RULING ON
SUBMISSION OF NO CASE TO ANSWER
MADE FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE
ACCUSED PERSONS Charges: In all
the state has indicted fifteen
(15) persons before the court.
They face a charge of conspiracy
to murder contrary to sections
23(1) and 46 of the Criminal
Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) as
amended in count one. The
particulars of the offence state
that on or about 24th March
2002, at Yendi in the Northern
Region of Ghana, the said
accused did agree to act
together with a common purpose
to murder the Yakubu Andani II,
the Yaa-ŽNa. The seventh (7th)
accused person Zakaria Yakubu @
Zakaria Forest alone is charged
with the crime of murder of the
Yaa-Na contrary to section 46 of
the Criminal Offences Act, 1960
(Act 29) as amended in count
two. He is however at large and
so he is not before the court to
answer the charges against him.
Background of the case There are
two royal gates in Yendi in the
Dagbon Traditional Area. They
are the Andani and the Abudu
gates. From 25th to 27th March
2002, factional fighting erupted
between the two gates leading to
the death of several people
including the Overlord of Dagbon,
Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II.
Survivors suffered various
degrees of injury. Several
houses including the Gbewaa
Palace were burnt and properties
looted. Wuaku Commission On 25th
April 2002, the then President
John Agyekum Kuffuour by a
Constitutional Instrument No.
C.I. 36, 2002 appointed a
Commission of Inquiry chaired by
Justice I.N.K. Wuaku retired,
(hence the name Wuaku
Commission) to investigate the
Yendi events. The specific terms
of reference of the Commission
were: (a) To make a full,
faithful and impartial inquiry
into the circumstance of and
establish the facts leading to
the events and the resultant
deaths and injuries in Yendi
between 25th and 27th March
2002. (b)To identify those
responsible for the events and
resultant deaths and injuries to
persons and to recommend
appropriate sanctions or actions
against any such person(s) found
to have been involved or caused
any of the events. (c) To
inquire into any matter which
the Commission considers
incidental or reasonably related
to the events and the resultant
deaths and injuries. Upon the
submission of its report the
government issued a White Paper
on it. Amongst others, the
government accepted the
recommendation of the Commission
that Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu
Gyamfo who were found holding
the severed parts of the Ya-Na
Yakubu Andani II be prosecuted
for murder. The Commission also
recommended that Iddrisu Iddi @
Mbadugu (A1), Kwame Alhassan @
Achiri (A3), Mohamadu Abdulai @
Samasama (A4), Shani Imoro (Al2)
and three others be prosecuted
for conspiracy to murder. In
accepting this recommendations,
the White Paper directed the
Attorney-General to instruct the
Police to use the evidence
before the Commission and its
findings as the basis for
further investigation and
appropriate action. Meanwhile,
between March 2003 and 30th July
2003, Yidana Sugri @ Red and
Iddrisu Gyamfo were prosecuted
for conspiracy to murder and
murder of the Ya-Na but were
acquitted and discharged on both
counts. Change of Government and
the Present trial When the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) lost the
2008 Presidential and
Parliamentary elections, the
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
came to the power. In its quest
to find the murderers of the Ya-Na
and in compliance with the
directive in the White Paper,
the Police Homicide Unit of the
C.I.D. Headquarters carried out
investigations into the matter.
As at now the Attorney-General
says sufficient evidence has
been gathered on the murder of
the Ya-Na against the fifteen
(15) accused persons herein.
Facts upon which accused are
charged As I stated early on,
there are two royal gates in
Yendi. Accession to the skin as
the Overlord of the Dagbon
Traditional Area is on
rotational basis between the two
gates. A protracted litigation
following a misunderstanding
between the two gates led to the
deskinment of Ya-Na Mohammadu
Abdulai from the Abudu gate upon
the recommendation of the
011ennu Commission. In his
place, the late Ya-Na Yakubu
Andani II was enskinned. The
Abudu gate had since harboured
discontent against this
decision. In February 2002, the
celebration of the Eid-Ul-Adha
festival brought about
disturbances in the Yendi
Township. And information
gathered by the security
agencies indicated that firearms
had been smuggled in by both
gates. In order to avoid any
clash, the District Security
Council with the approval of
Regional Security Council
imposed a curfew and placed a
ban on the celebration of the
fire (Bugum) festival. Whilst
the Abudu gate embraced the
decision, the Ya-Na saw the ban
as an affront to his
authority.The Ya-Na then invited
the Regional Minister and
expressed his displeasure at the
ban to him. Upon the promise and
assurance by the Ya-Na that his
people will not cause any
trouble, the Regional Minister
lifted the ban.On 25/03/2002,
the Ya-Na decided to invite his
elders to the palace to begin
the celebration of the Bugum
festival. He then asked Ziblim
Abdulai to call Dugbulana,
Ngbadogun. On their way back to
the palace, some Abudu youths
attacked and assaulted Ziblirn
Abdulai. This incident sparked
the three-day war/mayhem. This
is because the attack was
followed by sporadic shootings
towards the Gbewaa palace by
Abudus. The attack intensified
in the evening resulting in some
deaths. The situation grew from
bad to worse on 26th and 27th
March 2002. On the advise of the
Ya-Na, women and children had to
be evacuated from the palace.On
27th March, the Gbewaa palace
fell to the Abudus. It was set
ablaze and the shooting
intensified. As some elders in
the palace attempted to come
out, they were shot dead. A7,
Zakaria Yakubu @ Zakaria Forest
(now at large) was seen
decapitating the Ya-Na at a
Kraal after he had been dragged
there by A4, Mohamadu Abdulai @
Samasama and Shani Imoro
(A12-sic). Others now at large
poured petrol on the King after
putting used tyres on him and
set the body ablaze. According
to the prosecution, evidence
will be led to show that Iddrisu
Iddi @ Mbadugu (A1), Alhaji Baba
Abdulai @ Zohe (A2), Kwame
Alhassan (A3), Mahamadu Abdulai,
Salifu Mohammed and Zakaria
Forest and others at large took
active part in the planning and
execution of the events that
took place from 24th to 27th
March 2002. Again evidence will
be led to show that only houses
belonging to the Andani gate
were set ablaze. Additional to
that there will be evidence to
show that gun shot marks can
still be found on the Gbewaa
palace, on structures near the
palace and where Dagbon chiefs
are buried. It is upon these
facts that the accused herein
are charged with conspiracy to
murder the Ya-Na Yakubu Andani
II. Each and everyone of them
has denied the charge against
him. Prosecution's case The
prosecution called twelve (12)
witnesses including a Police
investigator and a Pathologist.
The prosecution without
objection tendered the following
documents: (i) Report on A
Working Visit to Yendi
Government Hospital – 29th to
30th March 2002, as Exhibit A.
(ii) Autopsy Report on the
Charred Remains of an Adult Male
- Exhibit B. (iii) The Caution
and Charged Statements of the 14
accused persons - Exhibit C, C1,
to R, R1. (iv) Photographs of
the Identification Parades -
Exhibits S, S1 to Exhibit X. (v)
Report on the Yendi Crisis by
Police Special Investigating
Team, Exhibit Y. (vi) Statutory
Caution Statements - Exhibit Z
series. On its part, the defence
tendered through the prosecution
witnesses the following: (a)
Proceedings of the Wuaku
Commission in 4 Volumes as
Exhibit 1, 1A, to 1C (b)The
Report of the Wuaku Commission
of Enquiry (Yendi Events)
Exhibit 2. (c) The White Paper
on the Report of the Commission
of Inquiry into the Yendi
Disturbances of 25th March,
2002, Exhibit 3. (d)The Record
of Proceedings in the Republic
vrs Yidana Sugri & Iddrisu
Gyamfo, Exhibit 4. (e)The
Witness Statement of PW12 -
Exhibit 5. Legal Basis of
Submission of No Case At the
close of the case of the
prosecution, the defence applied
to make a submission of no case
to answer. The basis of this
application is found in s.271 of
the Criminal and Other Offences
(Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30).
The section provides: "The judge
may consider at the conclusion
of the case for the prosecution
whether there is any case for
submission to the jury, and if
the judge is of opinion that
there is no evidence that the
accused has committed any
offence of which he could be
lawfully convicted on the
indictment upon which he is
being tried, the Judge shall
forthwith direct the jury to
enter a verdict of not guilty
and shall acquit the accused".
What this provision means is
that, at the close of the case
for the prosecution, it is
within the discretion of the
judge to decide that no case has
been made against the accused on
the offence he is being tried
for. If the judge so decides, he
stops the case. The judge
reaches that conclusion based
upon the fact that "there is no
evidence that the accused has
committed any offence". "No
evidence" as stated does not
only mean no evidence at all but
also that where the evidence led
is such that the court, had
there been no other evidence and
the jury had acted upon it, must
have set the verdict aside - see
Avery vrs Bowden [1856] 6 E1 &
B1m 953; 1119 applied in State
vrs Ali Kassena [1962] 1 GLR 144
at page 149. In clearer language
Willis J. in Ryder vrs Wombell
[1888] L.R. 4 Exch. 32 at page
39 said: "It is now settled that
the question for the judge is
not whether there is literally
no evidence but whether there is
none that ought reasonably to
satisfy the jury that the fact
sought to be proved is
established". In the Practice
Note (Magistrates: No case to
Answer: Criminal Charge) (1962),
Lord Parker C.J. said of
submissions of no case to answer
thus: "A submission that there
is no case to answer may
properly be made and upheld (a)
when there has been no evidence
to prove an essential element in
the alleged offence; (b) when
the evidence adduced by the
prosecution has been so
discredited as a result of
cross-examination or so
manifestly unreliable that no
reasonable tribunal could safely
convict on it" He continued
that: "Apart from these two
situations, a tribunal should
not in general be called upon to
reach a decision as to
conviction or acquittal until
the whole of the evidence which
either side wishes to tender has
been placed before it. If,
however, a submission is made
that there is no case to answer,
the decision should depend not
so much on whether the
adjudicating tribunal (if
compelled to do so) would at
that stage convict or acquit but
on whether the evidence is such
that a reasonable tribunal might
convict. If a reasonable
tribunal might convict on the
evidence so far laid before it,
there is a case to answer".This
Practice Direction has been
applied by our Supreme Court in
1962 in State vrs Ali Kassena
[1962] 1 GLR 144 with approval.
It has been followed as a matter
of judicial precedent by all
courts, even after the enactment
of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD
323). So for a judge to uphold a
submission of no case to answer,
he/she must be satisfied that:
(a) an essential element or
ingredient of the offence
charged has not been proved. (b)
the evidence led in support of
the charge has been so
discredited as a result of
cross-examination and/or (c) the
evidence led is so manifestly
unreliable that no reasonable
tribunal could safely convict on
it. See State vrs Annan [1965]
GLR 600 and Gyabaah vrs The
Republic [1984-86] 2 GRL 461
(C.A.) Burden of proof and
standard of proof Under the
Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323),
the burden of proof is termed
the burden of persuasion. It is
trite knowledge that in criminal
cases the burden of proof is on
the prosecution throughout. The
prosecution is required to
produce sufficient evidence on a
fact essential to establish the
guilt of the accused, so that on
all the evidence a reasonable
mind could find the existence of
that fact beyond reasonable
doubt - s.11(2) of the Act. But
on a fact or an issue not
essential to the guilt of the
accused, the proof is on the
balance of probabilities. In the
case of the accused except in
cases where a statute throws the
burden upon him, he is not
obliged to prove anything. All
that the law requires of him is
to raise a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt on the fact in
issue - s.11(3). But then unless
and until the prosecution has
discharged the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused to the
requisite degree, no burden will
be shifted on to the accused or
assumed by him - see s.15(1) of
the Act. In C.O.P. vrs Antwi
[1961] 1 GLR 408 (S.C), the
court put the relative burdens
of the prosecution and accused
this way: "The fundamental
principles underlying the rule
of law are that the burden of
proof remains throughout on the
prosecution and the evidential
burden shifts to the accused
only if at the end of the case
for the prosecution an
explanation of circumstances
peculiarly within the knowledge
of the accused is called for.
The accused is not required to
prove anything; if he can merely
raise a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt, he must be
acquitted". What standard then
must the evidence led by the
prosecution attain at the end of
its case? The standard is stated
in s.11(2) of the Act I have
referred to otherwise it will
not be lawful for the judge to
call upon the accused to answer
the charge against him. In plain
language, s.13(1) of the Act
provides that the standard of
the evidence produced on the
issue or fact essential to the
guilt of the accused under
s.11(2) must reach proof beyond
reasonable doubt. What is proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not
defined in the Evidence Act but
in Miller vrs Minister of
Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372
Denning J. described the term.
He says the evidence against the
accused must be so strong as to
leave only a remote possibility
in his favour which can be
dismissed with the sentence "of
course it is possible, but not
in the least probable". The term
he says does not mean proof
beyond a shadow of doubt. It
means therefore that the
evidence by the prosecution must
attain the degree which in other
words is referred to as a prima
facie case. This term simply
means that the charge or
allegation is sufficiently
supported by evidence as to call
for an answer or an explanation
from the accused. Thus in Sher
Singh vrs Jifendranath Sen
[1931] I.L.R. Calc. 275 at 286,
Ghose J. defined prima facie to
mean that "there is a ground for
proceeding ...., Proof is
nothing but belief according to
the conditions laid down in the
Evidence Act (in our case NRCD
323)". Therefore unless the
standard of proof reached the
requisite degree under our
Evidence Act, there will be no
ground for the court to proceed,
that is to say, to call on the
accused to explain his side of
the story. To quote the words of
Lord Parker C.J. in the Practice
Note approved in the Ali Kassena
case (supra), the evidence led
at the end of the prosecution's
case should be such that a
reasonable tribunal might
convict. If a reasonable
tribunal might convict on the
evidence so far laid before it,
there is a case to answer. The
learned Chief Justice used the
phrase "might convict" because
accused's version of the story
was yet to be heard. If the
accused in his answer fails to
raise a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt which is all that the
law required of him or exercised
his right to remain silent for
fear of self-incrimination, then
the court can go ahead and
convict the accused based on
that evidence led by the
prosecution only. This Practice
accords with the general
principle of criminal law that
the accused is presumed innocent
until he pleads or is proved
guilty. And in s.23 of the
Evidence Act, the principle is
applied to the determination of
both the basic and the presumed
facts which must be found beyond
reasonable doubt should the
accused raise no reasonable
doubt to either the basic or
presumed facts. At page 13 of
the Response by the Prosecution
to the Defence's Submission,
reference was made to the
Supreme Court case of G/CPI.
Valentino Gligah and EC/1
Abdulai Aziz Atiso vrs Republic,
Criminal Appeal No. J3/4/2009
Unreported Judgment dated 6th
May 2010. It is submitted that
the burden on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt is not discharged at the
close of the prosecution's case
but at the end of the trial.
That submission is based on a
holding of the Supreme court at
page 5 as follows: “…..it is
important for this court to bear
in mind that the Constitution,
1992, Article 19(2) presumes
everyone innocent until the
contrary is proved. In other
words, wherever an accused
person is arraigned before any
court on any criminal trial, it
is the duty of the prosecution
to prove the essential
ingredients of the offence
charged against the accused
person beyond reasonable doubt.
The burden of proof is therefore
on the prosecution and it is
only after a prima facie case
has been established by the
prosecution that the accused
person is called upon to give
his side of the story". With all
due respects to the prosecution,
I do not glean from this dictum
of the Supreme Court that, the
burden on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt can only be discharged at
the end of the whole case, i.e.
after the accused has given his
side of the story. To my mind
the dictum only reformulated the
burden of proof on the
prosecution, on the accused and
when the burden of proof shifts
to the accused as I have been
discussing under sections 11(2),
11(3) and 15 of the Evidence
Act, NRCD 323. And it is not
different from the submission
both sides have made in their
addresses. The question of
whether the prosecution is
required to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt at this
stage has been in controversy in
years gone by. In R. vrs Ojojo
[1959] 2 GLR 207, the Court of
Appeal asked why the defence was
called upon if there was doubt
in the prosecution's case at the
close of it. Consequently, the
Court quashed the conviction of
accused by the trial court. This
case supports the view that the
standard of proof at the end of
a prosecution's case should be
beyond reasonable doubt. But two
years later in State vrs Sowah &
Essel [1961] 2 GLR 743, the view
of the Supreme Court suggests
that whether or not the
prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt is a
question which must be left
until the end of the whole case.
This view supports the
proponents of substantial
justice theory. It would appear
that the case of Ali Kassena
(supra) also decided in 1962
based on the Practice Direction
has put an end to the
controversy in favour of the
Ojojo case (supra). And there is
statutory support for that view
held in the Ojojo case (supra)
in sections 10(2) and 22 of the
Evidence Act, NRCD 323. And in
view of the provisions of the
law in the sections which
require the prosecution to prove
the existence of a fact or a
presumed fact beyond reasonable
doubt, Justice Ofori Boaten J.A.
(as he then was) in his book The
Ghanaian Law of Evidence at page
254 (1st Edition) held the view
that the English Practice
Guidance applied with approval
in the Ali Kassena case (supra)
is superfluous. That is not all
there is to the submission that
the burden on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt is discharged at the end
of trial. If that submission is
acceded to by the court, then
s.271 of Act 30 under which this
application is brought should
have become a redundant
provision many years ago in our
criminal jurisprudence. This is
because s.271 does not provide
that the standard of proof
required at the end of the
prosecution's case should be
anything lower than the general
standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in all criminal
cases. And indeed in practice,
if a submission of no case is
wrongly overruled and accused
opens his defence and he is
eventually convicted, the
appellate court does disregard
all the evidence given after the
submission of no case was made.
The practice is based on the age
old obligation on the
prosecution to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt in order
to succeed. It is not for the
accused to assist the
prosecution at the trial to
prove the case against the
accused by filling in the
missing gaps in the evidence
adduced by the prosecution - see
the cases R. vrs Osabu and
Maaseyo [1957] 3 WALR 180 (C.A.)
Nyarko vrs The State [1963] 2
GLR 59 (S.C.) and Gyabaah vrs
The Republic [1984-Ž86] 2 GLR
461 (C.A.) And for the same
reason, in determining whether
or not based on the evidence led
by the prosecution, an accused
has a case to answer, the court
ought not to make an attempt to
make any findings of facts. This
is because at the close of the
case for the prosecution, all
the facts in issue are legally
rebuttable facts and therefore
displaceable by the evidence of
the accused - see Republic vrs
Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex-parte
Akosah [1977] 2 GLR 283.
Therefore in determining whether
a prima facie case has been
made, the court should confine
itself to the analysis of the
evidence of the prosecution
witnesses with regard to their
credibility. Floating Standard
of Proof In Bater vrs Bater
[1951] P.35, Denning L.J. (as he
then was) held the view that
there are degrees of proof in
the general standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In some
cases the lower bracket of proof
within the standard is required
or sufficient. In others proof
of the upper bracket of the
standard is required. In the
instant application, the
prosecution is of the view that,
since the evidence led is direct
and primary, the lower end of
the bracket of proof beyond
reasonable doubt is sufficient.
This is as opposed to proof by
circumstantial evidence which
must reach the upper end bracket
of the standard.So according to
that proposition the standard
"floats" depending on the
subject-matter. The prosecution
submits that it has met the
requisite bracket which is the
lower end because the evidence
it led is direct, cogent and
first-hand supported by
documents. It has therefore
discharged the burden of proof
on it so far as the
consideration of this submission
of no case is concerned. The
prosecution submits therefore
the application is misconceived.
It should be dismissed and
accused called upon to open
their defence. On the other
hand, the defence submits in its
address that the evidence led by
the prosecution is watery,
suspicious and dubious and for
that matter pathetically
unreliable. It is therefore not
a fit case to call upon the
accused to answer. On Denning L
J's proposition that there
exists degrees, in fact two
brackets in the requirement that
the prosecution must prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt, it
is my view that in our law,
there is no "floating standard".
What the law requires of the
prosecution is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, pure and
simple. And what matters n
attaining that standard is the
quality of evidence and the
cogency of proof. The more
serious the offence charged, the
high the degree of probability
that is required. Similarly, the
more inprobable the event the
stronger must be the evidence
that it did occur. That being
so, in determining this
application of submission of no
case, I will, based on statute
law and case law consider
whether the prosecution at the
close of its case on 4/11/2010,
has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. Put
differently, I will consider
whether the prosecution has
established a prima fade case
against the accused. The Charge
of Conspiracy to Murder The
charge which the accused face
and which the prosecution sought
to prove against them is
conspiracy to murder. Section
23(1) of our Criminal Offences
Act, 1960 (Act 29) as amended
defines conspiracy as follows:-
"If two or more persons agree or
act together with a common
purpose for or in committing or
abetting a crime, whether with
or without any previous concert
or deliberation, each of them is
guilty of conspiracy to commit
or abet that crime as the case
may be". The case of C.O.P. vrs
Afari and Addo [1962] 1 GLR 483,
S.C. provides a classic
explanation of the above
definition of conspiracy in our
law. The court stated: "In the
opinion of the court, the Ghana
law of conspiracy is wider in
scope and content than the
English law on the subject. It
consists of not only in the
criminal agreement between two
minds, but also in the acting
together in the furtherance of a
common criminal objective". The
case of Azametsi & Others vrs
The Republic [1974] 1 GLR 228
explained the crime of
conspiracy in similar terms that
"The crime of conspiracy
consisted in an agreement or
acting together by two or more
persons with a common purpose
for or in committing or abetting
a crime whether with or without
any previous concert or
deliberation. It was not always
easy to prove agreement by
evidence, but it could be
inferred from the conduct of and
statements made by the accused
persons". I notice that the
prosecution took issue with the
ingredients or elements of the
offence of conspiracy itemized
by the defence in its
submission. Certainly the fact
of conspiracy being an inchoate
offence cannot make it an
element of itself. This is
because abetment and attempt are
also inchoate offences. Also
ingredient in (e) - an agreement
to do a lawful act by an
unlawful means does not always
result in the commission of a
crime. The prosecution went to
great lengths to do an
exposition on the law of
conspiracy at common law and
other jurisdictions as compared
to our law: that is commendable.
But basically, conspiracy in our
law has two legs - (a) that the
accused persons agreed together
with a common purpose for or in
committing or abetting a crime
or (b) that the accused persons
acted together with a common
purpose for or in committing or
abetting a crime. When the two
legs are expanded, for the
purposes of proof seriously, in
order to succeed, the charge of
conspiracy to murder,
prosecution must prove that: (a)
there are two or more persons,
(b) who agreed or acted
together, (c) in pursuance of a
common purpose (d) and the said
purpose of their agreement or
acting together must be to
commit or abet a crime, in this
case murder. And murder is
committed if it is proved that:
(i) Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II is
dead (ii) he died as a result of
harm (iii) the said harm was
unlawful (iv) the harm was also
intentionally caused (v) and
these accused persons caused or
abetted the said harm. See
Serechi vrs The State [1963] 2
GLR 531, S.C. These ingredients
in a charge of murder are
isolated from the charge as
defined in s.47 of Act 30/60
thus: "whoever intentionally
causes the death of another
person by any unlawful harm is
guilty of murder, unless his
crime is reduced to manslaughter
by reason of such extreme
provocation or other matter of
partial excuse as mentioned in
s.52". There are fifteen (15)
persons charged in this case.
That only satisfies the first
requirement that conspiracy must
involve two or more persons. It
is sufficient as the law stands
to prove either agreement to
commit or abet the crime of
murder or acting together to
commit or abet the crime of
murder. It is better still if
the agreement and acting upon
the agreement are proved. But as
it is observed in the C.O.P. vrs
Afari & Addo case (supra) by the
Supreme Court, "it is rare in
conspiracy for there to be
direct evidence of the agreement
which is the gist of the crime.
This usually has to be proved by
evidence of subsequent acts done
in concert and indicating
agreement" - see page 486 of the
report. In R. vrs Brisac [1803]
4 East 164, Grose J. on the
issue of agreement in a charge
of conspiracy said: "Conspiracy
is a matter of inference,
deduced from certain criminal
acts of the parties accused,
done in pursuance of an apparent
criminal purpose in common
between them". See also
Professor Henrietta .J.A.N.
Mensa-Bonsu's article on
Conspiracy In Two Common Law
Jurisdictions - A Comparative
Analysis [1992] 4 Radic 419.
Conspiracy may also be proved by
evidence of one of the group who
betrays the others and that
evidence is considered credible.
However, once agreement has been
established, there is conspiracy
and it is immaterial that
nothing has been done in
furtherance or in pursuance of
it. Thus in Kenny's Outlines of
Criminal Law, 17th Edition at
page 391, it is stated: "a
person may be convicted of
conspiracy as soon as it has
been formed, and before any
overt act to carry out the
agreed purpose has been
committed. The offence is
complete as soon as the parties
have agreed to their unlawful
purpose although nothing has yet
been settled as to the means and
devices to be employed for
effecting it". In Boahene and
Monney vrs The State [1965] GLR
229 at holding 4, the Supreme
Court observed that one of the
conspirators may recant but he
could not undo or countermand
the act of his previous
agreement. Further in the case
of State vrs Yaw Boahene [1966]
2 GLR 554 at 555 at holding 2,
the test laid when considering
proof of a charge of conspiracy
is whether the accused have a
common purpose and not whether
they were acquainted with each
other. It is also to be noted
that, the mens rea (guilty
knowledge) is inherent in the
conspiracy itself or inferred
from the overt acts. In the
particulars of offence of the
charge of conspiracy against the
accused, it is stated that on
24th March 2002, at Yendi, they
agreed to act together with a
common purpose to murder the Ya-Na.
As I have indicated above, our
law of conspiracy consists of
two main elements - agreement
with or without previous concert
or deliberation between two or
more minds to commit or abet an
offence; or acting together with
a common purpose to commit or
abet a crime. Generally proof of
either element is sufficient to
secure a conviction. It however
appeared that the language of
the particulars of offence has
put together or mixed up the two
elements. So the prosecution now
has the burden to prove the
"agreement to act together" by
the accused. And yet it is
agreed by the authorities quoted
above that it is rare to prove
or establish agreement by direct
evidence, and indeed no such
direct evidence was led by any
of the prosecution witnesses in
this case. Any talk of
agreement, could only be
referable to an
indirect/circumstantial
evidence. That indirect or
circumstantial evidence is the
overt acts attributed to the
accused persons from which an
agreement can be referred or
deduced. That being so, the
evidence led by the prosecution
in proof of the charge of
conspiracy was not and could not
have been direct evidence in
proof of the crucial element of
agreement. As regards, the
element of agreement in a charge
of conspiracy, illustration (a)
of s.23(1) of Act 29/60, in my
view, appeared to be the picture
the prosecution has tried to
paint in this case. And indeed
that is the thrust of the
prosecution's address too. The
illustration states: "If a
lawful assembly is violently
disturbed any persons who take
part in the disturbance are
guilty of conspiracy to disturb
it although they may not have
personally committed any
violence and although they do
not act in pursuance of any
previous concert or
deliberation". The case put
forward by the prosecution is
that on 25/03/2002, the Abudus
attacked the Gbewaa palace when
the Ya-Na assembled his elders
to commence the activities for
the celebration of the Bugum
(fire) festival. The attack
continued on the palace until
27/03/2002 when the Ya-Na was
killed. Those involved in the
attack according to the
prosecution are these accused
and some other persons now at
large. It is the submission of
the prosecution that anybody
including these accused persons
who was concerned directly or
indirectly, by word or conduct
in the attack on the palace
leading to the death of the Ya-Na
is liable on the charge of
conspiracy. However, the defence
countered that the Andanis first
attacked the Abudus. The Abudus
repelled the attack. The attack
and the counter-attack led to a
factional war between the two
royal gates for three days.
Indeed PW4 Alhassan Yakuku @ Nat
in his indirect evidence said on
26/03/02, there was exchange of
gunfire between the two factions
till evening. PW9 is also such
warrior of the Ya-Na. In her
presentation of the facts of the
case, the D.P.P. stated that on
27/03/02, the Gbewa palace fell
to the Abudu. That is a
confirmation of the assertion of
the Abudus that they fought a
war. It meant therefore that
Andanis who also fought are
equally liable.These fifteen
(15) accused persons not only
participated in the war which
led to the death of the Ya-Na,
the prosecution alleged the
seventh accused alone is charged
with the murder of the Ya-Na. In
the address on behalf of the
accused persons counsel
submitted that the trial of A7
in absentia is not in accordance
with procedure laid down in the
Constitution, 1992. But the
D.P.P. in the responded that A7
is not on trial as at now. That
being so, I may as well
discharge him for the purposes
of this trial. What I have to do
now is to determine, based on
the evidence laid before the
court by the prosecution whether
the accused have a case to
answer. In so doing, I will
consider any or all of the
following three situations: (a)
whether there is no evidence to
prove an essential element of
the charge of conspiracy, or (b)
whether the evidence adduced has
been so discredited as a result
of cross- examination, or (c)
whether the evidence is so
manifestly unreliable that no
reasonable tribunal could safely
convict on it. In R. vrs
Galbraith [1981] 2 ALL ER 1060,
Lord Lane, C.J. gave a guide as
to how a judge should approach
the matter as follows:- "(1) If
there is no evidence that the
crime alleged has been committed
by the defendant, there is no
difficulty. The judge will of
course stop the case. (2) The
difficulty arises where there is
some evidence but it is of a
tenuous character, for example,
because of inherent weakness or
vagueness or because it is
inconsistent with other
evidence: (a) where the judge
comes to the conclusion that the
prosecution evidence, taken at
its highest, is such that a jury
properly directed could not
properly convict on it, it is
his duty, upon a submission
being made, to stop the case.
(b) where however the
prosecution evidence is such
that its strength or weakness
depends on the view to be taken
of a witness's reliability, or
other matters which are
generally speaking within the
province of the jury and where
on one possible view of the
facts there is evidence upon
which a jury could properly come
to the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty, then the
judge should allow the matter to
be tried by the jury". The
matters which fall within the
province of the jury are matters
of fact of which they are the
final arbiters. But it is the
duty of the judge to decide all
questions of law arising in
course of the trial. A
submission of no case under
section s.271 of Act 30/60 it is
held is question of law and must
therefore be decided by the
judge - see Zortorvie vrs The
Republic [1984-86] 2 GLR 1, C.A.
Relevance of the Proceedings of
the Wuaku Commission I recall
that on 17th September 2010, the
prosecution objected to the
tender of the proceedings of the
Wuaku Commission on the ground
that the report was not
authenticated. I gave the
defence counsel the opportunity
to have the four volumes of the
proceedings authenticated in
accordance with s.162 of the
Evidence Act. I did so because
of the view I held that, the
proceedings were not only
relevant to this trial but also
formed the very foundation of
this trial. Based on that
understanding, the four volumes
of the proceedings, the Report
of the Commission and the
Government White Paper were
admitted into evidence. However,
the D.P.P. submitted in her
address that the proceedings of
the Commission are completely
irrelevant to the determination
of issues in this trial. This is
because the mandate of the Wuaku
Commission was to make findings
of facts whiles this court has
the mandate to try the accused
persons. For the same reason,
the prosecution submits that the
evidence before Commission is
not relevant to prove or
disprove the truthfulness of the
testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in this trial. The
proceedings in the Republic vrs
Yidana Sugri & Another are
similarly considered irrelevant
to this trial of accused on a
charge of conspiracy to murder.
I have very early on listed the
terms of reference of the Wuaku
Commission. Indeed it was a
fact-finding Commission. But the
facts found were the basis for
prosecuting Yidana Sugri and
Idrissu Gyamfo on a charge of
murder. The process of eliciting
evidence before the Commission
and a court of law are not
different in that witnesses gave
evidence under oath and were
cross-examined. The
subject-matter or issues the
witnesses testified on before
Commission are the very issues
for which the accused herein are
being tried. The Wuaku
Commission in its Report made
specific recommendations.
Amongst them is that further
investigations should be
conducted with the view of
prosecuting certain people who
were mentioned. The Government
White Paper on the Report
directed that the evidence
before the Commission and its
findings should form the basis
for this further investigation.
And at page 3 of the
prosecution's address, the D.P.P.
stated clearly that the trial of
the accused herein followed a
painstaking investigation the
police have carried out in
compliance with the
recommendation in the White
Paper. Clearly, the compliance
with that recommendation is the
sole foundation of this trial.
How then can the prosecution in
all honesty turn round to invite
the court to ignore the
proceedings of the Commission on
the ground that it is
irrelevant. And because of the
view the prosecution held of the
proceedings, it submitted that
the proceedings were admitted to
prove the fact that the
Commission was actually set up
to investigate the Yendi crisis
which is part of the facts of
this case but not to prove its
contents. I however find from
the record that when it suits
the prosecution, it made
reference to the Report of the
Wuaku Commission (Exhibit 2) to
support its case for example at
page 49 of the address reference
was made to the fact that the Ya-Na
requested to be rescued by
sending two messengers to the
District Security Council
through the A8 the then District
Chief Executive. Similarly at
page 50 of the address, in
chastising A8 for failing to
carry out his administrative
duties in accordance with
Article 23 of the 1992
Constitution, heavy reliance was
placed on the view expressed by
the Commission on the role
played by A8 and the consequent
recommendation to re-assign him
- see pages 75, 85 and 86 of the
Report in both cases. I find the
whole submission on the
proceedings of the Commission
not only surprising as it is a
complete somersault but also
most unfortunate. The whole
purpose of tendering the
proceedings of the Wuaku
Commission is to attack the
credibility of the prosecution
witnesses who testified on the
same issues or matters as in
this trial. Indeed the line of
cross-examination of the defence
exemplifies the purpose of
putting the proceedings into
evidence. The proceedings were
therefore not tendered as a
"thing or object" against which
a crime has been committed but
to provide the court with the
evidence of its contents. In
arguing that the evidence led by
the prosecution is first-hand,
direct and consistent and for
that matter reliable, the
address limited itself to only
the viva voce testimonies of its
twelve witnesses. But that is
not the only evidence led so far
before the court. The documents
I have listed as tendered and
accepted by the court form part
of the evidence of the
prosecution. The only exception
so far as the prosecution's case
is concerned is the cautioned
statements of the accused which
are yet to be tested under
cross- examination. Thus in
s.179(1) of the Evidence Act,
"evidence" means "testimony,
writings, material objects, or
other things presented to the
senses that are offered to prove
the existence or non-existence
of a fact". In view of the
meaning assigned to "evidence"
by the Act, the proceedings of
the Wuaku Commission is evidence
for the purposes of this trial
tendered to prove the existence
or non-existence of matters
testified to by the prosecution
witnesses. It is my view
therefore that the proceedings
are relevant to the
consideration of this
application and I will certainly
do so. Furthermore, the Wuaku
Commission was set up just three
months after the crisis. At the
time the events were very fresh
in the minds of the witnesses.
Their testimonies before the
Commission in the natural course
of things should be accurate.
Over time memories fade. So the
inability to recollect minor
details in court eight years
later is understandably
pardonable. However, a complete
departure from or additions to
the previous testimonies cannot
be countenanced. The contents of
the proceedings are thus a
necessary aid in assessing the
credibility of the witnesses.
Assessment of Prosecution's Case
Against Each Accused The defence
in its approach, assessed the
case against each accused
separately and drew a
conclusion. The prosecution on
its part singled out A1 and A8
and assessed the case against
them separately. Thereafter, it
sort of lumped together the rest
of the accused. The approach
recommended in State vrs Annan &
Others [1965] GLR 600 is that
"where several accused persons
are charged on one indictment,
it is obligatory to consider the
case against each accused
separately". This approach is
worth emulating in order to do
real justice to each of the
accused persons. A1 - Iddrisu
Iddi @ Mbadugu The prosecution
witness who mentioned Al
referred to him derogatorily as
so-called Doho or father. In the
summary of evidence it is
alleged that he and others known
and unknown took part in
planning and execution of events
leading to the crisis. He is
also alleged to have played a
pivotal role in the death of the
Ya-Na. Woefully none of the
prosecution witnesses led any
such evidence directly or
indirectly. But PW3, Imrahama
Sayibu and PW4, Alhassan Yakubu
@ Nat accused him of rejoicing
with other Abudus at the death
of the Ya-Na. It is the case of
PW3 that after the head of the
Ya-Na had been cut off and
pictures taken with it, the
group went to the Abudu area.
After a while they returned to
the spot amidst drumming and
dancing. A1 he said led the
group dancing with the head of
the Ya-Na stuck on a spear. They
came to the spot where the body
was burnt and went back. PW3
said he saw this scene from his
hide out behind or beside a heap
of firewood at a time when he
was bleeding profusely from
gunshot wounds on both thighs
and the buttocks. On his part
PW4, also from the same location
as PW3, said he saw a group of
people drummed and danced to the
spot. Amongst them, he could
recognized only the Regent of
Bola and Zolanko Lana Yemyemsu,
the one nicknamed as their
father, Doho. In court PW4 then
identified A1 as Doho and A12
Shani Imoro as Zalanko Lana.
Further on, the same PW4
identified A1 as the Zalanko
Lana Iddrisu. In June 2002, both
witnesses testified before the
Wuaku Commission, barely three
(3) months after the crisis as
CW18 and CW26 respectively. None
of the two witnesses mentioned
Al as being amongst the people
jubilating with the head of the
Ya-Na. in June 2002, all these
events which took place in March
were certainly fresh in the
memory of the witnesses than
September 2010, eight good years
thereafter. And it is very clear
from the evidence of PW4 that
even as at today, he does not
know A1. At the Commission he
accepted that Zalanko Lana is a
title and his real name is
Iddrisu Gyamfo. But A12 whom he
identified also as Zalanko Lana
is not the said Iddrisu Gyamfo
but called Shani Imoro. So the
Zalanko Lana PW4 told the Wuaku
Commission held the head of Ya-Na
on a spear could not have been
A1. Yet again PW3 made a more
serious allegation against A1
for the first time in this
court. As I stated he sustained
gunshot wounds. So he went to
the Yendi Hospital on Wednesday,
27th March 2002. He was
admitted. According to him
during the twelve noon GTV news
he saw A1 in the company of
senior army officers, some
chiefs and the senior Minister,
Mr. J. H. Mensah on the screen.
According to him A1 said to the
hearing of the people that
"since Ya-Na became the chief of
the Dagomba's for 28 years,
Abudus had no peace, that is why
they came out and killed him".
PW3 told the court that A1 made
this statement in the presence
of soldiers and policemen but
nothing happened to him. He
there fore became scared and he
felt not safe. Without being
discharged, he left the hospital
for Tamale. Incriminating as
this evidence is, PW3 never told
Wuaku any such confession by A1
on behalf of the Abudus. What
was captured in the report of
the Commission, exhibit 2 is
that PW3 was admitted on
Wednesday 27th and discharged on
Thursday 28th March and in the
morning. And from the hospital,
he went home and not Tamale. The
records from the hospital made
available to Commission
confirmed this date of admission
and date of discharge. That
being so, the statement PW3 said
he heard Al aired on GTV news in
the afternoon of 30th March 2002
whiles on admission at the
hospital cannot be true. But PW3
maintained his ground, by
accusing the Commission of not
having correctly recorded him.
It is on record that Mr. Anthony
Rexford Wiredu (PSA) has
debunked this accusation. He
told the court authoritatively
that after listening to the
cassette recordings of the
proceedings of the Commission,
the Commission had captured
correctly the evidence of each
and every witness who appeared
before it. The prosecution in
its address submitted that by
holding the head of Ya-Na on a
spear and dancing with the
others, A1 has concurred in the
conspiracy to murder the Ya-Na.
He is therefore reliable. But
then this evidence of PW3 and
PW4 against A1 contradicts what
they told the Wuaku Commission.
The evidence is also
contradictory of each other and
discredited as a result of
cross-examination. What the law
required is that the jury had to
be certain of the role played by
A1 whether by words or deeds
during the crisis. This evidence
led against him by the witnesses
lack that certainty and
reliability. A2 - Alhaji Baba
Abdulal Iddrissu @ Zohe A2 was
implicated by PW3 Imrahama
Sayibu. In the summary of
evidence A2 and two others were
alleged to have short PW3 in
both thighs. He is also alleged
to have dragged the Ya-Na by the
legs with A12 to a distance. In
court PW3 stated that in his bid
to escape on leaving the palace
A2 and two others shot at him.
He sustained gun-shot wounds on
both thighs and on the buttocks.
He showed the scars on his
thighs and buttocks to the
court. When he was shot he fell
down and laid there. He managed
to get to the heap of firewood
where Pw1, PW4 and others were
hiding. From that location he
saw A2 took pictures with the
head of the Ya-Na. Under cross-
examination, he mentioned A2,
Baba Kruger and Abdulal Cheke as
those who shot at him. Contrary
to what was stated in the
summary of evidence, PW3 said A4
and A12 pulled the Ya-Na by the
legs to the spot. Before the
Wuaku Commission, PW3 testified
that he was shot in the two
thighs only. First, a man by
name Baba Kruger shot towards
him. Then he met A2 and Abdulal
Cheke around the house of Ya-Na's
first wife holding guns. This
time he said Cheke shot towards
his legs and he fell down
because the bullets got into his
thighs. It is noticed that
before Wuaku, PW3 did not say A2
shot at him. He mentioned Cheke
who is not on trial now. And of
the three people including A2
whom he told the court shot at
him, whose bullets caught him in
the thighs and the buttocks. In
particular whose shot caught him
on the buttocks as he might have
turned his back towards them.
The evidence by PW3 that A2 was
amongst those who shot at him
appears to be false. Similarly
the evidence that A2 took
pictures with the head of the Ya-Na
was not part PW3's evidence
before Wuaku Commission. In any
case, at what point in time, did
PW3 see all these events? After
he had sustained the gunshot
wounds at three places and was
in severe pains? PW3 has denied
his testimony as captured in the
Wuaku Report. But then the
evidence he gave in court did
not establish beyond doubt that
it was A2 who shot him in the
thighs and buttocks. In short,
PW3 did not know who shot and
caused injuries he sustained to
him. It is therefore not
surprising that in the address
of the prosecution, nothing was
said directly about A2. A3 -
Kwame Alhassan @ Achiri In the
summary of evidence three people
made allegation against A3.
Amongst them was PW3 but in
court he said he made no mention
of A3 in his statement and also
at the Wuaku Commission. Grundo
Wumbey listed as PW8 in the Bill
indictment was not called. In
the end Wumbey Binchera
testified against A3 as PW7. The
witness is a night watchman. His
case is that on 25th march, 2002
he loaded some yam seedlings on
his bike to go and plant. He met
A3, Ayoma and Moro Champong.
Moro Champong asked him where he
was going and he answered the
farm. The dialogue continued
that Moro Champong told him he
is not going to live him to see
the next farming season because
they were going to kill all the
Andanis. PW7 said he went to the
farm alright till late evening
when he reported at his duty
post. The following day 26th
March, 2002 in the morning he
was informed about the attack on
the palace the previous day. But
that morning the shooting had
not started and so he went home.
However after PW7 had identified
A3 in court, he said he could
not leave home on 26/03/02 until
an armour car passed in front of
his house and went close to the
palace. When the armour car
turned away, the shooting
started again. He himself lay
beside a rubbish container
whiles the shooting was going
on. He said those shooting at
them were many but amongst them
he recognized A3, Ayoma and Moro
Champong. Abudus he said were
killing their people. Under
cross-examination, the witness
could not give an eye-witness
account of the shooting and the
killings he alleged. Asked who
Abudus shot and killed, he could
only say our people and based
his specifics on hearsay. This
witness did not appear before
Wuaku Commission. But then the
only reason why he implicated A3
in this matter is that He met
A3, Ayoma and Imoro champing in
a house on 25/03/02 when
champing allegedly told or
Warned him that they were going
to kill all Andanis. This
witness during period was either
at work Or on his farm and was
nowhere near the palace, the
action spot. The witness thus
saw. It is this same Witness who
testified that at about 8.30pm
on 26/03/02 he saw A8,the
District chief Executive in the
Company of some soldiers at his
workplace. And after a chat with
them, A8 left in his pajero car.
This evidence of PW7 is in sharp
contrast with that of PW8 who
accompanied the DCE to Tamale to
Ask for re-inforcement and
returned to Yendi at 6.30pm and
then parked his car at the
police station. From there they
went to the police headquarters
and then to the military
barracks and stayed there until
9.00pm. The witness has no
credit to his name at all. A4 –
Mohammed Abdulai @ samasama In
the Bill of Indictment four
witnesses were to give evidence
against A4. But at the trial
three of them gave evidence
implicating him. They are PW3,
Imrahama sayibu, Alhassan Yakubu
PW4 and Iddrisu Mutawakilu, PW6.
It is PW3’s evidence that when
he climbed the wall of the
katini and jumped outside he was
shot by three people. He fell
down and could not walk as his
whole body was soaked in blood.
Whiles lying down he saw A4 and
A12 pulling the Ya-Na to where
he was at close quarters but
they did not see him. In fact he
put the distance between them at
3 metres. According to him, the
Ya-Na was not then dead. He went
on to say that he saw kools with
two lorry tyres,Leftee holding a
gun, Mustapha holding a
container and Yaan a camera.
Zakaria Forest removed his
machine from the neck, put it on
the ground and sparked it. A4
held Ya-Na’s head and zakaria
cut off the head with the
machine. Zakaria Forest also cut
the Ya-Na’s arm with the
machine. A4 then took the head
from which blood was dripping
profusely. PW4 and PW6 also said
they saw A4 and A12 dragged the
Ya-Na to a spot. For once PW3’s
evidence on an issue has been
corroborated. But that is all
there is to it. There are other
evidence on record which
discredits PW3’s evidence as a
whole. Whiles PW4 and PW6 made
this observation from their
hideout beside the heap of
firewood, PW3 observed the
events in the open before he
crawled across the street to
join PW4, PW6 and others. Before
this court, the evidence of PW4
suggest that at the time he saw
Ya-Na being dragged by A4 and
A12 he was already dead. This
evidence fairly accords with the
evidence of PW3 before Wuaku
Commission that at the time he
was fleeing the palace he saw
the Ya-Na lying flat on his
stomach with blood stains in his
dress. So he could not tell
whether he was dead or alive
then. In this court, PW3 denied
he gave any such evidence before
the Commission. Again it
appeared that at Wuaku
Commission PW3 observed the
scene with other colleagues and
not alone as he wants the court
to believe. And apart from PW3,
the other witnesses did not
observe the manner in which the
Ya-Na was decapitated as he
described. PW4 and PW6 only
heard someone said "I am holding
the hand of the Ya-Na. If you
know that you are a man, come
and collect it". And when they
looked out they saw Yidana Sugri
holding the hand". Before Wuaku
Commission it was Yidana who
took the arm but in court PW3
said A12 took it. PW3 also
denied that he saw A4 and A12
carrying guns as attributed to
him in the summary of evidence.
I leave PW3 for a while. In the
case of PW6, he made the
observation of the scene of
crime with five others. He never
mentioned at Wuaku Commission
that he saw A4 and A12 do
anything at the scene. PW1 was
also at the hideout but said
nothing about A4 and A12. Again
as between PW4 and PW6 there is
no certainty about the dress of
the Ya-Na that day. PW6 told
this court that the Ya-Na wore a
multi-coloured smock. But PW4
testified before Wuaku that the
Ya-Na's dress was a short blue
batakari. The question is, was
the person PW4 and PW6 saw
dragged to the spot Ya-Na or
not? As I observed, if there
were no inconsistencies in the
evidence of the witnesses, there
would have been no doubt about
the case against A4. But as
demonstrated, PW3's evidence
that he laid just 3 metres from
the scene but was not seen by
the Abudus on a plain dry field
is too sweet to believe. Also
being in pain as a result of the
gunshot wounds he sustained, his
ability to observe accurately is
suspect. Over and above PW3
having testified against Yidana
Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo as the
murderers of the Ya-Na, should
he be believed eight years after
the event that these accused are
the culprits? The evidence of
the three witnesses is
inconsistent with their previous
testimonies before the Wuaku
Commission. They also contradict
each other. A5 - Sayibu Mohammed
In the summary evidence, PW3
Imrahama Sayibu was to say that
on 26/03/02 when he took the
satellite disc to Alhassan
Andani in the palace, he saw a
group of armed men including A3
(Achiri) and A5 (Sayibu
Mohammed) shooting towards the
palace. But at the trial PW3
denied he ever mentioned A5 in
his statement. He also denied he
was unable to identify A5 at the
police headquarters. In the
address of the prosecution,
nothing was said about A5. At
the Wuaku Commission A5 was
found to have fought on the side
of Abudus on the 26th and 27th
and recommended that he be
prosecuted for illegal
possession of weapons. Since no
evidence was given against A5 by
any of the witnesses, it stands
to reason that no attempt was
made to prove the charge against
A5. If PW3 said he did not
mention A5 in his statement, how
did he come to be indicted? A6 -
Alhassan Braimah As stated in
the summary of evidence,
evidence against A6 was offered
by PW6, Iddrisu Mutawakilu. The
statement attributed to PW6 in
the summary of evidence is that
on 25/03/02 whiles sitting under
a baobab tree, he saw Abudus
shooting and burning houses.
Amongst those burning houses
were the Champong brothers
namely Moro and Mohamadu. Those
shooting towards the palace were
Aja and Alhassan Braiamah @ Ton
Kruma (A6). However in his
evidence to the court, he said
he was in the palace when he
observed the burning of houses
and the shooting. According to
PW6, he saw A8 (DCE) in a bullet
proof attire led an armour car
on his motor-bike passed behind
the Gbewaa palace towards the
Bolin Lana's palace. Not long
after, Abudus started shooting
them with the type of guns used
by the police and the military.
Amongst those he recognized
shooting towards the palace were
A6 and Aja. However, the
proceedings before the Wuaku
Commission show that PW6 never
mentioned A6. He similarly did
not mention his name at the
Yidana trial also. This evidence
against A6 eight years after the
event can only be described as
an afterthought. A8 - Mohammed
Habib Tijani This accused was
the District Chief Executive of
Yendi at the time and he is an
Abudu. He is the most implicated
in the crisis by his words and
conduct, although the Report of
the Wuaku Commission commended
him. In this trial six witnesses
namely PW1, PW2, PW5, PW6, PW7
and PW8 testified against him.
In consonance with the abundance
of evidence led against him, the
address on him was given special
attention by the D.P.P. As the
head of the District Security
Council (DISEC), A8 broke the
decision to ban the celebration
of the Bungum festival and the
imposition of curfew on Yendi to
the emissaries of the Ya-Na. It
is the evidence of PW1 (Abukari
Amadu) that the emissaries asked
A8 to come to the palace and
explain to the Ya-Na the reason
for the imposition of the
curfew. A8 agreed to come but he
never came even after the Ya-Na
had sent two invitations to him.
Ya-Na had to send for the
Regional Minister Prince Imoro
Andani who denied knowledge of
the imposition of the curfew. To
satisfy the wish and pleasure of
the Andanis, he lifted the
curfew. PW1 also testified that
one Mahama who was shot in the
thigh was brought to the palace.
The said Mahama informed the
palace that whiles mending an
armour car battery at the
barracks, A8 remarked to an army
commander that: "Up till now it
is getting to 1.00pm and we have
not come to execute our
assignment". Whatever that
assignment was, PW1 did not
explain. PW1 further testified
that on 24/03/02, he visited a
friend in the Abudu area. He
waited for the friend because he
had gone to attend nature's
call. Whiles waiting, he
overheard a boy said: "Ya-Na was
lucky today if it wasn't this
festival we would have killed
him". Another boy replied: "He
is even not safe, they have been
told by A8 that whether he
accepted the curfew or not, they
would kill him". PW1 said on
hearing these statements, he
left the house without seeing
his friend. It would appear that
although A8 in his capacity of
the Chairman of DISEC conveyed
the decision to impose the
curfew he personally incurred
the displeasure of the Andanis.
Then contrary to the submission
of the prosecution that the
witnesses led direct primary
evidence against the accused
persons, this evidence led by
PW1 against A8 are hearsay. They
have no probative value in law.
In any case before Wuaku
Commission, PW1 as CW19 did not
give any such evidence against
A8. His evidence was confined to
the imposition of the curfew,
the lifting of the curfew, the
assault on Ziblim, request by
the Ya-Na for military
intervention and escape from the
palace to Tamale where he caused
the arrest of Yidana. Why this
evidence against A8, eight years
down the line? The gist of the
evidence of PW2 against A8 is
that on 27/03/02 he carried the
Ya-Na's distress message to A8
to order the military to come
and rescue him. That was when
the palace was ablaze and the
firing had intensified.
According to witness A8 told him
plainly that the military will
not go because when a curfew was
imposed, the Andanis rejected
it. A soldier he said ordered
him to remove his talisman and
then slapped him from behind and
even insulted the Ya-Na as being
stupid for not accepting the
curfew. Not long after, a police
officer and the Bunta Ya-Na
arrived in a pick-up. The Bunta
Ya-ŽNa also put the Ya-Na's
request for a rescue operation
to A8. A8 gave the same negative
response and again cited the
refusal to accept the curfew as
the reason. The Bunta Ya-Na was
then ordered to sit down. When
the firing stopped, PW2 said he
heard jubilation and the unique
sound of a drum. Then he heard
A8 told a senior military
officer "we have succeeded". PW2
explained the sound of the drum
meant that the YaŽ-Na has been
killed. Up to this point, PW2's
evidence to the court accords
with his testimony before the
Wuaku Commission except in one
respect. It is that PW2 did not
tell the Commission that when he
and Bunta Ya-Na delivered the Ya-Na's
message to A8, he told them the
soldiers won't move because they
rejected the curfew when it was
imposed. The further evidence of
PW2 is that after A8 told the
army officer that "we have
succeeded", the army officer
ordered the Bunta Ya-Na to join
him in the armour car to go and
bring the Ya-Na. But they came
back with two young men,
Alhassan Zakaria and Kwadwo Abia.
When he enquired about the Ya-Na
and his fathers, PW2 said the
survivors told them they have
been killed in the Sampa. I
observed that PW4's evidence
suggests that at the scene the
time he saw the Ya-Na being
dragged he was already dead.
This hearsay evidence of PW2 is
some corroboration of that
evidence by PW4. On the comment
attributed to A8 after hearing
the unique sound of the drum,
PW2 appeared to be a consistent
witness but not on other issues.
At the Wuaku Commission, he
admitted police retrieved eight
BB catridges and seven
millimeter rounds of catridge
from him. In his indirect
evidence to this court he denied
it. He told the court that at
the palace, he took from his
father a single-barrel gun to
fight the Abudus. But then he
denied there were guns in the
palace. For his part PW5 said on
a visit to the Yendi Government
Hospital with other officials,
A8 told him in Dagbon. "the
arrogance that we have never
allow us to listen to anybody's
advice. That was the same
arrogance the chief was having
and he never listened to
anybody's advice. That is why he
was killed together with his
elders". PW5 testified that he
gave the same testimony at Wuaku
Commission. But the truth is
that as the 62nd witness, PW5
never mentioned A8 for once in
his testimony. Even without
determining whether this
statement attributed to A8 is
evidence of conspiracy to murder
the Ya-Na, it is inconsistent
with the previous statement to
the Wuaku Commission. PW6 also
said of A8 that on 26/03/02 in
the morning, he saw A8 in a
bullet proof dress on a
motor-bike leading an armour
car. There were six officers in
the armour car and they passed
behind the palace towards Abudu
area. Not long after they
turned, the attack on the Gbewaa
palace started again. That is
all the evidence of PW6 against
A8 to the court. What took place
for the three days was described
as a three-day war. PW5 wore a
talisman under his dress as a
protection. PW9 told the court
the Ya-Na himself did not only
have protective powers but also
magical powers to vanish. So
what was unusual when A8 wore a
bullet proof dress when he went
about his duties during a war?
At the Wuaku Commission, PW6
testified as CW17. In his long
evidence in which he even
accused the police of handing
him over to his enemies (Abudus)
he never mentioned A8. It is
also questioned how PW6 could
see the number of occupants of
an armour car at a distance of
100 ft. This evidence of PW6
also contradicts the evidence of
PW8 that on 26/03/02 when he got
to the office in the morning, A8
was already in a meeting. This
evidence against A8 cannot pass
as a credible one. The same goes
with the evidence of PW7 as
compared to the evidence of PW8.
PW7 is a night watchman. He said
whiles on duty on 26/03/02 at
about 8.30pm, a bus load of
soldiers pulled up. Then also
appeared A8 in his pajero. He
heard the soldier asked A8 "have
you killed the chief or taken
him away from the house?"
According to PW7, A8 answered
they have done neither because
there is tension and that is why
he had come so that they go to
town. Yet he said A8 alone left.
The evidence of PW7 is a
complete fabrication. There is
evidence by PW8 that on
26/03/02, he and A14 Abukari
Nabell @ Kunkakums @ Kums
accompanied A8 to Tamale and
returned to Yendi at about
6.30pm. A8 parked his pajero at
the police station. A8 went into
a meeting with some members of
the DISEC and later proceeded to
the military barracks. They
remained there until after
9.00pm when he PW8 left for
home. It is therefore very clear
from the evidence of PW8 that A8
could not have been seen by PW7
at his duty post at the time he
mentioned. PW7 is not a witness
of truth against A8. Here is the
evidence of PW8 I have been
referring to. His evidence about
A8 is both sweet and sour. At
the time, PW8 was an accountant
at the Assembly. He is also an
Andani. He said that when he
arrived at the office in the
morning of 26/03/02, he saw A8
in a meeting. After 1.15pm that
day, he accompanied A8 to the
military barracks. An army
officer they met complained that
the armour car could not spark
because of battery failure. They
returned to the office where A8
instructed that the battery
bought for the cesspit emptier
be released to the soldiers for
their use. Then A8 told him that
they were going to Tamale. At
the old market, they picked A14,
an Abudu. A8 then told the two
of them that he wanted them to
be witnesses to his actions so
that they can report to their
various factions to avoid any
allegations. On the way they met
a military vehicle and A8
conversed with the occupant. He
did not hear what they talked
about. But then along the way,
A8 looked at his wristwatch and
remarked aloud that at exactly
4.00pm the Abudus and Andanis
would clash at Yendi. He said he
became alarmed. At Tamale they
met the Regional Minister. A8
gave him a briefing on the
security situation in Yendi and
the need for reinforcement.Then
the Regional Minister got the
National Security Advisor
Lt.-General Hamidu on the line.
PW8 said he heard the Minister
saying that he could not get
back to the Gbewaa palace
because he feared for his life.
When A8 had the telephone
receiver, he said the same thing
to the National Security Advisor
(NSA). Then A8 told the NSA that
there is an Andani sympathizer
in his company and he was handed
the receiver.He informed the NSA
that the Ya-Na was not safe. The
NSA he said asked him to assure
the Ya-Na that 60 military men
will be flown from Accra to beef
up the security and the curfew
will be re-imposed. According to
PW8, A8 blamed the Regional
Minister for lifting the curfew.
But the Regional Minister
replied that the Abudus hooted
at him. Witness also mentioned
that when they went for
afternoon prayers he saw that A8
and A14 wore bullet proof
attires. Back in Yendi the BNI
Director informed A8 that Abudus
have besieged the palace and
burnt houses around it. The BNI
Director then suggested that
they should ask the military to
move the armour car around the
palace so that by dawn the next
day, they could get in and
rescue the Ya-Na. But the army
officer said he would not take
instructions from anybody. At
that juncture, A8 expressed
concern about the welfare of his
family. He was nearly slapped by
an army officer when he also
asked about the safety of the Ya-Na.
It was at that point that PW8
left the company of A8 that day.
But then the high point of PW8's
long evidence is that
responsible government officials
and the security knowingly and
deliberately refused to act when
they should have acted to save
the Ya-Na. This is because at
the time, there were over 60
armed military men and over 100
policemen with an armour car and
a police water can vehicle but
none of them was deplored to
save the Ya-Na. In the case of
A8, PW8 said he played a partial
role which benefitted the Abudu
faction only. It is said this
witness did not testify before
the Wuaku Commission. He told
this court that at the time he
was not bothered about what
happened. What made him bother
now? His evidence however is not
without doubt. The first is that
A8 having told him and A14 that
he was travelling with them as
witnesses to his actions, for A8
to turn round to say that at
4.00pm the factions will clash
is unthinkable. Again the
evidence that the National
Security Advisor told him the
curfew will be reŽimposed cannot
be true because the curfew was
re-imposed a day before.
Similarly, the National Security
Advisor could not have given a
message on security matters for
the YaŽNa through PW8. It is
also not stated if A8 had the
power to compel the military to
move the armour car around in
view of the stand taken by the
army officer that he would not
take instructions from anybody,
especially so when there is bad
blood between the Ya-Na and the
security agencies. In any case
all the security heads concerned
in this matter, the Regional
Minister, A8 as well as the
National Security Advisor
Lt-General Hamidu testified
before the Wuaku Commission.
None of them remotely alluded to
this telephone conversation PW8
talked about in the Regional
Minister's office. It is on
record that the Wuaku Commission
in its Report highly commended
A8 “for all the frantic attempts
he made to save the crisis and
its escalation". The prosecution
acknowledged this commendation
in its address. It however was
of the view that the Commission
recommended the re-assignment of
A8 because of his partial
complicity in the events leading
to the death of the Ya-Na. It is
my contrary view that if the
kind of evidence led against A8
by PW1, PW3, PW5, PW6 and PW7 in
this court were led against A8
before the Commission and they
were found credible and cogent
the Commission would not have
commended him so highly. But
then as I have demonstrated the
new evidence led against A8 by
these same witnesses is
contradictory of each other and
do not prove the offence charged
either. They are in short an
afterthought type of evidence. I
described the evidence about A8
as sweet and sour. By that I
mean that the evidence in its
raw form suggest that A8 could
be found liable of the offence
charge or he could be absolved
of the charge. That is kind of
evidence PW8 especially led. In
the case of Kwesi vrs The
Republic [1977] 1 GLR 448 at
451, the Supreme Court held that
where in a trial the prosecution
presented two alternative
possible views of the facts one
of which shows that the accused
is innocent, the prosecution
must fail". About thirteen years
earlier than the Kwesi case
(supra), the Supreme Court held
in Dowuona vrs The State [1964]
GLR 361 that "where the evidence
before the court is
circumstantial and the
circumstantial evidence is
consistent with guilt as well as
with innocence, accused should
be acquitted. That is the status
of the evidence the prosecution
led against A8 at the close of
its case. A9 - Baba Ibrahim @
Baba Zey Evidence against A9 was
given by PW4 Alhassan Yakubu @
Nat. He said when arrived at the
palace on 26/03/02, he saw A9,
Mahama @ Yellow and Adjuh, all
from the Abudu gate shooting and
killing their victims. At the
time of the crisis witness was a
student at the Yendi Secondary
School. He went to school on
25/03/02 but did not return home
because he was informed of
fighting in town. He said he
returned to the palace on
26/03/02 at 7.00am when he saw
the three attacked the palace
with the type of guns used by
police and soldiers. Under
cross-examination, he admitted
that when he arrived there was
calm and so he entered the
palace through the main gate.
But later when the fighting
started again, he ran inside and
hid himself in the house. This
evidence of the witness is clear
that he saw nobody fighting at
the time he arrived at the
palace and when he was in the
palace on the 26/03/02. This
evidence to the court aside,
witness told the Wuaku
Commission that when he went to
school on 25/03/02 he did not
come back until 27/03/02 at 6am
instead of 6pm in his statement
to the police. The witness
therefore saw nothing because he
was in school which is about 300
metres away from the palace for
the three days. His evidence
against A9 in court is false and
inconsistent with his testimony
before Wuaku Commission. A10 -
Alhassan Mohammed @ Mohammed
Champong PW6 Mutawakilu gave
evidence that Moro Champong and
Mohammed Champong, A10 herein
burnt houses of Andanis under
the control of the palace. At
Wuaku PW6 did not mention the
Champong brothers at all. Rather
it was Nantogma Alhassan Andani
CW21 (not called in this trial)
who testified that one Iddrisu
Gyamfo, an Andani who caused the
fires around the Gbewaa palace.
On his part, PW9 Mohammed Achana
Ibdulahim @ Red accused A10, his
brother and Alhassan Alhassan @
Baku of shooting at him on
27/03/02. He identified A10 in
court as the only one present.
In the summary evidence, PW9 was
to testify that the persons
named shot at him in turns when
he came out of the palace. The
same people, he is to say, fired
in the direction of the Ya-Na.
But when he ran towards the
police station for protection
one Yakubu Abudu shot him. In
court however, all PW9 said on
this issue is that A10, his
brother Moro and Alhassan Baku
shot him. At the Wuaku
Commission, his evidence was
that he escaped through the main
gate of the palace. He ran
towards the police station to
surrender himself. On the way,
Alhassan Alhassan @ Baku shot
him. He showed gun wounds on his
arm and stomach. But to this
court he showed scars on the
thighs and the buttocks as
gunshot wounds sustained. The
records of the Wuaku proceedings
showed that a confrontation was
even arranged between PW9 and
this Alhassan Alhassan Đ Baku.
The later denied the accusation
by PW9 and pleaded alibi. The
evidence of both PW6 and PW9
against A10 is not only
inconsistent with their previous
statement on the same issue at
the Wuaku Commission but also
unreliable. A11 - Mohammed
Mustapha This accused is a
petrol station attendant. In the
Bill of Indictment PW3 and PW4
implicated him in their evidence
on the role he played at the
scene of the crime on 27/03/02.
PW3 was to give evidence against
A11 that when Ya-Na was dragged
to a spot, he saw A11 holding a
gallon of petrol. After A7 had
cut off the head and the left
arm of the YaŽNa, Kums placed
tyres on the body and A11poured
petrol on the body and set the
body ablaze. In his detailed
evidence to the court, PW3 said
at the time the Ya-Na was
dragged to the spot, he was not
dead. He saw Kools with two
tyres and Leftee and A11 holding
guns. But further on PW3 said
A11 was holding a container and
Kools put the tyres on the body.
A11 then sprinkled petrol on the
tyres. He said he saw the fire
burning but did not know who lit
it. Remember the witness said
earlier that A11 lit the
fire.For PW4, he was to say that
at the spot the body was
deposited, he saw Koomson a
photographer and Mustapha
brought a lorry tyre, put it on
the body and poured petrol on
it. Koomson he said, lit the
fire. Note PW3 watched the scene
at a closer distance than PW4.
And in court PW4 said he saw
Kooms put a lorry tyre on the Ya-Na.
Then he saw someone holding
petrol and poured it on the tyre
and Kooms lit. He said now the
chief was burning. PW4 has not
mentioned in court that it was
A11 who was holding petrol and
poured it on the tyre as PW3
said. Whiles PW3 did not know at
a close distance of 3 metres who
lit the fire, PW4 said when the
chief was burning, he saw A11
holding a gallon and pouring
something like petrol on the
burning body. What the evidence
of PW3 and PW4 is offered to
prove is that A11 brought a
gallon of petrol which he poured
on the lorry tyre(s) to burn the
Ya-Na. But their evidence is
fraught with differences
although they watched the scene
from almost the same location on
a plain field. The difference
may appear minor. But there are
similar differences on the
evidence of PW3 and PW4
implicating other accused
persons. The cumulative effect
of these differences is that the
two witnesses are not reliable.
A12 - Shani Imoro He is
implicated by PW3 and PW6.
Whiles PW3 said it was A2 and
A12 who dragged the body of the
Ya-Na to the spot, PW6 said A4
and A12 pulled the body to the
spot. At the spot the Ya-Na was
decapitated and burnt. PW3 said
it was A12 who held down the
head of the Ya-Na and A7
decapitated him. I have
discussed the issue of the
dragging of the Ya-Na whether
dead or alive to the spot when
considering the case against A2
and A4. What I have to stress
again here is that before Wuaku
PW6 never mentioned A4 and A12
as seen pulling the Ya-Na
together. At Wuaku again, PW3
watched the scene of the crime
in the company of five others
from the same location. But from
his evidence to the court, he
watched the scene on the field
alone before he crossed over to
his colleagues hiding beside the
heap of the firewood. Even PW6
said he saw Yidana Sugri dancing
with the arm of the Ya-Na before
he was dragged to the spot. The
contradictions are too many on
material issues. A13 - Yakubu
Yussif @ Leftee PW3 Sayibu
testified that at the spot of
the Ya-Na was dragged to, he saw
A13 holding a gun. Of all those
who observed the scene, only PW3
mentioned A13. At Wuaku
Commission A13 was not mentioned
by any witness as having done
anything during the crisis. But
there was testimony by Isahaku
Wumbei (CW35) the caretaker of
Norrip Guest House that A13 was
amongst family members and
friends who sought refuge at his
place between 20th to 29th
March. He showed the list of
names of some of the people he
accommodated. There was some
doubt about the genuiness of the
name of A13 on the list - see
pages 29 to 30 of Volume 2 of
the Proceedings, Exhibit 1A. But
the important point is that no
allegation was made against him
by any witness before the
Commission. The defence has
revealed and I checked from the
record that when the accused
were put before the District
Court on 6/07/10 to be committed
for trial, A13 was not listed
and no allegation was made
against him in the summary of
evidence of the witnesses for
the prosecution. When attention
was drawn to it for which reason
A13 should have been discharged,
the prosecution asked for an
adjournment. Following that a
new bill of indictment was filed
on 12/07/10 with this allegation
by PW3 against A13. So far as
this evidence is attributed to
PW3, it is an afterthought. A14
- Hammed Abukari Yusif @ Kools
Both PW3 and PW4 gave evidence
that at the spot the Ya-Na was
dragged to, they saw A14 put two
lorry tyres on the body. PW3
gave the same evidence at the
Wuaku Commission but PW4 never
mentioned seeing A14 at the
scene at all. Incidentally, PW1
and PW6 who also watched the
scene from the same location as
PW3 did not notice the presence
of A14 at the spot. A15 - Abdul
Razak Yussif @ Nyaa The accused
is a photographer. PW3 and PW4
testified they saw A15 at the
spot the YaŽNa was pulled to.
They said he took pictures. PW3
was specific that A2 and A4 took
pictures with the head of the Ya-Na.
At Wuaku PW3 said he saw two
photographers at the scene. One
of the photographers carried a
camera and a cutlass, the other
a camera only. PW4 also said
before Wuaku that he saw
photographers. None of the two
witnesses told Wuaku that the
photographers took pictures as
they have told the court. At
Wuaku, they mentioned the name
of the photographers as A15 and
one Jekii. The defence alleged
in its address the said Jekii
was found out to be an Andani,
hence the failure of the
witnesses to mention him in
their evidence to the court.
They denied they know anybody by
that name at all. The effect of
the denial is that the evidence
of the witnesses against A15 in
this trial is inconsistent with
their testimony before the Wuaku
Commission on the number of
photographers they saw at the
spot. But for now, the
established evidence against A15
is that he was present at the
spot the Ya-Na was decapitated
and burnt. Whether he took
pictures or not is not certain.
The question is should his
presence at the spot make him
liable for the offence charged?
Apart from PW3 and PW4 who saw
A15 at the scene, PW1, PW5 and
PW6 also saw the scene from the
same location but did not
mention A15. All along this has
been trend of the evidence of
the key witnesses. At no time
was any two accounts on any
issue testified on ever the
same. Why should it be so?
Testimony of PW10 - Brigadier
Jaswant Mantey Wadhwani By way
of reminder, the charge the
accused face is conspiracy to
murder and murder of the Ya-Na.
To succeed the prosecution must
prove each and every ingredient
of each offence. In the charge
of murder in particular, proof
that the Ya-Na is indeed dead is
very fundamental. The evidence
of the prosecution witnesses who
witnessed the decapitation and
the burning of the body suggest
that the Ya-Na is dead. From the
evidence of the witnesses the Ya-Na
was killed on 27/03/02. Since
then nobody had heard of or seen
the Ya-Na alive. It is over
seven years now. The rebuttal
presumption under s.33(1) of the
Evidence Act (NRCD 323) is that
the Ya-Na is dead. But then
there is no presumption as to
the time of death. But the death
of the Ya-Na is not based on
presumption but murder by the
accused. PW9 said the Ya-Na is
believed to have magical powers
to vanish. PW4 said two
survivors rescued from the
palace told him the Ya-Na and
his elders were short in the
Sampa. Again PW4 and PW6
differed on the colour of the Ya-Na's
dress that morning. With the
burning of the body, the
features of the Ya-Na have been
disfigured. It is therefore not
sufficient for the prosecution
to prove that the Ya-Na is dead.
In the circumstances of this
case the prosecution must also
prove that the charred remains
collected and preserved in the
mortuary of the Yendi Hospital
is that of the Ya-Na and no
other person. D/Inspector Adabla
saw a body said to be Ya-Na
burning. So his evidence on the
identity of the body is not
conclusive. PW10 as the
pathologist examined the charred
remains in order to determine
the cause of death of the Ya-Na.
PW10 tendered two autopsy
reports. Exhibit A dated 3/04/02
is the Report On a Working Visit
to the Yendi Government Hospital
from 29th to 30th March 2002. On
page 2 (two) of this Report is a
subheading "Special Charred
Remains of An Adult Male". PW10
wrote that these remains were
yet to be identified. The second
report, Exhibit B is dated
7/05/03 is captioned "Autopsy
Report On The Charred Remains of
An Adult Male". Therein PW10
wrote that the body (remains)
was identified by Dr. Bernard
Seshie as that of the King of
Yendi, i.e. the YaŽ-Na. At the
Wuaku Commission, PW10 tendered
Exhibit A which he admitted was
incomplete. Not surprisingly,
the identity of the special
charred remains PW10 examined
became an issue. PW10 could not
say positively that the charred
remains were that of the Ya-Na.
He said the remains were
suspected to be body of the Ya-Na.
So before Wuaku, apart from the
absence of positive
identification of the charred
remains, witness could not tell
the cause of death of the Ya-Na
because the body was incomplete
and charred, as such fine clues
were missing. Witness told the
court that Exhibit B was
prepared for the purposes of
Yidana trial. In Exhibit B he
gave the cause of death of the
charred remains without any
further examination since he
issued the first report. Yet
again at the Yidana trial the
issue of the identity of the
charred remains surfaced. Again
PW10 admitted that it is
possible that the body
identified to him by Dr. Seshie
could be any one else - see
Exhibit 4, Proceedings of
14/05/2003. It is on record that
the Police Special Investigating
Team (SIT) whose work was abated
with the setting up of the Wuaku
Commission took samples of the
charred body including the bone
and teeth and swabs from the
sons of the Ya-Na for DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis
with a view to establishing the
identity of the charred body
scientifically - see the Report,
Exhibit Y at page 5. To date the
DNA analysis has not been done.
Incidentally PW10 said in this
trial that the identification by
Dr. Seshie was sufficient.
Further on, the witness said the
positive identification by a
family member negated the need
for a DNA examination of the
remains. This evidence should
not have come from PW10,
professional as he is. When and
where did a family member
identify the remains to PW10 as
that of the YaŽNa? If he had
that information, why did he not
state so in Exhibit B and why
did he describe the remains as
that of an adult male and not by
name? PW10 told the Wuaku
Commission that little whisper
here and there suggested that
the remains might be the body of
the Ya-Na. That is still the
position as at today because the
suspicion that the charred
remains might be Ya-Na's body
still holds sway. This is
because the prosecution has
failed to prove positively the
identity of the charred remains
as the body of the Ya-Na. Since
the crisis ended on 27/03/02 the
general public have painfully
accepted the fact of the death
of the Ya-Na. Nobody disputes
that fact. But in law the fact
of the death of the Ya-Na must
be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However in the absence of
a death certificate issued by
PW10 and the identity of charred
remains having not been
positively established, the
prosecution has failed to
discharge the burden on it to
the requisite degree. By that
failure, the prosecution has
sown the seed of doubt in its
own case. The reason being that
body whether dead or alive,
which was seen dragged to a
spot, decapitated and burnt, may
or may not be that of the YaŽ-Na.
The question which flows from
that conclusion is if the
prosecution has failed to prove
that the charred remains is the
body of the Ya-Na, could the
accused especially A4, A11, A14
and A15 be liable on the charge
of conspiracy to murder and
murder of the Ya-ŽNa? The answer
appears to be obvious. PW11-
D/Inspector Augustus Nkrumah
(Investigator) In the address of
the prosecution, it is submitted
that in compliance with the
government directive in the
White Paper, the Police led by a
very senior officer, conducted
further investigations into the
Yendi crisis, after which the
accused are indicted before the
court.PW11 is the lead
investigator according to the
prosecution. As part of the
investigations, PW11 told the
court he visited Yendi three
times to view the state of the
Gbewaa palace, he made arrests,
invited witnesses to Accra and
took their statements. What
follows is these accused are
arraigned before the court. This
case has a background. It is the
directive in the White Paper I
referred to. The White Paper was
based on the Report of the Wuaku
Commission on the Yendi Crisis.
And the root of all these is the
proceedings of the Commission.
And before the Wuaku Commission
was set up the police
administration initiated
investigations into the crisis
and submitted a report of their
findings - Exhibit Y. Following
the acceptance of the
Commission's recommendations,
Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Gyamfo
were prosecuted on the same
charges as the present accused.
They were acquitted and
discharged - Exhibit 4.
Surprisingly, PW11 told the
court that he did not request
for and read any of these
documents which relate to the
case he was investigating.
According to him he only had a
briefing by DCOP Ayalingo. I do
not think the senior officer
omitted or forgot to bring these
matters to the notice of PW11
before or in the course of his
work. Witness did not also
contact PW12 D/Sgt. Adabla who
did a very professional initial
investigations into the crisis
and compiled Exhibit Y.
Investigation does not mean
taking statements from suspects
and charging them before the
court. True investigations
involves following clues and
leads gathered from the
statements of suspects and
witnesses. In his book Criminal
Procedure In Ghana, A.N.E.
Amissah at pate 31 wrote on the
object of investigations as
follows:- "At the initial
stages, the object of an
investigation is not to prove a
case against any particular
person but to find out whether
or not the complaint lodged can
be substantiated and if so, how.
Consequently, it is advisable
that the police pursue all
openings, leads and clues
brought to their notice. Every
person mentioned as having
relevant information has to be
checked. The aim should be to
build up a complete case which
cannot be upset by material
within the possession of the
police. If investigation leads
to the conclusion that no
offence has been committed or
that an offence has been
committed but not by the person
suspected, the investigator
should be bold enough to say so.
The fact should not be forced to
fit a preconceived notion". The
investigator by his own evidence
did not do anything beyond the
taking of statements of suspects
and witnesses. Admittedly the
events he was to investigate
took place about eight years
ago. But he could have tendered
the arms and ammunitions
retrieved from Andanis who
surrendered themselves, the
burnt arms retrieve from the
palace and the one from Ya-Na's
own car. He did not say whether
he made any efforts to retrieve
the spear on which A1 allegedly
held the head of the Ya-Na, the
Dorman chainsaw machine used by
A7, A15's camera and the
pictures A4 and A12 were alleged
to have taken with the head of
the Ya-Na. Over and above, PW11
did not tell the court what
happened to the charred remains
suspected to be the body of the
Ya-Na. In short PW11 did not
build a case for s successful
prosecution. If he did the
identity of the charred remains
will not be an issue for the
third time in this trial. Just
like PW12 D/Insp. Adaba who in
an answer to the jury said he
did not extend his investigation
to the Abudu area, PW11 did not
care to find any information
from the Abudus. Inspite of the
established evidence that the
two sides fought a war which
evidence at least PW4 and PW7
confirmed the investigations in
all cases was one-sided. It is
no wonder that self-confessed
Andanis who took active part
unlawful fight or war are the
witnesses for the prosecution.
The Yidana Sugri @ Red and
Iddrisu Gyamfo Trial The two
accused in that case were
charged and tried on two counts
of conspiracy to murder and the
murder of Ya-Na. The accused
herein face the same charges.
PW1 Abukari Amadu, PW4 Alhassan
Yakubu @ Nat and PW6 Iddrisu
Mutawakilu gave evidence against
the accused in that case. The
two accused in that case were
acquitted and discharged. The
same persons have boldly given
evidence against the accused
herein on the same charges. If
these witnesses are to be
believed now, the logical
conclusion one draws from their
changed stance is that they
falsely prosecuted Yidana Sugri
and Iddrisu Gyamfo. And there is
nothing to show that these very
witnesses are not falsely
prosecuting these accused too.
Had the prosecution called
witnesses different from those
who testified in the Yidana
case, on the assumption that
these other witnesses were privy
to facts which the Yidana
witnesses were ignorant of, the
prosecution's case would have
sound more credible than it
appears now. What these Andanis
witnesses appear to be telling
the whole world is that any
Abudu is potentially liable for
the murder of the Ya-Na. So are
Abudus not being persecuted
rather than prosecuted?
Assessment of the Credibility of
the Witnesses As a guide the
Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) at
s.80 listed some matters which
are by no means exhaustive, to
be considered in assessing the
credibility of a witness. Both
the prosecution and the defence
discussed them in their
submissions. I will not list
them seriatim. The evidence of
all the prosecution witnesses
except PW11 and PW12 has fallen
foul of the matters listed in
there. As Andanis, they are no
doubt biased and interested
parties. They displayed
individually and collectively
inconsistency, dishonesty and
untruthfulness in their
evidence. As I have demonstrated
above, the evidence of PW10 and
PW11 as disinterested witnesses,
did not cure those defects in
the evidence of the Andani
witnesses. The D.P.P. in her
submission tried to distinguish
between internal inconsistency
in the evidence led as compared
to an external evidence. This
distinction is drawn in relation
to the Wuaku Commission
Proceedings and the Report
thereon. But all the materials
on the Wuaku Commission have
been admitted as Exhibits. They
therefore form part and parcel
of evidence of the prosecution
witnesses so far. That being so
the inconsistency in the
testimony of some of the
witnesses at Wuaku and in this
trial clearly undermines their
credibility. Conclusion I must
now decide on the submission
made by the defence. I remind
myself of the practice direction
in the State vrs Ali Kassena
(supra) that to uphold a
submission that there is no case
to answer by the accused, I must
satisfy myself that (a) an
essential element of the offence
has not been proved, or (b) the
evidence led in support of the
charge has been so discredited
as a result of
cross-examination, or (c) the
evidence led is so manifestly
unreliable that no reasonable
tribunal could safely convict on
it. I also remind myself of the
guide given by Lord Lane, C.J.
in R vrs Galbraith (supra)
quoted on page 17 of this
ruling. It is also trite that
the prosecution must establish a
prima fade case against each of
the accused before the court can
demand an answer from the
accused. And in determining
whether a prima fade has been
made, the court confines itself
to the analysis of the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses
with regards to their
credibility - Amakye vrs The
Republic [1982/83]2 GLR 1010. So
what the law requires is that
the evidence led must be certain
before the jury is asked to
determine the fate of the
accused. For in the Ali Kassena
case, Crabbe JSC observed at
page 154 that 'it is dangerous
in jury trials to leave to the
jury evidence which amounts to
suspicion only as there is the
fear that they may "put a
multitude of suspicions together
and make proof of it". It is
equally unsafe to leave to the
jury evidence which is fraught
with inconsistencies and
falsehood which abound in this
case. And the law is that a
witness whose evidence on oath
is contradictory of a previous
statement made by him whether
sworn or unsworn, is not worthy
of credit. Such evidence cannot
be regarded to be of any
importance in the light of the
previous contradictory
statement, unless the witness is
able to give a reasonable
explanation for the
contradiction - see State vrs
Otchere [1963] 2 GLR 463. Some
of the witnesses it is recalled
denied the testimony they made
before the Wuaku Commission but
the Principal State Attorney
confirmed it. 5; In Mali vrs The
State [1965] GLR 710, the
Supreme Court held that: "where
at the end of the prosecution's
case, the court requires further
evidence to enable it decide
issues raised in the evidence
given by the prosecution, then
the irresistible inference is
that the prosecution has not
made out a case and accused
should be acquitted". It
appeared the prosecution foresaw
this situation, hence its
application for leave to reŽopen
its case to adduce further
evidence. That application
failed. The obvious conclusion
to reach is that the prosecution
has failed to establish a prima
facie case against each and
every one of the accused
because: (a) the identity of the
charred remains has not been
proved positively as that of the
Ya-Na. (b)the evidence against
the accused apart from being
inconsistent, has been
discredited as a result of
cross-examination and it is
dangerous to leave such
discredited and unreliable
evidence to the jury. That being
so, I hold that the accused
herein have no case to answer.
That means that the submission
made on behalf of the accused is
upheld, |