HOME    UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

                                    COURT OF GHANA 2004

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA.

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CORAM:        KPEGAH, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

MISS AKUFFO, J.S.C.

BROBBEY, J.S.C.

DR. TWUM, J.S.C.

DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C.

 

 

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. 9/2003

 

21ST JULY, 2004

 

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CONSTITUTION 1992

 

A N D

 

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY DANIEL AWUNI PER HIS NEXT FRIEND.

 

 

MARIAN AWUNI                                                      ..          ..          ..              APPELLANT

 

VRS.

 

WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATION COUNCIL                 ..          ..          ..          RESPONDENT

 

 

 

J U D G M E N T

 

KPEGAH JSC.  On 17 June 2004, this court allowed the appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal but reserved its full reasons to be given later.  I now proceed to give my reasons why my vote was cast that the appeal be allowed. 

The facts of this case are fairly simple and I do not think a detailed discussion or analysis of them is crucial to the determination of this appeal.  The essential facts should not seriously be in dispute since the case was contested from the trial High Court to this court purely on legal grounds, both substantive and procedural, with the latter dominating and tilting the scales against the appellant in the Court of Appeal.

The case arises out of the decision of the Final Award Committee of the West African Examinations Council (hereinafter referred to as the council) not only to cancel the entire results of the appellants but also to ban them from taking part in any examinations conducted by it for three years. The facts, which in my view are essential for the determination of this matter, are briefly that the council is established by a convention between English-speaking West African countries which was later incorporated in the laws of Ghana by the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225), with the sole authority to conduct, in member countries, such examinations as the council may think appropriate and to award certificates and diplomas based on the results of such examinations. The council, therefore, is the sole authority                 responsible in Ghana for the conduct of both the Junior Secondary Basic Education Certificate Examinations (BECE) and Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (SSSCE).

Between October and December 2000, the council, as it normally does every academic year, conducted the Senior Secondary School Examinations throughout the country.  The appellants were all candidates at this examination with their parent school, the Notre Dame Minor Seminary in Navrongo in the Upper East Region as their examination centre.  While waiting for their results, the appellants were informed through the headmaster of the school about the cancellation of their entire result on the grounds that they had been involved in some examination malpractices or irregularities in relation to Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The nature of the irregularities the appellants were said to have indulged in was that they had foreknowledge of the paper and colluded among themselves in solving the questions.

Upon receipt of the letter informing him of the cancellation of the results of the appellants and the imposition on them of a three-year ban from taking any examinations under the auspices of the council, the headmaster of the Notre Dame School petitioned the council to review its decision.  He advanced a number of reasons why he felt the sanctions needed a review.  The most important and relevant, in my view, is his objection to the procedure adopted by the council in its investigations, culminating in the punishment of his students. He urged upon the                  council that the claim that the appellants had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 is only an allegation and the invocation and “application of rule 56 without further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation is a bit harsh on the poor                     students.”

By this statement, I understand the headmaster to be taking issue with the procedural unfairness of the investigations which were said to have established the involvement of the appellants in examination malpractices in relation to the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2, thereby              calling for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the appellants by the Final Award Committee of the Council.  The fact that a non-lawyer could raise such a serious issue on procedural fairness, to me only underscores how fundamental and basic its observance is by any person in our present constitutional dispensation making a decision which affects the rights of others. The headmaster also contended in his petition for a review that neither before, during, nor after the examinations at the centre was there any incident which suggested that any of the students of Notre Dame School had foreknowledge of any examination papers, let alone colluded during the examinations. The headmaster further indicated that when the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion was brought to their attention, the school authorities not only subjected the affected students to a thorough examination but also the masters to self-examination in what he called “a true spirit of a minor seminary” in the hope of finding where they might have erred this time round but their own investigations revealed the contrary.  He then protested the innocence of the affected students and claimed that any similarity in their answers might have been as a result of a particular use of a common text book – (Aki Ola Series) and SSS Mathematics (Core) (Dalaba Series); and that those books treated past questions from 1993 to 1998 which the students could have learnt.

In a short response to the headmaster’s petition for a review, the council stated as follows:

 

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers.  The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates.  As a result all scripts were scrutinized.  From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the 13 candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The council therefore applied the prescribed sanctions.”

 

The council rejected the headmaster’s assertion that the appellant during their preparations for the examinations, might have had access to and used two particular books that presented already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 because the headmaster did not indicate which of the solved problems were repeated in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) Paper 2; the Council then denied that any of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.  The council therefore reiterated its position that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the appellants.

This was followed by a letter from appellants’ solicitors raising certain legal points why they thought that the decision of the Council was unlawful, null and void since it violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution, the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255) “and a host of other laws, rules and regulations of this country.”  They also protested the innocence of the appellants and asked that their results be released.  When the council failed to meet the demands of the solicitors, they decided to resort to the courts to redress what they              perceived as the infringement of the fundamental human rights of their client.

Therefore, on 10 August 2001, the appellants’ solicitors by an  “originating notice of motion” initiated action in the Fast Track High Court seeking a number of declaratory reliefs which can be summarised as follows:

 

(i)            a declaration that the decision of the Final Awards and Examinations Committee of WAEC to cancel the entire results of the appellants is unlawful, void and of no effect;

and

 

(ii) the barring of the appellants from taking any examination conducted by WAEC for three years is equally unlawful, void and of no effect.

 

The application also sought such directions or orders which the court felt was necessary for the enforcement of any declarations made by it.

In support of their application, the appellants exhibited a number of documents which they felt supported their case.  These documents included the letter dated 30 April 2000 informing the headmaster of the cancellation of the entire results of the appellants – (exhibit A).  The headmaster’s petition on behalf of the appellants for a review was also exhibited as (exhibit B).  The reply of the council to the headmaster reiterating its position was (exhibit C).  The letter from the appellants’ solicitors was marked (exhibit D); and that of the council acknowledging same was (exhibit E).  This letter merely acknowledged receipt of the letter on behalf of the appellants and indicated, in a typical public service fashion that the petition had been forwarded to the Final Awards Committee, the decision of which would be communicated later.  It is obvious to me that it was this typical public service attitude of “we are looking into it” when action was immediately called for. That kind of response compelled the solicitors to resort to the courts and apply for a judicial review under articles 23 and 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.

In an affidavit in opposition sworn to by Mr Frederick Selby, solicitor for the council, and filed on 20 August 2001, the council tried to justify the decision of its Final Award Committee on a number of legal grounds, before finally objecting to the procedure the appellants adopted in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution.  I think it will be prudent on my part to quote the relevant paragraphs of the Council’s affidavit in opposition:

 

“(5) That in the exercise of the powers conferred on it, the respondent council has evolved rules and regulations to ensure the sanctity of examinations and also to ensure fairness to all  candidates.  This responsibility enjoins the respondent council to stem out acts of examination malpractices for the public interest…

 

(8)… The respondent council says that following allegations of leakage of the 2000 SSSCE 

           Mathematics (Core) 2 Pape

  all scripts were scrutinized.  That there was sufficient                evidence in the scripts of

  the plaintiffs (sic) confirm collusion arising out of foreknowledge.

 

(9)   In further answer the respondent council says it has all the expertise to detect collusion  among candidates.

(10) That the respondent council admits paragraph (10) of the affidavit in support and says it took the action for the public interest.

 

(11) … The respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representation.  The practice is universal with all examining bodies.

 

(12) … The respondent council says that the examination results are not a matter of human rights.  That cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an infringement of human rights.  Council will make reference to relevant provisions of the 1992 Constitution.

 

(14) … The respondent council says that as the name suggests, the Final Award Committee is the appropriate body that takes  decisions in all matters affecting the SSSCE.  As such it is the same body that can review its decisions, if any.

 

(15) … The respondent council says that the decision was based on evidence and was therefore reasonable and fair.

 

(16) … The respondent council says its decision does not contravene any provision of the 1992 Constitution.

 

(17) … The respondent council says its obligation of stemming out acts of examination malpractices is for the public interest and therefore overrides all other personal interests.”

 

After deposing to facts which can conveniently be described as a defence of justification for the council’s decision, Mr Fredeick Selby, the Solicitor for the West Africa Examinations Council, obviosly under a misapprehension, challenged the procedure adopted by the apellants in the concluding paragraphs of his affidavit in opposition thus:

 

“(18) The originating summons are used:

 

(i) under Order 54A to obtain a declaration as to construction of an instrument, will, deed or statute;

 

(ii)  under Order 54, r 15 for the etermination, without any administration of  the estate or trust, of the rights of persons interested, the ascertainment of any class of creditors, etc or the furnishing of accounts;

 

(iii)  under Order 54, r 16 for the administration of a trust or of the property of the estate of a deceased person;

 

(iv) under Order 54, r 18 for the foreclosure or redemption, etc of a mortgage.

 

(19) That the present procedure adopted by the applicants does not   give room for vidence, which is very vital in this case.

(20)That under the circumstances the procedure adopted by the plaintiffs is not the best to determine the merits of the matter.

 

(21)That the present action is misconceived and lacks merit.

 

(22)That plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs or at all.”

 

Later, in a supplementary affidavit filed on 27 August 2001, the same lawyer sought to “amend paragraphs (5) and (11)” of his original affidavit and to depose to a new information that the Final Awards Committee of the council did, indeed, invite the headmaster, Rev Fr Simon B Asofo and one Mr Konlaan, the invigilator for the day, to make representations on behalf of the appellants only for these officers to confess in written statements that the appellants did receive pre-examination briefing before the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  No such written statements were exhibited as any prudent lawyer would have done in compliance with the Rules of Court. For the avoidance of doubt, I would like to I quote the said affidavit in relevant parts:

 

“(3) That I amend paragraph (5) of the affidavit in opposition to read as follows: That in exercise of the powers conferred on it, the respondent council has evolved rules and regulations to ensure the sanctity of examinations and also to ensure fairness to all candidates.  This responsibility enjoins the respondent council to stem out acts of examination malpractices for the public interest.  Counsel will make references to regulations, structure and scheme of the examinations for the Senior                 Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSSCE).  Counsel will also make reference to the statement of Fr Simon B Asofo, headmaster indicating that he briefed the students before the commencement of the examinations.

 

(4)  That I amend paragraph (11) of my affidavit to read as follows: That in answer to paragraph (11) of affidavit in support, the respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent council as an examining body invited the headmaster of the school and Mr Konlaan, the supervisor in its investigations.  That being a school examination the respondent council did not need to invite candidates to make representation.”

 

       I would like to briefly comment on this peculiar procedure adopted by learned counsel for the council asking that he be permitted to “amend” paragraphs (5) and (11) of the affidavit he had earlier sworn to in opposition, and to depose to new facts.  I am very doubtful whether this procedure is permissible since to depose to a new state of facts which is inconsistent with that deposed to in an earlier affidavit is not the same as an application for amendment of pleadings and should not be considered as such so as to allow such a strange application at anytime as is                  permitted by the rules of court in the case of pleadings.  I dare say so because I consider a deposition as to the existence or non-existence of a state of facts as evidence for all purposes and cannot simply be   re-called by another affidavit stating a state of facts inconsistent with the earlier one, as is sought to be done in the instant case.  Even if a party could be allowed to, as it were, “amend” a deposition in an earlier affidavit, he should not be allowed to do so unless he satisfactorily explains how he came to depose to the previous information.

My Lords, I have a confession to make myself.  I was deeply troubled by this serious lapse on the part of learned counsel; and if you may permit me to re-call our anxieties and concerns during conference as to the likely ramifications of our final decision, upon reflection, however, and speaking for myself, I now think it was a needless anxiety because of this singular faux pas by learned counsel.  As I would have been persuaded to adopt a different position in this matter had there been some cogent and credible evidence on record which is supportive of this allegation and from which one can safely make a finding of fact in this direction, namely, that the headmaster and the invigilator were not only invited but also did admit to briefing the students.

I crave, your Lordships indulgence for patience with me if I appear to be treating “a non-essential issue” or an issue not relevant in this appeal because I strongly feel that the whole of my thought-process in arriving at my decision be sufficiently adumbrated.  Moreover, I feel greatly troubled by, and cannot honestly gloss over, what I consider to be learned counsel’s serious lapse and inadequacies on an important and crucial issue like tendering of confession statements from the headmaster and the invigilator to the detriment of his client’s case.

I have therefore decided to change my normal approach and to write this particular judgment in a what I will refer to as a “tutorial style;” (that is to say, pointing out what I consider to be mistakes of counsel and suggesting possible solutions), so as to forestall any possible accusations of lack of sensitivity to the public interest.

As earlier indicated, although I am skeptical about the procedure whereby a party files a supplementary affidavit seeking to, as it were, amend, recall or recant a disposition he had made in an earlier affidavit, I have, however, noticed from the record of proceedings that, the learned trial judge indulged learned counsel with a week’s adjournment to enable him put his house in order, as we often say, and yet counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity.  The following dialogue took place between him and the court when counsel attempted to show to the court the alleged confession statements.  This is what happened as recorded:

 

“Selby: … My Lord, this is a statement the headmaster wrote when he appeared before WAEC, Rev Father Simon B Asofo and then another one signed by the supervisor.  My Lord we gave them every opportunity as an institution.  The headmaster and the supervisor appeared before the WAEC committee and this are written statements they offered that day.

Judge:  Is that part of the material you have filed.

Selby:  My Lord, he is just telling us that we invited all other headmasters except this school and my Lord, I am only trying to disband that argument, they appeared before us.

Judge:  I remind you that you should not forget that you are arguing on affidavit and therefore if you know there is any material which will be of use to the court please submit it.  Make it part of the material you have filed.  Because if you have not filed any thing, I will not use it.  The rules do not permit me to use material which is not filed so don’t forget that.  I will give you one week from today, that is to say, you will be coming on 28th.  And in the interim, if you think it should be here but is not here please go and file it.  So the case is adjourned to 28 August 2001.”

 

Despite this obvious indulgent attitude of the learned trial judge, there is nothing on record to suggest that an affidavit exhibiting these two potentially decisive documents had been filed.  In my candid opinion, therefore, the decision of this court must unfortunately be put down on the inadequacies of learned counsel.  He cannot, in my humble view, escape blame for this culpa lata in the handing of this case.  Because, if such evidence were properly laid before the trial court, it would have, in my opinion, provided an unimpeachable answer to the complaint of the appellants under article 23 which enjoins administrative bodies and administrative officials, in a very robust and imperative language, to “act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law.”

The phrase “to act fairly and reasonably” in my opinion necessarily imports a duty to observe the common law maxim of audi alteram partem and other principles of natural justice which is very much part of our jurisprudence and are implicit in the constitutional provisions in article 23.  Because I cannot contemplate how a person could be said to have acted fairly and reasonably if he did not give either notice or hearing to another who was entitled to such notice or hearing before taking a decision which adversely affects his rights, neither can I contemplate a situation where a person could be said to have acted fairly and  reasonably if he acted as a judge in his own cause, or gave a biased and perverse decision!

My Lords, it is clear to me that the appellants anchored their plaint on article 23 of the Constitution of this country and, in seeking redress, took advantage of article 33(1) which confers jurisdiction on the High Court to adjudicate any lis in which an individual either alleges an actual infringement of his fundamental rights or brings a quia timet action to prevent a threatened breach of his rights. Article 33(1) states in unambiguous language as follows:

 

“33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

And in clause (2) of the said article, the High Court in the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction

 

under clause (1) is empowered to:

 

“33(2)…issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.”

 

Under clause (4) of article 33, the Rules of Court Committee of the Judicial Council is entrusted with the responsibility to make rules to regulate the practice and procedure for enforcing the fundamental rights of the individual by the courts.  And it is common knowledge that this constitutional responsibility has not yet been discharged by the appropriate authority.  It is this void or  lacuna in the rules as to the appropriate procedure to be employed to invoke the enforcement jurisdiction of the High Court under clause (1) of article 23 that                     compelled the appellants’ solicitors “to apply to the High Court for redress” by employing the procedure of “originating notice of motion” to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.  But before I consider the objection of learned counsel, I would like to digress a little bit and take a brief look at the history behind the whole of chapter 5 (articles 12-33) on the Fundamental Human Rights of the individual.

The historical and political development of the country as demonstrated by the landmark case of In re Akoto [1961] 2 GLR 523, SC not only made it paramount but inevitable that the fundamental rights of the individual be enshrined and entrenched in the 1992 Constitution, but also desirable that a mechanism be provided for their enforcement.  Therefore, in enacting the fundamental rights of the citizen in articles 12 to 32 of the Constitution coupled with a provision in article 33(1) empowering the High Court to enforce these rights, the framers of our Constitution have not only demonstrated their resolve and determination to confer rights on the individual but also that these rights be enforceable as well.  It may be that it is this mechanism that the framers of our Constitution intended to use to avoid, in the future, a similar decision like the one in In re Akoto.  Through the provisions of article 33(1), the framers of the Constitution have, as pointed out by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), in the case of Peoples’ Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138 where a similar provision in the 1969 Constitution was considered, clearly expressed their general intention that the courts should be the custodians and the protectors of the rights and liberties of the individual citizens of the country.  When, however, it is a law which infringes any of these rights and liberties, that law is pro tanto void and proceedings have to be initiated under articles 2(1)(a) and 130(1)(b) for such a declaration rather than a resort to article 33(1) of the Constitution.

     There is no gainsaying the fact that the gravamen of the appellants case is that the council did not give them any hearing contrary to the principles of natural justice which principles, by necessary implication, are now enshrined in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution before taking the decision cancelling their results; which decision in every sense will adversely affect them.  There can be no doubt, therefore, that the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the council could be reviewed by the High Court by means of a writ of certiorari to determine whether the said decision was given in compliance with the principles of natural justice and, in my view, with the provisions of article 23 of our Constitution as well.  But the appellants did not directly follow this                procedure possibly because of time constraint, as an application for certiorari, under our Rules, is ordinarily subject to be brought within six months from the date of the decision complained of.

The “originating notice on motion” taken out on behalf of the appellants, therefore, was essentially to determine whether the appellants were fairly treated or given a hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice embodied in the maxim: audi alteram partem, before they were sanctioned by the Final Awards Committee of the Council.  To me, these issues could easily and fairly be resolved on affidavit evidence without recourse to viva voce evidence as learned counsel erroneously assumed.  To me, therefore, the procedure of originating notice of             motion adopted by the appellants might not only be to avoid the constraints of time fortuitously imposed on them by the rules of court if they had brought an application for a writ of certiorari, but also as a simple, convenient and pragmatic means of vindicating their rights. And although the Rules of Court Committee is yet to regulate, as required by article 157(2) of the 1992 Constitution, the procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights enshrined in chapter five of the Constitution, I think it will be a great tragedy for the rule of law, like the decision in the Re Akoto case [1961] 2 GLR 523, SC, if we interpret article 33(1) in such a manner that an individual is, meanwhile, prevented from bringing the infringement of his fundamental rights under chapter 5 to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get unlawful conduct reviewed and stopped.  The fortunes of this case, therefore, will depend on what construction we put on the words “may apply … for redress” in article 33(1).  And we must bear in mind that in cases involving the rights of the citizen, a simple but efficacious procedure is the most desirable. I will therefore humbly urge your Lordships to adopt a very liberal and broad construction of article 33(1) rather than any restrictive and doctrinaire approach to its interpretation. As Sowah JSC (as he then was) advised (in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637), we must regard the Constitution as “a living organism capable of growth and development, as the body politic of Ghana itself is capable of growth and development.” In our efforts at interpreting the Constitution his Lordship advised thus at pp 647-648:

 

“A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation.  It does not admit of a narrow interpretation.  A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do.  We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time. 

 

And so we must take cognizance of the age-old fundamental principle of constitutional construction which gives effect to the intent of the framers of this organic law.  Every word has an effect.  Every part must be given effect.”

 

As earlier pointed out, human rights cases are matters which must not only be given liberal considerations but also must be expeditiously determined.  In such matters, therefore, a simple or non-cumbersome but efficacious procedure must be adopted for its enforcement; “simple” or “non-cumbersome” in the sense that the procedure should be readily available to, and inexpensive for the ordinary citizen of this country. And “efficacious” in the sense that the procedure will also allow for a speedy and convenient determination of the issues at stake.

After carefully reading clauses (1) and (2) of article 33 together, I am firmly of the view that the words must be given their literal and ordinary meaning; and the simple and ordinary meaning I would ascribe to the word  “redress” as it is used in clause (1) is “relief.”  And “apply” is wide enough to admit any procedure by which the court can be approached.  The question then may be asked: What types of relief can be granted by the High Court in such circumstances?  The answer is immediately provided in clause (2) of the said article 33 which empowers the High Court “to issue such directions or orders or writs … for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement” of the rights to which, in the opinion of the court, the person is entitled.  There should therefore, first, be a declaration as to the existence or otherwise of a right and its                   infringement before an appropriate “order” could be made or a “direction” issued to secure or enforce such a right.

It is my humble view that in the circumstances of the case before us, we can say without any fear of contradiction that where an individual brings such proceedings in court, he must have a high expectation of obtaining an authoritative declaration of his legal rights coupled with the grant of an appropriate judicial remedy to vindicate those rights. Therefore learned counsel’s argument that the procedure is inappropriate for a declaratory judgment, not in the accepted sense of it being a foundation for a future action, is, with the greatest respect, not                     maintainable.  Presumably the “directions” or “orders” or “writs” may be aimed at the person or body which violates the rights of the individual who brings the complaint to the court.  But to the question against whom these fundamental rights of the individual in chapter 5 can be enforced, I would, broadly speaking, answer that it is against the “state” or  “executive”; so that prima facie, the fundamental rights become enforceable against local or other authorities or agents of the state and the executive, or any person who violates them.  But article 23 specifically mentions “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials.”  This should not be inconsistent with the above submission as to the categories of persons against whom the rights can be enforced.

My Lords, it is interesting to note that in conferring supervisory jurisdiction on the High Court over all lower courts and any lower adjudicating authority, the framers of the Constitution provide, in almost identical language, that in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court has power to issue “orders” and “directions” for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of this jurisdiction.  What then is the meaning of the words “directions” or “orders” “writs” as used in clause (2) of article 33?

The writ of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition were replaced in England in 1938 by “orders” of the same name. It was quo warranto which was replaced first by information in the nature of quo warranto, and later by an injunction – that is, an order of the court.  In India, which is also a common law jurisdiction, however, the writs of habeas corpus and mandamus were replaced by “directions” in the nature of mandamus. So the words “orders” and “directions” may not be too different from the old writs since the terminology has also been in use in England; especially when “common law” as known in English jurisprudence is still applicable in our jurisdiction.  One basic principle of interpretation of statutes is that the legislature must be credited with knowledge of the state of the law.  Applying this canon of construction, it is submitted that under the common law which is still undoubtedly relevant in our                    jurisprudence, we can say that since the High Court enforces its supervisory jurisdiction through the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto of old, it is safe to presume that the words “orders” and “directions” and “writs” are used to describe what at one time were called prerogative writs in England; or they refer to these established and well-recognized English writs.  The words, in my humble opinion, have been used in clause (2) of article 33 and clause (2) or article 2 to describe well-recognized English writs.  There is, therefore, in my considered opinion, internal evidence in clauses (1) and (2) of article 33, read together, unlike in article 2 clauses (1) and (2), that the framers of the Constitution might have intended to de-emphasize the formal procedure of issuing a writ in the High Court to invoke its enforcement jurisdiction under article 33(1), and rather intended that the Rules of Court Committee make rules which will be as simple as, and similar to rules for the application for the old prerogative writs.

It is submitted that the principles governing the issue of the writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, have not been affected merely by reason of the wide language used in article 33(2).  It is doubtful to conceive of any “direction” or “order” which can secure a result, for example, a declaratory relief, which could not be secured by the writs expressly mentioned in the article.  The order, in my view, therefore, could be declaratory in form and so we can declare the rights of the appellants and secure its enforcement by the appropriate “direction” or “order” or “writ.”  But wide as the connotation of the words “directions” or “orders” in article 33(2) is, I do not consider them so wide as to include declarations for foundation of future claims.  These can                  appropriately be decided in a more appropriate proceedings.  This is not to say that any adequate alternative relief will defeat the constitutional remedy under article 33(1).  It may rather be that it is that other relief which is the only relief, and article 33(1) is neither the proper nor the adequate relief or means to secure it.  This is borne out by the phrase “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available” to the individual as used in the said article.

It is clear to me that the intention of the framers of our Constitution is that the individual who alleges that his fundamental rights have been breached or is threatened to be breached, should have cheap and unimpeded access to the High Court.  On the issue whether the                  appellants were right in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court by originating notice of motion in the absence of specific rules to vindicate their fundamental rights, I have already indicated that there is enough internal evidence in the relevant provision to permit the recourse to such a procedure. Therefore the objection that the procedure of originating notice of motion was inappropriate for the reliefs sought by the  appellants; and that until specific rules have been made by the mandated authority to regulate the procedure for invoking the enforcement               jurisdiction under article 33(1), the only viable alternative was for the appellants to have issued a writ like in civil cases is, in my view, not maintainable.  Although learned counsel did not specifically refer to Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), its influence could easily be discerned from his views.  It must be conceded that this alternative procedure is also available under clause (1) of article 33.  But it is a procedure which can hardly recommend itself to any human rights lawyer because of its cumbersome nature with its                  attendant delays which may result in considerable expenses.  In my humble opinion, the procedure of originating notice of motion is  currently the most suitable procedure, in the absence of any specific rules, for a situation which no doubt may demand some urgency and expeditious disposal.  The added advantage of this procedure is that in extreme cases, an applicant can obtain an interim relief, even if ex parte, for a brief period only.

In the High Court the learned trial judge rejected Mr Selby’s objection, dealt with the application on the merits and granted the  appellants’ reliefs by quashing the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the Council.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with learned counsel for the council and overruled the High Court and set aside its decision.  This court is therefore to decide whether the High Court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked or not.

My Lords, in overruling the High Court, the Court of Appeal held the view that two cases cited in argument were not relevant to the case they were dealing with.  These cases are: (a) People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138; and (b) Juandoo v Attorney-                 General of Guyana [1971] AC 972, PC.  In the case of the People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General, the applicants, a registered political party, applied for police permit to demonstrate in respect of certain national issues but were refused the permit by the police without                      assigning any reasons. Another political party was, however, permitted to demonstrate over some of the issues.  The People’s Popular Party therefore applied to the High Court by way of originating motion under article 28(2) of the 1969 Constitution claiming that their rights of                    association, movement and assembly as provided under the said Constitution, had been infringed.  The relief sought by them was an order compelling the police to issue them with a permit.  The Rules of Court Committee, like in this case, did not make rules to regulate the procedure to be followed under article 28(2) of the 1969 Constitution.

The court, presided over by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J, applying the case of In re Meister Locius and Bruning Ltd [1914] WN 390, held that where a statute (article 33(2) the 1992 Constitution) in this case provides for an application to be made to the court without specifying the procedure by which such an application is to be made, it may be made by originating notice of motion.  The case was also relied upon by the Law Lords in the Jaundoo case where Lord Diplock, reading the opinion of the Privy Council, quoted with approval the following words of Warrington J:

 

“… where the act merely provides for an application and does not say in what form that application is to me made, as a matter of procedure, it may be made in any way in which the court can be approached.”

 

Although the Court of Appeal is not bound by the decision of the High Court, it is inexplicable to me how this case could be said to be “hardly applicable” to the case before them, especially when the case dealt with a constitutional provision in the 1969 Constitution which can be said to be in pari material with article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution, which is involved here. 

With much respect to the learned judges of the Court of Appeal, I personally think the case is on all fours with the present one.  The Jaundoo case presents the same scenario as in the case before us.  The Government of Guyana proposed to construct a new road through the applicant’s land.  She held the view that her rights under article 8 of that country’s Constitution would be violated.  The said article prevented the compulsory acquisition of property unless under circumstances specified in the article.  There were similar provisions in the Constitution                     empowering the High Court to enforce a citizen’s fundamental rights; and also a provision requiring the rule making authority of the Supreme Court to make rules for the practice and procedure to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce the individual’s rights but this was not complied with.

The applicant by originating notice of motion applied to the High Court for redress.  The court dismissed the application in limine on the grounds that an originating notice of motion was not the proper procedure and that the proceedings should have been commenced by a writ of summons.  The case travelled up to the Privy Council where it was held that since the authorized body had not made any rules in respect of the practice and procedure for applications to be made to the High Court for redress, the right to apply was unqualified and wide enough to cover applications by any form of procedure by which the High Court could be approached to invoke its powers, and an originating motion was one such procedure.

Again, with much respect, although the Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the decision of the Privy Council in the Jaundoo case, one would have thought that it is on all fours with the case before them and contained useful guidance and should therefore have been treated with respect and applied.  But unfortunately the court said the case was “inapplicable” to the situation before it.

My Lords, if the Court of Appeal thought it had reached a complete dead end or cut-de-sac in the matter, it could have sought refuge under Order 74 of our High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), which allows the adoption of the practice in force in the High Court of England where our Rules make no provision for any procedure.  In 1962 the Supreme Court Rules were revised in England by the RSC (Review) 1962, which came into effect on 1 January 1964.  And by the said revision, Order 5 r 1 made changes as to the mode of commencing civil proceedings in the High Court.  The rule stated thus:

 

“Subject to the provisions of any Act and of these rules, civil proceedings in the High Court may be begun by writ, originating summons, originating motion or petition.”

 

This rule, juxtaposed to the provision in article 33(1), in view of the latter’s wide language, could only lead to the conclusion that the procedure adopted by the appellants to seek redress from the court was permissible.

One last point which I think is important for me to touch on is the failure of learned counsel to exhibit the alleged confession statements of the headmaster and the invigilator, one Mr Kolaan, to establish his allegation that the appellants were invited per those officials who                    confessed the offence.  The learned trial judge was therefore justified in his finding that the appellants were not given hearing at any stage of the council’s investigations into allegations of malpractices during the examinations; and this is the pith of the appellants’ complaint against the council.  To compensate for this failure, learned counsel contended that the council has the necessary expertise to detect “collusion among candidates through scrutiny of the scripts”; and that from this exercise, there was sufficient evidence to “confirm collusion arising out of                foreknowledge” against the appellants. 

I think, and this is important for emphasis, that there has been a misapprehension of the real import of the complaint of the appellants under article 23 of our Constitution.  This is so because it is a well-settled principle of administrative law that preliminary investigations, like the comparison and scrutiny of the scripts of candidates, is not subject to the principles of procedural fairness.  But when the council, after its own preliminary investigations, forms the opinion that there might have been collusion as a result of foreknowledge among the students then, I think, the principles of procedural fairness, like giving notice and hearing to the appellants, must be observed.  This is because after such preliminary investigations, the council could be said to have some evidence upon which to act and take a decision affecting the rights of the appellants.  To me, therefore, this case comes within the category of cases in which we cannot sincerely say that this serious default against article 23 had not inflicted a gross injustice on the appellants.  It was an unreasonable exercise of power.  Thus the argument of learned counsel to the effect that the issue concerned school examinations and the council could not, as a universal practice, invite the candidates to make representations is, to me, untenable since it implies the submission that the observance of the rules of natural justice was administratively inconvenient and the flawed procedure made no difference to the decision.  In this country, the right to be heard is a fundamental principle enshrined in our Constitution and cannot be ignored for reasons of administrative inconvenience.

Another problem area for the council is the type of punishment imposed on the appellants under their own regulations.  The appellants were said to have colluded in one paper – Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  This finding, admittedly was arrived at through the scrutiny of the scripts of the appellants.  The case therefore squarely falls under section B, regulation 3(a) of the council which governed the entire examinations in the year 2000.  It provides:

 

“3(a) Where cases of cheating are detected in the scripts and/or otherwise established in one paper, the results of the subject involved shall be cancelled.  Where a candidate is proved to have cheated in more than one paper/subject his entire results shall be cancelled.”

 

Clearly, the council has acted ultra vires its own regulations, that is, section B, reg (3)(a) which relates to collusion.  I do not see why Mr Selby as solicitor for the council, could not advise it that under its own regulations, it had acted ultra vires and allow for an earlier resolution of this case rather that contesting in the courts for all this while.

There has been some argument about the regulations not having been made by the Minister for Education as provided in the law establishing the council but by the council itself. The legal consequences of such a default are too great to contemplate and pronounce upon now.  In any case, I do not think it is very crucial to the determination of this case and I will prefer to rest my decision on the grounds earlier canvassed in this judgment.  We can only call upon the minister to             perform the functions he has been tasked with under PNDCL 225 to avoid any future embarrassment.

Charity, they say, begins from home.   And I cannot also forget the saying “let everybody sweep in front of his house and the whole world will be clean.”  It is the default in our system which has given rise to this case.  I cannot therefore end this judgment without quoting Lord Diplock in the Jaundoo case (supra).  He said at page 987 thus:

 

“Their Lordships, however, cannot part with this appeal without … drawing attention to the urgent need which it has disclosed for specific provision to be made under article 19(6) for the practice and procedure to be followed in applications and references to the High Court under article 9(2).  The absence of such provisions has had the result in the instant appeal that the parties have been put to the expense of three stages of interlocutory proceedings, and the applicant’s claim still remains to be heard on the merits nearly five years after the proceedings began.”

 

For article 19(6) substitute article 33(4) of the 1992 Constitution and for article 9(2) substitute article 33(1) and the sentiments expressed in this dictum will serve my purpose.

I do not think whatever decision we are compelled to arrive at will be subversive of the important public duty of the council to check and eradicate examination malpractices and preserve the integrity of its certificates and diplomas.  It is rather a decision which seeks to balance the democratic rights of the citizen as enshrined in article 23 against the obvious need, in the public interest, of the council to preserve the sanctity of its examinations.  I do not think this case is one in which injustice to one individual can be said to be of no consequence because the larger societal interest is more important.  For the right of a nation is that of the individual written in capital letters.  And a nation that stands by and looks on while the rights of the individual are slowly pecked at, eventually pays the ultimate price of finding its own rights eroded.  Often times, the concept of “public interest” and “national security” have been used to undermine and subvert individual freedoms.  These are words which are not infrequently on the lips of potential dictators and often used as convenient excuses for the violation of individual rights.  We may accept some limitation on the fundamental rights of the individual only if it is justified and proportionate.  Might be it was time we told public authorities that they would be held scrupulously to the democratic rights enshrined in chapter five (article 12-32); and especially the values impliedly enshrined in article 23.  My Lords, in view of all that I have said, I would allow the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restore the judgment of the High Court.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby set aside and that of the High Court restored.

As indicated in the preface to this opinion, we gave our decision on 17 June 2004 but reserved our reasons for allowing the appeal, and the issuing of our final orders to today.  We did so because at a pre-judgment conference held a few days before the intended judgment day to discuss our final orders, we were divided in opinion as to whether the appellants, in view of the circumstances of the case, were entitled to some damages as part of the redress or not.  And, if so, what factors were to be considered.  We therefore invited further submissions from both counsel as a form of assistance to us.  The essence of questions we posed to counsel can succinctly and neatly be reframed thus: whether a constitutional provision like article 33(1) for redress for breach of fundamental rights and liberties should be interpreted to include the award of damages when the act complained of is the non-observance of the rules of natural justice, or the violation a fundamental rights as in the instant case.

Admittedly, the question does not lend itself to an easy answer.  This is because customarily, a breach of the principles of natural justice does not, as such, give rise to a cause of action in public law proceedings for damages.  Strictly speaking, therefore, such a breach is not defined to include the risk that the irregularity might proximately affect the outcome and give rise to award of damages in public law proceedings.

In canvassing this traditional viewpoint that proceedings such as these are public law proceedings and therefore the appellants are not entitled to damages, learned counsel for the West African Examinations Council relied on decided cases like Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd (In              Liquidation) [1949] All ER 544 and the views of Simon Brown J in the case of Thames Valley Police; Ex parte Cotton [1989] COD 318 where the learned judge said at page 320 thus:

 

“The mere fact of succeeding in judicial review proceedings does not supply [an applicant with the cause of action].  Successful natural justice challenges do not carry in their wake damages claims.  They entitle the applicant to a fresh decision but it is generally well recognized that the mere quashing of a decision and the recognition that the state of affairs which it brought about was unlawfully occasioned does not carry with it an entitlement to damages.”

 

This is a classic common law position which is still part of the Laws of Ghana.  But the issue is whether article 33(1) should be interpreted to include the award of some damages as part of the “redress” under the said article.  Learned counsel submitted that the above dictum “mirrors the Ghanaian position” and that the only remedies available are those mentioned in article 33(2).  The logical conclusion of this submission, in my view, is that the orders, directions and writs etc are intended only to enforce the particular rights contravened and this cannot be achieved by the award of damages; a position, counsel submitted, which is reinforced by the words “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available” to a victim.  This, counsel submitted, not only excludes the right to damages after a successful application under article 33(1) of the Constitution but also concedes the multiplicity of actions and prevents a plea of estoppel so that an aggrieved person must institute fresh action for damages.

In the case of Edusei v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 1 at page 46, I did express myself in words which may appear to be supportive of this view when I was commenting on the words “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available to him” thus:

 

“These words cannot be said to have conferred jurisdiction on this court, or any other court for that matter, to enforce individual rights as some may argue.  In my humble opinion, it simply means that if any other cause of action is open to an individual as a result of the violation of his rights, he shall not be foreclosed by his initial action to vindicate his right from pursuing that other action. An example can help                 illustrate the point.  Mr Delali, a businessman, has been  unlawfully detained for say six months before his release through an application for a habeas corpus.  Mr Delali is not precluded from bringing an action for damages if his business has collapsed as a direct result of his detention and for unlawful detention.” (The emphasis is mine.)

 

It is therefore true to say that while a prior recourse to proceedings under article 33(1) of the Constitution to secure the immediate determination of the breach of a fundamental right cannot be construed as a waiver of the consequences of the breach with its attendant remedies previously known to our laws in any private law proceedings, it may not also be too far-fetched to say that the intention of the framers of the Constitution is to create a new remedy in addition to any existing remedies known to the common law.  The question whether the appellants are entitled to some compensatory award may therefore be resolved by the interpretation we put on the word “redress” as used in article 33(1).

My Lords, the breadth of language employed in the said article 33(1) should encourage us to follow the broad-minded approach and liberal interpretation adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago [1978] 2 WLR 902 where it was held that the award of some damages could be a component of the redress the court is entitled to give.

This was a case in which a lawyer was convicted of contempt and sentenced to prison for seven days without due process.  He immediately filed an ex parte notice of motion to the High Court under section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago, claiming redress for the violation of his fundamental rights, guaranteed under section 1(a) of the said Constitution, not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process.  In the Privy Council the majority of their Lordships held the view that an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under section 1 “has been” contravened is clearly a form of “redress” which a person is entitled to claim under section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress in a post contravention situation as it is in the instant case before us. It must be pointed out that section 6(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago corresponds with article 33(1) of our Constitution and is couched in almost identical language with the influential words “may apply to the High Court for redress” featuring in both provisions.

Their Lordships were confronted with the same problem which now confronts us in the instant case.  And as pointed out by Lord Hailsham of St Maryleborne in his dissenting opinion: “the only question in this appeal is whether the state is liable to pay monetary compensation to the appellant.”  The majority answered in the affirmative, and speaking per Lord Diplock, said:

 

“What then was the nature of the ‘redress’ to which the appellant was entitled?  Not being a term of legal art it must be understood as bearing its ordinary meaning, which in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, (3rd ed) 1944 is given as: Reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for a wrong sustained or the loss resulting from this.  At the time of the original notice of motion the appellant was still in prison.  His right not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law was still being contravened; but by the time the case reached the Court of Appeal he had long ago served his seven days and had been released.  The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

My Lords, although we are not bound to follow the decisions of the Privy Council or any other court, I am not particularly enthused with treating this decision with any careless abandon in view of the similarity in language of article 33(1) with section 6(1) involved in the Maharaj case.  It is therefore a case I find very relevant and persuasive enough and we must accord much judicial respect to it.

The Maharaj case, like the instant case, was dealing with a post violation of the fundamental rights situation.  The appellant had already served his sentence before his appeal was heard and the Board of the Privy Council felt the only way such a wrong could be adequately              redressed was not only by quashing the conviction and order of imprisonment but also by the award of some damages. And in the case before us we are similarly dealing with a contravention which is now in the past.  The appellants have been frustrated in planning their future in the academic field and entire life for the past four years not only as a result of the unlawful suspension of their entire results but also their illegal barring from taking any examinations under the auspices of the council for three years.  I find intolerable and unconscionable the                 situation the appellants went through by the decision of the council; especially when under their own regulations they are not entitled to withhold the entire results of the appellants and in addition bar them for three years.

In the circumstances, I think a token and moderate compensatory award coupled with the relevant orders and directions to the council will fairly and reasonably redress the contravention of the appellants’ rights.  I must, however, caution that this should be limited to its own facts since it is not intended to represent any general principle regulating a court’s discretion which will open the floodgates for the award of all types of damages in public law proceedings.

My Lords, under article 129(4) of the 1992 Constitution we are    empowered to do what the court below ought to have done.  It will certainly be a needless dissipation of valuable time to remit this case to the court below, as was one in Maharaj case, with a direction to assess the “damages.”  I would instead recommend to your Lordships that each of the appellants be awarded a token monetary compensation only, assessed at ¢5 million cedis to each of the appellants.

    

 

 

F. Y. KPEGAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

SOPHIA AKUFFO JSC Essentially, this case is about access to timely and effective judicial protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution, in general, and the right of the individual to administrative justice in particular. I will briefly touch upon the objectives of chapter 5 and discuss the objectives and scope of articles 33 and 23 in some detail. I will not set out to any great extent the factual background of the appeal since some of my learned colleagues have ably done so in their respective opinion. However, I will advert to some of the salient facts as and when necessary.

The Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms

In our collective and national quest for overall good governance, the rights and freedoms set out in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution constitute, by far, some of the most crucial mechanisms created by the Constitution for assuring the attainment and sustenance of the political, social, economic and cultural foundations of a modern democracy. The Committee of Experts (Constitution), in their Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana gave comprehensive justifications for the formulation of chapter 5, and the inclusion of provisions on fundamental human rights and freedoms in our Constitution. Of their numerous reasons, one may refer, in particular, to those set out in paragraphs 132, 133 and 139 of the Report, which respectively read as follows:

“132. Throughout Africa and, indeed, a significant part of the Third World, there has been, in recent years, a sustained public clamour for the promulgation and enforcement of human rights and freedoms as a critical ingredient of the democratization process…

133. This resurgence of interest in human rights is hardly surprising. Apart from the obvious desire for a more democratic order and the universal yearning for human dignity, there is a growing realization that the enjoyment of the basic freedoms is conducive to the development and purposeful application of human resources and, indeed, the establishment of an environment that enhances development...

139. The Committee also elaborated the social and economic aspects of human rights – aspects which are of particular relevance to the conditions of Africa and the developing world generally. Some of these rights are included in the proposed Directive Principles of State Policy, except that here they are more precisely elaborated as rights...”

The scope and magnitude of guaranteed fundamental human rights and freedoms are such that, the 1992 Constitution, in article 33(5) makes it very clear that the rights and freedoms specified in chapter 5 are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive of other rights, duties, declaration and guarantees relating to fundamental rights and freedoms “which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.” (The emphasis is mine). They are also reflected in the opening clause of chapter 5 (article 12(1)) which declares that:

“12(1). The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Execudive, Legislature and Judiciary and all other organs of the government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the courts as provided for in this Constitution.”

Thus, the judiciary is also required to do everything constitutionally and legally possible to assure that, in the exercise of its functions, these rights and freedoms are upheld and respected; subject of course to a concomitant respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest. The Constitution, in chapter five, does not only proclaim the fundamental rights and freedoms but goes on, in article 33, to provide, through the High Court, effective means for assuring the                     protection of these rights. In this light, therefore, it is the duty of the High Court, and appellate courts, to ensure that, where a person approaches the seat of justice for the protection of his rights and freedoms, the procedural rules of court do not become instruments for obstructing or denying the  aggrieved person’s access to justice. Hence, the well-known dictum of Collins MR in  In re Coles & Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1 at 4 remains a healthy reminder that:

“Although I agree that a court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, I think that the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaiden rather than mistress, and the court ought not to be so far bound and held by rules, which after all are only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case.”

Issues for determination

In arriving at its decision that is now on appeal, the Court of Appeal made the following key

findings:

(1) The procedure by which the High Court’s jurisdiction was invoked was contrary to the rules of the court and therefore irregular and incurably bad, especially since the action raises issues of fact that can only be established by evidence.

 

(2) The procedure adopted by the appellant is inapplicable in asserting a right under article 23.

 

(3) Until it has been clearly and amply demonstrated that a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached or contravened, no one can bring an originating  motion on notice under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(4) In arriving at its decision to impose penalties on the appellant and his colleagues, the respondent (hereinafter referred to as WAEC) was exercising an administrative rather than judicial function. Therefore, there has not been any breach of article 23 of the Constitution.

 

(5) The action taken by the WAEC was neither ultra vires nor arbitrary, but rather in accordance with the provisions of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).

       In this appeal, the appellant filed no less that ten grounds most of which are, to my mind,

 

merely verbose and repetitive. In substance, these grounds may be summed up as follows:

 

(a) The Court of Appeal erred when it held that the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1) of the Constitution may be invoked only when a fundamental human right under the  Constitution has in fact been contravened.

 

(b) The Court of Appeal erred in holding that, in the exercise of its statutory and administrative functions, WAEC had not breached the appellants’ right to administrative justice under article 23.

 

(c) The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the procedure of  originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed and was inapplicable to article 23.   

 

The determination of this appeal, therefore, turns on the two central issues of:

 

 (1) whether or not the procedure of originating motion on notice to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution is inappropriate, flawed and/or incurably bad; and

 

(2) whether or not WAEC has breached the appellants’ rights  under article 23 or any of their fundamental human rights.

 

Procedure for invoking article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution

 

I will first deal with the more primary issue of the appropriate procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) and (2), in view of the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. The article reads as follows:

 

“33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this  Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be  contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.

   (2) The High Court may, under clause (1) of this article, issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

It is clear to me that the primary objective of article 33(1) is to give full effect to the preceding provisions of chapter 5, by making them  enforceable by the High Court at the instance of every person who claims to be affected by a past, on-going or impending breach of any of the said provisions. In order to protect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the chapter five, therefore, the article gives to every person, who alleges that any of his rights or freedoms has been, is being or is likely to be contravened, a right of access to the High Court for redress. And the High Court, pursuant to its obligation under article 12(1) to protect and uphold these rights and freedoms, has been given the mandate (under article 33(2)) to exercise the full gamut of its judicial powers to assure effective redress to such a person who brings his or her grievance before it. By virtue of article 140(1), the High Court has (subject to the Constitution) jurisdiction in all matters. One would, therefore, be justified in thinking that, given its breadth, such jurisdiction would                encompass the matters set out in article 33(1) and (2). It is, therefore, noteworthy that, despite this broad jurisdiction, the drafters of the Constitution deemed it necessary to include these provisions specifically and subject article 140 to them. It is also significant that, having, in article 140(1) given such an expansive jurisdiction, the next clause (article 140(2)), nevertheless, particularises the High Court’s jurisdiction to enforce human rights and freedoms. We can only presume that, by article 33(1) and (2), the esteemed drafters intended to create, and have created, a special jurisdiction of the High Court which may be invoked in the manner stipulated in that article. 

I believe it is pertinent, at this stage, to set out some salient portions of the judgment under appeal herein. Owusu-Ansah JA, in his opinion (concurred in by his brothers in the Court of Appeal), made the following statements:

 

     “That provision [ie article 33(1)] in my opinion, postulates that in this case the fundamental human right under the Constitution of 1992 has been contravened in relation to the aggrieved party; this must be a condition precedent to the             invocation of article 33(1)

       ... It is not very clear which ‘fundamental human right’ under the Constitution has been breached or contravened so as to justify the invocation of article 33(1)

   … by means of an originating motion on notice or  originating summons

    … In my view the procedure adopted in this case, that is,  originating motion on notice, is inappropriate and flawed, since … the respondents (the appellants herein) were seeking a number of declarations

     … It is my considered view that the jurisdiction of the High Court could and should have been more appropriately invoked

     … The (the respondent therein) catalogues a list of statutory provisions allegedly contravened by the appellant council, in many cases without any indication as to how. However, these alleged rights can only be asserted by means of the proper             procedures in order to invoke the  jurisdiction of the court

     … In my view, unless the jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked in accordance with the relevant Rules any argument, however meritorious, cannot be entertained

       … Again it is a well established rule that where the facts are not capable of being determined on affidavit

      … then and in that event it will be necessary to take evidence.

      The court cannot condone such a glaring error as occurred in this case

    … The jurisdiction of the court is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties to the suit, the power or authority to adjudicate

       ... Jurisdiction can be properly invoked under Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A)

      … which provides that “Every action in the High Court shall be commenced by a writ of summons” subject of course to a few exceptions, such as a petition in a divorce case under Order 55, r 3(1) or in an appropriate case, an originating motion or                  originating summons

      ... It is true that no Rules had been made by the Rules of Court Committee in pursuance of article (33(4) of the Constitution. That, however, is immaterial until it has been clearly and amply demonstrated that a constitutionally guaranteed  human right has been breached or contravened, giving rise to the invocation of article 33(1). In such an eventuality, no one can legitimately quarrel with such an application being made by an originating motion on notice. Thus in my respectful view the decision in People’s Popular Party v Attorney General [1971] 1 GLR 138 cited with approval in subsequent cases is hardly applicable to the instant case

      … A careful perusal of the available affidavit evidence, the facts of the case, and all the surrounding circumstances would seem to confirm the need to take evidence to resolve the crucial  pertinent issues of fact in order to do substantial justice… It goes without saying that whether the council had ‘acted fairly and reasonably and complied with the law’ under article 23 of the Constitution must be issues of fact to be established by evidence. Hence the procedure adopted by the respondents is inapplicable in asserting a right under article 23.” (The  emphasis is mine).

 

As with every enactment, we have to presume that the drafters of the  Constitution chose with the utmost care, every word included therein and that, unless the contrary is established, such words must be given their normal and ordinary meaning. Therefore, when article 33(1) gives to a person alleging that any of his rights and freedoms under chapter five has been, is being or is likely to be contravened the right to apply to the High Court for redress, there is an irresistible presumption that such a person may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of an                  application rather than by way of a writ of summons. When fundamental human rights have been, are being or likely to be contravened, access to judicial redress must be as swift and timely as feasible to ensure that such rights or freedoms are not lost or irremediably damaged forever. Hence, in the light of the objective of article 33(1) (as hereinbefore mentioned), it is clear to me that what article 33(1) seeks to assure, by making provision for access by an application rather than a writ of summons (a relatively sluggish process), is that such a complaint be disposed of by the High Court with the optimum dispatch.

Admittedly, Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 dictates that all civil actions must be commenced by a writ of summons. The same Rules, as Owusu-Ansah JA correctly noted, make exceptions in specified circumstances (which do not include proceedings for the protection of constitutional rights) for the commencement of proceedings by other procedures, such as originating summons and originating motion on notice. However, as I have already stated above, we have to view the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1) as a special one; and by clear constitutional stipulation, it may be invoked by an application. Whether such an application must be by originating summons or originating motion on notice, the Constitution does not prescribe any particular form for such an application, but rather                     envisages, in article 33(4), that the Rules of Court Committee would make rules to guide the practice and procedures for the purposes of the article. Article 33(4) signifies a recognition that the existing Rules of the High Court predate the Constitution by almost four decades, were                enacted under a colonial regime, and do not necessarily address all the innovations, intentions and underlying aspirations of the Constitution. As yet, however, there are no correlated provisions in the Rules of the High Court that mandate any particular form of application for invoking article 33(1).  It is, therefore, my view that, until such rules have been made, the High Court must be guided by the terms of the article itself plus commonsense and pragmatism. This is the only means by which the judiciary can assure the realisation of the objective of the article. Indeed, it is my respectful view that, given the special nature of the jurisdiction created by article 33(1), the form of the application is not necessarily crucial, so long as the High Court becomes aware of the claim (or allegation), by one procedural means or the other, its jurisdiction must be deemed to have been properly invoked.

Additionally, it is clear from the language of article 33 that, contrary to the views expressed by the Court of Appeal, the form of desired redress cannot dictate the appropriate procedure for invoking the  jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, whether the aggrieved person is claiming declarations, directions or orders from the High Court is immaterial. Where the redress claimed is such as would necessitate the reception of parole evidence, the court has the power to give directions for the hearing of the same. Thus, in the case of Sumaila v Attorney-General (FTC (HR) 15/2001), Accra, unreported wherein an applicant brought an originating motion on notice to enforce his rights, and made certain factual allegations, which, in the view of the court (coram Agyeman-Bempah JA sitting as an additional High Court Judge to hear motions), must be established by parole evidence, the court, correctly in my view, ordered the parties to file pleadings and remitted the matter for substantive hearing.

One may even venture further to state that, from the language of articles 33(1) and (2), what matters is the allegation. If it is proven, it is for the court to fashion an effective redress that would, in terms of article 33(2), be “appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the              enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.” Consequently, whatever form of application is used to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1), and whatever be the nature of the redress sought by the applicant, no court may justifiably fault the commencement procedure or the proceedings, for the article does not create any procedural distinctions on the basis of the type of redress sought. And given the absence of explicit procedural rules to regulate practice and procedure under this article, the statement made by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), when he found himself in a similar situation in People’s Popular Party v Attorney General (supra at page 145), to the effect that when a statute (in that case article 28(4) of the 1969 Constitution)

“… provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is to be made and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such an  application may be made by an originating motion.

remains as applicable to our current circumstances as it did in 1970, when he delivered his judgment, and I fully endorse it as the most  sagacious and practical approach.

In my respectful view, therefore, the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal erred when, as is evident from their judgment, it subsumed the High Court’s jurisdiction in article 33(1) under Order, 2 r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, and held that the procedure used by the appellants herein to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was flawed and inappropriate. To the contrary, the procedure utilised was appropriate and correct for an application under article 33(1), regardless of the nature of reliefs claimed, and I hold that the High Court’s                      jurisdiction was properly invoked.

In arriving at this conclusion, I have given due consideration to the well-presented arguments set out in counsel’s statement of case for WAEC. However, I am not persuaded by them since their effect would be to thwart the intent of the framers of the Constitution in enacting article 33(1). One of these effects would be that the nature of the redress claimed would determine the appropriate form of commencement procedure. This will result in our placing procedural limitations on the scope and effect of a constitutional provision, which are neither expressed therein nor  necessarily implied thereby. I would decline to do any such thing.

Still on the issue of appropriate procedure for invoking article 33(1), the Court of Appeal appears to have persuaded itself, erroneously, that in order for the High Court to do justice in the matter, the circumstances required the reception of parole evidence “to resolve the crucial,                 pertinent issues of fact.” Owusu-Ansah JA, enumerated, as examples necessitating such evidence, WAEC’s allegation of foreknowledge and collusion, as well as the appellants’ allegation of breaches of articles 19 and 23. However, as is clear from the application and affidavit in                 support, all that the appellants herein were asking from the High Court was protection against WAEC’s alleged contravention of their rights  under these articles.

By the nature of their application and the facts deposed to, therefore, the only key issue properly arising in the High Court was whether or not WAEC had a duty to give and gave the appellants a fair and reasonable hearing before imposing the penalties on them. This, the appellants sought to establish by their affidavit and the attachments thereto. Certainly, the High Court was not being called upon to try any issue as to whether or not the students had foreknowledge of the examination questions or had colluded amongst themselves; such issues did not  properly arise from the application and did not need to be determined before the court could decide on the issue of contravention of the Constitution. In any event, as already pointed out above, even if, in the interest of justice, the determination of the application did indeed call for the reception of parole evidence and an opportunity for cross-examination, the High Court could have given the appropriate orders and directions. 

The Court of Appeal, as is evident from the excerpts hereinbefore quoted, also proceeded under an erroneous impression that, as a condition precedent to the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction, article 33(1) postulates that a fundamental human right under the                  Constitution must have been contravened in relation to the aggrieved person. With all due respect to their Lordships of the Court of Appeal, the article clearly postulates no such thing, as is patent from its plain language. As I understand the article, the only condition precedent (if such be a correct depiction) to the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction specified therein is an allegation by a person that one or more of her fundamental rights and/or freedoms under the Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened. Hence, the                        contravention may be in the past, ongoing or merely threatened. Once such a person brings an application, in order to succeed, it will, of course, be incumbent upon her to demonstrate to the court which provision of chapter 5 of the Constitution (or other fundamental human right or                 freedom) has been, is being or likely to be contravened and in what manner; whether or not the applicant surmounts these hurdles will depend on the court finding as demonstrably proven, the grounds for the application. Thus, an applicant has nothing to prove or demonstrate               before the right to invoke article 33(1) can accrue to him, and it is incomprehensible to me why the Court of Appeal stated otherwise.

The right to administrative justice

Article 23 of the Constitution provides that:

 

“Administrative bodies and administrative officers shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

Thus, by this article, the right to administrative justice is given  constitutional force, the objective being the assurance to all persons the due observance and application of the principles of natural justice which foster due process and the stated qualities, in the performance of                    administrative activities that affect them. In my view, the scope of article 23 is such that, there is no distinction made between acts done in exercise of ordinary administrative functions and quasi-judicial administrative functions. Where a body or officer has an administrative function to perform, the activity must be conducted with, and reflect the qualities of fairness, reasonableness and legal compliance.  I will not venture to give a comprehensive definition of what is fair and reasonable, since these qualities are dictated by the circumstances in which the administrative function is performed. At the very least however, it includes probity, transparency, objectivity, opportunity to be heard, legal competence and absence of bias, caprice or ill-will. In particular, where, as in this case, the likely outcome of an administrative activity is of a penal nature, no matter how strong the suspicion of the commission of the offence, it is imperative that all affected persons be given reasonable notice of the allegations against them and reasonable opportunity to be heard, if the objective of article 23 is to be achieved. This is in line with current trends in administrative law in general, and as pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th ed) (Reissue) Vol 1(1), para 84:

"…the obligation to observe natural justice is not confined to bodies constrained to observe the procedural and evidential rules of a court of law. For this reason the courts have tended in recent years to speak less of natural justice and more of a duty to act fairly. This is not a duty which is confined to persons and bodies having a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially, although whether a function is more                    characteristically administrative or quasi-judicial may be one factor determining what fairness requires in its exercise.”

In this appeal, it is quite clear from the record, and also not in dispute, that WAEC did not notify the appellants of the allegations and suspicions raised against them, or give them any reasonable opportunity to be heard before deciding to cancel their results and impose the three-year ban against them. The first time they had knowledge of any problems concerning their examinations was through exhibit A, a letter from WAEC and addressed to the Headmaster of their school. That letter, referred to  rule 5b, pages 3-5 of the 1997/98 West African               Examinations Council Regulations and syllabus, and informed the headmaster that:

“… by decision of the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment Committee  … the results of the candidates listed below have been cancelled as indicated because of their                  involvement in some examination irregularities.”

 The letter further indicated that the irregular paper was Mathematics Core 2 and barred the appellant and his twelve colleagues from all examinations conducted by the respondent for three years. The nature of the irregularity was stated as follows:

“It was alleged that the candidates had foreknowledge of the paper and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.” (The emphasis is mine).

The headmaster, in response to this letter, protested against the grounds for WAEC’s decision and petitioned it to review the same (exhibit B). WAEC replied with a letter dated 6 June 2001 (exhibit C) the most crucial part of which reads as follows:

 

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers. The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates. As a result all scripts for all subjects were scrutinized. From the scrutiny, it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2. The council therefore applied the prescribed                      sanctions.

In making a case for your candidates you intimated that your candidates had access to two particular books that present already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 which they ‘could have learnt.’ Your letter did not, however, indicate which of the solved problems were repeated in the in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 for which there could ‘have been coincidence of details’. None of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.”

According to the appellant throughout the examinations, neither he nor any of the twelve other students was ever questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by anyone for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices; he was never aware of any allegations of               impropriety having been raised by any person against him or any of his colleagues, in respect of any examination paper. Furthermore, he never had any foreknowledge of any of the examination papers nor did he collude with the other said students to gain foreknowledge of any such papers. Moreover, according to the appellant, before cancelling the examination results and barring him and said other candidates, they were:

“neither privy to any enquiry, investigation or trial to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination malpractice that might have been levelled against us nor were we given any opportunity by the respondent to make any representations or give any testimony as to our innocence to any such allegations.”

The appellants also caused their solicitors to write (per exhibit D) to WAEC, stating the appellant’s case and offering to produce the appellant as well as the other 12 persons for interrogation. Although the WAEC replied that the matter had been referred to the Final Awards Committee, there was no further communication from the respondent regarding the outcome of the said committee’s deliberations on the matter and the penalty imposed on the first appellant and his colleagues remained in effect.

 

By virtue of article 12(1) of the 1992 Constitution all institutions and persons (whether natural or legal) are enjoined to respect and uphold the rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter 5. WAEC is a legal person established by a multilateral convention, of which Ghana is a signatory. This Convention is given the force of law in Ghana by the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255). Thus, WAEC is a legal creature, which exists and functions in Ghana through this enactment and is subject to the 1992 Constitution. Its functions, as set out in article 4 of the schedule to the PNDCL 255, include the annual review and                     consideration of examinations to be held in member countries of the Convention, conducting such examinations, and awarding certificates and diplomas on the results of the examinations. It also has power under PNDCL 255, to cancel or withhold results or certificates and prohibit persons from participating in its examinations. Therefore, it is an administrative body and, as such, it is also subject to the provisions of article 23, which are, without doubt, applicable to legal persons. Thus, in the exercise of its functions and powers under PNDCL 255, the respondent must, like every other administrative body in Ghana, comply with article 23 and act fairly, reasonably and lawfully.

It is clear from the record of appeal and exhibits A and C in particular, that the process by which WAEC “established” the allegations made against the appellants was neither fair nor reasonable. The process, in the circumstances, was also, in my view, not in compliance with PNDCL 255, ss 3 and 10, the law under which WAEC exists and operates. WAEC, therefore, contravened the appellants’ rights under article 23. The said sections 3 and 10 of PNDCL 255 provide that:

3(1) Any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the Council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him -

(a) has in his possession any examination paper;(b) is found to have had fore-knowledge of the contents of

     any examination paper; or

 

(c) makes use of any examination paper or the contents of

     it in any manner whatsoever, commits an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less ¢20,000.00 and not exceeding ¢500,000.00 or   imprisonment for a term of not more than two years or to both.

 

(2)Where a candidate before or during an examination is found to have acted or is found acting in breach of the provisions of subsection (1) __

 

(a) he shall be disqualified from taking the examination and the entire results of the candidate in the examination shall be cancelled; and

 

(b)  the council may prohibit the candidate from taking any examination conducted by or on behalf of the council for a period of not less than two years immediately following the breach.

    

(3) The penalties contained in this section shall be in addition to any penalties that may be imposed by a Court or Tribunal.

    

 (10) Where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper or cheated in any way during an examination, a report shall be made to the council which shall take such action, including the cancellation of examination results and any certificate issued in respect thereof to the candidate.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

In his statement of case herein, counsel for WAEC argued that in upholding the appellants’ claim that he had not been heard, the trial judge failed to take into account sections 3(2) and 10 of the above-quoted provisions. According to counsel, section 3(2) must not and cannot be interpreted to impose on WAEC a duty to conduct a trial before exacting a penalty against an offending candidate since such a requirement would render impossible the application of the provision. Rather, according to counsel, WAEC may, under the section, withhold examination results if, in the course of marking a paper, it discovers that the answers of candidates from a particular school “are so identical as to lead to the conclusion that the candidates must have cheated.” Counsel, therefore, submitted that “the Council has the right to withhold the results of a candidate over whose script it entertains genuine suspicion”, and no rules of natural justice come into play in such a situation.

Regarding section 10, counsel also argued that, in the performance of administrative duty, it is not in every instance that a hearing must be conducted, and where it is impossible or inconvenient to expect such procedure, the court would not enforce it. He urged, further, that the function of the council relates to the education of the youth and maintenance of academic standards, and the council needs a free hand to perform its functions “without undue interference from lazy students who would rather cheat than learn for their exams.” He, therefore, submitted that the Court of Appeal was right when it held that section 10 does not impose a judicial inquiry on the council.

The rules of natural justice are never suspended in the absence of express and lawful stipulation to the contrary. They serve as an undercurrent running beneath the legitimate exercise of every administrative power. Hence, although it is true that neither section 3 nor section 10 (or indeed any of the provisions of the PNDCL 255) obliges the respondent WAEC to impose a penalty only after undertaking the full rigours of a court trial or proceedings, it is quite clear to me that, at the minimum, these provisions envisage and require some form of due                 process which comply with the principles of natural justice and reflect the qualities of fairness and reasonableness dictated by article 23. A full reading of sections 3 – 10 of PNDCL 255shows that each of the offence-creating sections must be read together with section 10. When read this way, it will be seen that each offence may be established in one of two ways, either because a person has been caught red-handed committing the offence; or has been found, after an investigation or a trial, to have committed the offence. In either situation the alleged                 offender must have been “found” committing or to have committed the offence.

Unfortunately, PNDCL 255 does not prescribe what form an investigation should take, and there are no regulations governing the procedure for investigating allegations of examination offences (the regulations to which WAEC made reference in exhibit A are not, and cannot be, those envisaged by section 12(b) and do not, in any event, deal with investigation procedures). However, since PNDCL 255 is subject to the 1992 Constitution, any investigation must comply with the requirements of article 23. Therefore, the absence of lawfully prescribed procedures does not exonerate WAEC, as an administrative body, from the obligation, to act fairly, reasonably and lawfully in the exercise of its powers to withhold or cancel results, and impose bans. In the absence of any prescribed procedure for investigation, one may consider the  ordinary meaning of the word to ascertain whether there was any. To “investigate”, according to the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, is “to carry out a thorough, detailed and often official inquiry into, or                examination of, something or someone.” (The emphasis is mine). The requisite degree of thoroughness and amount of detail will be dictated by the circumstances of each case. However, it is my view that, in this case, there was no attempt to achieve even a modicum of thoroughness on the part of WAEC. An allegation or suspicion, however genuine, and conjecture arrived at through a one-sided in-house process cannot amount to an investigation.

In this case, there is no dispute that none of the affected candidates was actually caught red-handed committing any of the alleged offences. Rather, WAEC’s case is that the identical answers given by the candidates raised genuine suspicion of foreknowledge and collusion. Thus, the circumstances only raised a suspicion, which should have been substantiated by fair and reasonable means in order to constitute an investigation. However genuine, mere suspicion is not enough and, bearing in mind the likely outcome of the inquiry (if it may called such) WAEC ought to have conducted a more serious investigation in the course of which the affected persons should have been given some opportunity to be heard. Nor can convenience and expediency serve as guiding principles in the exercise of WAEC’s penal powers if the outcome, in the circumstances, smacks of unfairness, unreasonableness or unlawfulness. Therefore, the fact that an investigation which complies with natural justice and meets the constitutional standards of fairness and  reasonableness might seem inconvenient or impracticable is no excuse. It is true that a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard does not necessarily require a full-dress hearing process. As was pointed by Twumasi J (as he then was) in Republic v Ghana Railway Corporation; Ex parte Appiah [1981] GLR 752 (as stated in holding (2):

 

“The core idea implicit in the natural justice principle of audi alteram partem was simply that a party ought to have reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and ought to be given the opportunity to make his statement in explanation of any question and answer any arguments put forward against it. The principle did not require that there must be a formal trial of a specific charge akin to court proceedings… In dealing with the principles of natural justice, one has always to bear in mind that the principles are substantive rather than procedural safeguards. Therefore the fact that a particular formal               procedure is not adopted, does not of itself imply that the  principle has not been applied in an appropriate case.”

In the circumstances of the instant matter, a letter to the suspected candidates informing them of the allegation and the grounds therefor, plus an invitation for their comments or explanations might have sufficed. And, certainly, when the appellant, through, his solicitor, requested a hearing and interrogation of himself and his colleagues, WAEC should have afforded them the opportunity. Consequently, the Honourable Court of Appeal was ill-advised and in error when, in the course of the judgment under appeal, the learned Owusu-Ansah JA, on behalf of the Court of Appeal, said:

“It seems to me that the council were exercising an administrative function rather than a judicial function when it came to a conclusion and decided to impose the penalties                complained of under section 3(3) of PNDCL 255 “the penalties contained in this section shall be in addition to any other penalties that may be imposed by a Court or a Tribunal.” That is if the appellant, in its wisdom, had decided to prosecute the respondents... West African Examinations  Council Law PNDCL 255 is by virtue of the provisions of the 1992 Constitution, part of the Laws of Ghana… This section 10 does not necessarily imply or even envisage a court action or proceeding. The council had been invested with power to investigate and take action. No legal enquiry was contemplated.  It is common  knowledge that the council in the fullness of its wisdom and in order to preserve its integrity and reputation, cancelled the entire results. I hold that the action taken by the council was neither ultra vires nor arbitrary but in accordance with the provisions of PNDCL 255.”

 

I am not unmindful of the critical importance of WAEC’s role in safeguarding the quality and international credibility of its examinations and resultant certificates and diplomas. Most members of this court have undergone, at least, one WAEC administered examination and are who we are because of its integrity. This role has been, is and will continue to be vital to the socio-economic development of Ghana and the other signatories of the Convention. However, the enviable standing of WAEC can be sustained only by ensuring that its administrative processes,              including the exercise of its powers, remain just. In my view, this can only be achieved through patent constitutionalism and legality, rather than through opacity and arbitrariness. Towards this end, it will inure to the benefit of both WAEC and public interest, as well as foster the sustenance of the rule of law, if the Minister for Education were to exercise the power given by section 12 of the West African Examinations Council, 1991 (PNDCL 255), and enact regulations to guide, inter alia, procedures for the exercise of WAEC’s powers under sections 3-10 of the Law.

Conclusion

In the circumstances, I hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court was properly invoked and the High Court judge was correct when he found that, by failing to observe the natural justice principle of audi alteram partem, WAEC contravened the appellants’ rights under article 23 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeal herein must succeed. I also agree with the learned President of this Court, Kpegah JSC, that, in the circumstances of this case, Daniel Awuni and his twelve affected colleagues are entitled to damages assessed at ¢5 million cedis to each appellants.

 

 

S.A.B. AKUFFO

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

BROBBEY JSC I agree with the judgment delivered by the learned President of the Court, my

brother Kpegah JSC, and I have nothing useful to add.

 

 

 

 

       S. A. BROBBEY

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

DR TWUM JSC In this appeal the applicant in the High Court who is strictly the applicant/respondent/appellant will be referred to as the applicant. The West African Examinations Council (WAEC) will simply be referred to as the council.

At the commencement of the action the applicant was aged 19 and he described himself as an infant. Consequently he appointed his sister, Marian Awuni, as his next friend to act for him. That, of course, was an error. Under the revised Order 15, r 12(7) as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), “an infant” is defined as a person aged below 18 years. The applicant  therefore did not need to sue by his next friend.

       On 20 August 2001, Daniel Awuni, the applicant, filed an originating notice of motion in the High Court, Accra, against the West African Examinations Council. By it the applicant applied for:

 

“a declaration that the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the West African Examinations Council cancelling the entire results of the Applicant together with that of the twelve other students aforementioned in the Senior Secondary School               Certificate Examination (SSSCE) 2000 and barring him and the twelve other students for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the West African Examinations Council and the refusal or neglect of the West African                 Examinations Council to release the results of the Applicant together with that of the twelve other students in the SSSCE 2000 are unlawful, null and void and of no effect on the grounds of breaches of articles 23, 24 (1) and 25 (1)(b) of the                  Constitution, 1992.”

 

In his affidavit in support, the applicant deposed, inter alia, as follows:

 

“(7)That during the examination period neither the twelve students aforementioned nor I was questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by any person for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices.

 

(8)  That I never had any foreknowledge of any examination papers nor did I collude with the other twelve students to have foreknowledge of any examination papers in the said                   examinations.

 

(10)That in a letter EX/SSS/RS/VOL IV/173 dated 30 April 2000 the respondents communicated to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School that my entire results and that of the twelve students in the SSSCE 2000 had been cancelled and the applicant and the others further barred for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents on the ground that it was alleged that the                   candidates had foreknowledge of the paper (Mathematics (Core) 2) and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.

 

(11)That before the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment  Committee of the respondents determined to cancel our results and further bar us for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents, the twelve students and I were neither privy to any inquiry, investigation or tried to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination  malpractices that might have been levelled against us nor were we given any opportunity by the respondents to make any representations or give any testimony as to our innocence to any such allegations.

 

(13)That in a letter NDSS/05/VOL 1/103 dated 21 May 2001 the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School petitioned the respondents to have another look at my scripts as well as that of the other students and review the decision punishing me and the others for  any alleged irregularity in the SSSCE 2000 Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper (copy of the letter annexed and marked exhibit B).

 

(14) That in a letter EC/SSSCE/IRR/VOL II/147 dated 6 June 2001 the respondents reiterated to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School that the twelve students and I colluded and had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) 2 paper in the SSSCE 2000. This conclusion was drawn on the basis that:

       ‘During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers. The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates. As a result all scripts for the subjects were scrutinized. From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in the Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper. The council therefore applied the prescribed sanctions.’ (Copy of letter annexed and marked exhibit C).

 

(15) That on 5 June 2001, my solicitors wrote a letter to the respondents urging them to review the sanction applied against me and the other students intimating, inter alia, that the twelve students and I are ready to be subjected to interrogative sessions by the respondents to establish my involvement or the involvement or otherwise of the other twelve students in any examination malpractices. (Copy of letter annexed and marked exhibit D).

(17)That I am advised by counsel and verily believe same to be true that the decision of the Final Appointment and Examiners’ Committee of the respondents to cancel my entire results together with that of the twelve other students and bar us for 3 years from taking any examinations conducted by the  respondents on the sole ground of “scrutiny of our scripts” is arbitrary and unfair and/or unreasonable and violative of                administrative justice. On 20 August 2001, the Principal Legal Officer of the respondent council swore to an affidavit in opposition to the application.  In it, the Council admitted              applying the sanctions to the thirteen students and explained in paragraph 11 thereof their reason for so acting, namely,

 

“(11)That in answer to paragraph (11) of the affidavit in support, the respondent council says the evidence in the script of the plaintiffs was so manifest that by its rules, the respondent council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representations. The practice is universal with all               examining bodies. In its paragraph (12), the council made the point “that the cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an                  infringement of human rights”. Further, it denied that its decision contravened any provision in the 1992 Constitution.

 

The respondent council next challenged the procedure adopted by the applicant in paragraphs (19) and (20) thus:

 

'(19)That the present procedure adopted by the applicant does not give room for evidence, which is very vital in this case:

 

(20)That under the circumstances the procedure adopted by the plaintiff is not the best to determine the merit of the matter.'"

 

Exhibit B which was annexed to the headmaster’s letter referred to in paragraph (13) of the applicant’s affidavit in support shows that the headmaster wrote “on behalf of the board of governors, the PTA, the staff and students of this school.” In it he claimed that the case that the thirteen students had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) 2 was only an allegation and therefore the application of rule 5(b) without further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation was a bit harsh on the students. He said the school had                   thoroughly examined the affected students in particular and they themselves to find out if “we actually erred this time but our investigation indicates the contrary.”

Next, the headmaster made the point that the thirteen students did not have foreknowledge of any of the examination papers:

 

“Rather, our investigation revealed that all the students had access to and used two particular books during their preparations for the SSSCE Mathematics Paper. These two books, namely Core Mathematics for Senior Secondary Schools (AKI OLA SERIES) and SSS MATHEMATICS (Core) (DALABA SERIES A1) present ready solved questions from 1993 to 1998, which the students could have learnt.”

 

He added that the case of the thirteen students might be “a rare coincidence of detail in the presentation of some portion of their answers in the Mathematic (Core) 2 Paper.”

The affidavit evidence also shows that the council considered the petition and replied to the headmaster’s letter on 6 June 2001 (see exhibit C annexed to the applicant’s affidavit in support). In it, the council  answered the suggestion that the students had access to and used two particular books that present already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 which they could have learnt, by pointing out that “none of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.”                   Meanwhile, a letter originating from LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE was addressed to the council. Even though the letter bore the date of 5 June 2001, it was hand-delivered by the writers to the council on 6 July 2001. In it, the directors of the centre, writing as solicitors for on behalf of their clients (the thirteen affected students) rehashed the facts leading to the cancellation of their clients’ results and rather unfairly accused the council that: “In a later communication to the Headmaster of the said school, you indicated that your outfit engaged in an ex-post facto                    rationalization leading to the imposition of the said penalties on our clients.” Speaking for myself, I found the tone and tenor of that letter unnecessarily abrasive and largely discourteous of the council. In my view, when solicitors write letters to third parties on behalf of their                clients, they must exhibit professional decorum and courtesy to them. It is improper for solicitors to threaten fire and brimstone in a letter to a third party. It is really a professional misconduct (see Constitution, Code of Ethics and Regulations of the Ghana Bar Association: Rule 4 at page 35).

Before the application was argued, His Lordship, Omari Sasu JA, sitting as additional High Court Judge, expressed the opinion that in view of the reliefs learned counsel for the applicant was claiming, he doubted whether proceedings by originating summons was the best way to reach those reliefs. He therefore invited counsel to reconsider the matter. Counsel promised to do so but in the end he informed the court that: “we have painfully come to the conclusion that we would move the motion as it stands, in spite of all the limitations the procedure we are adopting places on us.”

       After taking oral arguments, the learned judge gave judgment for the applicant on 4 October 2001. The court devoted a considerable portion of its judgment to restate the principles applicable to the audi alteram partem rule; and article 19(2) and (5) of the 1992 Constitution which dealt with criminal trials. With respect, no issue was joined by the parties on that aspect of the law. What was in issue from the various affidavits was whether on the facts the rule was applicable. Without any analysis or evaluation of the facts and circumstances, the court said:

 

“It is my considered view therefore that the respondents herein have acted in open defiance of the duty to act fairly and  reasonably which duty is mandatorily imposed on                        administrative bodies and officials by article 23 of our 1992 Constitution.”

 

He added:

 

“The applicants were never accused or charged. When the respondents were investigating the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion the applicants or their headmaster should have been heard and also given a chance to examine their accusers. The respondents are guilty of abnegation of a constitutional mandatory duty to act fairly and reasonably in this case. And I accordingly declare that the decision which the respondents arrived at concerning the applicants is incurably bad, void and of no consequence.”

 

The judgment ended with a number of consequential orders. These will be examined later in this

 

opinion.

 

On 10 October 2001, the council being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court given

 

on 4 October 2001, appealed to the Court of Appeal upon the following grounds:

 

(1) His Lordship failed to note that the Rules and Regulations that govern examinations constitute a contract between the candidates and the respondent/appellant and that candidates accept these conditions before writing the examinations.

 

(2) In summarizing, His Lordship omitted to note that the respondents/applicant had pleaded in paragraph (11) of affidavit in opposition and had also argued that the practice of examining bodies evolving their rules is universal. If His Lordship had applied the principle, he would have held that the decision to cancel the result was just.

 

(3) In summarizing the respondent/applicant’s defence, His Lordship omitted to note that the respondents had pleaded public interest under article 12 of the 1992 Constitution.

 

Counsel for the appellant intimated that other grounds of appeal would be filed upon receipt of copy of the record of appeal. There is no evidence on record that the council filed any additional grounds of appeal. Nonetheless in its statement of case, the council argued “additional ground (2)” and “additional ground B” The record shows that the council abandoned all the original grounds of appeal and rather  argued the additional grounds (2) and (B) which respectively stated as follows:

 

“(2) The learned trial judge erred in not setting aside the originating motion on notice as not warranted by any rule of law  or procedure.”

“(B) Having declared the cancellation of the results by the appellants as null and void  the trial judge erred in further ordering the release of the results of the applicant when the allegation that the applicant had committed an examination offence had not been determined.”

 

By its unanimous judgment delivered on 5 December 2002, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court.

The applicant also felt dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal and lodged and appeal to this court on 3 January 2003. The following were the grounds of appeal:

 

“(a) The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the constitution has in fact been                         contravened.

 

(b) The Court of  Appeal erred when it failed to recognize that the right administrative justice is embodied in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution is a fundamental human right directly enforceable under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(c)  The Court of Appeal failed to take account of the trial judge’s specific findings of fact that the respondents violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution when they breached the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice and ignored other requirements imposed on them by law.

 

(d) The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33 (1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellant to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.

 

(e)  The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33 (1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

 

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect;

the council’s refusal to release the results was unlawful.

 

 (f)The Court of Appeal misconstrued section 10 of the West  African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225), when it held that the appellants could be sanctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case.

 

(g)The Court of Appeal rightly found that the evidence predominantly favoured the appellants' case but erred in holding that the facts in issue were not capable of being              determined on affidavit evidence.

 

(h) The Court of Appeal erred grievously when it held that the decision of the respondents to cancel the entire results of the appellants in the SSSCE 2000 and to further bar them for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondents was an administrative decision and not subject to any further inquiry.

 

(i)  The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the decision of the respondents to sanction the appellants was in accordance with section 10 of  PNDCL 225 when the respondents have clearly stated that they punished the appellants under the provisions of Rule 5b of 1997/98 WAEC Regulations and Syllabus, which rule is not in force and is non-existent.

 

(j) The Court of Appeal failed to recognize that the sanctions imposed by the respondents on the appellants are ultra vires the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination Regulations 2000, which governed the examination in issue.

 

I have grouped these grounds of appeal into four, namely, grounds A, B, C and D. I will now discuss them as I have grouped them.

 

Group A covering grounds (a) and (b)

 

I am unable to appreciate the import of ground (a) since it contains a self-evident truth. I am also not sure that the Court of Appeal really failed to recognize the statement in ground (b). What the Court of Appeal said was that the originating notice of motion procedure was not the correct procedure. After all, article 33(1) merely states that the aggrieved party may apply to the High Court for redress. I would therefore dismiss grounds (a) and (b) as unmeritorious.  I shall next answer the question of the use of the originating notice of motion. 

 

Group B covering grounds (d), (e), and (g) relating to the use of originating motion on notice

These grounds deal with the procedure adopted by the applicant. One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal was that the procedure adopted by the applicant was “incurably bad.” In the view of the Court of Appeal, the procedure adopted by the applicant had the effect of taking away the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the matter. It emphasised that the Rules of Court are meant to facilitate a fair and expeditious trial and must not be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. These sentiments are perhaps justified, in view of the              uncompromising stand taken by learned counsel for the applicant even in the teeth of what I would describe as “mandatory advice” from the trial court. It was unfortunate that the learned trial judge having expressed such serious misgivings about the procedure adopted by the applicant’s lawyers, did not order the applicant to use what the court considered to be the regular procedure.

In arriving at the decision to dismiss the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Heward-Mills v Heward-Mills [1992-93] GBR 234. That judgment was right on the facts, but in my view, does not support the wide                 proposition of law stated at page 246 of the Report, namely:

 

“where a statutory condition must be complied with before a court can have jurisdiction to make an order, failure to comply with such a condition will leave the court with no discretion to make any order or orders in the matter.”

 

In that case, plaintiff issued a writ in the High Court for the revocation of a will. Under the Probate and Administration Rules, 1991 (LI 1515), this was “a probate action.” Under Order 6, r 2(3), before a writ beginning an action for the revocation of the grant of probate of a will or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person is issued out, notice shall be given under rule 6 unless the probate or letters of administration has or have been lodged in the registry. Further rule 6(1) provides:

“where an action is brought for the revocation of a grant of probate or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person the plaintiff shall serve a notice on the person to whom the probate or letters of administration as the case may be was granted requiring him to bring and leave at the registry the probate or letters of administration.”

 

The plaintiff filed his writ without complying with those statutory rules. The result was that the action was not properly before the court and had to be struck out, not, dismissed.

It must be emphasized that, under article 140 (1) of the 1992 Constitution, the “High Court, shall subject to the provisions of this Constitution, have jurisdiction in all matters and in particular, in civil and criminal matters...” The court in the Heward-Mills case therefore had jurisdiction to entertain a contentious probate action. The plaintiff failed to take the necessary step to invoke that jurisdiction. Hence his action could not be entertained by the court. Similar provision exists in the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), s 127(1). Another situation where the court will have jurisdiction but the action will not be properly before it is where the original writ is not signed by the party or his lawyer. The writ will be ineffective to commence an action and will have to be struck out.

In the present case, the position is not cut and dried. The applicant was desirous of taking action to protect what he perceived to be a breach of his fundamental human right. Under article 33 (4) of the Constitution, the Rules of Court Committee may make rules of court with respect to the practice and procedure of the Superior Courts for the purposes of this article. This is permissive, not mandatory. But there is mandatory provision in article 157(2) whereby “the Rules of Court Committee, shall by constitutional instrument, make rules and regulations for regulating the practice and procedure of all courts of Ghana.” At the time of this action no such rules had been made by the Rules of Court Committee. This, of course, should not lead to a failure of justice. The applicant, therefore, adopted a procedure which in the “considered” opinion of  his legal advisers, was permissible, namely, the originating notice of motion. Even though Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 provides that every action shall be commenced by writ, that is certainly not the practice in our courts. The Rules permit the use of originating summons, originating notice of motion, and petition in addition to the writ of summons. There is, at least, in the High Court, a decision of Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 134 to the effect that where a statute provides for an application to the court and neither the statute nor the Rules of Court provide expressly a specific procedure,  the application may be made by originating notice of motion.

I have noted earlier in this opinion that in the High Court, the trial judge expressed misgivings about the procedure adopted by the applicant; but it is clear that he was more concerned with whether that procedure would achieve the reliefs the applicant wanted; not that it was a wrong procedure.  In the case of Abdilmasih v Amarh  [1972] 2 GLR 414 at 422, CA  Apaloo JA (as he then was) said: “Nobody has a vested right in procedure and modern notions of justice require that a court should do substantial justice between the parties unhampered by                    technical procedural rules.” I can conceive of no injustice that was caused to the council by the procedure adopted by the applicant. Consequently, I hold that the procedure adopted by the applicant was not fatal to his action. The Court of Appeal erred in so holding.

 

Group C covering grounds (f), (i) and (j)

 

By these grounds, the applicant seeks to broaden the ambit of the type of application he made in the High Court. One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court was that it was not too clear which of the applicant’s fundamental human right had been violated.  As counsel for the applicant put it, they chose to proceed with the originating notice of motion, despite the limitations it imposed on them.

In my view, a claim under article 23 cannot be stretched to cover errors of law (if any) made by an administrative body. Nobody has a fundamental human right which guarantees him against any administrative body applying wrong law to his right or interest. That may be a ground for judicial review but certainly no application on such a complaint can be made under article 33(1). Lest we forget, it is only those fundamental human rights envisaged in article 12(1) that can be vindicated under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

One more point. The applicant submitted that the rules under which the council conducted the examinations were non-existent. Further, that the council had been making regulations in respect of the examinations they hold when that power is vested in the Minister of Education. If, indeed, these submissions are correct, then the logical conclusion will be that the entire 2000 SSSCE were a nullity, in which case all the legal challenge mounted by the applicant can properly be described as “much-ado about nothing.” I have carefully examined the submissions and I am persuaded that they are wrong.

Under article 24 of the Convention, the council has power to regulate certain matters, including the conduct of entrants during examinations. In my view, it is the council that can prescribe regulations for the behaviour of candidates and the appropriate penalties for breach of those regulations. Now section 12 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), opens with the words “except as otherwise provided in the Convention, the Secretary for education may by legislative instrument…” As I have pointed out article 24 of the              Convention gives the council power to regulate the conduct of the entire examination as well as the conduct of entrants. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Minister for Education also to make Regulations to cover the same matters.

In my view, the submission based on the non-existence of 1996-97 Rules is sheer sophistry. I am sure that what is wrong is the headed paper used to communicate the decision of the council to the affected students. There is no doubt in my mind that the candidates were examined on the basis of the “Regulations, Structure and Scheme of the Examination for the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (2000).” Regulation 5(b) referred to is what appears at page 8 of that booklet. Indeed, in their letter dated 5June 2001 (exhibit D), the Executive Director, Mohammed Ayariga and the Projects Director, Raymond Atuguba of the Legal Resources Centre, the solicitors for the applicants,  stated at page 2 as follows:

 

 “On the face of the facts, as we have been able to construct them, the decision of WAEC violates the 1992 Constitution (article 23), the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), s 3, the WAEC Regulations, Structure and Scheme of the SSSCE 2000, and a host of other laws rules, and regulations of this country.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

The applicant confirmed my view when he admitted in ground (j) of his grounds of appeal to this court that the SSSCE Regulations 2000 governed the examination in issue. Further, the council could sanction the applicant under section 10. I would accordingly dismiss these grounds of appeal.

 

GROUP D  covering grounds (c) (f) (h) – relating to failure to give the applicant the opportunity of presenting his case

The gist of these grounds is whether or not the applicants could be anctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case. This is really the pivotal issue in these proceedings. Since the applicants claim that they are entitled to administrative justice under article 23, we should examine that article a little more closely. Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution provides:

 

“23. Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

 

Since the duty to act fairly is imposed on administrative officials by article 23 it is important to determine whether or not the council is an administrative body within the meaning of that article. The Constitution does not define “administrative bodies” or “administrative officials.”        Curiously, neither counsel for the applicant nor for the council considered that issue. The judgment of the High Court assumed that it was and proceeded to paraphrase article 33 wrongly by saying that it confers jurisdiction on the High Court in cases where applicants allege their personal rights have been infringed upon. That is clearly wrong.

       Article 33 (1) states that: “Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him…” It is obvious that not all personal rights are fundamental human rights. A breach of contract is a personal right but it is clearly not a fundamental human right. Modern governments have grown into large bureaucracies.  As stated in Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed) at page 4):

 

“If the state is to care for its citizens from cradle to the grave, to protect their environment, to educate them at all stages, to provide them with employment, training, houses, medical services, pensions and in the last resort, food, clothing and shelter, it needs a huge administrative apparatus.”

 

A government’s vision and election promises cannot be translated into a welfare society merely by the passing of laws and leaving it to the courts to enforce them. 

In our tripartite governmental structure, we have the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It is the executive branch of government that must exercise executive authority of Ghana: see article 58(1) of the Constitution 1992.  It is this branch that is therefore charged with the real business of improving the overall welfare of the people of Ghana. The executive comprises the President, Ministers of State, the Ministries, Departments, Chief Directors, Directors, a host of administrative and other staff, as well as other agencies of government and other bodies in the Public Services such as the Police Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Audit Service, the Legal Service, the Immigration Service, the Prison Service, etc. These innumerable and variegated functionaries, central and local, are entrusted with various degrees of power to adjudicate numerous contested matters, make decisions and impose penalties and prohibitions; always acting under the authority of the Constitution or some Act of Parliament, Decree or Law or at the very least, under some delegated power from a person with authority to            delegate.

This process of delegation starts from the President himself. Under article 58 (3):

 

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the functions conferred on the President by clause (1) of this article may be exercised by him either directly or through officers  subordinate to him.”

 

Hence the official of the Internal Revenue Service who decides that a person resident in Ghana is assessable to income tax (see Republic v Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Fynhout  [1971] 1 GLR 213, CA; the VAT official who determines that a company was late in                  submitting its monthly VAT returns and imposes a mandatory penalty; the customs officer who assesses customs duty and imposes a penalty of three times the value of goods for attempted smuggling; the immigration officer who detains a passenger at the airport on a drug-related offence; the factory inspectors, the officers of the Environmental Protection Agency, are but a few examples of persons who help the President to exercise the executive authority of this country. They include the Ministers of State, both within and outside the Cabinet who decide                various policies of government, the implementation of which may affect the rights of subjects – such as, for example, compulsory acquisition of land for a new school or hospital; the introduction of a National Health Insurance Scheme and how it shall be funded; the National Accreditation Board which decides which institutions of learning shall be permitted to run university courses and under what conditions.  In my view, all bodies and persons whose authority to act derives by this process of sub-infeudation (to borrow an English feudal land law concept) from the President, however tenuous the connection may be, are the                      “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials” mentioned in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution.

The next question which may be posed is, is the Council an administrative body? On 23 March 1982, a Convention establishing the West African Examinations Council was signed in Monrovia, Liberia, by the Governments of the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and the Sierra Leone. Ghana ratified the Convention on 28 December 1982. Under article 14 of the Convention, each member country was required to enact laws in accordance with its legislative processes incorporating into its laws the provisions of the Convention. In pursuance of its said                   obligation, the government of Ghana promulgated the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), whereby the Convention, as set out in the Schedule to the Law, had the force of law in Ghana. The Convention constituted the council as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. It could sue and be sued in its corporate name. Under article 16(1) “the Council shall enjoy legal personality as an international organization within the territorial limits of the Member Countries and Associate Member Countries.” By article 16 (iv) “the chairman, members of the Council, the Registrar and members of his staff shall severally and collectively be accorded diplomatic privileges status in accordance with the rules, regulations and policies governing diplomatic immunities within the territories of the Member Countries and Associate Member countries.”

The Convention contained elaborate provisions for the constitution of the council. There are three categories of members: (a) persons appointed by each of the signatory governments; (b) persons appointed in a manner prescribed by the National Committee of each signatory government to represent their respective universities; (c) persons elected by each National Committee; and a registrar who is an ex-officio non-voting member. He is the Secretary to the council. The Convention also provided for the election of a chairman and vice-chairman of the council. It dealt with the tenure of office of members of the council; the powers and duties of the council; its finance and external auditors; the secretariat of the council; the establishment and constitution of national committee; settlement of disputes; amendments and discipline of staff. The main function of the council is provided in article 4. It shall review and consider annually the examinations to be held in the member countries in the public interest. It may also conduct, in consultation with member countries, such examinations as the council may think appropriate under the Convention and to award certificates and diplomas on the results of such examinations. The council may prescribe the fees chargeable to entrants to and regulate the conduct of, any examinations conducted under the provisions of sub-section (b) of article 4 of the Convention, including but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing: (a) the persons or categories of persons who may enter for such examinations; and (b) the conduct of entrants during such examinations.

Under article 9(d), if invited by any government of any member country, the council may conduct any other examination considered by the government to be in the public interest to conduct such examination, after due consultation. From what has been stated above, it is quite              evident that even though the functions of the council may affect a substantial part of the public ever so often, those functions are in no sense governmental. The council does not discharge functions of a governmental nature. In other words, those functions have not been woven into any system of executive authority. The council is not, de facto, even a surrogate organ of government. It is an international body domiciled in Ghana. It has   no business involving itself in the                    administration of Ghana. In its origin, its history, its constitution or least of all, its membership, it is not part of the administrative arm of government. Its status as an international body coupled with the fact that the chairman, members of the council, the registrar and even members of his staff are severally and collectively to be accorded diplomatic privileges status, is incompatible with the status of bodies or persons in the administrative organ of government. In my view, the council is not an “administrative body” within the meaning of article 23 of the                      Constitution.

Learned counsel for the applicant tried to expand the horizon of article 23 by referring to the Indian Constitution. In my view, that is not helpful in this particular instance. Chapter five of the 1992 Constitution, which deals with Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, opens with article 12(1) which clearly delimits what is intended to be protected as such. Article 12(1) provides:

 

“12(1) The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive, the Legislature and Judiciary and other organs of government and its agencies  and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts as provided for in the Constitution.”

 

I must not be misunderstood. I am aware that globally, the list of fundamental human rights protected under various national constitutions is far in excess of what is contained in our chapter five. But that is the choice we in this country have made and a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution must bring himself within the list contained in chapter five. I am also aware that outside the Constitution, the laws of Ghana protect personal rights akin to what are described in the Constitution as fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The principle of natural justice was developed by the judges of English Common Law without the intervention of any written constitution. Protection to life is adequately secured by the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). Article 14 covers the Common law tort of false                     imprisonment and a writ of habeas corpus may issue to secure the freedom of any person who is unlawfully detained by a public official or the government, or even by his own parents. The point I am making here is simply this: An action based on article 23 of the Constitution must be confined to the persons specified in that article, the fact that under some other national constitution or system a more expansive or restrictive definition is given to the infraction complained of is at most, only persuasive. Administrative law is essentially about the control of abuse or misuse of public power. Accordingly, it is persons who wield this type of authority who are targeted under article 23. For example, it cannot apply to domestic tribunals, such as the Presbyterian Church of Ghana which decides who may be admitted to the priesthood by the Church. The reason for this is that the powers of domestic tribunals derive from contract. Administrative justice is a public law remedy. Fundamental Human Rights are for the most part, rights against government interference.

Is the council, nonetheless, subject to the rules of natural justice? The power which the Council exercises over those, like the applicant, who take its examinations derive from agreement. This gives right to private rights on which effective action for declaration, injunction and even damages may be based. It is not part of any government regulation. By applying to take the examinations and paying the prescribed fees, people like the applicant, expressly submit themselves to the regulations of the council. They acknowledge that they are governed by the                   disciplinary rules of the council.

Article 23 does not define what is meant by “to act fairly and reasonably.” That omission may be supplied by resort to the common law. At common law, before the House of Lords decision in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, the court took the view that judicial tribunals empowered to deprive persons of their liberty, impose financial burdens on them and ascertain their legal rights had to observe the audi alteram partem rule. See R v Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London              Electricity Board [1924] 1 KB 171. At this point, functions which were administrative but not judicial or (later quasi-judicial) did not attract the rule. This dichotomy has been abandoned by the English Courts and have since Ridge v Baldwin (supra) insisted that even in the so-called administrative functions, the body discharging the function must act fairly. In my humble opinion, article 23 effectively lays to rest any lingering doubt about the modern statement of the rule in this country.

The audi alteram partem rule is part of the broader rule of natural justice which comprises the audi alteram partem rule and the nemo judex in causa sua rule. I am not concerned with the latter rule for the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), gives the council powers to control its examinations and impose various penalties for examination malpractices. Except in one area, which I will deal with presently, if the Council complies with the Law, its decisions cannot be impugned. The scope and purpose of the Law makes that abundantly clear. See Wilkinson v Barking Corporation [1948] 1 All ER 564; [1948] 1 KB 721. It is sometimes said glibly that any person who decides anything affecting the rights of subjects must observe the rules of natural justice. That is certainly not correct. For example, no such duty arises where numerous persons are competing for scare resources, eg allocation of government contracts or university places. This may cause some considerable hardship to the unsuccessful contenders, but no court has held that such people have any common law right to go to court on the ground that their applications were summarily rejected. In R v University of Aston Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538 the English Court of Appeal discussed what I consider to be similar to this case, ie when university students may be entitled to be heard when they have been asked to withdraw from the university for failure of examinations. The authorities establish that in examination malpractices, the party affected must be given an opportunity to be heard before               penalties are meted out to him. This duty will arise when the charges are put to him. See Herring v Templeman [1973] 3 All ER 569 and Glynn v Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487 at 494.

In the case before us, Part II of PNDCL 255 dealing with examination offences and penalties provides in section 3 (1) that any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him “(b) is found to have had foreknowledge of the contents of any examination paper … etc.” He can only discharge this burden if he is given an opportunity to be heard.  In my view, this is clear indication that a candidate who is accused of any examination malpractice must be given an opportunity to be heard. This is common fairness to the candidate, which is what natural justice is all about. The fact that he is not criminally prosecuted is irrelevant. But the matter does not end there. I have already referred to the letter which the Headmaster/Rector of the Notre Dame Minor             Seminary Secondary School wrote to the council (exhibit B). In it, he said he wrote on behalf of a number of people including the students requesting the council to take another look at the scripts and review the decision meting out punishment for the alleged irregularity. (See                 paragraph (13) of the applicant’s affidavit in support. The council replied by saying that the only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts. As a result, all the scripts for the subjects were scrutinized and it was from the scrutiny that it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates. In their letter to the council, the solicitors of the applicant suggested that the applicants were ready to be subjected to “interrogative sessions” by the council to establish their guilt or                    innocence. Counsel further argued in their said letter and also in their legal submission that the punishment meted out to their client on the sole ground of “scrutiny of our scripts” was arbitrary, unfair and/or unreasonable.

Is this right? As it has been pointed out in a number of English decisions starting with Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120 at 140; General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627 at 628 and particularly in In re Pergamon Press [1971] Ch 388 at 402-403, the rules of natural justice are not rigid norms of unchanging content and their ambit may vary according to the context. In In re Pergamon Press (supra) company inspectors had informed the directors of the general nature of their tentative findings and requested the directors to comment on them. The directors refused, claiming that they ought to be given copies of the transcripts of the proceedings before they would comment. The Court of Appeal held that they were not entitled to the transcripts. What the law insists upon is substantial fairness. In this case, the                  applicants were seeking to take over the role of the council. To act fairly does not necessarily mean that the person likely to be affected must be given an oral hearing.  The various letters exchanged between the council and the applicants through their headmaster and their lawyers could in an appropriate context, amount to “fair hearing.” Further, it will reduce the council to complete impotence if the applicants could dictate the mode or manner in which the council was to discharge a duty placed squarely on it by PNDCL 255. In my view, it cannot be said that the council acted unfairly and unreasonably by scrutinizing all the scripts. It shows rather that the council was most anxious to do justice to the applicants.

         In Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 79, Lord Reid said:

“I do not doubt that if an officer or body realizes that it has acted hastily and reconsiders the whole matter afresh, after affording to the person affected a proper  opportunity to present his case, then its later decision will be valid.”

 

This is exactly what happened in R v Aston University Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538. Here the university asked some students to withdraw from the university for poor performance in the university examinations. The students petitioned the Vice-Chancellor and thereafter a series of meetings were held by the students tutor with the students, by the board of examiners, the senate and other authorities to consider the students’ grievances. The court held that those meetings were proper to see what could be done to produce a fair result. The court ruled against the university on the ground that the board of examiners who only had the final say in the matter did not actually take any further decision after the various meetings.

In the instant case, the suggestion of “interrogative session” is clearly misplaced. I doubt it if the council has power to administer oaths. The council need not examine witnesses. It can obtain information in any way it thinks best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their interest. In this case the principle of res ipsa loquitor comes into play. In my view, no useful purpose will be served by cross-examination. The evidence of foreknowledge is in the scripts and apart from using a lie-detector, no amount of cross-examination of each of the affected students can resolve the problem of collusion among them. This is a difficult case. It places the council in a dilemma. Anybody who has marked examination scripts before will have no difficulty in coming to the               conclusion that there has been foreknowledge and collusion among the candidates. The difficulty here is how to demonstrate that to each affected student.

My Lords, what does fairness require in this case? To act fairly is to make over to the party affected the evidence available to him. Where the party affected has the right to make representations, this involves three things: (i) he must be informed of the case against him; (ii) so as to tailor his submission thereto; and (iii) to refute some of the allegation, (if that is the case), correct mistakes or explain away otherwise damaging evidence.  See In re Pergamon Press Ltd (supra).

         In this present case, the applicant’s headmaster suggested that what the council thought was a case of foreknowledge might be a rare case of coincidence because the students had access to two books that had ready-solved questions which the students could have learnt. The                    council rebutted it by saying that the questions that were set in the 2000 SSSCE had not been set before and could therefore not have appeared in those books.  Lord Mustill has observed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1993] 3 WLR 154 that the                    standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. The principles of fairness are not to be applied identically by rote in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and   the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken.  See also Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 2 WLR 821.

My Lords, what is required is a fair result reached by fair methods. It is in the public interest that the sanctity of the results is guaranteed. After a very careful and anxious consideration of the circumstances of this rather difficult case, and the language of section 3 (1) of PNDCL 255, I have come to the conclusion that the decision of the council should be set aside on the sole ground that it failed to give the students an opportunity to respond to the charge of foreknowledge before they were penalized. I wish to emphasize that my opinion should be limited in scope to the matter of disciplinary action taken against the affected students. Serious public mischief will result if any attempt is made in the future to introduce the principle of natural justice to the area of marking and moderating examination scripts. Judges do not inhabit an intellectual vacuum. I am not oblivious of the rampant nature of examination  malpractices in this country. We all bear a heavy responsibility to ensure that the canker is completely exterminated. To admit the principle of natural justice into the conduct of examinations apart from the disciplinary functions of the council will surely open the floodgates to a torrent of unbridled abuse. We do not wish to tie up the council in an impenetrable morass of legal chicanery. We owe a duty to our youth, our educational system, our institutions of higher learning, our business  community, indeed, our very survival as a nation, to ensure that our educational standards are constantly improved upon, that brilliant and diligent students are encouraged and that cheats are weeded out                   ruthlessly. In particular, l do not envisage cases like Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 QB 277. In that case, Dr Thorne Ph D sat and failed to pass certain examinations for the LLB Degree.  He claimed that his failure was the result of the negligence of the examiners.  He claimed damages against the defendants “for negligently misjudging his examination papers for the Inter and Final LLB Degree” and sought an order of mandamus commanding the defendants to award him “the grades at least justified.”

This judgment offers no solace to the person who claims that he is deserving of ten ones instead of the five he was awarded. Until the day comes when it is shown that the council has marked somebody down out of spite or ill-will, the courts must abstain from intruding into the marking room. To some extent, the council is to blame for its woes. If the  questions do not leak, all these problems will not arise. But having said that I am not prepared to gloss over the activities of students and or their parents who get hold of examination questions and hope to over-reach the council. Such students occupy no moral high ground. They cannot claim to be not in pari delicto with the council. They deserve the penalties contained in PNDCL 255 if they cheat and are found out.

 

The issue of award of damages

 

During our deliberations and before we announced our verdict, the question of whether or not if the appellants won, they would be entitled to damages, came up.  Consequently on 17 May 2004, when we announced our verdict, we reserved our reasons and invited learned counsel for the parties to file further submissions if they wished on the following:

 

A.  Whether or not in the circumstances of this case, the applicants are entitled to damages; and if so,

 

B.  What factors may be considered as appropriate, if damages, were to be awarded to the applicants.

 

Learned counsel duly filed their respective submissions.  After a very careful and anxious consideration of all the material available to me on issues (A) and (B), above, I regret to say that I am unable to answer A affirmatively.

 As I understand it, the kingpin of the argument in support of the majority holding that damages be awarded was inspired by a Privy Council judgment in the case of Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1979] AC 385.  It contains a holding that the reliefs available to a person who complains of a breach of a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right, may include the award of damages.  But the Privy Council was at pains to point out that that right depends on a determination of the merits.  Whether or not in this particular case,              damages should be awarded to the applicants, does not, in my view, follow as a matter of course.  I can accept that damages should be awarded to a person who complains that his personal liberty has been restricted without due process (article 14); or that forced labour was exacted from him (article 16); or that his property was unlawfully appropriated (article 20).  See Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] AC 972.  But I am not persuaded that this case is a proper case to award damages.

It was argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the students “have a residual or vested cause of action for damages under article 33(1) of the Constitution” but he did not show how that cause of action arises – whether at common law or under some statute.

He further argued that:

 

“irreparable and ruinous injury has been done to the reputation of the appellants by the actions of the respondent.  The hint at moral turpitude that the false accusations convey to the public … calls for heavy compensation if the charge is completely unsustainable.”

 

I am unable to follow counsel’s argument.  No court, and certainly not this court, has decided that the accusations of cheating are unfounded and completely unsustainable. What this court has decided is that the appellants were not given an opportunity to rebut the accusations levelled against them.  In other words, the procedure used by the respondent was flawed.  This is a case of procedural irregularity.  Our judgment has nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of the accusations.  Learned counsel for the applicant argued as though our judgment dealt with the merits of the charges.

I have read article 33 over and over again and I have come to the conclusion that it does not create the remedy of damages.  In my opinion, whether a party is entitled to damages or not must be determined according to common law principles.  I am of the firm opinion that successful natural justice challenges should not necessarily carry in their wake award of damages.  The appellants will only be entitled to damages if it should be established that there was no collusion or foreknowledge among the students as alleged.  For if it is proved that, indeed, they cheated, as alleged, there can be no justification for awarding them damages.  The issue of damages cannot therefore be dealt with without first dealing with the merits of the charges.  Already, counsel for the appellant is saying that the charges were false and completely unsustainable, when there has been no adjudication of that.

       In the result, I would refuse any award of damages to the appellants and leave them free to take advantage of the “without prejudice” provision in article 33 to commence a fresh suit against the respondent for damages.  In such an action, the respondent may, if it wishes, raise the charges of collusion and foreknowledge as a defence.  When battle is so joined, substantial justice will be done to all the parties.  This approach also accords well with the Privy Council decision in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana (supra).  In that case, in allowing the applicant’s appeal, the Privy Council remitted the motion to the court of first instance with a direction to hear and determine it on its merits, and if these were found to be favourable to the applicant, to assess and give a direction for the payment of damages or compensation.

       

 

DR. S. TWUM

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

DR DATE-BAH JSC. The key facts in this case are not disputed and they bring into sharp focus the accountability of an examination authority.  In this case, young examination candidates challenge the authority’s stance of infallibility on matters of collusion. The applicant in the case was nineteen at the time of the institution of the action and therefore brought the action through his sister, as his next friend.  The action was commenced by an originating notice of motion seeking a declaration that:

 

“(i) the decision of the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment Committee of the respondents communicated in a letter EC/SSS/RS/VOL IV/173 dated 30 April 2001 to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School, Navrongo cancelling the entire results of the applicant together with that of the twelve students of Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School in the SSSCE 2000 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect;

 

(ii)  the further barring of the applicant together with the twelve other students by the respondents for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents is unlawful, null and void and of no effect; and

 

(iii) the refusal or neglect of the respondents to release the entire results of the applicant together with that of the twelve other students in the SSSCE 2000 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect.; …”

 

The applicant also sought such directions or orders as the High Court might consider necessary and appropriate to remedy the infringement or violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the applicant and twelve other students on whose behalf he brought action.  In the title of the action, the applicant expressed himself as applying in a  representative capacity on his own behalf and for the benefit of twelve other students of the Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School, Navrongo.  Since the thirteen students have the same interest, it is legitimate for the applicant to bring these representative proceedings on their joint behalf. I will regard all thirteen students as parties to this suit for the purposes of the relief or remedy to be granted them, although only one of them has formally instituted this action.

The applicant and the twelve other students were students at Notre Dame Secondary School from 1998 to 2000 and sat for the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations “SSSCE 2000” between  October and December 2000.  The respondent is the body authorised to conduct these examinations and award the relevant certificate to successful candidates.  The applicant deposed in his affidavit in support of his motion that during the examination period neither he nor any of the other twelve students was questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by any person for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices.  He further deposed that he never had any foreknowledge of any examination papers nor did he collude with the other twelve               students to have foreknowledge of any examination papers.

However, in a letter dated 30 April 2001, the respondent informed the headmaster of the applicant’s school that its Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointments Committee had cancelled the results of the applicant and the twelve other students because of their involvement in some examination irregularities and requested him to inform the candidates.  The nature of the irregularity concerned was stated as follows:  “It was alleged that the candidates had foreknowledge of the paper and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.”  In addition to cancelling the results of the candidates, they were to be barred for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondent.

The applicant deposed that before this decision by the committee neither he nor any of the twelve other students were privy to any inquiry, investigation or trial to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination malpractices that might have been levelled against them and that they were not given any opportunity by the respondent to make any representations or give any testimony as to their innocence of any such allegations.

On 21 May 2001, the headmaster of the applicant’s school petitioned the respondent to review its decision.  One significant  paragraph of the headmaster’s petition reads as follows:

“First of all, the case that the thirteen students had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 is only an allegation, and therefore the application of rule 5b without             further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation is a bit harsh on the poor students.  We are dealing here with young people who have worked hard for three years in a reputable school with the hope of developing a career for themselves, and  if we are not careful we may ruin their future for good.”

 

By a letter of 6 June 2001, the respondent communicated its reaction to the headmaster’s petition, turning it down.  A very significant paragraph in the respondent’s letter in reply was the following:

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers.  The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates.  As a result all scripts for all subjects were scrutinized.  From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The council therefore applied the prescribed                   sanctions.”

 

This letter thus confirmed that applicant and the other students were not given an opportunity to be heard before the prescribed sanctions were applied.  Furthermore, in an affidavit deposed to by the respondent’s principal legal officer in opposition to the applicant’s motion, the sole evidence of malpractice relied on by the respondent appears to be evidence in the examination scripts themselves.

Paragraphs (8), (9) and (11) of the affidavit are quite illuminating.  They were in the following terms:

“(8)In answer to paragraphs (8) and (9) of affidavit respondent-council says that following allegations of leakage in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper all scripts were scrutinized.  That there was sufficient evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs confirm (sic) collusion arising out of foreknowledge.

 

(9) In further answer the respondent council says it has all the expertise to detect collusion among candidates.

 

(11) That in answer to paragraph (11) of affidavit in support the respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent                 council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representation. The practice is universal with all examining bodies.”

 

The respondent thus appears to have adopted the position that its expertise as an examining authority enabled it to discern cheating and collusion from the mere scrutiny of the examination scripts and that there was no need to receive representations from the affected candidates                 before applying sanctions to them.  Indeed, its principal legal officer deposed to its belief that examination results were not matters of human rights.  In paragraph (12) of his affidavit, he said:

 

“In answer to paragraph (12) of the affidavit in support, the respondent council says that the examination results is not a matter of human rights.  That cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an infringement of human rights.  Counsel will make reference to relevant  provisions of the 1992 Constitution.”

 

The applicant being dissatisfied with the result of the petition by his headmaster has brought this action to enforce his rights.  The learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, sitting as an additional High Court Judge, granted him the relief he sought.  Before doing so, he made the following findings of fact:

 

“(1)The thirteen applicants herein who are aged between 18 years and 22 years and in law called young persons were candidates who had been registered for and sat the 2000 SSSCE  conducted by the respondents.

 

(2) At no time either before or during the said examinations were any of the thirteen applicants questioned by anyone as engaging in any examination malpractices.

 

(3) It was after the scripts in Mathematics – Core Paper 2 had been marked that the thirteen applicants herein were said to have had foreknowledge of the said paper.

 

(4)The respondents scrutinised the scripts of the candidates and after the said scrutiny came to the conclusion that it had been established that the thirteen applicants herein had acted in collusion among themselves.

 

(5)The respondents have cancelled the entire results of the applicants in all the subjects/papers they had written including those in which there were no examination malpractices and also have barred the applicants for three years from writing any of respondent’s examination.

 

(6) During the investigations conducted by the respondents into the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion, there is no evidence on record which tends to show that:

 

(a) The applicants or their headmaster was informed of the allegations.

(b) The applicants or their head teacher was in any manner given a chance of being heard or participating in the investigations.

 

(7) The respondents in dealing with the present case acted as investigators, prosecutors and judges in their own cause and neither the applicants nor their headmaster was in any way invited to assist in the investigations.”

 

The judgment of the learned trial judge was, however, reversed on appeal.  The applicant and the twelve other students have therefore appealed to this court.  The grounds of appeal filed are as follows:

 

(a) The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992  Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the Constitution has in fact been                       contravened.

(b) The Court of Appeal erred when it failed to recognise that the right to administrative justice as embodied in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution is a fundamental human right directly enforceable under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(c) The Court of Appeal failed to take account of the trial judge’s specific findings of fact that the respondents violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution when they breached the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice and ignored other requirements imposed on them by law.

 

(d) The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33(1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.

 

(e) The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33(1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

 

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect;

the council’s refusal to release the results was  unlawful.

 

(f) The Court of Appeal misconstrued section 10 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225) when it held that the appellants could be sanctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case.

 

(g) The Court of Appeal rightly found that the evidence predominantly favoured the appellants’ case but erred in holding that the facts in issue were not capable of being               determined on affidavit evidence.

 

(h) The Court of Appeal erred grievously when it held that the decision of the respondents to cancel the entire results of the appellants in the SSSCE 2000 and to further bar them for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondents was an administrative decision and not subject to any further inquiry.

 

(i)  The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the decision of the respondents to sanction the appellants was in accordance with section 10 of PNDCL 225 when the respondents have clearly stated that they punished the appellants under the provisions of rule 5b of the 1997/98 WAEC Regulations and Syllabus, which rule is not in force and is non-existent.

 

(j)  The Court of Appeal failed to recognise that the sanctions imposed by the respondents on the appellants are ultra vires the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination Regulations 2000, which governed the examination in issue.”

 

Procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33

 

One of the grounds on which the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the respondent before this court from the High Court was procedural.  The court, through Owusu-Ansah JA, held that the procedure adopted by the applicant (ie appellant before this court) was “inapplicable in                asserting a right under article 23.”  Naturally, the appellants are dissatisfied with this decision and filed grounds of appeal in relation to it.  Ground (d) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal is in the following terms:

 

“The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33(1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.”

 

Ground (e) is also as follows:

 

“The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33(1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect; and

the council’s refusal to release the results was  unlawful.”

 

The respondent, of course, sought to defend the decision of the Court of Appeal.  In its statement of case, it argues as follows:

 

“(5)The appellants contend at page 14 that their action ‘was not an ordinary suit before the High Court.  It was an application for the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights under article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.’  That article, the appellants argue, enabled their invocation by originating motion on notice.

 

(6) With due respect to counsel for the appellants, the provision does not so say so.  The Constitution enables a person seeking remedy for the violation of a human rights provision to apply to the High Court for remedy, and had directed the Rules of Court Committee to make rules for its invocation.  Although the committee has not made fresh rules, the existing rules of the High Court continue to apply as existing law under section 26 of the transitional provisions of the 1992 Constitution.  The list of remedies in article 33, namely, habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus,  prohibition, and quo warranto have been adequately provided for in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), Order 59.  If those rules are inadequate, the aggrieved person may resort to the provision in Order 2, r 1 if it is intended to see declarations from the court. See also Order 25, r 5.

 

(7) A claim for the declaration in the High Court can be  made in limited circumstances by originating summons, otherwise it must be by a writ of summons.  The applicants did not adopt either procedure but rather proceeded by originating motion on               notice.  They claim that the decision of the High Court in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General  [1971] 1 GLR 138 and that of the Supreme Court in Edusei v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 enable claims for declaration to be made by originating motion. With due respect to counsel for the appellants, neither court so decided.

 

(8)  Further, and in the alternative, the respondent invites this court to take a second look at the above decisions and place them in context.  The ratio of In re Meister Lucius and Bruning Ltd [1914] WN 390 which has featured prominently in both decisions, was stated  succinctly in Peoples Popular Party thus:

      ‘It is … a rule of practice that where a statute provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is made, and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such application may be made by an originating motion.’

 

(9) When article 33 was promulgated in the 1992 Constitution, Order 59 of the High Court Rules was in force and adequately provided for the invocation of the remedies listed in the article by application.  In such situation it cannot be said that the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure.  Admittedly the Constitution provides that the Rules of Court Committee shall make rules to regulate proceedings under the provision but it does not follow that the existing rules must be cast aside even if they are adequate.

 

(10) The legislative scheme adopted in all Republican Constitutions in Ghana is to empower a law-making body to make laws, rules or regulations to govern specified situations, leaving it to such body to determine whether, having regard to the existing rules, law reform in the nature of new provisions would be necessary.  Where the need for reform would not arise the Constitution framers have ensured that the existing law, as              defined under the Constitution would hold extant the existing laws, rules or regulations as part of the Laws of Ghana.”

 

 

 

The appellants, on the other hand, argued as follows:

 

“Our application was not an ordinary suit before the High Court.  It was an application for the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights under article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.  This article states as follows:

 

  '33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been … contravened in relation to him, then, without                     prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.'  (Emphasis ours).

 

Article 33(1) of the Constitution provides for the making of an application to the High Court, and applications are not made by writ of summons.  Applications are made either by originating motions, originating summons, or summons (Orders 52, 54, and 54A) respectively of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).   And article 33(4) of the Constitution provides that the Rules of Court Committee may make rules of court with respect to how applications brought under article 33(1) may be made.  The Rules of Court Committee has not yet made any Rules to govern such                  applications.

The applicants in the case of People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138 were in the same situation that we found ourselves.  When the procedural issue was raised in that case, Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J, (as he then was), held as follows at page 145:

 

“Article 28(4) of the Constitution [1969] provides that, ‘The Rules of Court Committee may, by constitutional instrument, make Rules of Court with respect to the practice and procedure of the Superior Court of Judicature for the purposes of this article.’  No such rules have so far been made.  It is however a rule of practice that where a statute provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is to be made, and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such an application may be made by an originating motion …  The notice of motion must be intituled in the matter of the Act under which the application is made …”

 

The Court of Appeal was unable to refer to any rule of procedure which specifically provides that an application under article 33(1) should be by writ of summons.  The decision in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General was quoted with approval in the Supreme Court decision of Edusei v Attorney-General [1998-1999] SCGLR 753 at 796 per Acquah JSC (as he then was).  Indeed, in this case, the Supreme Court sought to energise and save from extinction, the provisions of article 33 of the Constitution when it held that the  claim of the applicant was properly to be brought under that article in the High Court.  This suit is the blood baby of that holding of this court.  The decision was again quoted with approval by the High Court in Republic v Edward Wiredu; Ex parte Amidu, Suit No FT (HR) 4/2001, Accra unreported at page 21. Again, in Juandoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] 3 WLR 13 at 14, the Privy Council held that where the rule making authority, had not exercised their power to make rules with respect to the practice and procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for a redress of rights in the Constitution of Guyana, the applicant was justified to use the procedure of an originating motion on notice in invoking the jurisdiction of the court.

A close reading of article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution especially the “without prejudice” clause, reveals that the appellants can bring an application under article 33(1) even if there are other forms of action available to them.  In the words of Acquah JSC in Edusei (No 2) v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 at 788:

 

“‘without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available’ … refers to any possible cause of action which may arise from the violation of one’s fundamental human right and freedom, independent of that victim’s constitutional right of seeking redress for the said violation.”

 

It is therefore improper for the Court of Appeal to attempt to restrict the options of the appellants to an action by writ of summons."

 

In determining which of these competing contentions on procedure by the parties is right, I think that one should remember the famous wise words of Sowah JSC (as he then was) in Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637 at 647-648:

 

“The Constitution has its letter of the law.  Equally, the Constitution has its spirit….Its language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of growth and development.  Indeed, it is a living organism capable of growth and development… A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation.  It does not admit of a narrow interpretation.  A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do.  We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time.”

 

We need to remind ourselves that the words to be construed, though they relate to procedure, are nevertheless contained in the Constitution. Accordingly, they should be construed liberally, as urged by Sowah JSC.  In that light, I have no hesitation in holding that “apply to the High Court for redress” in article 33(1) is to be construed as including applying by way of an originating motion, notwithstanding the express language in the High Court Rules to which the respondent has drawn this court’s attention, to the effect that unless a specific other mode of originating an action is specified in the Rules, a writ of summons is to be the mode of initiating an action.  Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) provides that: “Every action in the High Court shall be commenced by a writ of summons”, subject to specified                    exceptions.  In the circumstances of this case, this ordinary rule of  procedure is overridden by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.  In constitutional cases, it is generally right that the court should concentrate on the substantive matters raised, rather than allowing procedural                 considerations to preclude it from addressing the substance of the case.

In my view, until the Rules of Court Committee has prescribed a particular mode of application under article 33(1), applicants should be given latitude as to how to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.  This is certainly in consonance with the legal position formulated by Acquah JSC (as he then was) in Edusei (No 2) v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 at 797, as follows:

 

“The legal position therefore is that where an enactment confers an actionable right on a person, but there are no rules specifically provided for vindicating that right because either that enactment provided none, or it rather directed an authority to make the said rules which are yet to be made, an aggrieved person is entitled to adopt the nearest reasonable procedure of utilizing the right accorded by the law – a procedure which must be such as to give notice to the person or legally authorized authority against whom redress is sought and afford to him or it an opportunity of putting his side of the case.  For, where there is an actionable right there must be a remedy for vindicating that right.”

 

The spirit of procedural flexibility in constitutional matters, which is   embodied in this approach, is given emphatic re-affirmation in the recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Luke Mensah v Attorney-General, Writ No J1/1/2004, 5 March 2004 reported in [2003-2004] SCGLR 122, where in spite of procedural flaws identified by the court in the plaintiff’s action seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the court decided to deal with the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  Acquah CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, held that it was right for the court to do this if the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the procedural errors committed by the plaintiff are not so fundamental as to amount to a denial of the court’s jurisdiction. 

Similar broad considerations should guide the determination of the procedural point in relation to this case.  The most critical fact of this case, in my view, is that the applicant and the twelve other students were given no opportunity to make representations on their own behalf before the respondent made the decision about them, which they challenge.  This fact is not disputed and it is well established by the affidavit evidence.  Even if the case had required the leading of disputed evidence, there is no reason why, after it had been validly initiated by motion, the learned trial judge could not have ordered the parties to file pleadings and for the case to have proceeded to trial.

In sum, then, I would uphold grounds (d) and (e) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal.  With particular reference to ground (d), it is my view that the invocation of article 33 by originating motion on notice is  legitimate not only when a constitutionally guaranteed human right has been breached, but also when it is being breached or is likely to be breached.  I, thus, do not share the view expressed by Owusu-Ansah JA in the Court of Appeal that it is a condition precedent to the invocation of article 33(1) that a fundamental human right under the Constitution has been contravened in relation to the aggrieved party.  Accordingly, I would also uphold ground (a) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal, namely,

 

“The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992  Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the Constitution has in fact been                          contravened.”

 

With regard to ground (e), I do not see why, given the need for procedural flexibility in constitutional matters, the fact that the remedy sought by the appellants was a number of declarations should make the use of an originating motion on notice inappropriate and flawed, as held by the Court of Appeal per Owusu-Ansah JA.

 

Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution and judicial review of administrative action

 

Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution provides as follows:

 

“23. Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

 

This provision clearly lays a duty on “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials” and the first issue is whether the respondent is to be regarded as an administrative body and its officials as administrative officials.  These terms are not defined and therefore need to be interpreted by this court.

It appears to me that the purpose of article 23 is to provide a constitutional foundation for administrative law in Ghana and to entrench entitlement to administrative justice as a fundamental human right in Ghana.  Under the English Common Law, from which the Ghanaian common law has borrowed most, an important part of administrative law is the judicial control of administrative action.  This is because administrative power is quintessentially derived power.  It is the power of public officials derived from the Constitution or from statutes. The              common law courts have, therefore, seen it as their role to ensure that these public officials, and the bodies to which they belong, keep within their authority or jurisdiction.  Thus, historically, the doctrine of ultra vires was the rationale for judicial control of administrative action. This context has to be borne in mind during the search for the meaning of “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials.”

The opening paragraph of  De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review (1999) provides a clue as to the meaning of these terms.  It is in the following terms:

 

“This book is concerned with judicial review of the acts, decisions, determinations, orders and omissions of individuals and bodies performing public functions.  In all developed legal systems there has been recognition of a fundamental requirement for principles to govern the exercise by public authorities of their powers.  These principles provide a basic protection for individuals and prevent those exercising public functions from abusing their powers to the disadvantage of the public.  During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the circumstances in which the courts have been prepared to intervene to provide relief for unlawful administrative action have expanded in spectacular fashion. Coherent principles have steadily evolved in a number of areas of administrative law and disfiguring archaisms have been removed.”

 

To my mind, therefore, “administrative bodies” and “administration officials” should be interpreted as references to bodies and individuals, respectively, which or who exercise public functions which affect  individuals.  These individuals are entitled to protection from the courts in their interaction with such public bodies or their employees.

       The following quotation from the appellants’ statement of case is quite apposite in this connection:

 

“In a modern administrative state, such as ours, the citizenry is in constant interaction with the administrative agencies of the state.  Thus, the bulk of human rights abuses occur between the citizenry and the state, acting through its administrative agencies.  It is in this regard that administrative institutions must be regulated in order to ensure that they do not trample on the rights of the citizenry at will.  This is the purpose of article 23 of the 1992 Constitution.  By including article 23 in the directly enforceable provisions of Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution, the framers ensured that the broad range of administrative injustices that are capable of infringing on the rights of the citizenry are remediable through the mechanism under article 33(1) of the Constitution.”

 

Does the respondent come within the ambit of the concept of administrative body sketched out in the preceding discussion? Admittedly, the respondent is an inter-governmental organisation                   established by an international Convention.  The Convention is attached as a schedule to the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).  In addition to the respondent being established by an international legal instrument, however, the constitutive Convention itself requires (in article 14) that the Convention should be incorporated into the local laws of the respective countries.  PNDCL 255 fulfils this incorporation obligation.  By that incorporation, the Convention becomes a part of the municipal law of Ghana and therefore subject to the                   peremptory norms of the 1992 Constitution.

Thus, by PNDCL 255, the inter-governmental body established by Convention gains a Ghanaian legal status and becomes directly subject to Ghanaian municipal law, including its Constitution, as pointed out. Depending on the functions it carries out on the Ghanaian scene,                         therefore, the respondent is capable of being regarded as an administrative body within the meaning of article 23 of the Constitution.  The fact that the respondent has international legal personality is not necessarily an impediment to its being considered an administrative body under article 23.  What is important is its function in Ghana and its impact on the public.

For the purpose of this case, its relevant function is that of conducting the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination.  It is a function that touches directly on the lives and aspirations of thousands of young people in Ghana.  This is no distant public international law                   function carried out by an international legal person.  In view of the exercise of this function by the respondent, I have no hesitation in considering it to be an administrative body, within the meaning of article 23 of the Constitution.

We next need to consider what duties are imposed on the respondent in consequence of my holding it to be subject to article 23 of the Constitution.  First of all, it needs to be made abundantly clear, in view of the ambivalence expressed in the Court of Appeal as to whether any constitutionally guaranteed human rights of the appellants had been breached, that article 23 imposes binding obligations on administrative bodies and officials.  In this connection, it should be noted that article 12 provides that all the fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution are to be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and Judiciary and all other organs of government and its agencies and all natural and legal persons in Ghana.  The Article places a duty on the courts to enforce these rights and freedoms.  They are thus justiciable.  Since article 23 comes within chapter five, it embodies a justiciable fundamental human right.  What needs analysis is the extent of the rights and duties provided for in the article.  I shall, in this regard, consider two issues: first, the duty to act fairly and                  reasonably; and second, the duty to comply with the requirements imposed by law.  I proceed to do so seriatim.

 

The duty to act fairly and reasonably

 

The first element of the article 23 duty imposed on administrative bodies and officials is that of acting fairly and reasonably.  What does this mean?  In addition to whatever meaning may be derived from subjecting these words to the canons of constitutional interpretation, there is also the common law understanding of acting “fairly” in matters of administrative law.  Since the 1992 Constitution was affixed unto an underlying common law system, which was saved by article 11 of the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the common law on this issue.

A duty on administrative bodies to act fairly exists at common law.  It is a duty that the English courts have evolved from the doctrine,  commonly referred to earlier as the principles of natural justice,  epitomised in the twin latin maxims of :  nemo judex causae suae and audi alteram partem.  On this evolution, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review  (supra) comment (at pp 272-273) that:

 

“The principal value of the introduction of the duty to act fairly into the court’s vocabulary has been to assist them to extend the benefit of basic procedural protections to situations where it would be both confusing to characterise as judicial, or even quasi-judicial, the decision-makers’ functions, and inappropriate to insist on a procedure analogous to a trial.”

 

In the modern English common law, the term “natural justice” is being increasingly replaced by the duty to act fairly.  The current position of the English common law on this issue is summarised thus by De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (supra at pp 275-276):

 

“The entitlement to fair procedures no longer depends upon the adjudicative analogy, nor whether the authority is required or empowered to decide matters analogous to lites inter partes.  The law has moved on; not to the state where the entitlement to procedural protection can be extracted with certainty from a computer, but to where the courts are able to insist upon some degree of participation in reaching most official decisions by those whom the decisions will affect in widely different situations, subject to well-established exceptions.”

 

This generalisation of the English common law position suggests that the English jurisdiction is likely to have a rich seam of case-law which this court can mine, so to speak, to operationalise article 23.  Of course, the article, being a Ghanaian constitutional provision, has to be given purposive meaning within the context of the Ghanaian Constitution and the Ghanaian legal order.  Accordingly, any resort to foreign case-law has to be had with circumspection and any solutions adopted must be customised to fit the Ghanaian situation.  In Ghana, the natural justice doctrine was applied by Ofori-Boateng JA (as he then was) in L’Air Liquide v Anin [1991]1 GLR 460.  The learned judge expressed it thus at 463:

 

    “The general basic principle about these administrative inquiries is that whenever people are given power by law to consider facts and to arrive at conclusions affecting the fate of human beings, they are performing a quasi-judicial function.  And although not a court, if the body violates the rules of natural justice, the courts have the power to declare the procedure invalid, as well as the conclusions therefrom.  The rules of natural justice are two:  Firstly, that a man may not be condemned unheard; and secondly, that a man must not be a judge of his own cause.”

 

My comment on this formulation would be that it is unnecessary to seek to characterise a decision as quasi-judicial in order to enable the application of the doctrine of natural justice to it.  In its modern form, natural justice principles are equally applicable to certain purely                    administrative decisions.

My interpretation of fairness within the context of article 23 would be that, in general, unless the circumstances make it inappropriate, for instance for reasons of practicality or of public interest or for any other cogently valid reason, it includes a principle that individuals affected by administrative decisions should be afforded an opportunity to “participate” in the decision in the sense of being given a chance to make representations on their own behalf of some kind, oral or written, to the decision-maker. Individuals affected or to be affected by administrative decisions obviously have an interest in influencing the outcome of the decision-making process.  In general, it is fair that they should be afforded an opportunity to influence the decision.  Given the variety, and the width of the continuum, of contexts in which administrative decisions are taken, however, there is need for flexibility in the ways that are to be worked out to enable individuals to influence decisions about themselves. Thus, in relation to a particular decision, the circumstances may indicate that there is no need for a formal hearing, in the sense of an adjudication.  A consultation, for instance, may be adequate.  This flexibility, regarding how the presentation of the views of those affected by administrative decisions may be made, is expressed thus by Lord Bridge in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625 at 702:

 

"…the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone.  To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates."

 

Accordingly, a fair “hearing” does not necessarily connote an opportunity for the person affected to be heard orally.  Written representations on his or her behalf may be sufficient, given the context.  Also, the nature of the opportunity to be offered to an affected person to be heard may be influenced by public interest considerations and the requirements of efficient administration.

Article 12(2) of the Constitution contains, inter alia, a public interest proviso to the enforcement of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual enshrined in chapter five of the Constitution.  Article 12(2) is in the following terms:

 

     "Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in this Chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest." (The emphasis is mine).

 

My understanding of this provision is that an individual’s entitlement to a fundamental human right is to be interpreted in such a way as not to impair the public interest.  In relation to article 23, this principle connotes that, in determining procedural fairness, what is required to protect the public interest is also taken into account.  Some degree of balancing between the requirements of the public interest and the needs of administrative justice is called for. Clearly, there is a public interest in the maintenance of an efficient examination system for schools that detects and punishes cheating in exams.  This public interest has to be taken into account, alongside the standard of administrative justice prescribed in article 23, in determining whether the respondent is in breach of its duty under article 23.

Finally, in relation to the duty to act “fairly and reasonably”, it is significant that “reasonably” is added to the formulation.  To my mind, this denotes that this constitutional obligation is distinct from the  underlying common law duty that I have outlined above.  In other words, article 23 is not to be interpreted as a codification of the natural justice doctrine at common law, as it existed at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution, or at any other time.  The case-law produced by the doctrine is useful in giving content and specificity to the constitutional provision, but the doctrine is not to be taken as being coterminous with the constitutional provision.  The South African courts have arrived at a similar conclusion, although, of course,  the constitutional language they were construing was different.  (See Jenkins v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (8) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports 1059 (TK); 1996 SACLR LEXIS 21). This implies that in determining the content of the standard of fairness and reasonableness under article 23, the Ghanaian courts need not follow the course of the natural justice doctrine as it evolves in common law jurisdictions. Other than the flexibility that the additional word “reasonably” buttresses, I do not think that “reasonably” adds much more to the substantive meaning of article 23.  In my view, acting “fairly” will usually entail acting                    “reasonably.”

The learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, sitting as an additional High Court Judge, was emphatically clear on the respondent’s duty to act fairly and reasonably.  He said:

 

“It is my considered view therefore that the respondents herein have acted in open defiance of the duty to act fairly and  reasonably which duty is mandatorily imposed on                      administrative bodies and officials by article 23 of our 1992 Constitution. The applicants were never accused or charged.  When the respondents were investigating the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion the applicants or their headmaster should have been heard and also given a chance to examine their accusers.  The respondents are guilty of abnegation of a constitutional mandatory duty to act fairly and reasonably in this case.  And I accordingly declare that the decision which the respondents arrived at concerning the applicants is incurably bad, void and of no consequence.”

 

I agree with the learned trial judge that the respondent before this court breached the duty to act fairly and reasonably and that therefore its decision should be set aside.  His remarks, however, suggest that he had in mind a formal hearing, with cross-examination, before the respondent could take a lawful decision on the appellants’ case.  I would require less, in the light of practicality and the public interest.  I think that the appellants should have been given an opportunity to make written  representations in response to the allegation levelled against them, before the respondent took the decision to sanction the appellants.  In view of the large number of candidates involved in schools examinations, it is probably unwise to over-judicialise (sic) the due process procedures for policing wrong-doing in relation to examinations, so long as the                     procedures in place lead to the respondent acting fairly and reasonably.

 

The duty to comply with the requirements imposed by law

 

The next element of the article 23 duty which we need to examine is the duty to comply with the requirements imposed on administrative bodies and officials by law.  I understand this element to be additional to what has been discussed above.  In other words, administrative bodies and officials, in addition to complying with the rules on procedural fairness embodied in audi alteram partem and its derivatives and independent constitutional obligations (if any) distilled by Ghanaian courts from the duty to “act fairly and reasonably”, must comply with all other applicable rules of law.  Such other relevant applicable rules of law will often be in the constitutive enactment relating to the administrative body concerned. 

In the present case, the main source to examine for these applicable rules of law is the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), and instruments issued pursuant to it.  The effect of this element of Article 23 is to convert breaches of such rules into breaches of a                    fundamental human right actionable under article 33(1).

In the respondent’s statement of case, it sought to challenge the view of the learned trial judge that the respondent was in breach of article 23, by arguing that:

 

“(22) In so holding the learned trial judge never adverted to the relevant legislation on the point, namely, sections 3(2) and 10 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).

 

(23) Section 3(2) of PNDCL 255 provides that where a candidate is found “before or during an examination” to have in his possession an examination paper or had foreknowledge of the paper or uses an examination paper such candidate may be disqualified from taking the examination and his results shall be cancelled.  Additionally the council may prohibit him from  taking any of its examinations for two years.

 

(24)My Lords, can it be said that the above provision imposes a duty on the council to conduct a trial?  The answer to this question can only be negative otherwise the provision would be impossible of performance.  It is preposterous to argue, for example, that the council cannot act instanta where a candidate is caught red handed with a paper in the examination hall.  In this regard, the expression “during an examination” extends from the time when the invigilator announces the commencement of the examinations to the declaration of the results.  Thus the council may withhold the results where in the course of marking it discovers that the answers in the scripts of a particular school are so identical as to lead to the conclusion that the candidates must have cheated.

 

(25)My Lords, the respondent submits that the council has the right to withhold the results of a candidate over whose script it entertains genuine suspicion.  No rules of natural justice come into play in such situation.

 

(26)Section 10 similarly provides that where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have foreknowledge of an examination paper or cheated in the examination, a report shall be made to the             council which may take action including the cancellation of the result.  The learned judges of the Court of Appeal held rightly that the provision does not impose a judicial inquiry on the council.”

 

These  legal arguments need to be evaluated.  They are in the main based on PNDCL 255, whose requirements the respondent is obliged to comply with, on pain of being in breach of article 23.  The section 3(2) to which the respondent makes reference is in the following terms:

 

“3(2) Where a candidate before or during an examination is found to have acted or is found acting in breach of the provisions of subsection (1) –

 

(a)  he shall be disqualified from taking the examination and the entire results of the candidate in the examination shall be cancelled; and

 

(b)  the council may prohibit the candidate from taking any examination conducted by or on behalf of the council for a period of not less than two years immediately following the breach.”

 

Clearly the sanctions provided for in section 3(2) are predicated on a breach of the provisions of section 3(1), which are to the following effect:

     “Any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the Council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him –

 

(a)  has in his possession any examination paper;

 

(b)  is found to have had foreknowledge of the contents of any examination paper; or

 

(c)  makes use of any examination paper or the contents of it in any manner whatsoever,

commits an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than ¢20,000 and not exceeding ¢500,000 or imprisonment for a term of not more that two years or to both.”

 

Section 3(1) thus creates a criminal offence.  Accordingly, in accordance with the normal principles of criminal law, before the sanctions prescribed in section 3(2) can be applied to any examination candidate, the offence created under section 3(1) must have been proved against him or her beyond any reasonable doubt.  In response to the question posed in paragraph (24) of the respondent’s statement of case, it is clear that to impose the sanctions prescribed in section 3(1) of the Law, a criminal trial has to take place.  Of course, it is not the respondent which has to conduct this, but the courts, on initiation by the normal law enforcement agencies of the land.  Furthermore, I do not accept the respondent’s contention that “during an examination” extends from when the invigilator announces the commencement of the exams until the                 declaration of the results.  During the examination should bear its ordinary meaning of the duration of the actual written or oral examination. If in the course of marking the scripts of a particular school, the respondent discovers suspicious circumstances, but it has no extrinsic evidence sufficient to found a prosecution under section 3(1), the course of action available to it is pursuant to section 10 of the Law.  Under section 10 of PNDCL 255, the respondent may take administrative action in response to a candidate having been found to have had access to an examination paper; or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper; or have cheated in any way during an examination.  Section 10 is in the following terms:

 

“(10) Where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper or cheated in any way during an examination, a report shall be made to the Council which shall take such action, including the cancellation of examination results and any certificate issued in respect thereof to the candidate.”

 

The administrative action of the respondent permitted by this provision is, however, subject to the duty to act fairly and reasonably prescribed under article 23.  As I have already indicated, the respondent’s fair and reasonable administrative action need not take the form of a “trial”             conducted by it.  It is sufficient if the candidates concerned are given an opportunity to be heard through their written representations.  This implies that I do not accept the contention in paragraph (25) of the respondent’s statement of case to the effect that no rules of natural             justice come into play when the respondent withholds a candidate’s results on grounds of genuine suspicion.  The candidate must definitely have a right to be heard before being condemned.

Finally, in connection with the provisions of PNDCL 255, the learned trial judge found that the regulations which, it was anticipated, would be issued under the statute had not been and that the specific rule cited by the respondent to justify its action (rule 5b) did not exist.  These are all factors which weaken the legal basis for the respondent’s administrative action against the appellants.  Although the examination regulations issued by the respondent probably have contractual effect between it and the candidates who submit to its examinations, it is still important for it to identify the right provision under which it purports to take action against examination candidates.

 

Conclusion on issues arising from the grounds of appeal

 

I have not found it necessary to deal with each and every ground of appeal filed by the appellants.  From the foregoing, however, it is clear that I have found merit in their appeal.  In the result, I would allow the appeal of the appellants and restore the judgment of the learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, declaring the decision of the respondent concerning the appellants to be incurably bad, void and of no consequence.  The decision is accordingly set aside.

Availability of damages as a remedy for any loss suffered by appellants

 

To compensate the appellant in this case for the loss caused him as a result of the denial to him of a fair procedure, this court considered the desirability of awarding him (and the other students whom he represented) damages for the loss, in the interest of justice.  Since this is uncharted territory in this jurisdiction, the court determined, after announcing its decision to allow this appeal on 17 June 2004, to invite counsel to make written submissions on whether in the circumstances of this case, it would be appropriate to award damages against the                     defendants and, if so, what factors should be taken into account in determining such damages.  After considering these submissions and reflecting independently on the issues involved, I have come to the conclusion set out in this final part of my judgment.

To award damages to the appellant on the facts of this case would be novel and this court needs to consider carefully the desirability and the justification for such development of the law and the repercussions of such development for the fabric of our general legal system and our public administration.  Under English law, such damages would not be available.  The following terse overview of the position under English law is provided by De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review (1999) at page 609:

“A fundamental tenet of English law is that the failure of a public body to act in accordance with public law principles of itself gives no entitlement at common law to compensation for any loss suffered.  Nor does the careless performance of a statutory duty in itself give rise to any cause of action in the absence of a common law duty of care in negligence or a right of action for breach of statutory duty.  To recover damages, a recognised cause of action in tort must be pleaded and proved.  In short, while in some cases it may be a necessary condition, it is never a sufficient one for the award of damages that the act or omission complained of be ‘unlawful’ in a public law sense.”

 

The English common law has thus refused to develop any special law of torts applicable to only public bodies and officials.  Indeed, Professor Dicey in his famous doctrine of the rule of law propounded in the nineteenth century identified this aspect of the English common law as one of the elements of his doctrine.  He glorified in the fact under English law “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.”  (See Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (10th ed 1959) page 193.  Of course, it does not follow that this court should follow this English orthodoxy.  For even in England, even though the courts have clung to this orthodoxy, there has been pressure for reform.  For instance, in 1988, a Report of the Committee of the Justice/All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom entitled Administrative Justice – Some Necessary Reforms (Oxford, 1988) recommended in paragraph 11.83 that:

 

“compensation shall be recoverable by any person who sustains loss as a result of … (a) any act, decision, determination, instrument or order of a public body which materially affects him and which is for any reason wrongful or contrary to law; or (b) unreasonable or excessive delay on the part of any public body in taking any action, taking any decision or determination, making any order or carrying out any duty.”

 

Given the written Ghanaian Constitution of 1992 there may be opportunities for reform here, which are not available in England.

According to the English orthodoxy, the failure of a public body, contrary to the principles of fairness and natural justice, to give a person a proper hearing before making a decision does not, of itself, give rise to a cause of action for damages.  (See for instance, Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158.)  However, the interesting case of  Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1979] AC 385, PC illustrates the impact of a written Constitution on this English orthodoxy.

In Maharaj’s  case, the appellant before the Privy Council was a barrister engaged in a case in the High Court in Trinidad and Tobago.  He was committed to prison for seven days on the order of the judge.  He applied by motion to the High Court under section 6 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution claiming redress for the contravention of his right protected under the Constitution not to be deprived of his liberty save by due process of law.  He appealed to the Court of Appeal, when the High Court dismissed his motion.  He further appealed to the Privy Council when the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s dismissal.

The Privy Council allowed the appeal, holding that section 6(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago was intended to create a new remedy for the contravention of constitutional rights without reference to existing remedies; that the word “redress” in its context bore its  ordinary meaning of reparation or compensation, including monetary                           compensation; and that although the claim was not a claim in private law for damages for tort, but was a claim in public law for compensation, that compensation could be measured in terms of the deprivation of liberty, including consequential loss of earnings and recompense for the                       inconvenience and distress suffered during detention.

This decision has persuasive force in the Ghanaian jurisdiction because of the similarity in the wording of section 6(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and Article 33 (1) of the Ghanaian Constitution.  Section 6(1) provided as follows:

 

“For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that if any person alleges that any of the provisions of the foregoing sections or section of the Constitution has been, is being, or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

Article 33(1) is in the following terms:

 

“Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

The judgment of Lord Diplock, who delivered the majority judgment of the Privy Council, is of interest in respect of his view on whether on the above language, a claim for damages was available for a breach of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  This is what he said on that issue (at pages 398-399 of the Report):

 

“The right to 'apply to the High Court for redress' conferred by section 6(1) is expressed to be 'without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available.'  The clear intention is to create a new remedy whether there was already some other existing remedy or not.  Speaking of the corresponding provision of the Constitution of Guyana, which is in substantially identical terms, the Judicial Committee said in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] AC 972, 982:

 

“To ‘apply to the High Court for redress’ was not a term of art at the time the Constitution was made.  It was an expression which was first used in the Constitution of 1961 and was not descriptive of any procedure which then existed under Rules of Court for enforcing any legal right.  It was a newly created right of access to the High Court to invoke a jurisdiction which was itself newly created…”

 

As has been already mentioned, in his originating motion in the High Court of April 17, 1975, the appellant did allege that the provisions of section 1(a) had been and were being contravened in relation to him.  He was thus entitled under section 6(1) to apply to the High Court for redress, without prejudice to his right also to pursue his remedy of appealing to the Judicial Committee against the judge’s order.

     What then was the nature of the “redress” to which the appellant was entitled?  Not being a term of legal art it must be understood as bearing its ordinary meaning, which in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (3rd ed) 1944 is given as:  “Reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss resulting from this.”  At the time of the original notice of motion the appellant was still in prison.  His right not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law was still being contravened; but at the time the case reached the Court of Appeal he had long ago served his seven days and had been released.  The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.  It was argued on behalf of the Attorney-General that section 6(2) does not permit of an order for monetary compensation despite the fact that this kind of redress was ordered in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana.  Reliance was placed upon the reference in the subsection to “enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the foregoing sections” as the purpose for which orders etc., could be made.  An order for payment of compensation, it was submitted, did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been contravened.  In their Lordships’ view an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under section 1 “has been” contravened is clearly a form of “redress” which a person is entitled to claim under section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress; as by now it is in the instant case.”

 

This is an eminently sensible construction to put on the right to “apply to the High Court for redress” which is to be found in both section 6(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and article 33(1) of the Ghanaian Constitution.  It is a construction whose persuasive authority I am happy to follow. Accordingly, I hold, encouraged by this persuasive authority, that in Ghana also the High Court, in giving “redress” pursuant to article 33(1), has power to award damages or compensation for the infringement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution.

The respondent, however, in his statement of case on award of damages, submitted in response to this court’s invitation, urged a contrary viewpoint.  He argued, first, that damages were not available to the appellant because he had never claimed that relief.  This argument is easily disposed of.  In my view, a claim for redress under article 33 encompasses, in law, a claim for damages as a possible component of the redress.  It is up to the courts to determine where such relief is appropriate.

Secondly, the respondent maintained that the introduction of the issue of damages into the case was a great surprise to it and that injustice would be caused to both sides if the issue was pressed further.  I do not see how injustice would be caused to the appellant by an award of damages to him.  With regard to the respondent council, it may well have been taken by surprise.  But that was the very reason why the court gave it an opportunity to make further submissions on the issue.  The requirements of fairness have thus been complied with.  The fact that the respondent did not appreciate all the nuances in meaning of “redress” within the context of article 33(1) cannot be held up as a bar to this court’s right and responsibility to interpret the Constitution.  Given the extra opportunity that the respondent was given to marshal additional submissions on whether damages should be available on the facts of this case, I am satisfied that no injustice will be caused to him by the award of damages.

Thirdly, the respondent asserted that “there is no precedent in our municipality for a grant of damages in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, and this is because damages are not a public law remedy.”  It is inaccurate to describe the jurisdiction which this court is exercising in this case as supervisory.  The court is exercising an appellate jurisdiction over a suit in which the High Court has applied the provisions of the Constitution in order to protect the appellant’s constitutional rights. Under Ghanaian constitutional law, the exposition earlier in this judgment has demonstrated that damages have a role to play as a public law remedy in Ghana.

The next inquiry is to determine the circumstances in which the undoubted power of the High Court to award damages may be exercised in relation to article 23 of the Ghanaian Constitution.  There are policy reasons why there should be restraint in the exercise of the power to award damages in that context.  If damages were to be awarded each time that the High Court found administrative action unlawful and exercised judicial review over it, this would raise the cost of government and public administration.  This is an issue of policy that needs to be borne in mind.  The quashing of a decision or the prohibition of a public official from a particular course of action may be sufficient to meet the ends of justice, without the need to award damages.  In making decisions in the context of the facts of particular cases, the courts will need to remember that whilst damages may serve the purpose of compensating the victims of unlawful administrative action, they may not necessarily serve to deter such unlawful action, since the damages will be paid from public coffers and not from the personal funds of the officials concerned.

In any case, in the Maharaj case the facts lent themselves to an easy quantification of damages.  A public law cause of action in relation to the deprivation of liberty is quite analogous to the tort of false imprisonment and therefore the established methods of quantifying damages for that tort can be borrowed.  It is much more difficult to quantify the damage caused by unlawful administrative conduct where this consists, as in the instant case, of a failure to apply a fair procedure.  Should the difficulty in assessing damages in such circumstances affect entitlement to damages on such facts?  Or, rather, should there be a disconnection between the difficulties in determining the measure of damages and the establishment of the principle of liability to damages under the circumstances in contemplation?  These are difficult questions.

On the facts of the present case, the critical issues are whether just redress is achievable through the quashing alone of the offending decision of the respondent and whether in the interest of justice some compensation ought to be paid to the appellant and the other students.  If this court determines that it is desirable and appropriate in the interest of justice to give monetary compensation to the wronged students, the difficulty of quantification should not be allowed to be an impediment to the doing of justice.

In my opinion, just redress, on the facts of this case, is achievable only if, in addition to quashing the offending decision, compensation is paid to the victims of the procedural injustice.  This is because for more than three years the appellant and his fellow students have endured the loss of their constitutional right under article 23.  This loss of their right has already happened and it is irretrievable. As Lord Diplock said in the Maharaj case [1982] AC 385 at 398. “The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.” It may be that the award of damages may not be necessary where an offending decision is quickly set aside.  But where, as here, an aggrieved person has had to bear the consequences of an offending decision for a considerable period, the award of damages, pursuant to the High Court’s power under article 33(1), is justifiable.

 

Assessment of damages arising from failure to apply fair procedure in breach of article 23 of the 1992 Constitution

 

If this court decides to award damages for an infringement of any of the fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in chapter 5 of the Constitution, it would in effect be giving redress for a constitutional wrong or a public law tort.  This is uncharted territory for the common law, as already noted.  Accordingly, any principles from the common law that can be pressed into service can only be by analogy.  To award damages under the private law of tort, judges are guided by principles relating to the measure of damages.  Some analogous principles need to be                     fashioned for the public law of tort arising from the Ghanaian Constitution.

The basic principle that the common law courts have applied for the measure of damages in the private law of tort (and indeed of contract) is that of restitutio in integrum.  Lord Scarman expressed this principle thus in Lim v Camden Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 187:

 

“…the principle of the law is that compensation should as nearly as possible put the party who has suffered in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong.”

 

This measure of damage is easier to apply in the traditional private law of torts area, where a plaintiff’s loss may consist of personal injury, damage to property, financial loss etc.  It is much more difficult to apply where a plaintiff’s loss is that of a constitutional right.  What is the level of                monetary payment that can return him or her to the status quo ante.  A similar difficulty has been found in trying to apply restitutio in integrum to the non-pecuniary elements of personal injury compensation, such as pain and suffering.  In such situations, what the courts may end up with is not true compensation but what Romer LJ described in Rushton v National Coal Board  [1953] 495 at 502 as “notional or theoretical compensation to take the place of that which is not possible, namely, actual compensation.”

Similarly, how can there be actual compensation for the appellant’s loss of his right to a fair hearing, on the facts of this case?  What payment can restore him to the situation he was in before the respondents took their decision affecting him without hearing him?  The difficulty of this question is compounded by the fact that it is to be answered without prejudice to the substantive rights of the parties to this dispute.  On the facts of this case, I am not in a position to determine whether the applicant and his fellow students did or did not cheat.  All that this court can determine is that the procedure the respondent employed to arrive at its decision is flawed and therefore the decision is void. Assessing the monetary compensation to restore the applicant to his procedural status quo ante will, to my mind, inevitably involve a “notional or theoretical” exercise.  It is nevertheless worth carrying out in order to give substance to his constitutional right.  In undertaking this notional exercise of compensation, the courts will need to exercise their judicial discretion judiciously, taking into account the totality of the circumstances of each case.  They would be well advised to restrict themselves to modest awards because of the inevitable subjectivity of the exercise.

In effect, the damages that are awarded for breach of a constitutional right under chapter five of the Constitution in cases where no actual damage is proved are damages which are “at large” in the sense in which Lord Hailsham LC used this expression in Cassell & Co Ltd  v Broome [1972]  AC 1027 at 1073, HL where he said:

 

       “The expression ‘at large’ should be used in general to cover all cases where awards of damages may include elements for loss of reputation, injured feelings, bad or good conduct by either party, or punishment, and where in consequence no precise limit can be set in extent.  It would be convenient if, as the appellants’ counsel did at the hearing, it could be extended to include damages for pain and suffering or loss of amenity.  Lord Devlin uses the term in this sense in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129,1221, when he defines the phrase as meaning all cases where “the award is not limited to the pecuniary loss that can be specifically proved.”  But I suspect that he was there guilty of a neologism.  If I am wrong, it is a convenient use and should be repeated.”

 

 

In the Ghanaian context, use of the phrase may be convenient shorthand for describing the nature of the damages payable for breach of a constitutional right, where no actual proximate pecuniary loss is proved.  I think that the quantum of such damages is in the discretion of the judge and that there are no truly objective standards to guide him or her except the judge’s assessment of what justice requires in the context of the facts of each particular case.  To recapitulate, I would say that, in respect of article 23 of the Constitution, if no evidence of actual proximate                    consequential loss has been led, damages are at large and the court may award such compensation as it deems fit and just in order to restore the victim of the procedural injustice to the position he was in before the breach of his or her constitutional right, to the extent that money can do this.  However, for reasons of public policy, I recommend that the courts should limit themselves to awarding only moderate amounts.

Counsel for the appellant, in his supplementary submissions, prepared in response to this court’s invitation to identify the factors to be taken into account in the possible award of damages against the respondent, outlines three factors that should be taken into account in determining the level of general damages that should be awarded against the respondent.  (The appellant’s counsel defines general damages as “such damages as the law will presume to have resulted from the                   defendant’s actionable wrong.”)

The first factor which he points out is injury to reputation.  He claims that irreparable and ruinous injury has been done to the reputations of the appellants by the actions of the respondent.  I do not, however, accept that injury to reputation is a relevant factor in determining the measure of damages for breach of article 23 of the Constitution.  The appellant has the independent cause of action (preserved by the express language of article 33(1)) to sue for the private law tort of defamation, if he is so inclined.  This private law remedy is independent of the public law remedy of damages awarded to redress the breach of a constitutional duty.

The second factor that he identifies is: “loss of time and educational and related opportunities.”  In his words  (see paragraph  (11) of his supplementary submissions):

 

“Further, because of the virtual monopoly the respondent has in the conduct of Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (SSSCE), the unlawful ban on the appellants from sitting any examinations conducted by the respondent literally halted any educational progression the appellants could have made during the period of the ban.  They can never regain the invaluable educational time they have lost.  There has also been loss of employment opportunities and earnings for those of them who could have sought employment using their SSSCE certificates.  It must certainly have been foreseeable and in the reasonable contemplation of the respondent that unlawfully and capriciously cancelling the results of thirteen students, and further barring them for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondent, will occasion grave injury to the students.  The appellants should be compensated for this injury.”

 

It seems to me legitimate to take the injury sketched out above into account in determining the quantum of general damages to be awarded against the respondent since it can credibly be asserted that it was proximately caused by the respondent’s infringement of article 23 of the Constitution, subject to one qualification.  That qualification is that there is no certainty that if the appellants and the other students had been heard, they would have been awarded their SSSCE certificates.  This court should be careful not to pronounce on the substance of the               allegation of collusion and cheating.  The respondent may or may not have proved the allegation, if the proper procedure had been adopted.  This court has no way of knowing.  Accordingly, I would exclude from consideration any putative earnings that counsel claims the students would have received by using their SSSCE certificates.

The third factor referred to by the appellant is “social dislocation and emotional and mental distress.”  He contends that:

 

“the appellants have been socially dislocated, and have had to bear great emotional and mental distress.  For three years they have suffered severe and stormy emotional and mental distress as they protested their innocence.  The empty insistence of the respondent council that the appellants were guilty, when the council could not produce an iota of evidence against them, compounded the emotional and mental distress of the appellants.  The respondent ought properly to pay for this.”

 

I do not agree that the respondent should pay for this.  I do not consider the social dislocation and emotional and mental distress to be sufficiently proximate consequences of the breach of article 23.

Apart from putting forward a case in favour of general damages, the appellant’s counsel also asserted that aggravated damages should be awarded to the appellant, citing in support of this contention the following passage from Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (12th ed) at page 616:

“In any case in which damages are at large, that is, where they cannot be precisely calculated in money terms, the court may take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant, and where these aggravate the plaintiff’s injury, the damages will be correspondingly increased.  These ‘aggravated damages’ are truly compensatory, being given for the injury to the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity and pride.”  (The                emphasis is that of counsel).

 

I am not persuaded that aggravated damages should be payable on the facts of this case.  It has to be remembered that the damages in issue here are not ordinary private law damages of the kind that the passage above has in contemplation.  This is compensation for a public law wrong which is not actionable at common law.  I believe that we should tread carefully and gingerly in this novel territory.

Similarly, I do not think that this is an appropriate case in which to award exemplary/punitive damages, as we were urged to do by the appellant.  At the commencement of the evolution of the new remedy that this case has established, it would be prudent to exercise restraint and to allow time to provide an opportunity for the courts to monitor how the new remedy fits into the general fabric of our public law.  I believe that the modest general damages awarded in this case against an administrative body for breach of article 23 in itself sends a strong message to public authorities to be mindful of their constitutional obligations under that article in particular and under chapter five in general.

To conclude, I agree that, in addition to the quashing of the decision of the respondent, the respondent should pay damages in the amount as recommended in the judgment of my learned brother Kpegah JSC, the President of the Court.  I wish to highlight, for the guidance of High Courts which may subsequently follow this decision, the moderation in the quantum of the damages awarded. I believe that, in awarding these damages and in reaching its decision in this case, this court has taken an important step in the development of the constitutional and                           administrative law of this country.  I wish to thank both counsel for their assistance to this court in reaching this important decision.

 

 

 

 

S. K. DATE-BAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

COUNSEL:

 

Dr Raymond Atuguba (with him Baasit Abdul Aziz) for the appellants.

Kizito Beyuo for the respondent.

 

 

 

 

gso*

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA.

---------------------------------------------------------------

 

CORAM:        KPEGAH, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

MISS AKUFFO, J.S.C.

BROBBEY, J.S.C.

DR. TWUM, J.S.C.

DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C.

 

 

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. 9/2003

 

21ST JULY, 2004

 

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CONSTITUTION 1992

 

A N D

 

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY DANIEL AWUNI PER HIS NEXT FRIEND.

 

 

MARIAN AWUNI                                                      ..          ..          ..              APPELLANT

 

VRS.

 

WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATION COUNCIL                 ..          ..          ..          RESPONDENT

 

 

J U D G M E N T

 

KPEGAH JSC.  On 17 June 2004, this court allowed the appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal but reserved its full reasons to be given later.  I now proceed to give my reasons why my vote was cast that the appeal be allowed. 

The facts of this case are fairly simple and I do not think a detailed discussion or analysis of them is crucial to the determination of this appeal.  The essential facts should not seriously be in dispute since the case was contested from the trial High Court to this court purely on legal grounds, both substantive and procedural, with the latter dominating and tilting the scales against the appellant in the Court of Appeal.

The case arises out of the decision of the Final Award Committee of the West African Examinations Council (hereinafter referred to as the council) not only to cancel the entire results of the appellants but also to ban them from taking part in any examinations conducted by it for three years. The facts, which in my view are essential for the determination of this matter, are briefly that the council is established by a convention between English-speaking West African countries which was later incorporated in the laws of Ghana by the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225), with the sole authority to conduct, in member countries, such examinations as the council may think appropriate and to award certificates and diplomas based on the results of such examinations. The council, therefore, is the sole authority                 responsible in Ghana for the conduct of both the Junior Secondary Basic Education Certificate Examinations (BECE) and Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (SSSCE).

Between October and December 2000, the council, as it normally does every academic year, conducted the Senior Secondary School Examinations throughout the country.  The appellants were all candidates at this examination with their parent school, the Notre Dame Minor Seminary in Navrongo in the Upper East Region as their examination centre.  While waiting for their results, the appellants were informed through the headmaster of the school about the cancellation of their entire result on the grounds that they had been involved in some examination malpractices or irregularities in relation to Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The nature of the irregularities the appellants were said to have indulged in was that they had foreknowledge of the paper and colluded among themselves in solving the questions.

Upon receipt of the letter informing him of the cancellation of the results of the appellants and the imposition on them of a three-year ban from taking any examinations under the auspices of the council, the headmaster of the Notre Dame School petitioned the council to review its decision.  He advanced a number of reasons why he felt the sanctions needed a review.  The most important and relevant, in my view, is his objection to the procedure adopted by the council in its investigations, culminating in the punishment of his students. He urged upon the                  council that the claim that the appellants had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 is only an allegation and the invocation and “application of rule 56 without further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation is a bit harsh on the poor                     students.”

By this statement, I understand the headmaster to be taking issue with the procedural unfairness of the investigations which were said to have established the involvement of the appellants in examination malpractices in relation to the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2, thereby              calling for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the appellants by the Final Award Committee of the Council.  The fact that a non-lawyer could raise such a serious issue on procedural fairness, to me only underscores how fundamental and basic its observance is by any person in our present constitutional dispensation making a decision which affects the rights of others. The headmaster also contended in his petition for a review that neither before, during, nor after the examinations at the centre was there any incident which suggested that any of the students of Notre Dame School had foreknowledge of any examination papers, let alone colluded during the examinations. The headmaster further indicated that when the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion was brought to their attention, the school authorities not only subjected the affected students to a thorough examination but also the masters to self-examination in what he called “a true spirit of a minor seminary” in the hope of finding where they might have erred this time round but their own investigations revealed the contrary.  He then protested the innocence of the affected students and claimed that any similarity in their answers might have been as a result of a particular use of a common text book – (Aki Ola Series) and SSS Mathematics (Core) (Dalaba Series); and that those books treated past questions from 1993 to 1998 which the students could have learnt.

In a short response to the headmaster’s petition for a review, the council stated as follows:

 

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers.  The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates.  As a result all scripts were scrutinized.  From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the 13 candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The council therefore applied the prescribed sanctions.”

 

The council rejected the headmaster’s assertion that the appellant during their preparations for the examinations, might have had access to and used two particular books that presented already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 because the headmaster did not indicate which of the solved problems were repeated in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) Paper 2; the Council then denied that any of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.  The council therefore reiterated its position that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the appellants.

This was followed by a letter from appellants’ solicitors raising certain legal points why they thought that the decision of the Council was unlawful, null and void since it violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution, the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255) “and a host of other laws, rules and regulations of this country.”  They also protested the innocence of the appellants and asked that their results be released.  When the council failed to meet the demands of the solicitors, they decided to resort to the courts to redress what they              perceived as the infringement of the fundamental human rights of their client.

Therefore, on 10 August 2001, the appellants’ solicitors by an  “originating notice of motion” initiated action in the Fast Track High Court seeking a number of declaratory reliefs which can be summarised as follows:

 

(i)            a declaration that the decision of the Final Awards and Examinations Committee of WAEC to cancel the entire results of the appellants is unlawful, void and of no effect;

and

 

(ii) the barring of the appellants from taking any examination conducted by WAEC for three years is equally unlawful, void and of no effect.

 

The application also sought such directions or orders which the court felt was necessary for the enforcement of any declarations made by it.

In support of their application, the appellants exhibited a number of documents which they felt supported their case.  These documents included the letter dated 30 April 2000 informing the headmaster of the cancellation of the entire results of the appellants – (exhibit A).  The headmaster’s petition on behalf of the appellants for a review was also exhibited as (exhibit B).  The reply of the council to the headmaster reiterating its position was (exhibit C).  The letter from the appellants’ solicitors was marked (exhibit D); and that of the council acknowledging same was (exhibit E).  This letter merely acknowledged receipt of the letter on behalf of the appellants and indicated, in a typical public service fashion that the petition had been forwarded to the Final Awards Committee, the decision of which would be communicated later.  It is obvious to me that it was this typical public service attitude of “we are looking into it” when action was immediately called for. That kind of response compelled the solicitors to resort to the courts and apply for a judicial review under articles 23 and 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.

In an affidavit in opposition sworn to by Mr Frederick Selby, solicitor for the council, and filed on 20 August 2001, the council tried to justify the decision of its Final Award Committee on a number of legal grounds, before finally objecting to the procedure the appellants adopted in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution.  I think it will be prudent on my part to quote the relevant paragraphs of the Council’s affidavit in opposition:

 

“(5) That in the exercise of the powers conferred on it, the respondent council has evolved rules and regulations to ensure the sanctity of examinations and also to ensure fairness to all  candidates.  This responsibility enjoins the respondent council to stem out acts of examination malpractices for the public interest…

 

(8)… The respondent council says that following allegations of leakage of the 2000 SSSCE 

           Mathematics (Core) 2 Pape

  all scripts were scrutinized.  That there was sufficient                evidence in the scripts of

  the plaintiffs (sic) confirm collusion arising out of foreknowledge.

 

(9)   In further answer the respondent council says it has all the expertise to detect collusion  among candidates.

(10) That the respondent council admits paragraph (10) of the affidavit in support and says it took the action for the public interest.

 

(11) … The respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representation.  The practice is universal with all examining bodies.

 

(12) … The respondent council says that the examination results are not a matter of human rights.  That cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an infringement of human rights.  Council will make reference to relevant provisions of the 1992 Constitution.

 

(14) … The respondent council says that as the name suggests, the Final Award Committee is the appropriate body that takes  decisions in all matters affecting the SSSCE.  As such it is the same body that can review its decisions, if any.

 

(15) … The respondent council says that the decision was based on evidence and was therefore reasonable and fair.

 

(16) … The respondent council says its decision does not contravene any provision of the 1992 Constitution.

 

(17) … The respondent council says its obligation of stemming out acts of examination malpractices is for the public interest and therefore overrides all other personal interests.”

 

After deposing to facts which can conveniently be described as a defence of justification for the council’s decision, Mr Fredeick Selby, the Solicitor for the West Africa Examinations Council, obviosly under a misapprehension, challenged the procedure adopted by the apellants in the concluding paragraphs of his affidavit in opposition thus:

 

“(18) The originating summons are used:

 

(i) under Order 54A to obtain a declaration as to construction of an instrument, will, deed or statute;

 

(ii)  under Order 54, r 15 for the etermination, without any administration of  the estate or trust, of the rights of persons interested, the ascertainment of any class of creditors, etc or the furnishing of accounts;

 

(iii)  under Order 54, r 16 for the administration of a trust or of the property of the estate of a deceased person;

 

(iv) under Order 54, r 18 for the foreclosure or redemption, etc of a mortgage.

 

(19) That the present procedure adopted by the applicants does not   give room for vidence, which is very vital in this case.

(20)That under the circumstances the procedure adopted by the plaintiffs is not the best to determine the merits of the matter.

 

(21)That the present action is misconceived and lacks merit.

 

(22)That plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs or at all.”

 

Later, in a supplementary affidavit filed on 27 August 2001, the same lawyer sought to “amend paragraphs (5) and (11)” of his original affidavit and to depose to a new information that the Final Awards Committee of the council did, indeed, invite the headmaster, Rev Fr Simon B Asofo and one Mr Konlaan, the invigilator for the day, to make representations on behalf of the appellants only for these officers to confess in written statements that the appellants did receive pre-examination briefing before the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  No such written statements were exhibited as any prudent lawyer would have done in compliance with the Rules of Court. For the avoidance of doubt, I would like to I quote the said affidavit in relevant parts:

 

“(3) That I amend paragraph (5) of the affidavit in opposition to read as follows: That in exercise of the powers conferred on it, the respondent council has evolved rules and regulations to ensure the sanctity of examinations and also to ensure fairness to all candidates.  This responsibility enjoins the respondent council to stem out acts of examination malpractices for the public interest.  Counsel will make references to regulations, structure and scheme of the examinations for the Senior                 Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSSCE).  Counsel will also make reference to the statement of Fr Simon B Asofo, headmaster indicating that he briefed the students before the commencement of the examinations.

 

(4)  That I amend paragraph (11) of my affidavit to read as follows: That in answer to paragraph (11) of affidavit in support, the respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent council as an examining body invited the headmaster of the school and Mr Konlaan, the supervisor in its investigations.  That being a school examination the respondent council did not need to invite candidates to make representation.”

 

       I would like to briefly comment on this peculiar procedure adopted by learned counsel for the council asking that he be permitted to “amend” paragraphs (5) and (11) of the affidavit he had earlier sworn to in opposition, and to depose to new facts.  I am very doubtful whether this procedure is permissible since to depose to a new state of facts which is inconsistent with that deposed to in an earlier affidavit is not the same as an application for amendment of pleadings and should not be considered as such so as to allow such a strange application at anytime as is                  permitted by the rules of court in the case of pleadings.  I dare say so because I consider a deposition as to the existence or non-existence of a state of facts as evidence for all purposes and cannot simply be   re-called by another affidavit stating a state of facts inconsistent with the earlier one, as is sought to be done in the instant case.  Even if a party could be allowed to, as it were, “amend” a deposition in an earlier affidavit, he should not be allowed to do so unless he satisfactorily explains how he came to depose to the previous information.

My Lords, I have a confession to make myself.  I was deeply troubled by this serious lapse on the part of learned counsel; and if you may permit me to re-call our anxieties and concerns during conference as to the likely ramifications of our final decision, upon reflection, however, and speaking for myself, I now think it was a needless anxiety because of this singular faux pas by learned counsel.  As I would have been persuaded to adopt a different position in this matter had there been some cogent and credible evidence on record which is supportive of this allegation and from which one can safely make a finding of fact in this direction, namely, that the headmaster and the invigilator were not only invited but also did admit to briefing the students.

I crave, your Lordships indulgence for patience with me if I appear to be treating “a non-essential issue” or an issue not relevant in this appeal because I strongly feel that the whole of my thought-process in arriving at my decision be sufficiently adumbrated.  Moreover, I feel greatly troubled by, and cannot honestly gloss over, what I consider to be learned counsel’s serious lapse and inadequacies on an important and crucial issue like tendering of confession statements from the headmaster and the invigilator to the detriment of his client’s case.

I have therefore decided to change my normal approach and to write this particular judgment in a what I will refer to as a “tutorial style;” (that is to say, pointing out what I consider to be mistakes of counsel and suggesting possible solutions), so as to forestall any possible accusations of lack of sensitivity to the public interest.

As earlier indicated, although I am skeptical about the procedure whereby a party files a supplementary affidavit seeking to, as it were, amend, recall or recant a disposition he had made in an earlier affidavit, I have, however, noticed from the record of proceedings that, the learned trial judge indulged learned counsel with a week’s adjournment to enable him put his house in order, as we often say, and yet counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity.  The following dialogue took place between him and the court when counsel attempted to show to the court the alleged confession statements.  This is what happened as recorded:

 

“Selby: … My Lord, this is a statement the headmaster wrote when he appeared before WAEC, Rev Father Simon B Asofo and then another one signed by the supervisor.  My Lord we gave them every opportunity as an institution.  The headmaster and the supervisor appeared before the WAEC committee and this are written statements they offered that day.

Judge:  Is that part of the material you have filed.

Selby:  My Lord, he is just telling us that we invited all other headmasters except this school and my Lord, I am only trying to disband that argument, they appeared before us.

Judge:  I remind you that you should not forget that you are arguing on affidavit and therefore if you know there is any material which will be of use to the court please submit it.  Make it part of the material you have filed.  Because if you have not filed any thing, I will not use it.  The rules do not permit me to use material which is not filed so don’t forget that.  I will give you one week from today, that is to say, you will be coming on 28th.  And in the interim, if you think it should be here but is not here please go and file it.  So the case is adjourned to 28 August 2001.”

 

Despite this obvious indulgent attitude of the learned trial judge, there is nothing on record to suggest that an affidavit exhibiting these two potentially decisive documents had been filed.  In my candid opinion, therefore, the decision of this court must unfortunately be put down on the inadequacies of learned counsel.  He cannot, in my humble view, escape blame for this culpa lata in the handing of this case.  Because, if such evidence were properly laid before the trial court, it would have, in my opinion, provided an unimpeachable answer to the complaint of the appellants under article 23 which enjoins administrative bodies and administrative officials, in a very robust and imperative language, to “act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law.”

The phrase “to act fairly and reasonably” in my opinion necessarily imports a duty to observe the common law maxim of audi alteram partem and other principles of natural justice which is very much part of our jurisprudence and are implicit in the constitutional provisions in article 23.  Because I cannot contemplate how a person could be said to have acted fairly and reasonably if he did not give either notice or hearing to another who was entitled to such notice or hearing before taking a decision which adversely affects his rights, neither can I contemplate a situation where a person could be said to have acted fairly and  reasonably if he acted as a judge in his own cause, or gave a biased and perverse decision!

My Lords, it is clear to me that the appellants anchored their plaint on article 23 of the Constitution of this country and, in seeking redress, took advantage of article 33(1) which confers jurisdiction on the High Court to adjudicate any lis in which an individual either alleges an actual infringement of his fundamental rights or brings a quia timet action to prevent a threatened breach of his rights. Article 33(1) states in unambiguous language as follows:

 

“33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

And in clause (2) of the said article, the High Court in the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction

 

under clause (1) is empowered to:

 

“33(2)…issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.”

 

Under clause (4) of article 33, the Rules of Court Committee of the Judicial Council is entrusted with the responsibility to make rules to regulate the practice and procedure for enforcing the fundamental rights of the individual by the courts.  And it is common knowledge that this constitutional responsibility has not yet been discharged by the appropriate authority.  It is this void or  lacuna in the rules as to the appropriate procedure to be employed to invoke the enforcement jurisdiction of the High Court under clause (1) of article 23 that                     compelled the appellants’ solicitors “to apply to the High Court for redress” by employing the procedure of “originating notice of motion” to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.  But before I consider the objection of learned counsel, I would like to digress a little bit and take a brief look at the history behind the whole of chapter 5 (articles 12-33) on the Fundamental Human Rights of the individual.

The historical and political development of the country as demonstrated by the landmark case of In re Akoto [1961] 2 GLR 523, SC not only made it paramount but inevitable that the fundamental rights of the individual be enshrined and entrenched in the 1992 Constitution, but also desirable that a mechanism be provided for their enforcement.  Therefore, in enacting the fundamental rights of the citizen in articles 12 to 32 of the Constitution coupled with a provision in article 33(1) empowering the High Court to enforce these rights, the framers of our Constitution have not only demonstrated their resolve and determination to confer rights on the individual but also that these rights be enforceable as well.  It may be that it is this mechanism that the framers of our Constitution intended to use to avoid, in the future, a similar decision like the one in In re Akoto.  Through the provisions of article 33(1), the framers of the Constitution have, as pointed out by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), in the case of Peoples’ Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138 where a similar provision in the 1969 Constitution was considered, clearly expressed their general intention that the courts should be the custodians and the protectors of the rights and liberties of the individual citizens of the country.  When, however, it is a law which infringes any of these rights and liberties, that law is pro tanto void and proceedings have to be initiated under articles 2(1)(a) and 130(1)(b) for such a declaration rather than a resort to article 33(1) of the Constitution.

     There is no gainsaying the fact that the gravamen of the appellants case is that the council did not give them any hearing contrary to the principles of natural justice which principles, by necessary implication, are now enshrined in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution before taking the decision cancelling their results; which decision in every sense will adversely affect them.  There can be no doubt, therefore, that the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the council could be reviewed by the High Court by means of a writ of certiorari to determine whether the said decision was given in compliance with the principles of natural justice and, in my view, with the provisions of article 23 of our Constitution as well.  But the appellants did not directly follow this                procedure possibly because of time constraint, as an application for certiorari, under our Rules, is ordinarily subject to be brought within six months from the date of the decision complained of.

The “originating notice on motion” taken out on behalf of the appellants, therefore, was essentially to determine whether the appellants were fairly treated or given a hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice embodied in the maxim: audi alteram partem, before they were sanctioned by the Final Awards Committee of the Council.  To me, these issues could easily and fairly be resolved on affidavit evidence without recourse to viva voce evidence as learned counsel erroneously assumed.  To me, therefore, the procedure of originating notice of             motion adopted by the appellants might not only be to avoid the constraints of time fortuitously imposed on them by the rules of court if they had brought an application for a writ of certiorari, but also as a simple, convenient and pragmatic means of vindicating their rights. And although the Rules of Court Committee is yet to regulate, as required by article 157(2) of the 1992 Constitution, the procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights enshrined in chapter five of the Constitution, I think it will be a great tragedy for the rule of law, like the decision in the Re Akoto case [1961] 2 GLR 523, SC, if we interpret article 33(1) in such a manner that an individual is, meanwhile, prevented from bringing the infringement of his fundamental rights under chapter 5 to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get unlawful conduct reviewed and stopped.  The fortunes of this case, therefore, will depend on what construction we put on the words “may apply … for redress” in article 33(1).  And we must bear in mind that in cases involving the rights of the citizen, a simple but efficacious procedure is the most desirable. I will therefore humbly urge your Lordships to adopt a very liberal and broad construction of article 33(1) rather than any restrictive and doctrinaire approach to its interpretation. As Sowah JSC (as he then was) advised (in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637), we must regard the Constitution as “a living organism capable of growth and development, as the body politic of Ghana itself is capable of growth and development.” In our efforts at interpreting the Constitution his Lordship advised thus at pp 647-648:

 

“A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation.  It does not admit of a narrow interpretation.  A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do.  We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time. 

 

And so we must take cognizance of the age-old fundamental principle of constitutional construction which gives effect to the intent of the framers of this organic law.  Every word has an effect.  Every part must be given effect.”

 

As earlier pointed out, human rights cases are matters which must not only be given liberal considerations but also must be expeditiously determined.  In such matters, therefore, a simple or non-cumbersome but efficacious procedure must be adopted for its enforcement; “simple” or “non-cumbersome” in the sense that the procedure should be readily available to, and inexpensive for the ordinary citizen of this country. And “efficacious” in the sense that the procedure will also allow for a speedy and convenient determination of the issues at stake.

After carefully reading clauses (1) and (2) of article 33 together, I am firmly of the view that the words must be given their literal and ordinary meaning; and the simple and ordinary meaning I would ascribe to the word  “redress” as it is used in clause (1) is “relief.”  And “apply” is wide enough to admit any procedure by which the court can be approached.  The question then may be asked: What types of relief can be granted by the High Court in such circumstances?  The answer is immediately provided in clause (2) of the said article 33 which empowers the High Court “to issue such directions or orders or writs … for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement” of the rights to which, in the opinion of the court, the person is entitled.  There should therefore, first, be a declaration as to the existence or otherwise of a right and its                   infringement before an appropriate “order” could be made or a “direction” issued to secure or enforce such a right.

It is my humble view that in the circumstances of the case before us, we can say without any fear of contradiction that where an individual brings such proceedings in court, he must have a high expectation of obtaining an authoritative declaration of his legal rights coupled with the grant of an appropriate judicial remedy to vindicate those rights. Therefore learned counsel’s argument that the procedure is inappropriate for a declaratory judgment, not in the accepted sense of it being a foundation for a future action, is, with the greatest respect, not                     maintainable.  Presumably the “directions” or “orders” or “writs” may be aimed at the person or body which violates the rights of the individual who brings the complaint to the court.  But to the question against whom these fundamental rights of the individual in chapter 5 can be enforced, I would, broadly speaking, answer that it is against the “state” or  “executive”; so that prima facie, the fundamental rights become enforceable against local or other authorities or agents of the state and the executive, or any person who violates them.  But article 23 specifically mentions “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials.”  This should not be inconsistent with the above submission as to the categories of persons against whom the rights can be enforced.

My Lords, it is interesting to note that in conferring supervisory jurisdiction on the High Court over all lower courts and any lower adjudicating authority, the framers of the Constitution provide, in almost identical language, that in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court has power to issue “orders” and “directions” for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of this jurisdiction.  What then is the meaning of the words “directions” or “orders” “writs” as used in clause (2) of article 33?

The writ of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition were replaced in England in 1938 by “orders” of the same name. It was quo warranto which was replaced first by information in the nature of quo warranto, and later by an injunction – that is, an order of the court.  In India, which is also a common law jurisdiction, however, the writs of habeas corpus and mandamus were replaced by “directions” in the nature of mandamus. So the words “orders” and “directions” may not be too different from the old writs since the terminology has also been in use in England; especially when “common law” as known in English jurisprudence is still applicable in our jurisdiction.  One basic principle of interpretation of statutes is that the legislature must be credited with knowledge of the state of the law.  Applying this canon of construction, it is submitted that under the common law which is still undoubtedly relevant in our                    jurisprudence, we can say that since the High Court enforces its supervisory jurisdiction through the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto of old, it is safe to presume that the words “orders” and “directions” and “writs” are used to describe what at one time were called prerogative writs in England; or they refer to these established and well-recognized English writs.  The words, in my humble opinion, have been used in clause (2) of article 33 and clause (2) or article 2 to describe well-recognized English writs.  There is, therefore, in my considered opinion, internal evidence in clauses (1) and (2) of article 33, read together, unlike in article 2 clauses (1) and (2), that the framers of the Constitution might have intended to de-emphasize the formal procedure of issuing a writ in the High Court to invoke its enforcement jurisdiction under article 33(1), and rather intended that the Rules of Court Committee make rules which will be as simple as, and similar to rules for the application for the old prerogative writs.

It is submitted that the principles governing the issue of the writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, have not been affected merely by reason of the wide language used in article 33(2).  It is doubtful to conceive of any “direction” or “order” which can secure a result, for example, a declaratory relief, which could not be secured by the writs expressly mentioned in the article.  The order, in my view, therefore, could be declaratory in form and so we can declare the rights of the appellants and secure its enforcement by the appropriate “direction” or “order” or “writ.”  But wide as the connotation of the words “directions” or “orders” in article 33(2) is, I do not consider them so wide as to include declarations for foundation of future claims.  These can                  appropriately be decided in a more appropriate proceedings.  This is not to say that any adequate alternative relief will defeat the constitutional remedy under article 33(1).  It may rather be that it is that other relief which is the only relief, and article 33(1) is neither the proper nor the adequate relief or means to secure it.  This is borne out by the phrase “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available” to the individual as used in the said article.

It is clear to me that the intention of the framers of our Constitution is that the individual who alleges that his fundamental rights have been breached or is threatened to be breached, should have cheap and unimpeded access to the High Court.  On the issue whether the                  appellants were right in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court by originating notice of motion in the absence of specific rules to vindicate their fundamental rights, I have already indicated that there is enough internal evidence in the relevant provision to permit the recourse to such a procedure. Therefore the objection that the procedure of originating notice of motion was inappropriate for the reliefs sought by the  appellants; and that until specific rules have been made by the mandated authority to regulate the procedure for invoking the enforcement               jurisdiction under article 33(1), the only viable alternative was for the appellants to have issued a writ like in civil cases is, in my view, not maintainable.  Although learned counsel did not specifically refer to Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), its influence could easily be discerned from his views.  It must be conceded that this alternative procedure is also available under clause (1) of article 33.  But it is a procedure which can hardly recommend itself to any human rights lawyer because of its cumbersome nature with its                  attendant delays which may result in considerable expenses.  In my humble opinion, the procedure of originating notice of motion is  currently the most suitable procedure, in the absence of any specific rules, for a situation which no doubt may demand some urgency and expeditious disposal.  The added advantage of this procedure is that in extreme cases, an applicant can obtain an interim relief, even if ex parte, for a brief period only.

In the High Court the learned trial judge rejected Mr Selby’s objection, dealt with the application on the merits and granted the  appellants’ reliefs by quashing the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the Council.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with learned counsel for the council and overruled the High Court and set aside its decision.  This court is therefore to decide whether the High Court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked or not.

My Lords, in overruling the High Court, the Court of Appeal held the view that two cases cited in argument were not relevant to the case they were dealing with.  These cases are: (a) People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138; and (b) Juandoo v Attorney-                 General of Guyana [1971] AC 972, PC.  In the case of the People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General, the applicants, a registered political party, applied for police permit to demonstrate in respect of certain national issues but were refused the permit by the police without                      assigning any reasons. Another political party was, however, permitted to demonstrate over some of the issues.  The People’s Popular Party therefore applied to the High Court by way of originating motion under article 28(2) of the 1969 Constitution claiming that their rights of                    association, movement and assembly as provided under the said Constitution, had been infringed.  The relief sought by them was an order compelling the police to issue them with a permit.  The Rules of Court Committee, like in this case, did not make rules to regulate the procedure to be followed under article 28(2) of the 1969 Constitution.

The court, presided over by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J, applying the case of In re Meister Locius and Bruning Ltd [1914] WN 390, held that where a statute (article 33(2) the 1992 Constitution) in this case provides for an application to be made to the court without specifying the procedure by which such an application is to be made, it may be made by originating notice of motion.  The case was also relied upon by the Law Lords in the Jaundoo case where Lord Diplock, reading the opinion of the Privy Council, quoted with approval the following words of Warrington J:

 

“… where the act merely provides for an application and does not say in what form that application is to me made, as a matter of procedure, it may be made in any way in which the court can be approached.”

 

Although the Court of Appeal is not bound by the decision of the High Court, it is inexplicable to me how this case could be said to be “hardly applicable” to the case before them, especially when the case dealt with a constitutional provision in the 1969 Constitution which can be said to be in pari material with article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution, which is involved here. 

With much respect to the learned judges of the Court of Appeal, I personally think the case is on all fours with the present one.  The Jaundoo case presents the same scenario as in the case before us.  The Government of Guyana proposed to construct a new road through the applicant’s land.  She held the view that her rights under article 8 of that country’s Constitution would be violated.  The said article prevented the compulsory acquisition of property unless under circumstances specified in the article.  There were similar provisions in the Constitution                     empowering the High Court to enforce a citizen’s fundamental rights; and also a provision requiring the rule making authority of the Supreme Court to make rules for the practice and procedure to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce the individual’s rights but this was not complied with.

The applicant by originating notice of motion applied to the High Court for redress.  The court dismissed the application in limine on the grounds that an originating notice of motion was not the proper procedure and that the proceedings should have been commenced by a writ of summons.  The case travelled up to the Privy Council where it was held that since the authorized body had not made any rules in respect of the practice and procedure for applications to be made to the High Court for redress, the right to apply was unqualified and wide enough to cover applications by any form of procedure by which the High Court could be approached to invoke its powers, and an originating motion was one such procedure.

Again, with much respect, although the Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the decision of the Privy Council in the Jaundoo case, one would have thought that it is on all fours with the case before them and contained useful guidance and should therefore have been treated with respect and applied.  But unfortunately the court said the case was “inapplicable” to the situation before it.

My Lords, if the Court of Appeal thought it had reached a complete dead end or cut-de-sac in the matter, it could have sought refuge under Order 74 of our High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), which allows the adoption of the practice in force in the High Court of England where our Rules make no provision for any procedure.  In 1962 the Supreme Court Rules were revised in England by the RSC (Review) 1962, which came into effect on 1 January 1964.  And by the said revision, Order 5 r 1 made changes as to the mode of commencing civil proceedings in the High Court.  The rule stated thus:

 

“Subject to the provisions of any Act and of these rules, civil proceedings in the High Court may be begun by writ, originating summons, originating motion or petition.”

 

This rule, juxtaposed to the provision in article 33(1), in view of the latter’s wide language, could only lead to the conclusion that the procedure adopted by the appellants to seek redress from the court was permissible.

One last point which I think is important for me to touch on is the failure of learned counsel to exhibit the alleged confession statements of the headmaster and the invigilator, one Mr Kolaan, to establish his allegation that the appellants were invited per those officials who                    confessed the offence.  The learned trial judge was therefore justified in his finding that the appellants were not given hearing at any stage of the council’s investigations into allegations of malpractices during the examinations; and this is the pith of the appellants’ complaint against the council.  To compensate for this failure, learned counsel contended that the council has the necessary expertise to detect “collusion among candidates through scrutiny of the scripts”; and that from this exercise, there was sufficient evidence to “confirm collusion arising out of                foreknowledge” against the appellants. 

I think, and this is important for emphasis, that there has been a misapprehension of the real import of the complaint of the appellants under article 23 of our Constitution.  This is so because it is a well-settled principle of administrative law that preliminary investigations, like the comparison and scrutiny of the scripts of candidates, is not subject to the principles of procedural fairness.  But when the council, after its own preliminary investigations, forms the opinion that there might have been collusion as a result of foreknowledge among the students then, I think, the principles of procedural fairness, like giving notice and hearing to the appellants, must be observed.  This is because after such preliminary investigations, the council could be said to have some evidence upon which to act and take a decision affecting the rights of the appellants.  To me, therefore, this case comes within the category of cases in which we cannot sincerely say that this serious default against article 23 had not inflicted a gross injustice on the appellants.  It was an unreasonable exercise of power.  Thus the argument of learned counsel to the effect that the issue concerned school examinations and the council could not, as a universal practice, invite the candidates to make representations is, to me, untenable since it implies the submission that the observance of the rules of natural justice was administratively inconvenient and the flawed procedure made no difference to the decision.  In this country, the right to be heard is a fundamental principle enshrined in our Constitution and cannot be ignored for reasons of administrative inconvenience.

Another problem area for the council is the type of punishment imposed on the appellants under their own regulations.  The appellants were said to have colluded in one paper – Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  This finding, admittedly was arrived at through the scrutiny of the scripts of the appellants.  The case therefore squarely falls under section B, regulation 3(a) of the council which governed the entire examinations in the year 2000.  It provides:

 

“3(a) Where cases of cheating are detected in the scripts and/or otherwise established in one paper, the results of the subject involved shall be cancelled.  Where a candidate is proved to have cheated in more than one paper/subject his entire results shall be cancelled.”

 

Clearly, the council has acted ultra vires its own regulations, that is, section B, reg (3)(a) which relates to collusion.  I do not see why Mr Selby as solicitor for the council, could not advise it that under its own regulations, it had acted ultra vires and allow for an earlier resolution of this case rather that contesting in the courts for all this while.

There has been some argument about the regulations not having been made by the Minister for Education as provided in the law establishing the council but by the council itself. The legal consequences of such a default are too great to contemplate and pronounce upon now.  In any case, I do not think it is very crucial to the determination of this case and I will prefer to rest my decision on the grounds earlier canvassed in this judgment.  We can only call upon the minister to             perform the functions he has been tasked with under PNDCL 225 to avoid any future embarrassment.

Charity, they say, begins from home.   And I cannot also forget the saying “let everybody sweep in front of his house and the whole world will be clean.”  It is the default in our system which has given rise to this case.  I cannot therefore end this judgment without quoting Lord Diplock in the Jaundoo case (supra).  He said at page 987 thus:

 

“Their Lordships, however, cannot part with this appeal without … drawing attention to the urgent need which it has disclosed for specific provision to be made under article 19(6) for the practice and procedure to be followed in applications and references to the High Court under article 9(2).  The absence of such provisions has had the result in the instant appeal that the parties have been put to the expense of three stages of interlocutory proceedings, and the applicant’s claim still remains to be heard on the merits nearly five years after the proceedings began.”

 

For article 19(6) substitute article 33(4) of the 1992 Constitution and for article 9(2) substitute article 33(1) and the sentiments expressed in this dictum will serve my purpose.

I do not think whatever decision we are compelled to arrive at will be subversive of the important public duty of the council to check and eradicate examination malpractices and preserve the integrity of its certificates and diplomas.  It is rather a decision which seeks to balance the democratic rights of the citizen as enshrined in article 23 against the obvious need, in the public interest, of the council to preserve the sanctity of its examinations.  I do not think this case is one in which injustice to one individual can be said to be of no consequence because the larger societal interest is more important.  For the right of a nation is that of the individual written in capital letters.  And a nation that stands by and looks on while the rights of the individual are slowly pecked at, eventually pays the ultimate price of finding its own rights eroded.  Often times, the concept of “public interest” and “national security” have been used to undermine and subvert individual freedoms.  These are words which are not infrequently on the lips of potential dictators and often used as convenient excuses for the violation of individual rights.  We may accept some limitation on the fundamental rights of the individual only if it is justified and proportionate.  Might be it was time we told public authorities that they would be held scrupulously to the democratic rights enshrined in chapter five (article 12-32); and especially the values impliedly enshrined in article 23.  My Lords, in view of all that I have said, I would allow the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restore the judgment of the High Court.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby set aside and that of the High Court restored.

As indicated in the preface to this opinion, we gave our decision on 17 June 2004 but reserved our reasons for allowing the appeal, and the issuing of our final orders to today.  We did so because at a pre-judgment conference held a few days before the intended judgment day to discuss our final orders, we were divided in opinion as to whether the appellants, in view of the circumstances of the case, were entitled to some damages as part of the redress or not.  And, if so, what factors were to be considered.  We therefore invited further submissions from both counsel as a form of assistance to us.  The essence of questions we posed to counsel can succinctly and neatly be reframed thus: whether a constitutional provision like article 33(1) for redress for breach of fundamental rights and liberties should be interpreted to include the award of damages when the act complained of is the non-observance of the rules of natural justice, or the violation a fundamental rights as in the instant case.

Admittedly, the question does not lend itself to an easy answer.  This is because customarily, a breach of the principles of natural justice does not, as such, give rise to a cause of action in public law proceedings for damages.  Strictly speaking, therefore, such a breach is not defined to include the risk that the irregularity might proximately affect the outcome and give rise to award of damages in public law proceedings.

In canvassing this traditional viewpoint that proceedings such as these are public law proceedings and therefore the appellants are not entitled to damages, learned counsel for the West African Examinations Council relied on decided cases like Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd (In              Liquidation) [1949] All ER 544 and the views of Simon Brown J in the case of Thames Valley Police; Ex parte Cotton [1989] COD 318 where the learned judge said at page 320 thus:

 

“The mere fact of succeeding in judicial review proceedings does not supply [an applicant with the cause of action].  Successful natural justice challenges do not carry in their wake damages claims.  They entitle the applicant to a fresh decision but it is generally well recognized that the mere quashing of a decision and the recognition that the state of affairs which it brought about was unlawfully occasioned does not carry with it an entitlement to damages.”

 

This is a classic common law position which is still part of the Laws of Ghana.  But the issue is whether article 33(1) should be interpreted to include the award of some damages as part of the “redress” under the said article.  Learned counsel submitted that the above dictum “mirrors the Ghanaian position” and that the only remedies available are those mentioned in article 33(2).  The logical conclusion of this submission, in my view, is that the orders, directions and writs etc are intended only to enforce the particular rights contravened and this cannot be achieved by the award of damages; a position, counsel submitted, which is reinforced by the words “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available” to a victim.  This, counsel submitted, not only excludes the right to damages after a successful application under article 33(1) of the Constitution but also concedes the multiplicity of actions and prevents a plea of estoppel so that an aggrieved person must institute fresh action for damages.

In the case of Edusei v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 1 at page 46, I did express myself in words which may appear to be supportive of this view when I was commenting on the words “without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available to him” thus:

 

“These words cannot be said to have conferred jurisdiction on this court, or any other court for that matter, to enforce individual rights as some may argue.  In my humble opinion, it simply means that if any other cause of action is open to an individual as a result of the violation of his rights, he shall not be foreclosed by his initial action to vindicate his right from pursuing that other action. An example can help                 illustrate the point.  Mr Delali, a businessman, has been  unlawfully detained for say six months before his release through an application for a habeas corpus.  Mr Delali is not precluded from bringing an action for damages if his business has collapsed as a direct result of his detention and for unlawful detention.” (The emphasis is mine.)

 

It is therefore true to say that while a prior recourse to proceedings under article 33(1) of the Constitution to secure the immediate determination of the breach of a fundamental right cannot be construed as a waiver of the consequences of the breach with its attendant remedies previously known to our laws in any private law proceedings, it may not also be too far-fetched to say that the intention of the framers of the Constitution is to create a new remedy in addition to any existing remedies known to the common law.  The question whether the appellants are entitled to some compensatory award may therefore be resolved by the interpretation we put on the word “redress” as used in article 33(1).

My Lords, the breadth of language employed in the said article 33(1) should encourage us to follow the broad-minded approach and liberal interpretation adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago [1978] 2 WLR 902 where it was held that the award of some damages could be a component of the redress the court is entitled to give.

This was a case in which a lawyer was convicted of contempt and sentenced to prison for seven days without due process.  He immediately filed an ex parte notice of motion to the High Court under section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago, claiming redress for the violation of his fundamental rights, guaranteed under section 1(a) of the said Constitution, not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process.  In the Privy Council the majority of their Lordships held the view that an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under section 1 “has been” contravened is clearly a form of “redress” which a person is entitled to claim under section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress in a post contravention situation as it is in the instant case before us. It must be pointed out that section 6(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago corresponds with article 33(1) of our Constitution and is couched in almost identical language with the influential words “may apply to the High Court for redress” featuring in both provisions.

Their Lordships were confronted with the same problem which now confronts us in the instant case.  And as pointed out by Lord Hailsham of St Maryleborne in his dissenting opinion: “the only question in this appeal is whether the state is liable to pay monetary compensation to the appellant.”  The majority answered in the affirmative, and speaking per Lord Diplock, said:

 

“What then was the nature of the ‘redress’ to which the appellant was entitled?  Not being a term of legal art it must be understood as bearing its ordinary meaning, which in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, (3rd ed) 1944 is given as: Reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for a wrong sustained or the loss resulting from this.  At the time of the original notice of motion the appellant was still in prison.  His right not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law was still being contravened; but by the time the case reached the Court of Appeal he had long ago served his seven days and had been released.  The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

My Lords, although we are not bound to follow the decisions of the Privy Council or any other court, I am not particularly enthused with treating this decision with any careless abandon in view of the similarity in language of article 33(1) with section 6(1) involved in the Maharaj case.  It is therefore a case I find very relevant and persuasive enough and we must accord much judicial respect to it.

The Maharaj case, like the instant case, was dealing with a post violation of the fundamental rights situation.  The appellant had already served his sentence before his appeal was heard and the Board of the Privy Council felt the only way such a wrong could be adequately              redressed was not only by quashing the conviction and order of imprisonment but also by the award of some damages. And in the case before us we are similarly dealing with a contravention which is now in the past.  The appellants have been frustrated in planning their future in the academic field and entire life for the past four years not only as a result of the unlawful suspension of their entire results but also their illegal barring from taking any examinations under the auspices of the council for three years.  I find intolerable and unconscionable the                 situation the appellants went through by the decision of the council; especially when under their own regulations they are not entitled to withhold the entire results of the appellants and in addition bar them for three years.

In the circumstances, I think a token and moderate compensatory award coupled with the relevant orders and directions to the council will fairly and reasonably redress the contravention of the appellants’ rights.  I must, however, caution that this should be limited to its own facts since it is not intended to represent any general principle regulating a court’s discretion which will open the floodgates for the award of all types of damages in public law proceedings.

My Lords, under article 129(4) of the 1992 Constitution we are    empowered to do what the court below ought to have done.  It will certainly be a needless dissipation of valuable time to remit this case to the court below, as was one in Maharaj case, with a direction to assess the “damages.”  I would instead recommend to your Lordships that each of the appellants be awarded a token monetary compensation only, assessed at ¢5 million cedis to each of the appellants.

    

 

 

F. Y. KPEGAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

SOPHIA AKUFFO JSC Essentially, this case is about access to timely and effective judicial protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution, in general, and the right of the individual to administrative justice in particular. I will briefly touch upon the objectives of chapter 5 and discuss the objectives and scope of articles 33 and 23 in some detail. I will not set out to any great extent the factual background of the appeal since some of my learned colleagues have ably done so in their respective opinion. However, I will advert to some of the salient facts as and when necessary.

The Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms

In our collective and national quest for overall good governance, the rights and freedoms set out in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution constitute, by far, some of the most crucial mechanisms created by the Constitution for assuring the attainment and sustenance of the political, social, economic and cultural foundations of a modern democracy. The Committee of Experts (Constitution), in their Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana gave comprehensive justifications for the formulation of chapter 5, and the inclusion of provisions on fundamental human rights and freedoms in our Constitution. Of their numerous reasons, one may refer, in particular, to those set out in paragraphs 132, 133 and 139 of the Report, which respectively read as follows:

“132. Throughout Africa and, indeed, a significant part of the Third World, there has been, in recent years, a sustained public clamour for the promulgation and enforcement of human rights and freedoms as a critical ingredient of the democratization process…

133. This resurgence of interest in human rights is hardly surprising. Apart from the obvious desire for a more democratic order and the universal yearning for human dignity, there is a growing realization that the enjoyment of the basic freedoms is conducive to the development and purposeful application of human resources and, indeed, the establishment of an environment that enhances development...

139. The Committee also elaborated the social and economic aspects of human rights – aspects which are of particular relevance to the conditions of Africa and the developing world generally. Some of these rights are included in the proposed Directive Principles of State Policy, except that here they are more precisely elaborated as rights...”

The scope and magnitude of guaranteed fundamental human rights and freedoms are such that, the 1992 Constitution, in article 33(5) makes it very clear that the rights and freedoms specified in chapter 5 are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive of other rights, duties, declaration and guarantees relating to fundamental rights and freedoms “which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.” (The emphasis is mine). They are also reflected in the opening clause of chapter 5 (article 12(1)) which declares that:

“12(1). The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Execudive, Legislature and Judiciary and all other organs of the government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the courts as provided for in this Constitution.”

Thus, the judiciary is also required to do everything constitutionally and legally possible to assure that, in the exercise of its functions, these rights and freedoms are upheld and respected; subject of course to a concomitant respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest. The Constitution, in chapter five, does not only proclaim the fundamental rights and freedoms but goes on, in article 33, to provide, through the High Court, effective means for assuring the                     protection of these rights. In this light, therefore, it is the duty of the High Court, and appellate courts, to ensure that, where a person approaches the seat of justice for the protection of his rights and freedoms, the procedural rules of court do not become instruments for obstructing or denying the  aggrieved person’s access to justice. Hence, the well-known dictum of Collins MR in  In re Coles & Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1 at 4 remains a healthy reminder that:

“Although I agree that a court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, I think that the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaiden rather than mistress, and the court ought not to be so far bound and held by rules, which after all are only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case.”

Issues for determination

In arriving at its decision that is now on appeal, the Court of Appeal made the following key

findings:

(1) The procedure by which the High Court’s jurisdiction was invoked was contrary to the rules of the court and therefore irregular and incurably bad, especially since the action raises issues of fact that can only be established by evidence.

 

(2) The procedure adopted by the appellant is inapplicable in asserting a right under article 23.

 

(3) Until it has been clearly and amply demonstrated that a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached or contravened, no one can bring an originating  motion on notice under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(4) In arriving at its decision to impose penalties on the appellant and his colleagues, the respondent (hereinafter referred to as WAEC) was exercising an administrative rather than judicial function. Therefore, there has not been any breach of article 23 of the Constitution.

 

(5) The action taken by the WAEC was neither ultra vires nor arbitrary, but rather in accordance with the provisions of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).

       In this appeal, the appellant filed no less that ten grounds most of which are, to my mind,

 

merely verbose and repetitive. In substance, these grounds may be summed up as follows:

 

(a) The Court of Appeal erred when it held that the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1) of the Constitution may be invoked only when a fundamental human right under the  Constitution has in fact been contravened.

 

(b) The Court of Appeal erred in holding that, in the exercise of its statutory and administrative functions, WAEC had not breached the appellants’ right to administrative justice under article 23.

 

(c) The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the procedure of  originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed and was inapplicable to article 23.   

 

The determination of this appeal, therefore, turns on the two central issues of:

 

 (1) whether or not the procedure of originating motion on notice to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution is inappropriate, flawed and/or incurably bad; and

 

(2) whether or not WAEC has breached the appellants’ rights  under article 23 or any of their fundamental human rights.

 

Procedure for invoking article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution

 

I will first deal with the more primary issue of the appropriate procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) and (2), in view of the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. The article reads as follows:

 

“33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this  Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be  contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.

   (2) The High Court may, under clause (1) of this article, issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

It is clear to me that the primary objective of article 33(1) is to give full effect to the preceding provisions of chapter 5, by making them  enforceable by the High Court at the instance of every person who claims to be affected by a past, on-going or impending breach of any of the said provisions. In order to protect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the chapter five, therefore, the article gives to every person, who alleges that any of his rights or freedoms has been, is being or is likely to be contravened, a right of access to the High Court for redress. And the High Court, pursuant to its obligation under article 12(1) to protect and uphold these rights and freedoms, has been given the mandate (under article 33(2)) to exercise the full gamut of its judicial powers to assure effective redress to such a person who brings his or her grievance before it. By virtue of article 140(1), the High Court has (subject to the Constitution) jurisdiction in all matters. One would, therefore, be justified in thinking that, given its breadth, such jurisdiction would                encompass the matters set out in article 33(1) and (2). It is, therefore, noteworthy that, despite this broad jurisdiction, the drafters of the Constitution deemed it necessary to include these provisions specifically and subject article 140 to them. It is also significant that, having, in article 140(1) given such an expansive jurisdiction, the next clause (article 140(2)), nevertheless, particularises the High Court’s jurisdiction to enforce human rights and freedoms. We can only presume that, by article 33(1) and (2), the esteemed drafters intended to create, and have created, a special jurisdiction of the High Court which may be invoked in the manner stipulated in that article. 

I believe it is pertinent, at this stage, to set out some salient portions of the judgment under appeal herein. Owusu-Ansah JA, in his opinion (concurred in by his brothers in the Court of Appeal), made the following statements:

 

     “That provision [ie article 33(1)] in my opinion, postulates that in this case the fundamental human right under the Constitution of 1992 has been contravened in relation to the aggrieved party; this must be a condition precedent to the             invocation of article 33(1)

       ... It is not very clear which ‘fundamental human right’ under the Constitution has been breached or contravened so as to justify the invocation of article 33(1)

   … by means of an originating motion on notice or  originating summons

    … In my view the procedure adopted in this case, that is,  originating motion on notice, is inappropriate and flawed, since … the respondents (the appellants herein) were seeking a number of declarations

     … It is my considered view that the jurisdiction of the High Court could and should have been more appropriately invoked

     … The (the respondent therein) catalogues a list of statutory provisions allegedly contravened by the appellant council, in many cases without any indication as to how. However, these alleged rights can only be asserted by means of the proper             procedures in order to invoke the  jurisdiction of the court

     … In my view, unless the jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked in accordance with the relevant Rules any argument, however meritorious, cannot be entertained

       … Again it is a well established rule that where the facts are not capable of being determined on affidavit

      … then and in that event it will be necessary to take evidence.

      The court cannot condone such a glaring error as occurred in this case

    … The jurisdiction of the court is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties to the suit, the power or authority to adjudicate

       ... Jurisdiction can be properly invoked under Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A)

      … which provides that “Every action in the High Court shall be commenced by a writ of summons” subject of course to a few exceptions, such as a petition in a divorce case under Order 55, r 3(1) or in an appropriate case, an originating motion or                  originating summons

      ... It is true that no Rules had been made by the Rules of Court Committee in pursuance of article (33(4) of the Constitution. That, however, is immaterial until it has been clearly and amply demonstrated that a constitutionally guaranteed  human right has been breached or contravened, giving rise to the invocation of article 33(1). In such an eventuality, no one can legitimately quarrel with such an application being made by an originating motion on notice. Thus in my respectful view the decision in People’s Popular Party v Attorney General [1971] 1 GLR 138 cited with approval in subsequent cases is hardly applicable to the instant case

      … A careful perusal of the available affidavit evidence, the facts of the case, and all the surrounding circumstances would seem to confirm the need to take evidence to resolve the crucial  pertinent issues of fact in order to do substantial justice… It goes without saying that whether the council had ‘acted fairly and reasonably and complied with the law’ under article 23 of the Constitution must be issues of fact to be established by evidence. Hence the procedure adopted by the respondents is inapplicable in asserting a right under article 23.” (The  emphasis is mine).

 

As with every enactment, we have to presume that the drafters of the  Constitution chose with the utmost care, every word included therein and that, unless the contrary is established, such words must be given their normal and ordinary meaning. Therefore, when article 33(1) gives to a person alleging that any of his rights and freedoms under chapter five has been, is being or is likely to be contravened the right to apply to the High Court for redress, there is an irresistible presumption that such a person may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of an                  application rather than by way of a writ of summons. When fundamental human rights have been, are being or likely to be contravened, access to judicial redress must be as swift and timely as feasible to ensure that such rights or freedoms are not lost or irremediably damaged forever. Hence, in the light of the objective of article 33(1) (as hereinbefore mentioned), it is clear to me that what article 33(1) seeks to assure, by making provision for access by an application rather than a writ of summons (a relatively sluggish process), is that such a complaint be disposed of by the High Court with the optimum dispatch.

Admittedly, Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 dictates that all civil actions must be commenced by a writ of summons. The same Rules, as Owusu-Ansah JA correctly noted, make exceptions in specified circumstances (which do not include proceedings for the protection of constitutional rights) for the commencement of proceedings by other procedures, such as originating summons and originating motion on notice. However, as I have already stated above, we have to view the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1) as a special one; and by clear constitutional stipulation, it may be invoked by an application. Whether such an application must be by originating summons or originating motion on notice, the Constitution does not prescribe any particular form for such an application, but rather                     envisages, in article 33(4), that the Rules of Court Committee would make rules to guide the practice and procedures for the purposes of the article. Article 33(4) signifies a recognition that the existing Rules of the High Court predate the Constitution by almost four decades, were                enacted under a colonial regime, and do not necessarily address all the innovations, intentions and underlying aspirations of the Constitution. As yet, however, there are no correlated provisions in the Rules of the High Court that mandate any particular form of application for invoking article 33(1).  It is, therefore, my view that, until such rules have been made, the High Court must be guided by the terms of the article itself plus commonsense and pragmatism. This is the only means by which the judiciary can assure the realisation of the objective of the article. Indeed, it is my respectful view that, given the special nature of the jurisdiction created by article 33(1), the form of the application is not necessarily crucial, so long as the High Court becomes aware of the claim (or allegation), by one procedural means or the other, its jurisdiction must be deemed to have been properly invoked.

Additionally, it is clear from the language of article 33 that, contrary to the views expressed by the Court of Appeal, the form of desired redress cannot dictate the appropriate procedure for invoking the  jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, whether the aggrieved person is claiming declarations, directions or orders from the High Court is immaterial. Where the redress claimed is such as would necessitate the reception of parole evidence, the court has the power to give directions for the hearing of the same. Thus, in the case of Sumaila v Attorney-General (FTC (HR) 15/2001), Accra, unreported wherein an applicant brought an originating motion on notice to enforce his rights, and made certain factual allegations, which, in the view of the court (coram Agyeman-Bempah JA sitting as an additional High Court Judge to hear motions), must be established by parole evidence, the court, correctly in my view, ordered the parties to file pleadings and remitted the matter for substantive hearing.

One may even venture further to state that, from the language of articles 33(1) and (2), what matters is the allegation. If it is proven, it is for the court to fashion an effective redress that would, in terms of article 33(2), be “appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the              enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights and freedoms to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.” Consequently, whatever form of application is used to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 33(1), and whatever be the nature of the redress sought by the applicant, no court may justifiably fault the commencement procedure or the proceedings, for the article does not create any procedural distinctions on the basis of the type of redress sought. And given the absence of explicit procedural rules to regulate practice and procedure under this article, the statement made by Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), when he found himself in a similar situation in People’s Popular Party v Attorney General (supra at page 145), to the effect that when a statute (in that case article 28(4) of the 1969 Constitution)

“… provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is to be made and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such an  application may be made by an originating motion.

remains as applicable to our current circumstances as it did in 1970, when he delivered his judgment, and I fully endorse it as the most  sagacious and practical approach.

In my respectful view, therefore, the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal erred when, as is evident from their judgment, it subsumed the High Court’s jurisdiction in article 33(1) under Order, 2 r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, and held that the procedure used by the appellants herein to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was flawed and inappropriate. To the contrary, the procedure utilised was appropriate and correct for an application under article 33(1), regardless of the nature of reliefs claimed, and I hold that the High Court’s                      jurisdiction was properly invoked.

In arriving at this conclusion, I have given due consideration to the well-presented arguments set out in counsel’s statement of case for WAEC. However, I am not persuaded by them since their effect would be to thwart the intent of the framers of the Constitution in enacting article 33(1). One of these effects would be that the nature of the redress claimed would determine the appropriate form of commencement procedure. This will result in our placing procedural limitations on the scope and effect of a constitutional provision, which are neither expressed therein nor  necessarily implied thereby. I would decline to do any such thing.

Still on the issue of appropriate procedure for invoking article 33(1), the Court of Appeal appears to have persuaded itself, erroneously, that in order for the High Court to do justice in the matter, the circumstances required the reception of parole evidence “to resolve the crucial,                 pertinent issues of fact.” Owusu-Ansah JA, enumerated, as examples necessitating such evidence, WAEC’s allegation of foreknowledge and collusion, as well as the appellants’ allegation of breaches of articles 19 and 23. However, as is clear from the application and affidavit in                 support, all that the appellants herein were asking from the High Court was protection against WAEC’s alleged contravention of their rights  under these articles.

By the nature of their application and the facts deposed to, therefore, the only key issue properly arising in the High Court was whether or not WAEC had a duty to give and gave the appellants a fair and reasonable hearing before imposing the penalties on them. This, the appellants sought to establish by their affidavit and the attachments thereto. Certainly, the High Court was not being called upon to try any issue as to whether or not the students had foreknowledge of the examination questions or had colluded amongst themselves; such issues did not  properly arise from the application and did not need to be determined before the court could decide on the issue of contravention of the Constitution. In any event, as already pointed out above, even if, in the interest of justice, the determination of the application did indeed call for the reception of parole evidence and an opportunity for cross-examination, the High Court could have given the appropriate orders and directions. 

The Court of Appeal, as is evident from the excerpts hereinbefore quoted, also proceeded under an erroneous impression that, as a condition precedent to the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction, article 33(1) postulates that a fundamental human right under the                  Constitution must have been contravened in relation to the aggrieved person. With all due respect to their Lordships of the Court of Appeal, the article clearly postulates no such thing, as is patent from its plain language. As I understand the article, the only condition precedent (if such be a correct depiction) to the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction specified therein is an allegation by a person that one or more of her fundamental rights and/or freedoms under the Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened. Hence, the                        contravention may be in the past, ongoing or merely threatened. Once such a person brings an application, in order to succeed, it will, of course, be incumbent upon her to demonstrate to the court which provision of chapter 5 of the Constitution (or other fundamental human right or                 freedom) has been, is being or likely to be contravened and in what manner; whether or not the applicant surmounts these hurdles will depend on the court finding as demonstrably proven, the grounds for the application. Thus, an applicant has nothing to prove or demonstrate               before the right to invoke article 33(1) can accrue to him, and it is incomprehensible to me why the Court of Appeal stated otherwise.

The right to administrative justice

Article 23 of the Constitution provides that:

 

“Administrative bodies and administrative officers shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

Thus, by this article, the right to administrative justice is given  constitutional force, the objective being the assurance to all persons the due observance and application of the principles of natural justice which foster due process and the stated qualities, in the performance of                    administrative activities that affect them. In my view, the scope of article 23 is such that, there is no distinction made between acts done in exercise of ordinary administrative functions and quasi-judicial administrative functions. Where a body or officer has an administrative function to perform, the activity must be conducted with, and reflect the qualities of fairness, reasonableness and legal compliance.  I will not venture to give a comprehensive definition of what is fair and reasonable, since these qualities are dictated by the circumstances in which the administrative function is performed. At the very least however, it includes probity, transparency, objectivity, opportunity to be heard, legal competence and absence of bias, caprice or ill-will. In particular, where, as in this case, the likely outcome of an administrative activity is of a penal nature, no matter how strong the suspicion of the commission of the offence, it is imperative that all affected persons be given reasonable notice of the allegations against them and reasonable opportunity to be heard, if the objective of article 23 is to be achieved. This is in line with current trends in administrative law in general, and as pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th ed) (Reissue) Vol 1(1), para 84:

"…the obligation to observe natural justice is not confined to bodies constrained to observe the procedural and evidential rules of a court of law. For this reason the courts have tended in recent years to speak less of natural justice and more of a duty to act fairly. This is not a duty which is confined to persons and bodies having a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially, although whether a function is more                    characteristically administrative or quasi-judicial may be one factor determining what fairness requires in its exercise.”

In this appeal, it is quite clear from the record, and also not in dispute, that WAEC did not notify the appellants of the allegations and suspicions raised against them, or give them any reasonable opportunity to be heard before deciding to cancel their results and impose the three-year ban against them. The first time they had knowledge of any problems concerning their examinations was through exhibit A, a letter from WAEC and addressed to the Headmaster of their school. That letter, referred to  rule 5b, pages 3-5 of the 1997/98 West African               Examinations Council Regulations and syllabus, and informed the headmaster that:

“… by decision of the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment Committee  … the results of the candidates listed below have been cancelled as indicated because of their                  involvement in some examination irregularities.”

 The letter further indicated that the irregular paper was Mathematics Core 2 and barred the appellant and his twelve colleagues from all examinations conducted by the respondent for three years. The nature of the irregularity was stated as follows:

“It was alleged that the candidates had foreknowledge of the paper and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.” (The emphasis is mine).

The headmaster, in response to this letter, protested against the grounds for WAEC’s decision and petitioned it to review the same (exhibit B). WAEC replied with a letter dated 6 June 2001 (exhibit C) the most crucial part of which reads as follows:

 

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers. The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates. As a result all scripts for all subjects were scrutinized. From the scrutiny, it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2. The council therefore applied the prescribed                      sanctions.

In making a case for your candidates you intimated that your candidates had access to two particular books that present already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 which they ‘could have learnt.’ Your letter did not, however, indicate which of the solved problems were repeated in the in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 for which there could ‘have been coincidence of details’. None of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.”

According to the appellant throughout the examinations, neither he nor any of the twelve other students was ever questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by anyone for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices; he was never aware of any allegations of               impropriety having been raised by any person against him or any of his colleagues, in respect of any examination paper. Furthermore, he never had any foreknowledge of any of the examination papers nor did he collude with the other said students to gain foreknowledge of any such papers. Moreover, according to the appellant, before cancelling the examination results and barring him and said other candidates, they were:

“neither privy to any enquiry, investigation or trial to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination malpractice that might have been levelled against us nor were we given any opportunity by the respondent to make any representations or give any testimony as to our innocence to any such allegations.”

The appellants also caused their solicitors to write (per exhibit D) to WAEC, stating the appellant’s case and offering to produce the appellant as well as the other 12 persons for interrogation. Although the WAEC replied that the matter had been referred to the Final Awards Committee, there was no further communication from the respondent regarding the outcome of the said committee’s deliberations on the matter and the penalty imposed on the first appellant and his colleagues remained in effect.

 

By virtue of article 12(1) of the 1992 Constitution all institutions and persons (whether natural or legal) are enjoined to respect and uphold the rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter 5. WAEC is a legal person established by a multilateral convention, of which Ghana is a signatory. This Convention is given the force of law in Ghana by the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255). Thus, WAEC is a legal creature, which exists and functions in Ghana through this enactment and is subject to the 1992 Constitution. Its functions, as set out in article 4 of the schedule to the PNDCL 255, include the annual review and                     consideration of examinations to be held in member countries of the Convention, conducting such examinations, and awarding certificates and diplomas on the results of the examinations. It also has power under PNDCL 255, to cancel or withhold results or certificates and prohibit persons from participating in its examinations. Therefore, it is an administrative body and, as such, it is also subject to the provisions of article 23, which are, without doubt, applicable to legal persons. Thus, in the exercise of its functions and powers under PNDCL 255, the respondent must, like every other administrative body in Ghana, comply with article 23 and act fairly, reasonably and lawfully.

It is clear from the record of appeal and exhibits A and C in particular, that the process by which WAEC “established” the allegations made against the appellants was neither fair nor reasonable. The process, in the circumstances, was also, in my view, not in compliance with PNDCL 255, ss 3 and 10, the law under which WAEC exists and operates. WAEC, therefore, contravened the appellants’ rights under article 23. The said sections 3 and 10 of PNDCL 255 provide that:

3(1) Any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the Council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him -

(a) has in his possession any examination paper;(b) is found to have had fore-knowledge of the contents of

     any examination paper; or

 

(c) makes use of any examination paper or the contents of

     it in any manner whatsoever, commits an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less ¢20,000.00 and not exceeding ¢500,000.00 or   imprisonment for a term of not more than two years or to both.

 

(2)Where a candidate before or during an examination is found to have acted or is found acting in breach of the provisions of subsection (1) __

 

(a) he shall be disqualified from taking the examination and the entire results of the candidate in the examination shall be cancelled; and

 

(b)  the council may prohibit the candidate from taking any examination conducted by or on behalf of the council for a period of not less than two years immediately following the breach.

    

(3) The penalties contained in this section shall be in addition to any penalties that may be imposed by a Court or Tribunal.

    

 (10) Where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper or cheated in any way during an examination, a report shall be made to the council which shall take such action, including the cancellation of examination results and any certificate issued in respect thereof to the candidate.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

In his statement of case herein, counsel for WAEC argued that in upholding the appellants’ claim that he had not been heard, the trial judge failed to take into account sections 3(2) and 10 of the above-quoted provisions. According to counsel, section 3(2) must not and cannot be interpreted to impose on WAEC a duty to conduct a trial before exacting a penalty against an offending candidate since such a requirement would render impossible the application of the provision. Rather, according to counsel, WAEC may, under the section, withhold examination results if, in the course of marking a paper, it discovers that the answers of candidates from a particular school “are so identical as to lead to the conclusion that the candidates must have cheated.” Counsel, therefore, submitted that “the Council has the right to withhold the results of a candidate over whose script it entertains genuine suspicion”, and no rules of natural justice come into play in such a situation.

Regarding section 10, counsel also argued that, in the performance of administrative duty, it is not in every instance that a hearing must be conducted, and where it is impossible or inconvenient to expect such procedure, the court would not enforce it. He urged, further, that the function of the council relates to the education of the youth and maintenance of academic standards, and the council needs a free hand to perform its functions “without undue interference from lazy students who would rather cheat than learn for their exams.” He, therefore, submitted that the Court of Appeal was right when it held that section 10 does not impose a judicial inquiry on the council.

The rules of natural justice are never suspended in the absence of express and lawful stipulation to the contrary. They serve as an undercurrent running beneath the legitimate exercise of every administrative power. Hence, although it is true that neither section 3 nor section 10 (or indeed any of the provisions of the PNDCL 255) obliges the respondent WAEC to impose a penalty only after undertaking the full rigours of a court trial or proceedings, it is quite clear to me that, at the minimum, these provisions envisage and require some form of due                 process which comply with the principles of natural justice and reflect the qualities of fairness and reasonableness dictated by article 23. A full reading of sections 3 – 10 of PNDCL 255shows that each of the offence-creating sections must be read together with section 10. When read this way, it will be seen that each offence may be established in one of two ways, either because a person has been caught red-handed committing the offence; or has been found, after an investigation or a trial, to have committed the offence. In either situation the alleged                 offender must have been “found” committing or to have committed the offence.

Unfortunately, PNDCL 255 does not prescribe what form an investigation should take, and there are no regulations governing the procedure for investigating allegations of examination offences (the regulations to which WAEC made reference in exhibit A are not, and cannot be, those envisaged by section 12(b) and do not, in any event, deal with investigation procedures). However, since PNDCL 255 is subject to the 1992 Constitution, any investigation must comply with the requirements of article 23. Therefore, the absence of lawfully prescribed procedures does not exonerate WAEC, as an administrative body, from the obligation, to act fairly, reasonably and lawfully in the exercise of its powers to withhold or cancel results, and impose bans. In the absence of any prescribed procedure for investigation, one may consider the  ordinary meaning of the word to ascertain whether there was any. To “investigate”, according to the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, is “to carry out a thorough, detailed and often official inquiry into, or                examination of, something or someone.” (The emphasis is mine). The requisite degree of thoroughness and amount of detail will be dictated by the circumstances of each case. However, it is my view that, in this case, there was no attempt to achieve even a modicum of thoroughness on the part of WAEC. An allegation or suspicion, however genuine, and conjecture arrived at through a one-sided in-house process cannot amount to an investigation.

In this case, there is no dispute that none of the affected candidates was actually caught red-handed committing any of the alleged offences. Rather, WAEC’s case is that the identical answers given by the candidates raised genuine suspicion of foreknowledge and collusion. Thus, the circumstances only raised a suspicion, which should have been substantiated by fair and reasonable means in order to constitute an investigation. However genuine, mere suspicion is not enough and, bearing in mind the likely outcome of the inquiry (if it may called such) WAEC ought to have conducted a more serious investigation in the course of which the affected persons should have been given some opportunity to be heard. Nor can convenience and expediency serve as guiding principles in the exercise of WAEC’s penal powers if the outcome, in the circumstances, smacks of unfairness, unreasonableness or unlawfulness. Therefore, the fact that an investigation which complies with natural justice and meets the constitutional standards of fairness and  reasonableness might seem inconvenient or impracticable is no excuse. It is true that a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard does not necessarily require a full-dress hearing process. As was pointed by Twumasi J (as he then was) in Republic v Ghana Railway Corporation; Ex parte Appiah [1981] GLR 752 (as stated in holding (2):

 

“The core idea implicit in the natural justice principle of audi alteram partem was simply that a party ought to have reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and ought to be given the opportunity to make his statement in explanation of any question and answer any arguments put forward against it. The principle did not require that there must be a formal trial of a specific charge akin to court proceedings… In dealing with the principles of natural justice, one has always to bear in mind that the principles are substantive rather than procedural safeguards. Therefore the fact that a particular formal               procedure is not adopted, does not of itself imply that the  principle has not been applied in an appropriate case.”

In the circumstances of the instant matter, a letter to the suspected candidates informing them of the allegation and the grounds therefor, plus an invitation for their comments or explanations might have sufficed. And, certainly, when the appellant, through, his solicitor, requested a hearing and interrogation of himself and his colleagues, WAEC should have afforded them the opportunity. Consequently, the Honourable Court of Appeal was ill-advised and in error when, in the course of the judgment under appeal, the learned Owusu-Ansah JA, on behalf of the Court of Appeal, said:

“It seems to me that the council were exercising an administrative function rather than a judicial function when it came to a conclusion and decided to impose the penalties                complained of under section 3(3) of PNDCL 255 “the penalties contained in this section shall be in addition to any other penalties that may be imposed by a Court or a Tribunal.” That is if the appellant, in its wisdom, had decided to prosecute the respondents... West African Examinations  Council Law PNDCL 255 is by virtue of the provisions of the 1992 Constitution, part of the Laws of Ghana… This section 10 does not necessarily imply or even envisage a court action or proceeding. The council had been invested with power to investigate and take action. No legal enquiry was contemplated.  It is common  knowledge that the council in the fullness of its wisdom and in order to preserve its integrity and reputation, cancelled the entire results. I hold that the action taken by the council was neither ultra vires nor arbitrary but in accordance with the provisions of PNDCL 255.”

 

I am not unmindful of the critical importance of WAEC’s role in safeguarding the quality and international credibility of its examinations and resultant certificates and diplomas. Most members of this court have undergone, at least, one WAEC administered examination and are who we are because of its integrity. This role has been, is and will continue to be vital to the socio-economic development of Ghana and the other signatories of the Convention. However, the enviable standing of WAEC can be sustained only by ensuring that its administrative processes,              including the exercise of its powers, remain just. In my view, this can only be achieved through patent constitutionalism and legality, rather than through opacity and arbitrariness. Towards this end, it will inure to the benefit of both WAEC and public interest, as well as foster the sustenance of the rule of law, if the Minister for Education were to exercise the power given by section 12 of the West African Examinations Council, 1991 (PNDCL 255), and enact regulations to guide, inter alia, procedures for the exercise of WAEC’s powers under sections 3-10 of the Law.

Conclusion

In the circumstances, I hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court was properly invoked and the High Court judge was correct when he found that, by failing to observe the natural justice principle of audi alteram partem, WAEC contravened the appellants’ rights under article 23 of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeal herein must succeed. I also agree with the learned President of this Court, Kpegah JSC, that, in the circumstances of this case, Daniel Awuni and his twelve affected colleagues are entitled to damages assessed at ¢5 million cedis to each appellants.

 

 

S.A.B. AKUFFO

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

BROBBEY JSC I agree with the judgment delivered by the learned President of the Court, my

brother Kpegah JSC, and I have nothing useful to add.

 

 

 

 

       S. A. BROBBEY

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

DR TWUM JSC In this appeal the applicant in the High Court who is strictly the applicant/respondent/appellant will be referred to as the applicant. The West African Examinations Council (WAEC) will simply be referred to as the council.

At the commencement of the action the applicant was aged 19 and he described himself as an infant. Consequently he appointed his sister, Marian Awuni, as his next friend to act for him. That, of course, was an error. Under the revised Order 15, r 12(7) as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), “an infant” is defined as a person aged below 18 years. The applicant  therefore did not need to sue by his next friend.

       On 20 August 2001, Daniel Awuni, the applicant, filed an originating notice of motion in the High Court, Accra, against the West African Examinations Council. By it the applicant applied for:

 

“a declaration that the decision of the Final Awards Committee of the West African Examinations Council cancelling the entire results of the Applicant together with that of the twelve other students aforementioned in the Senior Secondary School               Certificate Examination (SSSCE) 2000 and barring him and the twelve other students for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the West African Examinations Council and the refusal or neglect of the West African                 Examinations Council to release the results of the Applicant together with that of the twelve other students in the SSSCE 2000 are unlawful, null and void and of no effect on the grounds of breaches of articles 23, 24 (1) and 25 (1)(b) of the                  Constitution, 1992.”

 

In his affidavit in support, the applicant deposed, inter alia, as follows:

 

“(7)That during the examination period neither the twelve students aforementioned nor I was questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by any person for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices.

 

(8)  That I never had any foreknowledge of any examination papers nor did I collude with the other twelve students to have foreknowledge of any examination papers in the said                   examinations.

 

(10)That in a letter EX/SSS/RS/VOL IV/173 dated 30 April 2000 the respondents communicated to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School that my entire results and that of the twelve students in the SSSCE 2000 had been cancelled and the applicant and the others further barred for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents on the ground that it was alleged that the                   candidates had foreknowledge of the paper (Mathematics (Core) 2) and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.

 

(11)That before the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment  Committee of the respondents determined to cancel our results and further bar us for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents, the twelve students and I were neither privy to any inquiry, investigation or tried to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination  malpractices that might have been levelled against us nor were we given any opportunity by the respondents to make any representations or give any testimony as to our innocence to any such allegations.

 

(13)That in a letter NDSS/05/VOL 1/103 dated 21 May 2001 the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School petitioned the respondents to have another look at my scripts as well as that of the other students and review the decision punishing me and the others for  any alleged irregularity in the SSSCE 2000 Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper (copy of the letter annexed and marked exhibit B).

 

(14) That in a letter EC/SSSCE/IRR/VOL II/147 dated 6 June 2001 the respondents reiterated to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary-Secondary School that the twelve students and I colluded and had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) 2 paper in the SSSCE 2000. This conclusion was drawn on the basis that:

       ‘During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers. The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates. As a result all scripts for the subjects were scrutinized. From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in the Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper. The council therefore applied the prescribed sanctions.’ (Copy of letter annexed and marked exhibit C).

 

(15) That on 5 June 2001, my solicitors wrote a letter to the respondents urging them to review the sanction applied against me and the other students intimating, inter alia, that the twelve students and I are ready to be subjected to interrogative sessions by the respondents to establish my involvement or the involvement or otherwise of the other twelve students in any examination malpractices. (Copy of letter annexed and marked exhibit D).

(17)That I am advised by counsel and verily believe same to be true that the decision of the Final Appointment and Examiners’ Committee of the respondents to cancel my entire results together with that of the twelve other students and bar us for 3 years from taking any examinations conducted by the  respondents on the sole ground of “scrutiny of our scripts” is arbitrary and unfair and/or unreasonable and violative of                administrative justice. On 20 August 2001, the Principal Legal Officer of the respondent council swore to an affidavit in opposition to the application.  In it, the Council admitted              applying the sanctions to the thirteen students and explained in paragraph 11 thereof their reason for so acting, namely,

 

“(11)That in answer to paragraph (11) of the affidavit in support, the respondent council says the evidence in the script of the plaintiffs was so manifest that by its rules, the respondent council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representations. The practice is universal with all               examining bodies. In its paragraph (12), the council made the point “that the cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an                  infringement of human rights”. Further, it denied that its decision contravened any provision in the 1992 Constitution.

 

The respondent council next challenged the procedure adopted by the applicant in paragraphs (19) and (20) thus:

 

'(19)That the present procedure adopted by the applicant does not give room for evidence, which is very vital in this case:

 

(20)That under the circumstances the procedure adopted by the plaintiff is not the best to determine the merit of the matter.'"

 

Exhibit B which was annexed to the headmaster’s letter referred to in paragraph (13) of the applicant’s affidavit in support shows that the headmaster wrote “on behalf of the board of governors, the PTA, the staff and students of this school.” In it he claimed that the case that the thirteen students had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) 2 was only an allegation and therefore the application of rule 5(b) without further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation was a bit harsh on the students. He said the school had                   thoroughly examined the affected students in particular and they themselves to find out if “we actually erred this time but our investigation indicates the contrary.”

Next, the headmaster made the point that the thirteen students did not have foreknowledge of any of the examination papers:

 

“Rather, our investigation revealed that all the students had access to and used two particular books during their preparations for the SSSCE Mathematics Paper. These two books, namely Core Mathematics for Senior Secondary Schools (AKI OLA SERIES) and SSS MATHEMATICS (Core) (DALABA SERIES A1) present ready solved questions from 1993 to 1998, which the students could have learnt.”

 

He added that the case of the thirteen students might be “a rare coincidence of detail in the presentation of some portion of their answers in the Mathematic (Core) 2 Paper.”

The affidavit evidence also shows that the council considered the petition and replied to the headmaster’s letter on 6 June 2001 (see exhibit C annexed to the applicant’s affidavit in support). In it, the council  answered the suggestion that the students had access to and used two particular books that present already solved past questions from 1993 to 1998 which they could have learnt, by pointing out that “none of the questions in the said paper was a repeat from a previous year.”                   Meanwhile, a letter originating from LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE was addressed to the council. Even though the letter bore the date of 5 June 2001, it was hand-delivered by the writers to the council on 6 July 2001. In it, the directors of the centre, writing as solicitors for on behalf of their clients (the thirteen affected students) rehashed the facts leading to the cancellation of their clients’ results and rather unfairly accused the council that: “In a later communication to the Headmaster of the said school, you indicated that your outfit engaged in an ex-post facto                    rationalization leading to the imposition of the said penalties on our clients.” Speaking for myself, I found the tone and tenor of that letter unnecessarily abrasive and largely discourteous of the council. In my view, when solicitors write letters to third parties on behalf of their                clients, they must exhibit professional decorum and courtesy to them. It is improper for solicitors to threaten fire and brimstone in a letter to a third party. It is really a professional misconduct (see Constitution, Code of Ethics and Regulations of the Ghana Bar Association: Rule 4 at page 35).

Before the application was argued, His Lordship, Omari Sasu JA, sitting as additional High Court Judge, expressed the opinion that in view of the reliefs learned counsel for the applicant was claiming, he doubted whether proceedings by originating summons was the best way to reach those reliefs. He therefore invited counsel to reconsider the matter. Counsel promised to do so but in the end he informed the court that: “we have painfully come to the conclusion that we would move the motion as it stands, in spite of all the limitations the procedure we are adopting places on us.”

       After taking oral arguments, the learned judge gave judgment for the applicant on 4 October 2001. The court devoted a considerable portion of its judgment to restate the principles applicable to the audi alteram partem rule; and article 19(2) and (5) of the 1992 Constitution which dealt with criminal trials. With respect, no issue was joined by the parties on that aspect of the law. What was in issue from the various affidavits was whether on the facts the rule was applicable. Without any analysis or evaluation of the facts and circumstances, the court said:

 

“It is my considered view therefore that the respondents herein have acted in open defiance of the duty to act fairly and  reasonably which duty is mandatorily imposed on                        administrative bodies and officials by article 23 of our 1992 Constitution.”

 

He added:

 

“The applicants were never accused or charged. When the respondents were investigating the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion the applicants or their headmaster should have been heard and also given a chance to examine their accusers. The respondents are guilty of abnegation of a constitutional mandatory duty to act fairly and reasonably in this case. And I accordingly declare that the decision which the respondents arrived at concerning the applicants is incurably bad, void and of no consequence.”

 

The judgment ended with a number of consequential orders. These will be examined later in this

 

opinion.

 

On 10 October 2001, the council being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court given

 

on 4 October 2001, appealed to the Court of Appeal upon the following grounds:

 

(1) His Lordship failed to note that the Rules and Regulations that govern examinations constitute a contract between the candidates and the respondent/appellant and that candidates accept these conditions before writing the examinations.

 

(2) In summarizing, His Lordship omitted to note that the respondents/applicant had pleaded in paragraph (11) of affidavit in opposition and had also argued that the practice of examining bodies evolving their rules is universal. If His Lordship had applied the principle, he would have held that the decision to cancel the result was just.

 

(3) In summarizing the respondent/applicant’s defence, His Lordship omitted to note that the respondents had pleaded public interest under article 12 of the 1992 Constitution.

 

Counsel for the appellant intimated that other grounds of appeal would be filed upon receipt of copy of the record of appeal. There is no evidence on record that the council filed any additional grounds of appeal. Nonetheless in its statement of case, the council argued “additional ground (2)” and “additional ground B” The record shows that the council abandoned all the original grounds of appeal and rather  argued the additional grounds (2) and (B) which respectively stated as follows:

 

“(2) The learned trial judge erred in not setting aside the originating motion on notice as not warranted by any rule of law  or procedure.”

“(B) Having declared the cancellation of the results by the appellants as null and void  the trial judge erred in further ordering the release of the results of the applicant when the allegation that the applicant had committed an examination offence had not been determined.”

 

By its unanimous judgment delivered on 5 December 2002, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court.

The applicant also felt dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal and lodged and appeal to this court on 3 January 2003. The following were the grounds of appeal:

 

“(a) The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the constitution has in fact been                         contravened.

 

(b) The Court of  Appeal erred when it failed to recognize that the right administrative justice is embodied in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution is a fundamental human right directly enforceable under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(c)  The Court of Appeal failed to take account of the trial judge’s specific findings of fact that the respondents violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution when they breached the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice and ignored other requirements imposed on them by law.

 

(d) The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33 (1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellant to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.

 

(e)  The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33 (1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

 

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect;

the council’s refusal to release the results was unlawful.

 

 (f)The Court of Appeal misconstrued section 10 of the West  African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225), when it held that the appellants could be sanctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case.

 

(g)The Court of Appeal rightly found that the evidence predominantly favoured the appellants' case but erred in holding that the facts in issue were not capable of being              determined on affidavit evidence.

 

(h) The Court of Appeal erred grievously when it held that the decision of the respondents to cancel the entire results of the appellants in the SSSCE 2000 and to further bar them for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondents was an administrative decision and not subject to any further inquiry.

 

(i)  The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the decision of the respondents to sanction the appellants was in accordance with section 10 of  PNDCL 225 when the respondents have clearly stated that they punished the appellants under the provisions of Rule 5b of 1997/98 WAEC Regulations and Syllabus, which rule is not in force and is non-existent.

 

(j) The Court of Appeal failed to recognize that the sanctions imposed by the respondents on the appellants are ultra vires the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination Regulations 2000, which governed the examination in issue.

 

I have grouped these grounds of appeal into four, namely, grounds A, B, C and D. I will now discuss them as I have grouped them.

 

Group A covering grounds (a) and (b)

 

I am unable to appreciate the import of ground (a) since it contains a self-evident truth. I am also not sure that the Court of Appeal really failed to recognize the statement in ground (b). What the Court of Appeal said was that the originating notice of motion procedure was not the correct procedure. After all, article 33(1) merely states that the aggrieved party may apply to the High Court for redress. I would therefore dismiss grounds (a) and (b) as unmeritorious.  I shall next answer the question of the use of the originating notice of motion. 

 

Group B covering grounds (d), (e), and (g) relating to the use of originating motion on notice

These grounds deal with the procedure adopted by the applicant. One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal was that the procedure adopted by the applicant was “incurably bad.” In the view of the Court of Appeal, the procedure adopted by the applicant had the effect of taking away the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the matter. It emphasised that the Rules of Court are meant to facilitate a fair and expeditious trial and must not be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. These sentiments are perhaps justified, in view of the              uncompromising stand taken by learned counsel for the applicant even in the teeth of what I would describe as “mandatory advice” from the trial court. It was unfortunate that the learned trial judge having expressed such serious misgivings about the procedure adopted by the applicant’s lawyers, did not order the applicant to use what the court considered to be the regular procedure.

In arriving at the decision to dismiss the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Heward-Mills v Heward-Mills [1992-93] GBR 234. That judgment was right on the facts, but in my view, does not support the wide                 proposition of law stated at page 246 of the Report, namely:

 

“where a statutory condition must be complied with before a court can have jurisdiction to make an order, failure to comply with such a condition will leave the court with no discretion to make any order or orders in the matter.”

 

In that case, plaintiff issued a writ in the High Court for the revocation of a will. Under the Probate and Administration Rules, 1991 (LI 1515), this was “a probate action.” Under Order 6, r 2(3), before a writ beginning an action for the revocation of the grant of probate of a will or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person is issued out, notice shall be given under rule 6 unless the probate or letters of administration has or have been lodged in the registry. Further rule 6(1) provides:

“where an action is brought for the revocation of a grant of probate or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person the plaintiff shall serve a notice on the person to whom the probate or letters of administration as the case may be was granted requiring him to bring and leave at the registry the probate or letters of administration.”

 

The plaintiff filed his writ without complying with those statutory rules. The result was that the action was not properly before the court and had to be struck out, not, dismissed.

It must be emphasized that, under article 140 (1) of the 1992 Constitution, the “High Court, shall subject to the provisions of this Constitution, have jurisdiction in all matters and in particular, in civil and criminal matters...” The court in the Heward-Mills case therefore had jurisdiction to entertain a contentious probate action. The plaintiff failed to take the necessary step to invoke that jurisdiction. Hence his action could not be entertained by the court. Similar provision exists in the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), s 127(1). Another situation where the court will have jurisdiction but the action will not be properly before it is where the original writ is not signed by the party or his lawyer. The writ will be ineffective to commence an action and will have to be struck out.

In the present case, the position is not cut and dried. The applicant was desirous of taking action to protect what he perceived to be a breach of his fundamental human right. Under article 33 (4) of the Constitution, the Rules of Court Committee may make rules of court with respect to the practice and procedure of the Superior Courts for the purposes of this article. This is permissive, not mandatory. But there is mandatory provision in article 157(2) whereby “the Rules of Court Committee, shall by constitutional instrument, make rules and regulations for regulating the practice and procedure of all courts of Ghana.” At the time of this action no such rules had been made by the Rules of Court Committee. This, of course, should not lead to a failure of justice. The applicant, therefore, adopted a procedure which in the “considered” opinion of  his legal advisers, was permissible, namely, the originating notice of motion. Even though Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 provides that every action shall be commenced by writ, that is certainly not the practice in our courts. The Rules permit the use of originating summons, originating notice of motion, and petition in addition to the writ of summons. There is, at least, in the High Court, a decision of Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was), in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 134 to the effect that where a statute provides for an application to the court and neither the statute nor the Rules of Court provide expressly a specific procedure,  the application may be made by originating notice of motion.

I have noted earlier in this opinion that in the High Court, the trial judge expressed misgivings about the procedure adopted by the applicant; but it is clear that he was more concerned with whether that procedure would achieve the reliefs the applicant wanted; not that it was a wrong procedure.  In the case of Abdilmasih v Amarh  [1972] 2 GLR 414 at 422, CA  Apaloo JA (as he then was) said: “Nobody has a vested right in procedure and modern notions of justice require that a court should do substantial justice between the parties unhampered by                    technical procedural rules.” I can conceive of no injustice that was caused to the council by the procedure adopted by the applicant. Consequently, I hold that the procedure adopted by the applicant was not fatal to his action. The Court of Appeal erred in so holding.

 

Group C covering grounds (f), (i) and (j)

 

By these grounds, the applicant seeks to broaden the ambit of the type of application he made in the High Court. One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court was that it was not too clear which of the applicant’s fundamental human right had been violated.  As counsel for the applicant put it, they chose to proceed with the originating notice of motion, despite the limitations it imposed on them.

In my view, a claim under article 23 cannot be stretched to cover errors of law (if any) made by an administrative body. Nobody has a fundamental human right which guarantees him against any administrative body applying wrong law to his right or interest. That may be a ground for judicial review but certainly no application on such a complaint can be made under article 33(1). Lest we forget, it is only those fundamental human rights envisaged in article 12(1) that can be vindicated under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

One more point. The applicant submitted that the rules under which the council conducted the examinations were non-existent. Further, that the council had been making regulations in respect of the examinations they hold when that power is vested in the Minister of Education. If, indeed, these submissions are correct, then the logical conclusion will be that the entire 2000 SSSCE were a nullity, in which case all the legal challenge mounted by the applicant can properly be described as “much-ado about nothing.” I have carefully examined the submissions and I am persuaded that they are wrong.

Under article 24 of the Convention, the council has power to regulate certain matters, including the conduct of entrants during examinations. In my view, it is the council that can prescribe regulations for the behaviour of candidates and the appropriate penalties for breach of those regulations. Now section 12 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), opens with the words “except as otherwise provided in the Convention, the Secretary for education may by legislative instrument…” As I have pointed out article 24 of the              Convention gives the council power to regulate the conduct of the entire examination as well as the conduct of entrants. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Minister for Education also to make Regulations to cover the same matters.

In my view, the submission based on the non-existence of 1996-97 Rules is sheer sophistry. I am sure that what is wrong is the headed paper used to communicate the decision of the council to the affected students. There is no doubt in my mind that the candidates were examined on the basis of the “Regulations, Structure and Scheme of the Examination for the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (2000).” Regulation 5(b) referred to is what appears at page 8 of that booklet. Indeed, in their letter dated 5June 2001 (exhibit D), the Executive Director, Mohammed Ayariga and the Projects Director, Raymond Atuguba of the Legal Resources Centre, the solicitors for the applicants,  stated at page 2 as follows:

 

 “On the face of the facts, as we have been able to construct them, the decision of WAEC violates the 1992 Constitution (article 23), the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), s 3, the WAEC Regulations, Structure and Scheme of the SSSCE 2000, and a host of other laws rules, and regulations of this country.” (The emphasis is mine).

 

The applicant confirmed my view when he admitted in ground (j) of his grounds of appeal to this court that the SSSCE Regulations 2000 governed the examination in issue. Further, the council could sanction the applicant under section 10. I would accordingly dismiss these grounds of appeal.

 

GROUP D  covering grounds (c) (f) (h) – relating to failure to give the applicant the opportunity of presenting his case

The gist of these grounds is whether or not the applicants could be anctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case. This is really the pivotal issue in these proceedings. Since the applicants claim that they are entitled to administrative justice under article 23, we should examine that article a little more closely. Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution provides:

 

“23. Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

 

Since the duty to act fairly is imposed on administrative officials by article 23 it is important to determine whether or not the council is an administrative body within the meaning of that article. The Constitution does not define “administrative bodies” or “administrative officials.”        Curiously, neither counsel for the applicant nor for the council considered that issue. The judgment of the High Court assumed that it was and proceeded to paraphrase article 33 wrongly by saying that it confers jurisdiction on the High Court in cases where applicants allege their personal rights have been infringed upon. That is clearly wrong.

       Article 33 (1) states that: “Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him…” It is obvious that not all personal rights are fundamental human rights. A breach of contract is a personal right but it is clearly not a fundamental human right. Modern governments have grown into large bureaucracies.  As stated in Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed) at page 4):

 

“If the state is to care for its citizens from cradle to the grave, to protect their environment, to educate them at all stages, to provide them with employment, training, houses, medical services, pensions and in the last resort, food, clothing and shelter, it needs a huge administrative apparatus.”

 

A government’s vision and election promises cannot be translated into a welfare society merely by the passing of laws and leaving it to the courts to enforce them. 

In our tripartite governmental structure, we have the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It is the executive branch of government that must exercise executive authority of Ghana: see article 58(1) of the Constitution 1992.  It is this branch that is therefore charged with the real business of improving the overall welfare of the people of Ghana. The executive comprises the President, Ministers of State, the Ministries, Departments, Chief Directors, Directors, a host of administrative and other staff, as well as other agencies of government and other bodies in the Public Services such as the Police Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Audit Service, the Legal Service, the Immigration Service, the Prison Service, etc. These innumerable and variegated functionaries, central and local, are entrusted with various degrees of power to adjudicate numerous contested matters, make decisions and impose penalties and prohibitions; always acting under the authority of the Constitution or some Act of Parliament, Decree or Law or at the very least, under some delegated power from a person with authority to            delegate.

This process of delegation starts from the President himself. Under article 58 (3):

 

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the functions conferred on the President by clause (1) of this article may be exercised by him either directly or through officers  subordinate to him.”

 

Hence the official of the Internal Revenue Service who decides that a person resident in Ghana is assessable to income tax (see Republic v Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Fynhout  [1971] 1 GLR 213, CA; the VAT official who determines that a company was late in                  submitting its monthly VAT returns and imposes a mandatory penalty; the customs officer who assesses customs duty and imposes a penalty of three times the value of goods for attempted smuggling; the immigration officer who detains a passenger at the airport on a drug-related offence; the factory inspectors, the officers of the Environmental Protection Agency, are but a few examples of persons who help the President to exercise the executive authority of this country. They include the Ministers of State, both within and outside the Cabinet who decide                various policies of government, the implementation of which may affect the rights of subjects – such as, for example, compulsory acquisition of land for a new school or hospital; the introduction of a National Health Insurance Scheme and how it shall be funded; the National Accreditation Board which decides which institutions of learning shall be permitted to run university courses and under what conditions.  In my view, all bodies and persons whose authority to act derives by this process of sub-infeudation (to borrow an English feudal land law concept) from the President, however tenuous the connection may be, are the                      “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials” mentioned in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution.

The next question which may be posed is, is the Council an administrative body? On 23 March 1982, a Convention establishing the West African Examinations Council was signed in Monrovia, Liberia, by the Governments of the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and the Sierra Leone. Ghana ratified the Convention on 28 December 1982. Under article 14 of the Convention, each member country was required to enact laws in accordance with its legislative processes incorporating into its laws the provisions of the Convention. In pursuance of its said                   obligation, the government of Ghana promulgated the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), whereby the Convention, as set out in the Schedule to the Law, had the force of law in Ghana. The Convention constituted the council as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. It could sue and be sued in its corporate name. Under article 16(1) “the Council shall enjoy legal personality as an international organization within the territorial limits of the Member Countries and Associate Member Countries.” By article 16 (iv) “the chairman, members of the Council, the Registrar and members of his staff shall severally and collectively be accorded diplomatic privileges status in accordance with the rules, regulations and policies governing diplomatic immunities within the territories of the Member Countries and Associate Member countries.”

The Convention contained elaborate provisions for the constitution of the council. There are three categories of members: (a) persons appointed by each of the signatory governments; (b) persons appointed in a manner prescribed by the National Committee of each signatory government to represent their respective universities; (c) persons elected by each National Committee; and a registrar who is an ex-officio non-voting member. He is the Secretary to the council. The Convention also provided for the election of a chairman and vice-chairman of the council. It dealt with the tenure of office of members of the council; the powers and duties of the council; its finance and external auditors; the secretariat of the council; the establishment and constitution of national committee; settlement of disputes; amendments and discipline of staff. The main function of the council is provided in article 4. It shall review and consider annually the examinations to be held in the member countries in the public interest. It may also conduct, in consultation with member countries, such examinations as the council may think appropriate under the Convention and to award certificates and diplomas on the results of such examinations. The council may prescribe the fees chargeable to entrants to and regulate the conduct of, any examinations conducted under the provisions of sub-section (b) of article 4 of the Convention, including but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing: (a) the persons or categories of persons who may enter for such examinations; and (b) the conduct of entrants during such examinations.

Under article 9(d), if invited by any government of any member country, the council may conduct any other examination considered by the government to be in the public interest to conduct such examination, after due consultation. From what has been stated above, it is quite              evident that even though the functions of the council may affect a substantial part of the public ever so often, those functions are in no sense governmental. The council does not discharge functions of a governmental nature. In other words, those functions have not been woven into any system of executive authority. The council is not, de facto, even a surrogate organ of government. It is an international body domiciled in Ghana. It has   no business involving itself in the                    administration of Ghana. In its origin, its history, its constitution or least of all, its membership, it is not part of the administrative arm of government. Its status as an international body coupled with the fact that the chairman, members of the council, the registrar and even members of his staff are severally and collectively to be accorded diplomatic privileges status, is incompatible with the status of bodies or persons in the administrative organ of government. In my view, the council is not an “administrative body” within the meaning of article 23 of the                      Constitution.

Learned counsel for the applicant tried to expand the horizon of article 23 by referring to the Indian Constitution. In my view, that is not helpful in this particular instance. Chapter five of the 1992 Constitution, which deals with Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, opens with article 12(1) which clearly delimits what is intended to be protected as such. Article 12(1) provides:

 

“12(1) The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive, the Legislature and Judiciary and other organs of government and its agencies  and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts as provided for in the Constitution.”

 

I must not be misunderstood. I am aware that globally, the list of fundamental human rights protected under various national constitutions is far in excess of what is contained in our chapter five. But that is the choice we in this country have made and a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33(1) of the Constitution must bring himself within the list contained in chapter five. I am also aware that outside the Constitution, the laws of Ghana protect personal rights akin to what are described in the Constitution as fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The principle of natural justice was developed by the judges of English Common Law without the intervention of any written constitution. Protection to life is adequately secured by the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). Article 14 covers the Common law tort of false                     imprisonment and a writ of habeas corpus may issue to secure the freedom of any person who is unlawfully detained by a public official or the government, or even by his own parents. The point I am making here is simply this: An action based on article 23 of the Constitution must be confined to the persons specified in that article, the fact that under some other national constitution or system a more expansive or restrictive definition is given to the infraction complained of is at most, only persuasive. Administrative law is essentially about the control of abuse or misuse of public power. Accordingly, it is persons who wield this type of authority who are targeted under article 23. For example, it cannot apply to domestic tribunals, such as the Presbyterian Church of Ghana which decides who may be admitted to the priesthood by the Church. The reason for this is that the powers of domestic tribunals derive from contract. Administrative justice is a public law remedy. Fundamental Human Rights are for the most part, rights against government interference.

Is the council, nonetheless, subject to the rules of natural justice? The power which the Council exercises over those, like the applicant, who take its examinations derive from agreement. This gives right to private rights on which effective action for declaration, injunction and even damages may be based. It is not part of any government regulation. By applying to take the examinations and paying the prescribed fees, people like the applicant, expressly submit themselves to the regulations of the council. They acknowledge that they are governed by the                   disciplinary rules of the council.

Article 23 does not define what is meant by “to act fairly and reasonably.” That omission may be supplied by resort to the common law. At common law, before the House of Lords decision in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, the court took the view that judicial tribunals empowered to deprive persons of their liberty, impose financial burdens on them and ascertain their legal rights had to observe the audi alteram partem rule. See R v Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London              Electricity Board [1924] 1 KB 171. At this point, functions which were administrative but not judicial or (later quasi-judicial) did not attract the rule. This dichotomy has been abandoned by the English Courts and have since Ridge v Baldwin (supra) insisted that even in the so-called administrative functions, the body discharging the function must act fairly. In my humble opinion, article 23 effectively lays to rest any lingering doubt about the modern statement of the rule in this country.

The audi alteram partem rule is part of the broader rule of natural justice which comprises the audi alteram partem rule and the nemo judex in causa sua rule. I am not concerned with the latter rule for the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), gives the council powers to control its examinations and impose various penalties for examination malpractices. Except in one area, which I will deal with presently, if the Council complies with the Law, its decisions cannot be impugned. The scope and purpose of the Law makes that abundantly clear. See Wilkinson v Barking Corporation [1948] 1 All ER 564; [1948] 1 KB 721. It is sometimes said glibly that any person who decides anything affecting the rights of subjects must observe the rules of natural justice. That is certainly not correct. For example, no such duty arises where numerous persons are competing for scare resources, eg allocation of government contracts or university places. This may cause some considerable hardship to the unsuccessful contenders, but no court has held that such people have any common law right to go to court on the ground that their applications were summarily rejected. In R v University of Aston Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538 the English Court of Appeal discussed what I consider to be similar to this case, ie when university students may be entitled to be heard when they have been asked to withdraw from the university for failure of examinations. The authorities establish that in examination malpractices, the party affected must be given an opportunity to be heard before               penalties are meted out to him. This duty will arise when the charges are put to him. See Herring v Templeman [1973] 3 All ER 569 and Glynn v Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487 at 494.

In the case before us, Part II of PNDCL 255 dealing with examination offences and penalties provides in section 3 (1) that any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him “(b) is found to have had foreknowledge of the contents of any examination paper … etc.” He can only discharge this burden if he is given an opportunity to be heard.  In my view, this is clear indication that a candidate who is accused of any examination malpractice must be given an opportunity to be heard. This is common fairness to the candidate, which is what natural justice is all about. The fact that he is not criminally prosecuted is irrelevant. But the matter does not end there. I have already referred to the letter which the Headmaster/Rector of the Notre Dame Minor             Seminary Secondary School wrote to the council (exhibit B). In it, he said he wrote on behalf of a number of people including the students requesting the council to take another look at the scripts and review the decision meting out punishment for the alleged irregularity. (See                 paragraph (13) of the applicant’s affidavit in support. The council replied by saying that the only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts. As a result, all the scripts for the subjects were scrutinized and it was from the scrutiny that it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates. In their letter to the council, the solicitors of the applicant suggested that the applicants were ready to be subjected to “interrogative sessions” by the council to establish their guilt or                    innocence. Counsel further argued in their said letter and also in their legal submission that the punishment meted out to their client on the sole ground of “scrutiny of our scripts” was arbitrary, unfair and/or unreasonable.

Is this right? As it has been pointed out in a number of English decisions starting with Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120 at 140; General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627 at 628 and particularly in In re Pergamon Press [1971] Ch 388 at 402-403, the rules of natural justice are not rigid norms of unchanging content and their ambit may vary according to the context. In In re Pergamon Press (supra) company inspectors had informed the directors of the general nature of their tentative findings and requested the directors to comment on them. The directors refused, claiming that they ought to be given copies of the transcripts of the proceedings before they would comment. The Court of Appeal held that they were not entitled to the transcripts. What the law insists upon is substantial fairness. In this case, the                  applicants were seeking to take over the role of the council. To act fairly does not necessarily mean that the person likely to be affected must be given an oral hearing.  The various letters exchanged between the council and the applicants through their headmaster and their lawyers could in an appropriate context, amount to “fair hearing.” Further, it will reduce the council to complete impotence if the applicants could dictate the mode or manner in which the council was to discharge a duty placed squarely on it by PNDCL 255. In my view, it cannot be said that the council acted unfairly and unreasonably by scrutinizing all the scripts. It shows rather that the council was most anxious to do justice to the applicants.

         In Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 79, Lord Reid said:

“I do not doubt that if an officer or body realizes that it has acted hastily and reconsiders the whole matter afresh, after affording to the person affected a proper  opportunity to present his case, then its later decision will be valid.”

 

This is exactly what happened in R v Aston University Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538. Here the university asked some students to withdraw from the university for poor performance in the university examinations. The students petitioned the Vice-Chancellor and thereafter a series of meetings were held by the students tutor with the students, by the board of examiners, the senate and other authorities to consider the students’ grievances. The court held that those meetings were proper to see what could be done to produce a fair result. The court ruled against the university on the ground that the board of examiners who only had the final say in the matter did not actually take any further decision after the various meetings.

In the instant case, the suggestion of “interrogative session” is clearly misplaced. I doubt it if the council has power to administer oaths. The council need not examine witnesses. It can obtain information in any way it thinks best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their interest. In this case the principle of res ipsa loquitor comes into play. In my view, no useful purpose will be served by cross-examination. The evidence of foreknowledge is in the scripts and apart from using a lie-detector, no amount of cross-examination of each of the affected students can resolve the problem of collusion among them. This is a difficult case. It places the council in a dilemma. Anybody who has marked examination scripts before will have no difficulty in coming to the               conclusion that there has been foreknowledge and collusion among the candidates. The difficulty here is how to demonstrate that to each affected student.

My Lords, what does fairness require in this case? To act fairly is to make over to the party affected the evidence available to him. Where the party affected has the right to make representations, this involves three things: (i) he must be informed of the case against him; (ii) so as to tailor his submission thereto; and (iii) to refute some of the allegation, (if that is the case), correct mistakes or explain away otherwise damaging evidence.  See In re Pergamon Press Ltd (supra).

         In this present case, the applicant’s headmaster suggested that what the council thought was a case of foreknowledge might be a rare case of coincidence because the students had access to two books that had ready-solved questions which the students could have learnt. The                    council rebutted it by saying that the questions that were set in the 2000 SSSCE had not been set before and could therefore not have appeared in those books.  Lord Mustill has observed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1993] 3 WLR 154 that the                    standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. The principles of fairness are not to be applied identically by rote in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and   the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken.  See also Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 2 WLR 821.

My Lords, what is required is a fair result reached by fair methods. It is in the public interest that the sanctity of the results is guaranteed. After a very careful and anxious consideration of the circumstances of this rather difficult case, and the language of section 3 (1) of PNDCL 255, I have come to the conclusion that the decision of the council should be set aside on the sole ground that it failed to give the students an opportunity to respond to the charge of foreknowledge before they were penalized. I wish to emphasize that my opinion should be limited in scope to the matter of disciplinary action taken against the affected students. Serious public mischief will result if any attempt is made in the future to introduce the principle of natural justice to the area of marking and moderating examination scripts. Judges do not inhabit an intellectual vacuum. I am not oblivious of the rampant nature of examination  malpractices in this country. We all bear a heavy responsibility to ensure that the canker is completely exterminated. To admit the principle of natural justice into the conduct of examinations apart from the disciplinary functions of the council will surely open the floodgates to a torrent of unbridled abuse. We do not wish to tie up the council in an impenetrable morass of legal chicanery. We owe a duty to our youth, our educational system, our institutions of higher learning, our business  community, indeed, our very survival as a nation, to ensure that our educational standards are constantly improved upon, that brilliant and diligent students are encouraged and that cheats are weeded out                   ruthlessly. In particular, l do not envisage cases like Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 QB 277. In that case, Dr Thorne Ph D sat and failed to pass certain examinations for the LLB Degree.  He claimed that his failure was the result of the negligence of the examiners.  He claimed damages against the defendants “for negligently misjudging his examination papers for the Inter and Final LLB Degree” and sought an order of mandamus commanding the defendants to award him “the grades at least justified.”

This judgment offers no solace to the person who claims that he is deserving of ten ones instead of the five he was awarded. Until the day comes when it is shown that the council has marked somebody down out of spite or ill-will, the courts must abstain from intruding into the marking room. To some extent, the council is to blame for its woes. If the  questions do not leak, all these problems will not arise. But having said that I am not prepared to gloss over the activities of students and or their parents who get hold of examination questions and hope to over-reach the council. Such students occupy no moral high ground. They cannot claim to be not in pari delicto with the council. They deserve the penalties contained in PNDCL 255 if they cheat and are found out.

 

The issue of award of damages

 

During our deliberations and before we announced our verdict, the question of whether or not if the appellants won, they would be entitled to damages, came up.  Consequently on 17 May 2004, when we announced our verdict, we reserved our reasons and invited learned counsel for the parties to file further submissions if they wished on the following:

 

A.  Whether or not in the circumstances of this case, the applicants are entitled to damages; and if so,

 

B.  What factors may be considered as appropriate, if damages, were to be awarded to the applicants.

 

Learned counsel duly filed their respective submissions.  After a very careful and anxious consideration of all the material available to me on issues (A) and (B), above, I regret to say that I am unable to answer A affirmatively.

 As I understand it, the kingpin of the argument in support of the majority holding that damages be awarded was inspired by a Privy Council judgment in the case of Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1979] AC 385.  It contains a holding that the reliefs available to a person who complains of a breach of a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right, may include the award of damages.  But the Privy Council was at pains to point out that that right depends on a determination of the merits.  Whether or not in this particular case,              damages should be awarded to the applicants, does not, in my view, follow as a matter of course.  I can accept that damages should be awarded to a person who complains that his personal liberty has been restricted without due process (article 14); or that forced labour was exacted from him (article 16); or that his property was unlawfully appropriated (article 20).  See Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] AC 972.  But I am not persuaded that this case is a proper case to award damages.

It was argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the students “have a residual or vested cause of action for damages under article 33(1) of the Constitution” but he did not show how that cause of action arises – whether at common law or under some statute.

He further argued that:

 

“irreparable and ruinous injury has been done to the reputation of the appellants by the actions of the respondent.  The hint at moral turpitude that the false accusations convey to the public … calls for heavy compensation if the charge is completely unsustainable.”

 

I am unable to follow counsel’s argument.  No court, and certainly not this court, has decided that the accusations of cheating are unfounded and completely unsustainable. What this court has decided is that the appellants were not given an opportunity to rebut the accusations levelled against them.  In other words, the procedure used by the respondent was flawed.  This is a case of procedural irregularity.  Our judgment has nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of the accusations.  Learned counsel for the applicant argued as though our judgment dealt with the merits of the charges.

I have read article 33 over and over again and I have come to the conclusion that it does not create the remedy of damages.  In my opinion, whether a party is entitled to damages or not must be determined according to common law principles.  I am of the firm opinion that successful natural justice challenges should not necessarily carry in their wake award of damages.  The appellants will only be entitled to damages if it should be established that there was no collusion or foreknowledge among the students as alleged.  For if it is proved that, indeed, they cheated, as alleged, there can be no justification for awarding them damages.  The issue of damages cannot therefore be dealt with without first dealing with the merits of the charges.  Already, counsel for the appellant is saying that the charges were false and completely unsustainable, when there has been no adjudication of that.

       In the result, I would refuse any award of damages to the appellants and leave them free to take advantage of the “without prejudice” provision in article 33 to commence a fresh suit against the respondent for damages.  In such an action, the respondent may, if it wishes, raise the charges of collusion and foreknowledge as a defence.  When battle is so joined, substantial justice will be done to all the parties.  This approach also accords well with the Privy Council decision in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana (supra).  In that case, in allowing the applicant’s appeal, the Privy Council remitted the motion to the court of first instance with a direction to hear and determine it on its merits, and if these were found to be favourable to the applicant, to assess and give a direction for the payment of damages or compensation.

       

 

DR. S. TWUM

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

DR DATE-BAH JSC. The key facts in this case are not disputed and they bring into sharp focus the accountability of an examination authority.  In this case, young examination candidates challenge the authority’s stance of infallibility on matters of collusion. The applicant in the case was nineteen at the time of the institution of the action and therefore brought the action through his sister, as his next friend.  The action was commenced by an originating notice of motion seeking a declaration that:

 

“(i) the decision of the Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointment Committee of the respondents communicated in a letter EC/SSS/RS/VOL IV/173 dated 30 April 2001 to the Headmaster/Rector of Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School, Navrongo cancelling the entire results of the applicant together with that of the twelve students of Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School in the SSSCE 2000 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect;

 

(ii)  the further barring of the applicant together with the twelve other students by the respondents for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondents is unlawful, null and void and of no effect; and

 

(iii) the refusal or neglect of the respondents to release the entire results of the applicant together with that of the twelve other students in the SSSCE 2000 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect.; …”

 

The applicant also sought such directions or orders as the High Court might consider necessary and appropriate to remedy the infringement or violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the applicant and twelve other students on whose behalf he brought action.  In the title of the action, the applicant expressed himself as applying in a  representative capacity on his own behalf and for the benefit of twelve other students of the Notre Dame Seminary Secondary School, Navrongo.  Since the thirteen students have the same interest, it is legitimate for the applicant to bring these representative proceedings on their joint behalf. I will regard all thirteen students as parties to this suit for the purposes of the relief or remedy to be granted them, although only one of them has formally instituted this action.

The applicant and the twelve other students were students at Notre Dame Secondary School from 1998 to 2000 and sat for the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations “SSSCE 2000” between  October and December 2000.  The respondent is the body authorised to conduct these examinations and award the relevant certificate to successful candidates.  The applicant deposed in his affidavit in support of his motion that during the examination period neither he nor any of the other twelve students was questioned, reprimanded or cautioned by any person for engaging in or trying to engage in any examination malpractices.  He further deposed that he never had any foreknowledge of any examination papers nor did he collude with the other twelve               students to have foreknowledge of any examination papers.

However, in a letter dated 30 April 2001, the respondent informed the headmaster of the applicant’s school that its Final Awards and Examiners’ Appointments Committee had cancelled the results of the applicant and the twelve other students because of their involvement in some examination irregularities and requested him to inform the candidates.  The nature of the irregularity concerned was stated as follows:  “It was alleged that the candidates had foreknowledge of the paper and it has been established that the listed candidates colluded among themselves.”  In addition to cancelling the results of the candidates, they were to be barred for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondent.

The applicant deposed that before this decision by the committee neither he nor any of the twelve other students were privy to any inquiry, investigation or trial to establish the truth or otherwise of any allegation of examination malpractices that might have been levelled against them and that they were not given any opportunity by the respondent to make any representations or give any testimony as to their innocence of any such allegations.

On 21 May 2001, the headmaster of the applicant’s school petitioned the respondent to review its decision.  One significant  paragraph of the headmaster’s petition reads as follows:

“First of all, the case that the thirteen students had foreknowledge of the Mathematics (Core) Paper 2 is only an allegation, and therefore the application of rule 5b without             further investigation to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the allegation is a bit harsh on the poor students.  We are dealing here with young people who have worked hard for three years in a reputable school with the hope of developing a career for themselves, and  if we are not careful we may ruin their future for good.”

 

By a letter of 6 June 2001, the respondent communicated its reaction to the headmaster’s petition, turning it down.  A very significant paragraph in the respondent’s letter in reply was the following:

“During the conduct of the 2000 SSSCE there were allegations of foreknowledge of some of the question papers.  The only means by which the council could verify the allegations was the scrutiny of the scripts of the candidates.  As a result all scripts for all subjects were scrutinized.  From the scrutiny it was established that there was foreknowledge and collusion among the thirteen candidates from your school in Mathematics (Core) Paper 2.  The council therefore applied the prescribed                   sanctions.”

 

This letter thus confirmed that applicant and the other students were not given an opportunity to be heard before the prescribed sanctions were applied.  Furthermore, in an affidavit deposed to by the respondent’s principal legal officer in opposition to the applicant’s motion, the sole evidence of malpractice relied on by the respondent appears to be evidence in the examination scripts themselves.

Paragraphs (8), (9) and (11) of the affidavit are quite illuminating.  They were in the following terms:

“(8)In answer to paragraphs (8) and (9) of affidavit respondent-council says that following allegations of leakage in the 2000 SSSCE Mathematics (Core) 2 Paper all scripts were scrutinized.  That there was sufficient evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs confirm (sic) collusion arising out of foreknowledge.

 

(9) In further answer the respondent council says it has all the expertise to detect collusion among candidates.

 

(11) That in answer to paragraph (11) of affidavit in support the respondent council says the evidence in the scripts of the plaintiffs are so manifest that by its rules the respondent                 council as an examining body does not need to invite candidates to make representation. The practice is universal with all examining bodies.”

 

The respondent thus appears to have adopted the position that its expertise as an examining authority enabled it to discern cheating and collusion from the mere scrutiny of the examination scripts and that there was no need to receive representations from the affected candidates                 before applying sanctions to them.  Indeed, its principal legal officer deposed to its belief that examination results were not matters of human rights.  In paragraph (12) of his affidavit, he said:

 

“In answer to paragraph (12) of the affidavit in support, the respondent council says that the examination results is not a matter of human rights.  That cancellation of examination results on good grounds does not constitute an infringement of human rights.  Counsel will make reference to relevant  provisions of the 1992 Constitution.”

 

The applicant being dissatisfied with the result of the petition by his headmaster has brought this action to enforce his rights.  The learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, sitting as an additional High Court Judge, granted him the relief he sought.  Before doing so, he made the following findings of fact:

 

“(1)The thirteen applicants herein who are aged between 18 years and 22 years and in law called young persons were candidates who had been registered for and sat the 2000 SSSCE  conducted by the respondents.

 

(2) At no time either before or during the said examinations were any of the thirteen applicants questioned by anyone as engaging in any examination malpractices.

 

(3) It was after the scripts in Mathematics – Core Paper 2 had been marked that the thirteen applicants herein were said to have had foreknowledge of the said paper.

 

(4)The respondents scrutinised the scripts of the candidates and after the said scrutiny came to the conclusion that it had been established that the thirteen applicants herein had acted in collusion among themselves.

 

(5)The respondents have cancelled the entire results of the applicants in all the subjects/papers they had written including those in which there were no examination malpractices and also have barred the applicants for three years from writing any of respondent’s examination.

 

(6) During the investigations conducted by the respondents into the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion, there is no evidence on record which tends to show that:

 

(a) The applicants or their headmaster was informed of the allegations.

(b) The applicants or their head teacher was in any manner given a chance of being heard or participating in the investigations.

 

(7) The respondents in dealing with the present case acted as investigators, prosecutors and judges in their own cause and neither the applicants nor their headmaster was in any way invited to assist in the investigations.”

 

The judgment of the learned trial judge was, however, reversed on appeal.  The applicant and the twelve other students have therefore appealed to this court.  The grounds of appeal filed are as follows:

 

(a) The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992  Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the Constitution has in fact been                       contravened.

(b) The Court of Appeal erred when it failed to recognise that the right to administrative justice as embodied in article 23 of the 1992 Constitution is a fundamental human right directly enforceable under article 33(1) of the Constitution.

 

(c) The Court of Appeal failed to take account of the trial judge’s specific findings of fact that the respondents violated article 23 of the 1992 Constitution when they breached the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice and ignored other requirements imposed on them by law.

 

(d) The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33(1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.

 

(e) The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33(1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

 

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect;

the council’s refusal to release the results was  unlawful.

 

(f) The Court of Appeal misconstrued section 10 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 225) when it held that the appellants could be sanctioned and damnified in the enjoyment of their legal rights by a process of investigation by the council that did not afford them an opportunity to present their case.

 

(g) The Court of Appeal rightly found that the evidence predominantly favoured the appellants’ case but erred in holding that the facts in issue were not capable of being               determined on affidavit evidence.

 

(h) The Court of Appeal erred grievously when it held that the decision of the respondents to cancel the entire results of the appellants in the SSSCE 2000 and to further bar them for three years from taking any examination conducted by the respondents was an administrative decision and not subject to any further inquiry.

 

(i)  The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the decision of the respondents to sanction the appellants was in accordance with section 10 of PNDCL 225 when the respondents have clearly stated that they punished the appellants under the provisions of rule 5b of the 1997/98 WAEC Regulations and Syllabus, which rule is not in force and is non-existent.

 

(j)  The Court of Appeal failed to recognise that the sanctions imposed by the respondents on the appellants are ultra vires the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination Regulations 2000, which governed the examination in issue.”

 

Procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 33

 

One of the grounds on which the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the respondent before this court from the High Court was procedural.  The court, through Owusu-Ansah JA, held that the procedure adopted by the applicant (ie appellant before this court) was “inapplicable in                asserting a right under article 23.”  Naturally, the appellants are dissatisfied with this decision and filed grounds of appeal in relation to it.  Ground (d) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal is in the following terms:

 

“The Court of Appeal rightly held that article 33(1) could be invoked by an originating motion on notice where a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human right has been breached, but erred in holding that the procedure of originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants to enforce article 23 of the Constitution was inappropriate and flawed.”

 

Ground (e) is also as follows:

 

“The Court of Appeal erred grievously by misapplying article 33(1) and (4) when it held that the procedure of an originating motion on notice adopted by the appellants was inappropriate and flawed because the appellants were seeking a number of declarations including but not limited to a declaration that:

the cancellation of the results of the appellants was unlawful;

the barring of the applicants was void and of no effect; and

the council’s refusal to release the results was  unlawful.”

 

The respondent, of course, sought to defend the decision of the Court of Appeal.  In its statement of case, it argues as follows:

 

“(5)The appellants contend at page 14 that their action ‘was not an ordinary suit before the High Court.  It was an application for the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights under article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.’  That article, the appellants argue, enabled their invocation by originating motion on notice.

 

(6) With due respect to counsel for the appellants, the provision does not so say so.  The Constitution enables a person seeking remedy for the violation of a human rights provision to apply to the High Court for remedy, and had directed the Rules of Court Committee to make rules for its invocation.  Although the committee has not made fresh rules, the existing rules of the High Court continue to apply as existing law under section 26 of the transitional provisions of the 1992 Constitution.  The list of remedies in article 33, namely, habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus,  prohibition, and quo warranto have been adequately provided for in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), Order 59.  If those rules are inadequate, the aggrieved person may resort to the provision in Order 2, r 1 if it is intended to see declarations from the court. See also Order 25, r 5.

 

(7) A claim for the declaration in the High Court can be  made in limited circumstances by originating summons, otherwise it must be by a writ of summons.  The applicants did not adopt either procedure but rather proceeded by originating motion on               notice.  They claim that the decision of the High Court in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General  [1971] 1 GLR 138 and that of the Supreme Court in Edusei v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 enable claims for declaration to be made by originating motion. With due respect to counsel for the appellants, neither court so decided.

 

(8)  Further, and in the alternative, the respondent invites this court to take a second look at the above decisions and place them in context.  The ratio of In re Meister Lucius and Bruning Ltd [1914] WN 390 which has featured prominently in both decisions, was stated  succinctly in Peoples Popular Party thus:

      ‘It is … a rule of practice that where a statute provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is made, and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such application may be made by an originating motion.’

 

(9) When article 33 was promulgated in the 1992 Constitution, Order 59 of the High Court Rules was in force and adequately provided for the invocation of the remedies listed in the article by application.  In such situation it cannot be said that the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure.  Admittedly the Constitution provides that the Rules of Court Committee shall make rules to regulate proceedings under the provision but it does not follow that the existing rules must be cast aside even if they are adequate.

 

(10) The legislative scheme adopted in all Republican Constitutions in Ghana is to empower a law-making body to make laws, rules or regulations to govern specified situations, leaving it to such body to determine whether, having regard to the existing rules, law reform in the nature of new provisions would be necessary.  Where the need for reform would not arise the Constitution framers have ensured that the existing law, as              defined under the Constitution would hold extant the existing laws, rules or regulations as part of the Laws of Ghana.”

 

 

 

The appellants, on the other hand, argued as follows:

 

“Our application was not an ordinary suit before the High Court.  It was an application for the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights under article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution.  This article states as follows:

 

  '33(1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been … contravened in relation to him, then, without                     prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.'  (Emphasis ours).

 

Article 33(1) of the Constitution provides for the making of an application to the High Court, and applications are not made by writ of summons.  Applications are made either by originating motions, originating summons, or summons (Orders 52, 54, and 54A) respectively of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).   And article 33(4) of the Constitution provides that the Rules of Court Committee may make rules of court with respect to how applications brought under article 33(1) may be made.  The Rules of Court Committee has not yet made any Rules to govern such                  applications.

The applicants in the case of People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General [1971] 1 GLR 138 were in the same situation that we found ourselves.  When the procedural issue was raised in that case, Robert Hayfron-Benjamin J, (as he then was), held as follows at page 145:

 

“Article 28(4) of the Constitution [1969] provides that, ‘The Rules of Court Committee may, by constitutional instrument, make Rules of Court with respect to the practice and procedure of the Superior Court of Judicature for the purposes of this article.’  No such rules have so far been made.  It is however a rule of practice that where a statute provides for an application to the court without specifying the form in which it is to be made, and the normal rules of court do not expressly provide for any special procedure, such an application may be made by an originating motion …  The notice of motion must be intituled in the matter of the Act under which the application is made …”

 

The Court of Appeal was unable to refer to any rule of procedure which specifically provides that an application under article 33(1) should be by writ of summons.  The decision in People’s Popular Party v Attorney-General was quoted with approval in the Supreme Court decision of Edusei v Attorney-General [1998-1999] SCGLR 753 at 796 per Acquah JSC (as he then was).  Indeed, in this case, the Supreme Court sought to energise and save from extinction, the provisions of article 33 of the Constitution when it held that the  claim of the applicant was properly to be brought under that article in the High Court.  This suit is the blood baby of that holding of this court.  The decision was again quoted with approval by the High Court in Republic v Edward Wiredu; Ex parte Amidu, Suit No FT (HR) 4/2001, Accra unreported at page 21. Again, in Juandoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] 3 WLR 13 at 14, the Privy Council held that where the rule making authority, had not exercised their power to make rules with respect to the practice and procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the court for a redress of rights in the Constitution of Guyana, the applicant was justified to use the procedure of an originating motion on notice in invoking the jurisdiction of the court.

A close reading of article 33(1) of the 1992 Constitution especially the “without prejudice” clause, reveals that the appellants can bring an application under article 33(1) even if there are other forms of action available to them.  In the words of Acquah JSC in Edusei (No 2) v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 at 788:

 

“‘without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available’ … refers to any possible cause of action which may arise from the violation of one’s fundamental human right and freedom, independent of that victim’s constitutional right of seeking redress for the said violation.”

 

It is therefore improper for the Court of Appeal to attempt to restrict the options of the appellants to an action by writ of summons."

 

In determining which of these competing contentions on procedure by the parties is right, I think that one should remember the famous wise words of Sowah JSC (as he then was) in Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637 at 647-648:

 

“The Constitution has its letter of the law.  Equally, the Constitution has its spirit….Its language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of growth and development.  Indeed, it is a living organism capable of growth and development… A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation.  It does not admit of a narrow interpretation.  A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do.  We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time.”

 

We need to remind ourselves that the words to be construed, though they relate to procedure, are nevertheless contained in the Constitution. Accordingly, they should be construed liberally, as urged by Sowah JSC.  In that light, I have no hesitation in holding that “apply to the High Court for redress” in article 33(1) is to be construed as including applying by way of an originating motion, notwithstanding the express language in the High Court Rules to which the respondent has drawn this court’s attention, to the effect that unless a specific other mode of originating an action is specified in the Rules, a writ of summons is to be the mode of initiating an action.  Order 2, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) provides that: “Every action in the High Court shall be commenced by a writ of summons”, subject to specified                    exceptions.  In the circumstances of this case, this ordinary rule of  procedure is overridden by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.  In constitutional cases, it is generally right that the court should concentrate on the substantive matters raised, rather than allowing procedural                 considerations to preclude it from addressing the substance of the case.

In my view, until the Rules of Court Committee has prescribed a particular mode of application under article 33(1), applicants should be given latitude as to how to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.  This is certainly in consonance with the legal position formulated by Acquah JSC (as he then was) in Edusei (No 2) v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753 at 797, as follows:

 

“The legal position therefore is that where an enactment confers an actionable right on a person, but there are no rules specifically provided for vindicating that right because either that enactment provided none, or it rather directed an authority to make the said rules which are yet to be made, an aggrieved person is entitled to adopt the nearest reasonable procedure of utilizing the right accorded by the law – a procedure which must be such as to give notice to the person or legally authorized authority against whom redress is sought and afford to him or it an opportunity of putting his side of the case.  For, where there is an actionable right there must be a remedy for vindicating that right.”

 

The spirit of procedural flexibility in constitutional matters, which is   embodied in this approach, is given emphatic re-affirmation in the recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Luke Mensah v Attorney-General, Writ No J1/1/2004, 5 March 2004 reported in [2003-2004] SCGLR 122, where in spite of procedural flaws identified by the court in the plaintiff’s action seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the court decided to deal with the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  Acquah CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, held that it was right for the court to do this if the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the procedural errors committed by the plaintiff are not so fundamental as to amount to a denial of the court’s jurisdiction. 

Similar broad considerations should guide the determination of the procedural point in relation to this case.  The most critical fact of this case, in my view, is that the applicant and the twelve other students were given no opportunity to make representations on their own behalf before the respondent made the decision about them, which they challenge.  This fact is not disputed and it is well established by the affidavit evidence.  Even if the case had required the leading of disputed evidence, there is no reason why, after it had been validly initiated by motion, the learned trial judge could not have ordered the parties to file pleadings and for the case to have proceeded to trial.

In sum, then, I would uphold grounds (d) and (e) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal.  With particular reference to ground (d), it is my view that the invocation of article 33 by originating motion on notice is  legitimate not only when a constitutionally guaranteed human right has been breached, but also when it is being breached or is likely to be breached.  I, thus, do not share the view expressed by Owusu-Ansah JA in the Court of Appeal that it is a condition precedent to the invocation of article 33(1) that a fundamental human right under the Constitution has been contravened in relation to the aggrieved party.  Accordingly, I would also uphold ground (a) of the appellants’ grounds of appeal, namely,

 

“The Court of Appeal misapplied article 33(1) of the 1992  Constitution when it held that the jurisdiction of the High Court can only be invoked under article 33(1) when a fundamental human right under the Constitution has in fact been                          contravened.”

 

With regard to ground (e), I do not see why, given the need for procedural flexibility in constitutional matters, the fact that the remedy sought by the appellants was a number of declarations should make the use of an originating motion on notice inappropriate and flawed, as held by the Court of Appeal per Owusu-Ansah JA.

 

Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution and judicial review of administrative action

 

Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution provides as follows:

 

“23. Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.”

 

This provision clearly lays a duty on “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials” and the first issue is whether the respondent is to be regarded as an administrative body and its officials as administrative officials.  These terms are not defined and therefore need to be interpreted by this court.

It appears to me that the purpose of article 23 is to provide a constitutional foundation for administrative law in Ghana and to entrench entitlement to administrative justice as a fundamental human right in Ghana.  Under the English Common Law, from which the Ghanaian common law has borrowed most, an important part of administrative law is the judicial control of administrative action.  This is because administrative power is quintessentially derived power.  It is the power of public officials derived from the Constitution or from statutes. The              common law courts have, therefore, seen it as their role to ensure that these public officials, and the bodies to which they belong, keep within their authority or jurisdiction.  Thus, historically, the doctrine of ultra vires was the rationale for judicial control of administrative action. This context has to be borne in mind during the search for the meaning of “administrative bodies” and “administrative officials.”

The opening paragraph of  De Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review (1999) provides a clue as to the meaning of these terms.  It is in the following terms:

 

“This book is concerned with judicial review of the acts, decisions, determinations, orders and omissions of individuals and bodies performing public functions.  In all developed legal systems there has been recognition of a fundamental requirement for principles to govern the exercise by public authorities of their powers.  These principles provide a basic protection for individuals and prevent those exercising public functions from abusing their powers to the disadvantage of the public.  During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the circumstances in which the courts have been prepared to intervene to provide relief for unlawful administrative action have expanded in spectacular fashion. Coherent principles have steadily evolved in a number of areas of administrative law and disfiguring archaisms have been removed.”

 

To my mind, therefore, “administrative bodies” and “administration officials” should be interpreted as references to bodies and individuals, respectively, which or who exercise public functions which affect  individuals.  These individuals are entitled to protection from the courts in their interaction with such public bodies or their employees.

       The following quotation from the appellants’ statement of case is quite apposite in this connection:

 

“In a modern administrative state, such as ours, the citizenry is in constant interaction with the administrative agencies of the state.  Thus, the bulk of human rights abuses occur between the citizenry and the state, acting through its administrative agencies.  It is in this regard that administrative institutions must be regulated in order to ensure that they do not trample on the rights of the citizenry at will.  This is the purpose of article 23 of the 1992 Constitution.  By including article 23 in the directly enforceable provisions of Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution, the framers ensured that the broad range of administrative injustices that are capable of infringing on the rights of the citizenry are remediable through the mechanism under article 33(1) of the Constitution.”

 

Does the respondent come within the ambit of the concept of administrative body sketched out in the preceding discussion? Admittedly, the respondent is an inter-governmental organisation                   established by an international Convention.  The Convention is attached as a schedule to the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).  In addition to the respondent being established by an international legal instrument, however, the constitutive Convention itself requires (in article 14) that the Convention should be incorporated into the local laws of the respective countries.  PNDCL 255 fulfils this incorporation obligation.  By that incorporation, the Convention becomes a part of the municipal law of Ghana and therefore subject to the                   peremptory norms of the 1992 Constitution.

Thus, by PNDCL 255, the inter-governmental body established by Convention gains a Ghanaian legal status and becomes directly subject to Ghanaian municipal law, including its Constitution, as pointed out. Depending on the functions it carries out on the Ghanaian scene,                         therefore, the respondent is capable of being regarded as an administrative body within the meaning of article 23 of the Constitution.  The fact that the respondent has international legal personality is not necessarily an impediment to its being considered an administrative body under article 23.  What is important is its function in Ghana and its impact on the public.

For the purpose of this case, its relevant function is that of conducting the Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination.  It is a function that touches directly on the lives and aspirations of thousands of young people in Ghana.  This is no distant public international law                   function carried out by an international legal person.  In view of the exercise of this function by the respondent, I have no hesitation in considering it to be an administrative body, within the meaning of article 23 of the Constitution.

We next need to consider what duties are imposed on the respondent in consequence of my holding it to be subject to article 23 of the Constitution.  First of all, it needs to be made abundantly clear, in view of the ambivalence expressed in the Court of Appeal as to whether any constitutionally guaranteed human rights of the appellants had been breached, that article 23 imposes binding obligations on administrative bodies and officials.  In this connection, it should be noted that article 12 provides that all the fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution are to be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and Judiciary and all other organs of government and its agencies and all natural and legal persons in Ghana.  The Article places a duty on the courts to enforce these rights and freedoms.  They are thus justiciable.  Since article 23 comes within chapter five, it embodies a justiciable fundamental human right.  What needs analysis is the extent of the rights and duties provided for in the article.  I shall, in this regard, consider two issues: first, the duty to act fairly and                  reasonably; and second, the duty to comply with the requirements imposed by law.  I proceed to do so seriatim.

 

The duty to act fairly and reasonably

 

The first element of the article 23 duty imposed on administrative bodies and officials is that of acting fairly and reasonably.  What does this mean?  In addition to whatever meaning may be derived from subjecting these words to the canons of constitutional interpretation, there is also the common law understanding of acting “fairly” in matters of administrative law.  Since the 1992 Constitution was affixed unto an underlying common law system, which was saved by article 11 of the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the common law on this issue.

A duty on administrative bodies to act fairly exists at common law.  It is a duty that the English courts have evolved from the doctrine,  commonly referred to earlier as the principles of natural justice,  epitomised in the twin latin maxims of :  nemo judex causae suae and audi alteram partem.  On this evolution, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review  (supra) comment (at pp 272-273) that:

 

“The principal value of the introduction of the duty to act fairly into the court’s vocabulary has been to assist them to extend the benefit of basic procedural protections to situations where it would be both confusing to characterise as judicial, or even quasi-judicial, the decision-makers’ functions, and inappropriate to insist on a procedure analogous to a trial.”

 

In the modern English common law, the term “natural justice” is being increasingly replaced by the duty to act fairly.  The current position of the English common law on this issue is summarised thus by De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (supra at pp 275-276):

 

“The entitlement to fair procedures no longer depends upon the adjudicative analogy, nor whether the authority is required or empowered to decide matters analogous to lites inter partes.  The law has moved on; not to the state where the entitlement to procedural protection can be extracted with certainty from a computer, but to where the courts are able to insist upon some degree of participation in reaching most official decisions by those whom the decisions will affect in widely different situations, subject to well-established exceptions.”

 

This generalisation of the English common law position suggests that the English jurisdiction is likely to have a rich seam of case-law which this court can mine, so to speak, to operationalise article 23.  Of course, the article, being a Ghanaian constitutional provision, has to be given purposive meaning within the context of the Ghanaian Constitution and the Ghanaian legal order.  Accordingly, any resort to foreign case-law has to be had with circumspection and any solutions adopted must be customised to fit the Ghanaian situation.  In Ghana, the natural justice doctrine was applied by Ofori-Boateng JA (as he then was) in L’Air Liquide v Anin [1991]1 GLR 460.  The learned judge expressed it thus at 463:

 

    “The general basic principle about these administrative inquiries is that whenever people are given power by law to consider facts and to arrive at conclusions affecting the fate of human beings, they are performing a quasi-judicial function.  And although not a court, if the body violates the rules of natural justice, the courts have the power to declare the procedure invalid, as well as the conclusions therefrom.  The rules of natural justice are two:  Firstly, that a man may not be condemned unheard; and secondly, that a man must not be a judge of his own cause.”

 

My comment on this formulation would be that it is unnecessary to seek to characterise a decision as quasi-judicial in order to enable the application of the doctrine of natural justice to it.  In its modern form, natural justice principles are equally applicable to certain purely                    administrative decisions.

My interpretation of fairness within the context of article 23 would be that, in general, unless the circumstances make it inappropriate, for instance for reasons of practicality or of public interest or for any other cogently valid reason, it includes a principle that individuals affected by administrative decisions should be afforded an opportunity to “participate” in the decision in the sense of being given a chance to make representations on their own behalf of some kind, oral or written, to the decision-maker. Individuals affected or to be affected by administrative decisions obviously have an interest in influencing the outcome of the decision-making process.  In general, it is fair that they should be afforded an opportunity to influence the decision.  Given the variety, and the width of the continuum, of contexts in which administrative decisions are taken, however, there is need for flexibility in the ways that are to be worked out to enable individuals to influence decisions about themselves. Thus, in relation to a particular decision, the circumstances may indicate that there is no need for a formal hearing, in the sense of an adjudication.  A consultation, for instance, may be adequate.  This flexibility, regarding how the presentation of the views of those affected by administrative decisions may be made, is expressed thus by Lord Bridge in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625 at 702:

 

"…the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone.  To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates."

 

Accordingly, a fair “hearing” does not necessarily connote an opportunity for the person affected to be heard orally.  Written representations on his or her behalf may be sufficient, given the context.  Also, the nature of the opportunity to be offered to an affected person to be heard may be influenced by public interest considerations and the requirements of efficient administration.

Article 12(2) of the Constitution contains, inter alia, a public interest proviso to the enforcement of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual enshrined in chapter five of the Constitution.  Article 12(2) is in the following terms:

 

     "Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in this Chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest." (The emphasis is mine).

 

My understanding of this provision is that an individual’s entitlement to a fundamental human right is to be interpreted in such a way as not to impair the public interest.  In relation to article 23, this principle connotes that, in determining procedural fairness, what is required to protect the public interest is also taken into account.  Some degree of balancing between the requirements of the public interest and the needs of administrative justice is called for. Clearly, there is a public interest in the maintenance of an efficient examination system for schools that detects and punishes cheating in exams.  This public interest has to be taken into account, alongside the standard of administrative justice prescribed in article 23, in determining whether the respondent is in breach of its duty under article 23.

Finally, in relation to the duty to act “fairly and reasonably”, it is significant that “reasonably” is added to the formulation.  To my mind, this denotes that this constitutional obligation is distinct from the  underlying common law duty that I have outlined above.  In other words, article 23 is not to be interpreted as a codification of the natural justice doctrine at common law, as it existed at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution, or at any other time.  The case-law produced by the doctrine is useful in giving content and specificity to the constitutional provision, but the doctrine is not to be taken as being coterminous with the constitutional provision.  The South African courts have arrived at a similar conclusion, although, of course,  the constitutional language they were construing was different.  (See Jenkins v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (8) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports 1059 (TK); 1996 SACLR LEXIS 21). This implies that in determining the content of the standard of fairness and reasonableness under article 23, the Ghanaian courts need not follow the course of the natural justice doctrine as it evolves in common law jurisdictions. Other than the flexibility that the additional word “reasonably” buttresses, I do not think that “reasonably” adds much more to the substantive meaning of article 23.  In my view, acting “fairly” will usually entail acting                    “reasonably.”

The learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, sitting as an additional High Court Judge, was emphatically clear on the respondent’s duty to act fairly and reasonably.  He said:

 

“It is my considered view therefore that the respondents herein have acted in open defiance of the duty to act fairly and  reasonably which duty is mandatorily imposed on                      administrative bodies and officials by article 23 of our 1992 Constitution. The applicants were never accused or charged.  When the respondents were investigating the allegation of foreknowledge and collusion the applicants or their headmaster should have been heard and also given a chance to examine their accusers.  The respondents are guilty of abnegation of a constitutional mandatory duty to act fairly and reasonably in this case.  And I accordingly declare that the decision which the respondents arrived at concerning the applicants is incurably bad, void and of no consequence.”

 

I agree with the learned trial judge that the respondent before this court breached the duty to act fairly and reasonably and that therefore its decision should be set aside.  His remarks, however, suggest that he had in mind a formal hearing, with cross-examination, before the respondent could take a lawful decision on the appellants’ case.  I would require less, in the light of practicality and the public interest.  I think that the appellants should have been given an opportunity to make written  representations in response to the allegation levelled against them, before the respondent took the decision to sanction the appellants.  In view of the large number of candidates involved in schools examinations, it is probably unwise to over-judicialise (sic) the due process procedures for policing wrong-doing in relation to examinations, so long as the                     procedures in place lead to the respondent acting fairly and reasonably.

 

The duty to comply with the requirements imposed by law

 

The next element of the article 23 duty which we need to examine is the duty to comply with the requirements imposed on administrative bodies and officials by law.  I understand this element to be additional to what has been discussed above.  In other words, administrative bodies and officials, in addition to complying with the rules on procedural fairness embodied in audi alteram partem and its derivatives and independent constitutional obligations (if any) distilled by Ghanaian courts from the duty to “act fairly and reasonably”, must comply with all other applicable rules of law.  Such other relevant applicable rules of law will often be in the constitutive enactment relating to the administrative body concerned. 

In the present case, the main source to examine for these applicable rules of law is the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255), and instruments issued pursuant to it.  The effect of this element of Article 23 is to convert breaches of such rules into breaches of a                    fundamental human right actionable under article 33(1).

In the respondent’s statement of case, it sought to challenge the view of the learned trial judge that the respondent was in breach of article 23, by arguing that:

 

“(22) In so holding the learned trial judge never adverted to the relevant legislation on the point, namely, sections 3(2) and 10 of the West African Examinations Council Law, 1991 (PNDCL 255).

 

(23) Section 3(2) of PNDCL 255 provides that where a candidate is found “before or during an examination” to have in his possession an examination paper or had foreknowledge of the paper or uses an examination paper such candidate may be disqualified from taking the examination and his results shall be cancelled.  Additionally the council may prohibit him from  taking any of its examinations for two years.

 

(24)My Lords, can it be said that the above provision imposes a duty on the council to conduct a trial?  The answer to this question can only be negative otherwise the provision would be impossible of performance.  It is preposterous to argue, for example, that the council cannot act instanta where a candidate is caught red handed with a paper in the examination hall.  In this regard, the expression “during an examination” extends from the time when the invigilator announces the commencement of the examinations to the declaration of the results.  Thus the council may withhold the results where in the course of marking it discovers that the answers in the scripts of a particular school are so identical as to lead to the conclusion that the candidates must have cheated.

 

(25)My Lords, the respondent submits that the council has the right to withhold the results of a candidate over whose script it entertains genuine suspicion.  No rules of natural justice come into play in such situation.

 

(26)Section 10 similarly provides that where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have foreknowledge of an examination paper or cheated in the examination, a report shall be made to the             council which may take action including the cancellation of the result.  The learned judges of the Court of Appeal held rightly that the provision does not impose a judicial inquiry on the council.”

 

These  legal arguments need to be evaluated.  They are in the main based on PNDCL 255, whose requirements the respondent is obliged to comply with, on pain of being in breach of article 23.  The section 3(2) to which the respondent makes reference is in the following terms:

 

“3(2) Where a candidate before or during an examination is found to have acted or is found acting in breach of the provisions of subsection (1) –

 

(a)  he shall be disqualified from taking the examination and the entire results of the candidate in the examination shall be cancelled; and

 

(b)  the council may prohibit the candidate from taking any examination conducted by or on behalf of the council for a period of not less than two years immediately following the breach.”

 

Clearly the sanctions provided for in section 3(2) are predicated on a breach of the provisions of section 3(1), which are to the following effect:

     “Any person who, before or during an examination conducted by the Council, without lawful authority, the proof of which shall be on him –

 

(a)  has in his possession any examination paper;

 

(b)  is found to have had foreknowledge of the contents of any examination paper; or

 

(c)  makes use of any examination paper or the contents of it in any manner whatsoever,

commits an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than ¢20,000 and not exceeding ¢500,000 or imprisonment for a term of not more that two years or to both.”

 

Section 3(1) thus creates a criminal offence.  Accordingly, in accordance with the normal principles of criminal law, before the sanctions prescribed in section 3(2) can be applied to any examination candidate, the offence created under section 3(1) must have been proved against him or her beyond any reasonable doubt.  In response to the question posed in paragraph (24) of the respondent’s statement of case, it is clear that to impose the sanctions prescribed in section 3(1) of the Law, a criminal trial has to take place.  Of course, it is not the respondent which has to conduct this, but the courts, on initiation by the normal law enforcement agencies of the land.  Furthermore, I do not accept the respondent’s contention that “during an examination” extends from when the invigilator announces the commencement of the exams until the                 declaration of the results.  During the examination should bear its ordinary meaning of the duration of the actual written or oral examination. If in the course of marking the scripts of a particular school, the respondent discovers suspicious circumstances, but it has no extrinsic evidence sufficient to found a prosecution under section 3(1), the course of action available to it is pursuant to section 10 of the Law.  Under section 10 of PNDCL 255, the respondent may take administrative action in response to a candidate having been found to have had access to an examination paper; or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper; or have cheated in any way during an examination.  Section 10 is in the following terms:

 

“(10) Where in any investigation or trial a candidate is found to have had access to an examination paper or to have had foreknowledge of the contents of an examination paper or cheated in any way during an examination, a report shall be made to the Council which shall take such action, including the cancellation of examination results and any certificate issued in respect thereof to the candidate.”

 

The administrative action of the respondent permitted by this provision is, however, subject to the duty to act fairly and reasonably prescribed under article 23.  As I have already indicated, the respondent’s fair and reasonable administrative action need not take the form of a “trial”             conducted by it.  It is sufficient if the candidates concerned are given an opportunity to be heard through their written representations.  This implies that I do not accept the contention in paragraph (25) of the respondent’s statement of case to the effect that no rules of natural             justice come into play when the respondent withholds a candidate’s results on grounds of genuine suspicion.  The candidate must definitely have a right to be heard before being condemned.

Finally, in connection with the provisions of PNDCL 255, the learned trial judge found that the regulations which, it was anticipated, would be issued under the statute had not been and that the specific rule cited by the respondent to justify its action (rule 5b) did not exist.  These are all factors which weaken the legal basis for the respondent’s administrative action against the appellants.  Although the examination regulations issued by the respondent probably have contractual effect between it and the candidates who submit to its examinations, it is still important for it to identify the right provision under which it purports to take action against examination candidates.

 

Conclusion on issues arising from the grounds of appeal

 

I have not found it necessary to deal with each and every ground of appeal filed by the appellants.  From the foregoing, however, it is clear that I have found merit in their appeal.  In the result, I would allow the appeal of the appellants and restore the judgment of the learned trial judge, Omari-Sasu JA, declaring the decision of the respondent concerning the appellants to be incurably bad, void and of no consequence.  The decision is accordingly set aside.

Availability of damages as a remedy for any loss suffered by appellants

 

To compensate the appellant in this case for the loss caused him as a result of the denial to him of a fair procedure, this court considered the desirability of awarding him (and the other students whom he represented) damages for the loss, in the interest of justice.  Since this is uncharted territory in this jurisdiction, the court determined, after announcing its decision to allow this appeal on 17 June 2004, to invite counsel to make written submissions on whether in the circumstances of this case, it would be appropriate to award damages against the                     defendants and, if so, what factors should be taken into account in determining such damages.  After considering these submissions and reflecting independently on the issues involved, I have come to the conclusion set out in this final part of my judgment.

To award damages to the appellant on the facts of this case would be novel and this court needs to consider carefully the desirability and the justification for such development of the law and the repercussions of such development for the fabric of our general legal system and our public administration.  Under English law, such damages would not be available.  The following terse overview of the position under English law is provided by De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review (1999) at page 609:

“A fundamental tenet of English law is that the failure of a public body to act in accordance with public law principles of itself gives no entitlement at common law to compensation for any loss suffered.  Nor does the careless performance of a statutory duty in itself give rise to any cause of action in the absence of a common law duty of care in negligence or a right of action for breach of statutory duty.  To recover damages, a recognised cause of action in tort must be pleaded and proved.  In short, while in some cases it may be a necessary condition, it is never a sufficient one for the award of damages that the act or omission complained of be ‘unlawful’ in a public law sense.”

 

The English common law has thus refused to develop any special law of torts applicable to only public bodies and officials.  Indeed, Professor Dicey in his famous doctrine of the rule of law propounded in the nineteenth century identified this aspect of the English common law as one of the elements of his doctrine.  He glorified in the fact under English law “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.”  (See Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (10th ed 1959) page 193.  Of course, it does not follow that this court should follow this English orthodoxy.  For even in England, even though the courts have clung to this orthodoxy, there has been pressure for reform.  For instance, in 1988, a Report of the Committee of the Justice/All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom entitled Administrative Justice – Some Necessary Reforms (Oxford, 1988) recommended in paragraph 11.83 that:

 

“compensation shall be recoverable by any person who sustains loss as a result of … (a) any act, decision, determination, instrument or order of a public body which materially affects him and which is for any reason wrongful or contrary to law; or (b) unreasonable or excessive delay on the part of any public body in taking any action, taking any decision or determination, making any order or carrying out any duty.”

 

Given the written Ghanaian Constitution of 1992 there may be opportunities for reform here, which are not available in England.

According to the English orthodoxy, the failure of a public body, contrary to the principles of fairness and natural justice, to give a person a proper hearing before making a decision does not, of itself, give rise to a cause of action for damages.  (See for instance, Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158.)  However, the interesting case of  Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1979] AC 385, PC illustrates the impact of a written Constitution on this English orthodoxy.

In Maharaj’s  case, the appellant before the Privy Council was a barrister engaged in a case in the High Court in Trinidad and Tobago.  He was committed to prison for seven days on the order of the judge.  He applied by motion to the High Court under section 6 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution claiming redress for the contravention of his right protected under the Constitution not to be deprived of his liberty save by due process of law.  He appealed to the Court of Appeal, when the High Court dismissed his motion.  He further appealed to the Privy Council when the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s dismissal.

The Privy Council allowed the appeal, holding that section 6(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago was intended to create a new remedy for the contravention of constitutional rights without reference to existing remedies; that the word “redress” in its context bore its  ordinary meaning of reparation or compensation, including monetary                           compensation; and that although the claim was not a claim in private law for damages for tort, but was a claim in public law for compensation, that compensation could be measured in terms of the deprivation of liberty, including consequential loss of earnings and recompense for the                       inconvenience and distress suffered during detention.

This decision has persuasive force in the Ghanaian jurisdiction because of the similarity in the wording of section 6(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and Article 33 (1) of the Ghanaian Constitution.  Section 6(1) provided as follows:

 

“For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that if any person alleges that any of the provisions of the foregoing sections or section of the Constitution has been, is being, or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

Article 33(1) is in the following terms:

 

“Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”

 

The judgment of Lord Diplock, who delivered the majority judgment of the Privy Council, is of interest in respect of his view on whether on the above language, a claim for damages was available for a breach of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  This is what he said on that issue (at pages 398-399 of the Report):

 

“The right to 'apply to the High Court for redress' conferred by section 6(1) is expressed to be 'without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available.'  The clear intention is to create a new remedy whether there was already some other existing remedy or not.  Speaking of the corresponding provision of the Constitution of Guyana, which is in substantially identical terms, the Judicial Committee said in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] AC 972, 982:

 

“To ‘apply to the High Court for redress’ was not a term of art at the time the Constitution was made.  It was an expression which was first used in the Constitution of 1961 and was not descriptive of any procedure which then existed under Rules of Court for enforcing any legal right.  It was a newly created right of access to the High Court to invoke a jurisdiction which was itself newly created…”

 

As has been already mentioned, in his originating motion in the High Court of April 17, 1975, the appellant did allege that the provisions of section 1(a) had been and were being contravened in relation to him.  He was thus entitled under section 6(1) to apply to the High Court for redress, without prejudice to his right also to pursue his remedy of appealing to the Judicial Committee against the judge’s order.

     What then was the nature of the “redress” to which the appellant was entitled?  Not being a term of legal art it must be understood as bearing its ordinary meaning, which in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (3rd ed) 1944 is given as:  “Reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss resulting from this.”  At the time of the original notice of motion the appellant was still in prison.  His right not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law was still being contravened; but at the time the case reached the Court of Appeal he had long ago served his seven days and had been released.  The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.  It was argued on behalf of the Attorney-General that section 6(2) does not permit of an order for monetary compensation despite the fact that this kind of redress was ordered in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana.  Reliance was placed upon the reference in the subsection to “enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the foregoing sections” as the purpose for which orders etc., could be made.  An order for payment of compensation, it was submitted, did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been contravened.  In their Lordships’ view an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under section 1 “has been” contravened is clearly a form of “redress” which a person is entitled to claim under section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress; as by now it is in the instant case.”

 

This is an eminently sensible construction to put on the right to “apply to the High Court for redress” which is to be found in both section 6(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and article 33(1) of the Ghanaian Constitution.  It is a construction whose persuasive authority I am happy to follow. Accordingly, I hold, encouraged by this persuasive authority, that in Ghana also the High Court, in giving “redress” pursuant to article 33(1), has power to award damages or compensation for the infringement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in chapter five of the 1992 Constitution.

The respondent, however, in his statement of case on award of damages, submitted in response to this court’s invitation, urged a contrary viewpoint.  He argued, first, that damages were not available to the appellant because he had never claimed that relief.  This argument is easily disposed of.  In my view, a claim for redress under article 33 encompasses, in law, a claim for damages as a possible component of the redress.  It is up to the courts to determine where such relief is appropriate.

Secondly, the respondent maintained that the introduction of the issue of damages into the case was a great surprise to it and that injustice would be caused to both sides if the issue was pressed further.  I do not see how injustice would be caused to the appellant by an award of damages to him.  With regard to the respondent council, it may well have been taken by surprise.  But that was the very reason why the court gave it an opportunity to make further submissions on the issue.  The requirements of fairness have thus been complied with.  The fact that the respondent did not appreciate all the nuances in meaning of “redress” within the context of article 33(1) cannot be held up as a bar to this court’s right and responsibility to interpret the Constitution.  Given the extra opportunity that the respondent was given to marshal additional submissions on whether damages should be available on the facts of this case, I am satisfied that no injustice will be caused to him by the award of damages.

Thirdly, the respondent asserted that “there is no precedent in our municipality for a grant of damages in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, and this is because damages are not a public law remedy.”  It is inaccurate to describe the jurisdiction which this court is exercising in this case as supervisory.  The court is exercising an appellate jurisdiction over a suit in which the High Court has applied the provisions of the Constitution in order to protect the appellant’s constitutional rights. Under Ghanaian constitutional law, the exposition earlier in this judgment has demonstrated that damages have a role to play as a public law remedy in Ghana.

The next inquiry is to determine the circumstances in which the undoubted power of the High Court to award damages may be exercised in relation to article 23 of the Ghanaian Constitution.  There are policy reasons why there should be restraint in the exercise of the power to award damages in that context.  If damages were to be awarded each time that the High Court found administrative action unlawful and exercised judicial review over it, this would raise the cost of government and public administration.  This is an issue of policy that needs to be borne in mind.  The quashing of a decision or the prohibition of a public official from a particular course of action may be sufficient to meet the ends of justice, without the need to award damages.  In making decisions in the context of the facts of particular cases, the courts will need to remember that whilst damages may serve the purpose of compensating the victims of unlawful administrative action, they may not necessarily serve to deter such unlawful action, since the damages will be paid from public coffers and not from the personal funds of the officials concerned.

In any case, in the Maharaj case the facts lent themselves to an easy quantification of damages.  A public law cause of action in relation to the deprivation of liberty is quite analogous to the tort of false imprisonment and therefore the established methods of quantifying damages for that tort can be borrowed.  It is much more difficult to quantify the damage caused by unlawful administrative conduct where this consists, as in the instant case, of a failure to apply a fair procedure.  Should the difficulty in assessing damages in such circumstances affect entitlement to damages on such facts?  Or, rather, should there be a disconnection between the difficulties in determining the measure of damages and the establishment of the principle of liability to damages under the circumstances in contemplation?  These are difficult questions.

On the facts of the present case, the critical issues are whether just redress is achievable through the quashing alone of the offending decision of the respondent and whether in the interest of justice some compensation ought to be paid to the appellant and the other students.  If this court determines that it is desirable and appropriate in the interest of justice to give monetary compensation to the wronged students, the difficulty of quantification should not be allowed to be an impediment to the doing of justice.

In my opinion, just redress, on the facts of this case, is achievable only if, in addition to quashing the offending decision, compensation is paid to the victims of the procedural injustice.  This is because for more than three years the appellant and his fellow students have endured the loss of their constitutional right under article 23.  This loss of their right has already happened and it is irretrievable. As Lord Diplock said in the Maharaj case [1982] AC 385 at 398. “The contravention was in the past; the only practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.” It may be that the award of damages may not be necessary where an offending decision is quickly set aside.  But where, as here, an aggrieved person has had to bear the consequences of an offending decision for a considerable period, the award of damages, pursuant to the High Court’s power under article 33(1), is justifiable.

 

Assessment of damages arising from failure to apply fair procedure in breach of article 23 of the 1992 Constitution

 

If this court decides to award damages for an infringement of any of the fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in chapter 5 of the Constitution, it would in effect be giving redress for a constitutional wrong or a public law tort.  This is uncharted territory for the common law, as already noted.  Accordingly, any principles from the common law that can be pressed into service can only be by analogy.  To award damages under the private law of tort, judges are guided by principles relating to the measure of damages.  Some analogous principles need to be                     fashioned for the public law of tort arising from the Ghanaian Constitution.

The basic principle that the common law courts have applied for the measure of damages in the private law of tort (and indeed of contract) is that of restitutio in integrum.  Lord Scarman expressed this principle thus in Lim v Camden Health Authority [1980] AC 174 at 187:

 

“…the principle of the law is that compensation should as nearly as possible put the party who has suffered in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong.”

 

This measure of damage is easier to apply in the traditional private law of torts area, where a plaintiff’s loss may consist of personal injury, damage to property, financial loss etc.  It is much more difficult to apply where a plaintiff’s loss is that of a constitutional right.  What is the level of                monetary payment that can return him or her to the status quo ante.  A similar difficulty has been found in trying to apply restitutio in integrum to the non-pecuniary elements of personal injury compensation, such as pain and suffering.  In such situations, what the courts may end up with is not true compensation but what Romer LJ described in Rushton v National Coal Board  [1953] 495 at 502 as “notional or theoretical compensation to take the place of that which is not possible, namely, actual compensation.”

Similarly, how can there be actual compensation for the appellant’s loss of his right to a fair hearing, on the facts of this case?  What payment can restore him to the situation he was in before the respondents took their decision affecting him without hearing him?  The difficulty of this question is compounded by the fact that it is to be answered without prejudice to the substantive rights of the parties to this dispute.  On the facts of this case, I am not in a position to determine whether the applicant and his fellow students did or did not cheat.  All that this court can determine is that the procedure the respondent employed to arrive at its decision is flawed and therefore the decision is void. Assessing the monetary compensation to restore the applicant to his procedural status quo ante will, to my mind, inevitably involve a “notional or theoretical” exercise.  It is nevertheless worth carrying out in order to give substance to his constitutional right.  In undertaking this notional exercise of compensation, the courts will need to exercise their judicial discretion judiciously, taking into account the totality of the circumstances of each case.  They would be well advised to restrict themselves to modest awards because of the inevitable subjectivity of the exercise.

In effect, the damages that are awarded for breach of a constitutional right under chapter five of the Constitution in cases where no actual damage is proved are damages which are “at large” in the sense in which Lord Hailsham LC used this expression in Cassell & Co Ltd  v Broome [1972]  AC 1027 at 1073, HL where he said:

 

       “The expression ‘at large’ should be used in general to cover all cases where awards of damages may include elements for loss of reputation, injured feelings, bad or good conduct by either party, or punishment, and where in consequence no precise limit can be set in extent.  It would be convenient if, as the appellants’ counsel did at the hearing, it could be extended to include damages for pain and suffering or loss of amenity.  Lord Devlin uses the term in this sense in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129,1221, when he defines the phrase as meaning all cases where “the award is not limited to the pecuniary loss that can be specifically proved.”  But I suspect that he was there guilty of a neologism.  If I am wrong, it is a convenient use and should be repeated.”

 

 

In the Ghanaian context, use of the phrase may be convenient shorthand for describing the nature of the damages payable for breach of a constitutional right, where no actual proximate pecuniary loss is proved.  I think that the quantum of such damages is in the discretion of the judge and that there are no truly objective standards to guide him or her except the judge’s assessment of what justice requires in the context of the facts of each particular case.  To recapitulate, I would say that, in respect of article 23 of the Constitution, if no evidence of actual proximate                    consequential loss has been led, damages are at large and the court may award such compensation as it deems fit and just in order to restore the victim of the procedural injustice to the position he was in before the breach of his or her constitutional right, to the extent that money can do this.  However, for reasons of public policy, I recommend that the courts should limit themselves to awarding only moderate amounts.

Counsel for the appellant, in his supplementary submissions, prepared in response to this court’s invitation to identify the factors to be taken into account in the possible award of damages against the respondent, outlines three factors that should be taken into account in determining the level of general damages that should be awarded against the respondent.  (The appellant’s counsel defines general damages as “such damages as the law will presume to have resulted from the                   defendant’s actionable wrong.”)

The first factor which he points out is injury to reputation.  He claims that irreparable and ruinous injury has been done to the reputations of the appellants by the actions of the respondent.  I do not, however, accept that injury to reputation is a relevant factor in determining the measure of damages for breach of article 23 of the Constitution.  The appellant has the independent cause of action (preserved by the express language of article 33(1)) to sue for the private law tort of defamation, if he is so inclined.  This private law remedy is independent of the public law remedy of damages awarded to redress the breach of a constitutional duty.

The second factor that he identifies is: “loss of time and educational and related opportunities.”  In his words  (see paragraph  (11) of his supplementary submissions):

 

“Further, because of the virtual monopoly the respondent has in the conduct of Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (SSSCE), the unlawful ban on the appellants from sitting any examinations conducted by the respondent literally halted any educational progression the appellants could have made during the period of the ban.  They can never regain the invaluable educational time they have lost.  There has also been loss of employment opportunities and earnings for those of them who could have sought employment using their SSSCE certificates.  It must certainly have been foreseeable and in the reasonable contemplation of the respondent that unlawfully and capriciously cancelling the results of thirteen students, and further barring them for three years from taking any examinations conducted by the respondent, will occasion grave injury to the students.  The appellants should be compensated for this injury.”

 

It seems to me legitimate to take the injury sketched out above into account in determining the quantum of general damages to be awarded against the respondent since it can credibly be asserted that it was proximately caused by the respondent’s infringement of article 23 of the Constitution, subject to one qualification.  That qualification is that there is no certainty that if the appellants and the other students had been heard, they would have been awarded their SSSCE certificates.  This court should be careful not to pronounce on the substance of the               allegation of collusion and cheating.  The respondent may or may not have proved the allegation, if the proper procedure had been adopted.  This court has no way of knowing.  Accordingly, I would exclude from consideration any putative earnings that counsel claims the students would have received by using their SSSCE certificates.

The third factor referred to by the appellant is “social dislocation and emotional and mental distress.”  He contends that:

 

“the appellants have been socially dislocated, and have had to bear great emotional and mental distress.  For three years they have suffered severe and stormy emotional and mental distress as they protested their innocence.  The empty insistence of the respondent council that the appellants were guilty, when the council could not produce an iota of evidence against them, compounded the emotional and mental distress of the appellants.  The respondent ought properly to pay for this.”

 

I do not agree that the respondent should pay for this.  I do not consider the social dislocation and emotional and mental distress to be sufficiently proximate consequences of the breach of article 23.

Apart from putting forward a case in favour of general damages, the appellant’s counsel also asserted that aggravated damages should be awarded to the appellant, citing in support of this contention the following passage from Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (12th ed) at page 616:

“In any case in which damages are at large, that is, where they cannot be precisely calculated in money terms, the court may take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant, and where these aggravate the plaintiff’s injury, the damages will be correspondingly increased.  These ‘aggravated damages’ are truly compensatory, being given for the injury to the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity and pride.”  (The                emphasis is that of counsel).

 

I am not persuaded that aggravated damages should be payable on the facts of this case.  It has to be remembered that the damages in issue here are not ordinary private law damages of the kind that the passage above has in contemplation.  This is compensation for a public law wrong which is not actionable at common law.  I believe that we should tread carefully and gingerly in this novel territory.

Similarly, I do not think that this is an appropriate case in which to award exemplary/punitive damages, as we were urged to do by the appellant.  At the commencement of the evolution of the new remedy that this case has established, it would be prudent to exercise restraint and to allow time to provide an opportunity for the courts to monitor how the new remedy fits into the general fabric of our public law.  I believe that the modest general damages awarded in this case against an administrative body for breach of article 23 in itself sends a strong message to public authorities to be mindful of their constitutional obligations under that article in particular and under chapter five in general.

To conclude, I agree that, in addition to the quashing of the decision of the respondent, the respondent should pay damages in the amount as recommended in the judgment of my learned brother Kpegah JSC, the President of the Court.  I wish to highlight, for the guidance of High Courts which may subsequently follow this decision, the moderation in the quantum of the damages awarded. I believe that, in awarding these damages and in reaching its decision in this case, this court has taken an important step in the development of the constitutional and                           administrative law of this country.  I wish to thank both counsel for their assistance to this court in reaching this important decision.

 

 

 

 

S. K. DATE-BAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

COUNSEL:

 

Dr Raymond Atuguba (with him Baasit Abdul Aziz) for the appellants.

Kizito Beyuo for the respondent.

 

 

 

 

gso*

 

 
 

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