor to prevent the quashing
of the proceedings and ruling
complained of. A factor that
arises for consideration in this
connection relates to the
weakness of the substance of the
applicant’s appeal and the fact
that the interim injunction it
seeks is intended to defy the
will of Parliament, which will
has been declared to be
constitutional by the Supreme
Court. This factor is evident
from the papers filed before
us. Nevertheless, this Court
should be careful not to do
anything that will prejudge the
applicant’s appeal. Although
certiorari is a
discretionary remedy, it is
clear, even from the dictum of
Acquah JSC quoted above, that
this Court cannot deny it in
such a clear case of lack of
jurisdiction. Although, on the
affidavit evidence placed before
us, there is ground for
suspicion that the applicant may
be abusing the judicial process
to delay the implementation of
the new statutory regime for
gaming, this is not a sufficient
basis on which to deny
certiorari where it is
manifest that a learned High
Court judge has exercised a
jurisdiction that he did not
have. Also, the existence of
alternative remedies is one of
the factors that the courts have
said they will take into account
to deny resort to certiorari.
On the facts here, I do not see
any alternative remedy.
The Interested Party has argued
that the facts before us present
a situation where the
“exceptional cases” exception
articulated by my learned
brother Atuguba JSC in
Republic v High Court (Fast
Track Division) Accra, ex parte
Quaye and Another (Yovonoo and
other – Interested Parties)
[2005-2006] SCGLR 660 at p.
664 is triggered. This is what
my learned brother said:
“The need to observe
administrative and procedural
mechanisms in the interests of
the smooth administration of
justice has been upheld: see
Republic v High Court, Cape
Coast\; Ex parte Marwan Kort
[1998-99] SCGLR 833 and
recently stressed by Wood JSC in
Republic v High Court, Kumasi;
Ex parte Mobil Oil (Ghana) Ltd.
(Hagan Interested Party)
[2005-2006] SCGLR 312 at p334 –
335:
“In the administration of
justice in our jurisdiction, and
I believe that to a large extent
the same holds true for other
jurisdictions, no one particular
judge has exclusive monopoly or
ownership rights over any given
case. Thus, at the pre-trial
stage in particular, a case may,
for any sufficient cause be
taken away from a judge before
whom it was pending. For
example, the judge might be
asked to proceed on transfer, in
which case he loses the
privilege of having anything
further to do with the case(s)
pending before him or her.
Again, the Chief Justice’s power
of transfer of cases under
section 104 of the Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459), from one judge
to another, a prerogative meant
for the smooth and efficient
administration of justice,
cannot also be overlooked or
treated lightly.”
We think the above dictum of
Wood JSC in Ex parte Mobil
Oil (Ghana) Ltd (supra) is
a realistic view to take of the
course of administration of
justice in our judicial system
and that, always saving
exceptional cases, this
should be adhered to.”
The Interested Party’s argument
in support of an exceptional
case was in the following terms
(in its Statement of Case):
“18. It is submitted on
behalf of the Interested Party
that given the circumstances of
this case, the placing of the
application before Ofori-Atta J
in the absence of Asante J was
in accord with the
administration of justice.
19.
There was the need to have an
expeditious determination of the
plaintiffs’ motion for
injunction. This was to guide
the Interested Party in carrying
out its statutory functions
under Act 722. Whilst the
application for injunction was
pending, if the Interested Party
had attempted to enforce the
provisions of Act 722, the
self-same plaintiffs would have
cited the Interested Party for
contempt.
20.
Since the matter was referred to
Ofori-Atta J for the sole
purpose of determining only the
application for injunction
pending appeal, pending the
return of Asante J from leave,
it is submitted it was not
necessary for Her Lordship the
Chief Justice to comply with the
provisions of section 104 of the
Courts Act.
21.
Even if we be wrong in our
argument above it is our
submission that that no useful
purpose will be served in
granting the instant application
therefore this court ought to
refuse it.”
I must say that I am not
persuaded by this argument.
What the Registrar should have
sought when he referred this
matter to the Chief Justice’s
Secretariat should have been an
order of transfer. Not having
got such an order, he had no
authority to move the case from
one judge to another. The
delay in the State’s
mobilisation of revenue under
Act 722, which has been urged on
us by counsel for the Interested
Party, cannot be a relevant
consideration in determining a
matter of jurisdiction affecting
the High Court. Accordingly, I
think that the proceedings and
ruling before Justice Ofori-Atta
should be brought to this court
to be quashed and the same are
hereby quashed. The application
for interim injunction is hereby
remitted to Justice Asante for
urgent consideration. The
Registrar of this Court should
ensure an expeditious dispatch
of this case back to the High
Court for the application to be
re-heard.
It would be inappropriate for
this Court itself to decide on
the interim injunction
application, as requested by the
Interested Party. This is
because what was argued before
this Court was the certiorari
application and not the interim
injunction application.
Although this Court has the
powers of the High Court in
dealing with consequential
matters arising from exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction, I
think that the interest of
justice would be better served,
on the facts of this case, for
the case to be remitted to the
High Court for the interim
injunction application to be
properly argued before the High
Court.
DR. S. K. DATE-BAH
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
J. ANSAH
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS)
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
I agree
R.C. OWUSU (MS)
( JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
KIZITO BEYUO FOR THE INTERESTED
PARTY.
AURELIUS AWUKU WITH ANDREW OBENG
FOR THE APPLICANT.
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