Chietiancy –
Cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy - Chieftaincy Act,
2008 (Act 759) - Section 57 (1)
- 1992 Constitution - Article
277 - Distoolment - Definition
of a Chief - Judicial Committee
of the National House of Chiefs
- Whether a person who has no
real connection or at all to
royalty can aspire to Chiefly
office –- Whether the allegation
of bias has been adequately made
against some panel members -
HEADNOTES
The
plaintiffs initiated their
action against the Defendants on
the grounds that the
installation of the 8th
Defendant, as Yonsohene on 3rd
February 1997 by the
co-ordinated efforts of the
other defendants was contrary to
the customary powers exercised
by Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III
reputed to be the overlords of
the Defendant’s predecessors in
title who as it were destooled
the predecessor of the
Defendants by name Baffour Kofi
Kwarteng III for acts of
rebellion against him as
overlord.
In the
statement of claim the
plaintiffs contended that as a
consequence of that rebellion,
the Defendants predecessor was
destooled as Yonsohene and
Benkumhene of Jamasi, and in his
place, the 1st
Plaintiff has been elevated and
installed as the Yonsohene and
Benkumhene of Jamasi.
In their
defence, whilst the Defendants
conceded the constitutional
relationship that existed
between their predecessor
Baffour Kofi Kwateng III the
Yonsohene and the Jamasihene,
Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III,
they denied any acts of
rebellion by their predecessor
in the manner stated by the
Plaintiffs. They contended that
Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey’s action
in purporting to destool the
Defendant’s predecessor was in
total breach of custom. The
defendants therefore contended
that the 8th
Defendant had been validly and
lawfully nominated, elected and
installed as Yonsohene to succed
his late uncle Baffour Kofi
Kwateng III.
HELD
(1) We have
reviewed the evidence on this
issue of biasWe are however of
the view that this allegation of
bias has not been well made out.
As a result, we have no
hesitation in dismissing this
ground of appeal, and it is
accordingly dismissed. This is
because on the strength of the
authorities, the defendants,
failed to establish any cogent
evidence to support their case
of bias
(2) It has
already been demonstrated quite
convincingly from evidence on
record that the Yonsohene was
not conferred on the Defendants
predecessors by the Jamasihene,
but that they created their own
stool and had since the founding
of Yonso been the only clans
that occupied the said stool. It
is therefore perfectly
legitimate for this court to
depart from the concurrent
findings made by the two
appellate Judicial Committee’s
and which we hereby do.
(3) If the
plaintiffs should succeed on
their claims as has been
repeated supra, then every
family or clan that own a stool,
but is subservient to an
overlord chief would be at risk.
This is because it would take
the subjective thinking of the
overlord chief to consider an
act by the incumbent occupant of
the subordinate stool as an act
of rebellion. This will
automatically divest the chiefly
status from that person and
indeed the entire family and
vest it in another person and or
family of choice. In our
opinion, there can be nothing
more arbitrary than the said
conduct. If these are allowed to
permeate and exist in our
revered and respected
chieftaincy institution, chaos
and disaster will be the by
products.
We will
therefore hold and rule that the
constitutional relationship
between the Yonsohene then
occupied by the Defendant’s
predecessor Barfour Kofi
KwartengIII and the Jamasihene
then occupied by Nana Adu Ghamfi
Brobbey III was such that, as
far as the Yonso stool was
concerned, the Jamasihene cannot
vest that status in another
family who do not have the
appropriate royal lineage. In
the premises, we will allow the
appeal against the judgment of
the Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs, Kumasi
dated 5th April 2006.
We will accordingly set it aside
and by inference the judgment of
the JC.A.R.H.C dated 22nd
December 1999 is also set aside.
We will in turn affirm the
judgment of the J.C.M.T.C dated
16th February 1999
which we accordingly restore.
Judgment is accordingly entered
for the Defendants.
DISSENTING
OPINIONS
In
consideration of the evidence
before us, it was difficult to
find any fault with the decision
by the National House of Chiefs
in its decision now under appeal
before us. The prevailing
custom in Ashanti was that it is
the prerogative of an undisputed
overlord incumbent chief to
elevate a deserving and
appropriate sub-chief to another
status. As the chiefly office
could not reasonably be left
empty for that length of time,
the overlord chief exercised his
customary prerogative and filled
the vacuum by doing the
reasonable thing under the
prevailing circumstances, to
wit, by conferring the title on
the person most deserving of it
– he conferred it on the
Nkotokuasehene. I am of the
opinion that the Jamasehene
could hardly be accused of, or
was guilty of any rash,
unconstitutional, undemocratic
conduct He did not purport to
wrest a right customarily
reserved unto one stool and
bestowed or conferred it on an
undeserving stool. He only
bestowed the title on the
occupant of a stool that
exhibited unalloyed loyalty to
him. For the above reasons we
are of the view that the
Judicial Committee of the
National House of chiefs was
right in their decision under
appeal before us; consequently,
I affirm their decision and
dismiss the appeal
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1979.Constitution
1992
Constitution
Chieftaincy
Act, 2008 (Act 759)
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Gregory V
Tandoh IV & Hanson [2010] SCGLR
975
Achoro v
Akanfela [1996-97] SCGLR
209
Fosua & Adu
Poku v Dufie (Deceased) & Adu
Poku Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310
P.S.
Investments Ltd. V CEREDEC
[2012] 1 SCGLR 618
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Chieftaincy
and the Law in Modern Ghana”,
Professor Kofi Kumado University
of Ghana Law Journal, Volume
XVIII 1990-1992, 194 at 212
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
JONES DOTSE,
J.S.C.
DISSENTING
ANSAH JSC.
COUNSEL
ASANTE
KROBEA ESQ. FOR THE
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/
APPELLANTS/ APPELLANTS.
KWEKU
PAINTSIL ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/
RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJORITY OPINIONS
JONES DOTSE,
J.S.C.
Article 277
of the Constitution, 1992
provides as follows:-
“A Chief is a person who
hailing from the appropriate
family and lineage,
has been validly nominated,
elected or selected and
enstooled, enskinned or
installed as a Chief or queen
mother in accordance with
relevant customary law and
usage.”
The
Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759)
also repeats verbatim the said
definition of a Chief in section
57 (1) thereof.
From the
above definition of a Chief, the
following are essential
ingredients and pre-requisites:-
i.
The person must qualify to be a
Chief, in that, he or she
must hail from the
appropriate family or lineage.
In other words, to qualify to be
a Chief, you must first
be a royal to start with.
See also
article 181 of the Constitution
1979 which also defined a chief
in pari materia as the
definition in article 277 of the
Constitution 1992 already
referred to supra. Despite the
fact that the P.N.D.C
Establishment Proclamation
abrogated the Constitution,
1979, the same Proclamation
recognised and retained the
definition of a Chief contained
in article 181 of the
Constitution 1979.
This was the
position until P.N.D.C Law 107
was enacted in 1985 which
purported to amend section 48
(1) of the Chieftaincy Act,
1970, Act 370. It is unclear
whether the amendment of this
section 48 (1) & (2) of Act 370
by P.N.D.C Law 107 had any
effect, since the retention of
the original constitutional
provision retaining article 181
of the Constitution 1979 was
contained in the P.N.D.C
Establishment Proclamation 1981
as amended by P.N.D.C Law 42,
section 53 (2) thereof.
In terms of
interpretation, an ordinary
statute like P.N.D.C law 107
cannot amend the P.N.D.C
Establishment Proclamation. It
follows therefore that the
definition of a chief as
contained in article 181 of the
Constitution 1979 continued
during all times material to the
circumstances of this case, up
to and including the coming into
force of the Constitution 1992
on 7th January 1992.
The
definition of a chief contained
in article 277 of the
Constitution 1992 will therefore
be deemed applicable to the
status of a chief at all times
material to the circumstances of
this case.
ii.
The person must have been
nominated as a Chief.
iii.
The person must have been
elected or selected as a Chief
and finally
iv.
The person must have been taken
through the ceremony of
enstoolment, enskinnment or
installation as a Chief
according to the relevant
customary practices
The reason we
have made reference to article
277 of the Constitution and the
other constitutional and
statutory provisions is to hone
the issue that arises for
determination in this
Chieftaincy appeal. This is
the issue of whether a person
who has no real connection or at
all to royalty can aspire to
Chiefly office either through
his own machinations or by the
deliberate acts of others such
as has happened in this case.
What then are
the facts of this appeal?
FACTS
This is an
appeal lodged by the
Defendants/Respondents/Appellants/Appellants,
hereinafter referred to as the
Defendants against the decision
of the Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs dated
5th April, 2006
which confirmed an earlier
decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Ashanti
Regional House of Chiefs, dated
22nd December 1999
in favour of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents/
Respondents, hereinafter
referred to as the Plaintiffs.
The
Plaintiffs on 7th
February, 1997 claimed before
the Judicial Committee of the
Mampong Traditional Council
hereafter referred to as
(J.C.M.T.C) the following
reliefs:-
1. A
declaration that the privilege
previously vested in the Yonso
Bedomasi family to nominate,
elect and install a Yonsohene
was validly abrogated by Nana
Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III the then
Jamasihene when the said family
rebelled against the
Jamasi stool and proclaimed
itself no longer subject to
the traditional authority of the
Jamasi stool.
2. A
declaration that Nana Yeboah
Kodie Asare II was lawfully
elevated to the status
of Yonsohene and Benkumhene of
Jamasi by Nana Adu Gyamfi
Brobbey III in the
face of the said rebellion and
all customary rites were
duly performed to seal the
elevation.
3. A
declaration that the purported
nomination election and
installation of one
Francis Yaw Adusei (the 8th
Defendant) by the Yonso Bedomasi
Bretuo family or any other
person as Yonsohene is contrary
to Ashanti custom and
usage and that the same is
therefore null and void.
4. A
declaration that Nana Oforiwaa
Amanfo, the 2nd
Defendant herein is an Obaapanin
of Yonso Bretuo Bedomasi family
and not the queenmother of
Yonso
5. An
injunction to restrain the 2nd
and 8th Defendants
from acting or holding
themselves out or allowing
themselves to be held out as the
queenmother and Chief
of Yonso respectively.
On the 16th
February 1999, the J.C.M.T.C
rendered a well considered
judgment in which they dismissed
the claims of the Plaintiffs in
its entirety in the following
terms:-
“From the
evidence before the Committee,
it is clear that Nana
Jamasihene, the late Nana Adu
Gyamfi Brobbey III, elevated the
Nkotuahene stool of Jamasi to
that of Benkumhene of Jamasi and
that Nana Yeboah Kodie Asare
II swore the oath of allegiance
to the
Jamasihene and his elders as
Benkumhene of Jamasi but
not as Yonsohene. The
reliefs sought by the plaintiffs
cannot therefore be granted and
it is hereby dismissed with cost
assessed at Eighty hundred
thousand cedis (¢800,000.00)”
emphasis supplied
Dissatisfied
with the judgment of the
J.C.M.T.C, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Judicial
Committee of the Ashanti Region
House of Chiefs, hereafter
referred to as J.C.A.R.H.C,
which on the 22nd
day of December 1999 allowed
the appeal lodged by the
plaintiffs, and set aside the
decision and findings of the
trial J.C.M.T.C.
The
Defendants naturally felt
aggrieved by the decision of the
J.C.A.R.H.C and also appealed
that decision to the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs, hereafter referred to
as (J.C.N.H.C).
The J.C.N.H.C
on the 21st day of
June, 2006, almost six years
after the J.C.A.R.H.C decision
dismissed the appeal, therein
prompting the Defendants to yet
again appeal to this Court by
leave of the National House of
Chiefs which was given on 7th
December, 2006.
GROUNDS OF
APPEAL
1.
The Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs erred
by holding that 2 of the 3
panel members of the Judicial
Committee of the Ashanti
Regional House of Chiefs who sat
on the matter did not act as a
Judge in their own
Courts and their judgment is not
nullity.
2.
The trial Court erred by holding
that Jamasi Stool had capacity
to disposes
Defendants/Respondents/Appellants/Appellants
of their Stool and confer same
on Plaintiffs family, when it is
wrong, unconscionable and
contrary to custom.
3.
The trial Court erred by
affirming the judgment of the
Judicial Committee of the
Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs
to the effect that it was Jamasi
Stool which created Yonso
Stool. (I believe the trial
court is rather a reference
to the J.C.N.H.C)
4.
The judgment is against the
weight of evidence on record.
5.
Additional grounds of Appeal
would be filed on receipt of the
Record of Appeal.
As can be
seen from the above grounds, the
Defendants have appealed against
the entirety of the decision of
the J.C.N.H.C in which they seek
a reversal of the said judgment
and a restoration of the
decision of the trial J.C.M.T.C.
FACTS IN
SUPPORT OF THE ACTION
The
plaintiffs initiated their
action against the Defendants on
the grounds that the
installation of the 8th
Defendant, as Yonsohene on 3rd
February 1997 by the
co-ordinated efforts of the
other defendants was contrary to
the customary powers exercised
by Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III
reputed to be the overlords of
the Defendant’s predecessors in
title who as it were destooled
the predecessor of the
Defendants by name Baffour Kofi
Kwarteng III for acts of
rebellion against him as
overlord.
In the
statement of claim the
plaintiffs contended that as a
consequence of that rebellion,
the Defendants predecessor was
destooled as Yonsohene and
Benkumhene of Jamasi, and in his
place, the 1st
Plaintiff has been elevated and
installed as the Yonsohene and
Benkumhene of Jamasi.
In their
defence, whilst the Defendants
conceded the constitutional
relationship that existed
between their predecessor
Baffour Kofi Kwateng III the
Yonsohene and the Jamasihene,
Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III,
they denied any acts of
rebellion by their predecessor
in the manner stated by the
Plaintiffs. They contended that
Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey’s action
in purporting to destool the
Defendant’s predecessor was in
total breach of custom. The
defendants therefore contended
that the 8th
Defendant had been validly and
lawfully nominated, elected and
installed as Yonsohene to succed
his late uncle Baffour Kofi
Kwateng III.
After an
evaluation of the pleadings and
evidence in great detail, the
J.C.M.T.C identified the
following issues as those
germane to the resolution of the
core issues in the case as
follows:
1.
Who were the first settlers
(Jamasi or Yonso) and who
settled first on Yonso lands –
The Bedomasi Bretuo family or
the Asona Odumasi family?
2.
How was the title Yonsohene
acquired by the Bedomasi Bretuo
Royal family?
3.
What customary position was
given to Nana Yeboah Kodie Asare
by Nana Adu Gyamfi
Brobbey III on his elevation?
4.
Who is the Obaapanin of Yonso
and whether her installation was
according to custom.
5.
Has Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey the
customary right to strip Baffour
Kwarteng of all his titles if he
actually rebelled – against him.
These questions will
have to be answered from the
evidence adduced by both
parties and their witnesses.
Having
perused the grounds of appeal
vis-à-vis the evidence in the
appeal record together with the
erudite submissions of learned
Counsel for the parties, we are
of the view that the following
issues arise for determination
in this appeal. These are:
1.
Whether the allegation of bias
has been adequately made against
some panel members of the
J.C.A.R.H.C by the Defendants.
2.
Whether a chiefly status can be
divested from one family and
vested in another family by
a mere verbal declaration by an
overlord chief irrespective of
how that stool was created
3.
The Constitutional relationship
between chiefs in this case, the
Jamasihene and
Yonsohene vis-à-vis a critique
of the reliefs claimed by the
plaintiffs before the
J.C.M.T.C
4.
The issue of concurrent findings
made by the two appellate
courts, viz, the
J.C.A.R.H.C and J.C.N.H.C and
whether on the strength of the
authorities there is sufficient
justification for this court to
depart from those concurrent
findings.
In the latter
event, this phenomenon would be
used to apply to the other
issues formulated above and made
applicable in general terms to
the determination of the entire
appeal.
1.
BIAS
We have
reviewed the evidence on this
issue of bias on record and we
have also reviewed the
statements of case filed in the
case as well as the decision of
the J.C.N.H.C on the matter.
We are
however of the view that this
allegation of bias has not been
well made out. As a result, we
have no hesitation in dismissing
this ground of appeal, and it is
accordingly dismissed. This is
because on the strength of the
authorities, the defendants,
failed to establish any cogent
evidence to support their case
of bias.
CONCURRENT
FINDINGS OF FACT
In this
appeal, it must be well
understood that it is the
J.C.M.T.C that is the trial
court. It is they who must be
considered to have been the
court that made primary findings
of fact.
Even though
both the first and second
appellate Judicial Committees
all departed from the primary
findings made by the J.C.M.T.C,
and as it were cast a daunting
task on the Defendants in their
bid to overturn the concurrent
findings made by these appellate
Judicial Committees, the fact
still remains that, as the trial
court, it had advantages which
the appellate Committee’s did
not have.
As a result,
for these appellate Judicial
Committee’s to depart from the
findings of the trial Judicial
Committee, it must be
established that their decision
had been based on sound judicial
reasoning and well established
principles of law.
At the
moment, it would however appear
that because of the concurrent
findings of fact by the two
intermediate appellate Judicial
Committee’s, the Defendants as
has already been stated must
establish by clear legal
principles, why those concurrent
findings must be jettisoned in
favour of the earlier decision
of the J.C.M.T.C
In the
judgment of the J.C.A.R. H.C
they settled several issues
which according to them would
help them resolve the appeal.
One of these
issues which they considered
very important is the
following:-
“Whether or not the title
Yonsohene was vested in the
Bretuo-Bedomasi family by the
Jamasihene”.
In resolving
the above issue, the J.C.A.R.H.C
referred to portions of the
judgment of the J.C.M.T.C and
which states as follows:-
“it was after Mampong had
settled at the present Mampong
that Jamasihene arrived
with his group. Therefore if
plaintiff’s claim that his
ancestors migrated with Nana Adu
Gyamfi then we hold the views
that the Asona Odumasi
clan came to meet the
Bedomasi-Bretuo family already
at Yonso. It is
therefore not accepted that the
title Yonsohene was
bestowed on the
Bedomasi-Bretuo family by the
Jamasihene.”
Thereafter, the J.C.A.R.H.C made
the following statements which
sought to cast doubts on the
authenticity and veracity of the
said findings as follows:-
“We think that with the utmost
respect to the committee below
they over simplified the issue
and arrived at that finding of
fact without
considering other relevant
pieces of evidence on the
record. For instance
on the issue of whether the
Bedomasi-Bretuo family settled
at Yonso before the
Jamasi and Odumasi people
arrived, 8th
Defendant, in cross-
examination at page 105 of the
record testified as follows:-
Q. You
said in your statement that Nana
Jamasihene is your senior
brother. How did you become
brothers?
A. We
were brothers from a certain
place before they migrated and
we came to them there.”
With the
above statement, the J.C.A.R.H.C
reversed the findings of the
J.C.M.T.C and stated to the
contrary thus:-
“This evidence from the 8th
defendant shows that the Jamasi
people were the first to arrive
in Jamasi before Bedomasi-
Bretuo came to meet them. If on
the Committee below’s own
finding that the Odumasi people
came with the Jamasi people then
it follows that the Odumasi
people arrived in Yonso before
the Bedomasi-Bretuo family.”
We are of the
firm opinion that, the
J.C.A.R.H.C had no business to
depart from the findings made by
the J.C.M.T.C on the above issue
because of the following
reasons:-
i.
It is not in dispute that the
Apaahene gave land to the two
disputants to settle on.
ii.
The Bedomasi-Bretuo family have
been Chiefs at Yonso ever since
the town was founded.
iii.
The Plaintiffs have never been
able to establish that their
family members have ever been
Chiefs at Yonso.
iv.
The Defendant’s witness DW4 –
Nana Agyapong Ntrah, Krontihene
of Apaa, corroborated the
evidence of 8th and 2nd
Defendants by affirming that
it was his predecessors who gave
land to Nana Oforiwaa Amanfo I
and her subjects.
v.
Indeed, during cross-examination
of DW4 by the plaintiffs a very
important question
was asked and the answer given
remains unchallenged and forms
part of the evidence on record
which the J.C.M.T.C and indeed
any critically minded
adjudicator must of necessity
take into consideration.
This is how
the cross-examination went.
“Q. You have told this
court that the land given to
Nana Oforiwaa and
her
people was vacant. Do you want
us to believe that there was
nobody settling on the land?
A. Yes
Q. Was Nana Oforiwa the 1st
Chief of Yonso where the
Bedomasi people
settled?
A. Yes. She brought the
Bedomasi Stool
Q. Will you agree with me
that any settler who comes to
stay after the
Oyon river will have
to go to beg for land from Nana
Oforiwa
A. Yes”
Based on the
above quotations from the
cross-examination, it was quite
legitimate for the J.C.M.T.C to
have made the findings which
they did which unfortunately was
attacked by the J.C.A.R.H.C
without any basis whatsoever.
At this stage
of the opinion it will not be
out of place to state that, for
an appellate court to depart
from the primary findings made
by a trial court, it must put
itself into the position of the
trial court.
This it can
do by referring and considering
all the pieces of evidence led
before the trial court, to wit
viva-voce and documentary.
In this case,
if the J.C.A.R.H.C had
considered exhibit A, and the
evidence of 8th and 2nd
Defendants alongside that of
DW4, they would have come to the
conclusion that the findings of
the J.C.M.T.C stated below, were
validly made and would not have
departed from them.
After the
complete review of the evidence
on record, this is how the
J.C.M.T.C gave reasons for their
findings.
“From the evidence adduced
before the Committee, it can be
noted that both
parties allegedly got their
lands from Apaahene. The
Apaahene or his
representative will have been
the decider of this issue.
However, the Plaintiffs
tendered in evidence,
proceedings in a land case
between Kwame Adu – 1st
Plaintiff’s grand-uncle and one
Kobina Afuakwa. This was
marked exhibit ‘A’.
A
critical study of Exhibit ‘A’
reveals that the land dispute
was a piece of land at
Frepoti. The then Apaahene Nana
Kwaku Ayeh gave evidence in
the case and said and I
quote: “My name is Kwaku Ayeh
and I am chief of Apaa. In
the olden days Wionsohene came
to me and I gave him land. I
gave Frepoti land to Plaintiff’s
grandfather Kofi Dite The
boundary between Atwia and
Apaa starts where the Frepo
rises. The land up to Frapo to
Plaintiffs grandfather. The land
that the dispute is about
belongs to Plaintiff”. When you
study this piece of evidence by
Nana Kweku Ayeh, you will see
that Nana Ayeh said specifically
that in the olden days he
gave land to
Wionsuhene and then Frapo lands
to the Plaintiffs grandfather
Kofi Ditu. The question one will
ask is who is this Yonsohene
whom this land was given
to?
From plaintiff’s evidence and
that of their witnesses and the
Defendants and their
witnesses they all accept the
fact that the
Bedomasi Bretuo family have been
chiefs at Yonso ever since
the town was founded.
Throughout the proceedings
plaintiffs
could not establish any claim
that any of their ancestors have
been Odikro or chiefs at Yonso.
If therefore the Apaahene claims
he gave Yonso land to
Yonsohene and Frapo lands to
1stplaintiff’s
great- grand uncle then it
is clear that the land was given
to the first Chief
of Yonso who happens to
be Nana Oforiwaa Amanfo. If 1stplaintiff’s
great-grand uncle was the Odikro
the Apaahene wouldn’t have been
too specific.
D.W.4, Nana Agyapong Ntrah,
Krontihene of Apaa whose
overlords gave the land to both
Yonso and Jamasi collaborated
the evidence of the 8th
Defendant and D.W.3. He
told the Court that Yonso land
was given to Nana
Oforiwaa Amanfo I and her
ancestors by the then Apaahene
who settled at Yonso
long before the Jamasihene
arrived with his group. This
evidence was not
challenged by the plaintiffs.”
Emphasis supplied.
After the
above statement and reasons, the
J.C.M.T.C in our view then
proceeded to make logical
deductions based on their
appreciation of the evidence and
relevant rules of custom. The
J.C.M.T.C also made the
following positive and specific
findings which again find
support from the totality of the
evidence on record.
“From the evidence before Court,
and also the history of Mampong
shows that the Bedomasi Bretuo
family came to meet Nana
Akuamoah Panin (the then
Mamponghene) at Akrofonso and
settled there before Mampong
moved to its present
settlement. It was after Mampong
had settled at the present
Mampong that Jamaishene arrived
with his group. Therefore if
1st plaintiff
claims that his ancestors
migrated with Nana Adu
Gyamfi, then we hold
the view that the Asona Odumasi
clan came to meet the Bedomasi
Bretuo family already settled at
Yonso. It is
therefore not accepted that the
title Yonsohene was bestowed
on the Bodomasi Bretuo
family by the Jamasihene”.
Emphasized supplied.
It would thus
appear that instead of attacking
the judgment of the J.C.N.H.C,
much strength is being spent on
the judgment of the J.C.A.R.H.C,
which really is not on appeal in
this court.
The brief
write up on that judgment was
just to show that once the
J.C.A.R.H.C fell into error by
departing from the findings made
by the J.C.M.T.C the J.C.N.H.C
also fell into the same error by
continuing the same error in
departing from the valid
findings of the J.C.M.T.C by
following the decision of the
J.C.A.R.H.C.
Based upon
the said erroneous and perverse
findings, the J.C.N.H.C stated
in their judgment on this issue
as follows:
“The traditional history goes on
further to say that Nana
Jamasihene conferred
the title Yonsohene on the
Bedomasi Bretuo family since all
the major stools in the
area were occupied by the Bretuo
Clan which he himself
belonged to. The Mampong Stool
is also Bretuo as is well known
in Ashanti history. It is
also instructive to note that of
the four clans the
Bedomasi Bretuo family was the
last to found their settlement
at Yonso and it is equally
instructive to note that none of
the four clans
comprising Yonso ever laid
claim to the title “Yonsohene”
from the onset.
From the above reasoned
findings of fact by the
appellate Committee
below, we have no difficulty in
coming to the conclusion
that the right to confer the
title Yonsohene on any
of the four clans is the sole
prerogative and customary
obligations of the Jamasihene.
The issue whether or not Nana
Kofi Kwarteng III was
conferred with the title
Yonsohene and the fact that he
ruled as Chief in that
capacity is not in dispute. That
he later rebelled
against the Jamasihene on the
grounds that he Nana Kwarteng
was at par with him
following his purported
elevation to the status of
Obrempong is supported by
the evidence on record. In the
first instance the
escalating rebellion of Nana
Kofi Kwarteng III compelled the
Mampong Traditional Council
to convene a meeting to
reconcile the two feuding
chiefs, but they failed
to resolve “the Jamasi/Yonso
Constitutional
Stalemate”. The rebellion did
not end there for in a letter
written by Nana
Kwarteng’s Solicitor, he
emphasized his claim “that the
stools of Effiduasi, Jamasi
and Yonso are on the same status
as far as Mampong affairs are
concerned.” In
deciding whether or not the
Yonsohene had infact rebelled,
the Appellate
Committee found as follows:-
“…by claiming the same status as
the Jamasihene, the Yonsohene
had violated his oath of
allegiance to the Jamasihene and
that amounts to a rebellion”
Evidence further showed that
when the intervention of Nana
Attakorah
Amaniampong II the Mamponghene
could not change the
entrenched position of the
Yonsohene, the Jamasihene Nana
Adu Gyamfi Brobbey
III decided to elevate the 1st
Plaintiff Nana Yeboah
Kodie Asare II to the status of
Benkumhene and by the
prevailing custom
the Yonsohene since the two
customary offices had
been fused and were therefore
one and the same customary
office.”
Again, the
decision of the J.C.N.H.C to the
effect that, by the stroke of a
verbal pronouncement, the rights
of the defendants to the Yonso
stool could be whittled away has
been demonstrated by their own
judgment to be illogical,
inconsistent, uncustomary and
wishful thinking.
“It is also instructive to note
that the 8th
Defendant who claims to have
been customarily
enstooled the Yonsohene
accompanied the 1st
Plaintiff Nana Yeboah
Kodie Asare II to swear the oath
of allegiance to Nana
Jamasiehene as the Benkumhene of
Jamasi. This was in 1986.
Then in 1994, the
elders of Yonso namely the
Krontihene, Akwamuhene,
Adontenhene,
Manwerehene, Twafohene,
Akyeamehene all of Yonso swore
the oath of allegiance to the 1st
Plaintiff as Yonsohene.
In respect of the
parties’ overlord, Nana Adu
Gyamfi Brobbey III, his letter
Exhibit J, confirms the status
of 1st Plaintiff
as Yonsohene but not by a letter
of appointment as contended
by the Defendants in the
Appellate Committee
below. In our view a chiefly
status is not a subject of
appointment by a
mere letter but through
eligibility and the
relevant customary process.
From the evidence on record and
as was rightly pronounced on by
the Judicial Committee of
the Ashanti Region House of
Chiefs, the title Yonsohene
was customarily and properly
conferred on the 1st
Plaintiff Nana Yeboah
Kodie Asare II by Nana Adu
Gyamfi Brobbey III,
Jamasihene.”
Indeed whilst
the J.C.N.H.C is correct to
state that chiefly status is not
by appointment but through
eligibility and relevant
customary procedure as contained
in article 277 of the
Constitution 1992, their
immediate statement that the
Yonsohene was conferred on the 1st
Plaintiff by the Jamasihene is
an inconsistency and
illogicality that must not be
allowed to stand. It is
unconstitutional and
uncustomary.
What then is
the legal position when a court
is faced with the issue of
departing from the concurrent
findings made by two lower
courts?
As has
already been stated, the
original findings in this appeal
had been made by the J.C.M.T.C
which had the advantage of
hearing the witnesses viva-voce,
seeing and appreciating their
demeanor before coming to their
conclusions.
The two
appellate courts only had the
benefit of the cold facts just
as we have had in this court.
This court
had the opportunity to re-visit
the issue in the case of
Gregory V Tandoh IV & Hanson
[2010] SCGLR 975 holding 2
where the principles upon which
an appellate court such as our
court could depart from
concurrent findings and come to
different conclusion was stated
as follows:
“It was well-settled that where
findings of fact such as in the
instant case had been made by
the trial court and concurred in
by the first appellate
court, i.e. the Court of Appeal,
then the second appellate court,
such as the Supreme Court,
must be slow in coming to
different conclusions unless
it was satisfied that
there were strong pieces of
evidence on record which made it
manifestly clear that the
findings of the trial court and
the first appellate
court were perverse. However, a
second appellate court, like the
Supreme Court, could and
was entitled to depart from
findings of fact made
by the trial court and concurred
in by the first appellate court
under the following
circumstances: First, where
from the record of appeal, the
findings of fact by the
trial court were clearly not
supported by evidence on record
and the reasons in support of
the findings were
unsatisfactory; second, where
the findings of fact by
the trial court could be seen
from the record of appeal to
be either perverse or
inconsistent with the the
totality of evidence
led by the witnesses and the
surrounding circumstances of the
entire evidence on
record; third, where the
findings of fact made by
the trial court were
consistently inconsistent with
important documentary
evidence on record; and fourth,
where the first appellate
court had wrongly applied a
principle of law. In all
such situations,
the second appellate court must
feel free to
interfere with the said findings
of fact, in order to ensure that
absolute justice was done in the
case. Achoro v
Akanfela
[1996- 97] SCGLR 209
and Fosua & Adu Poku v Dufie
(Deceased) & Adu
Poku Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310 at
313 cited “
See also the
unanimous decision of this court
in P.S. Investments Ltd. V
CEREDEC [2012] 1 SCGLR 618,
where the court, again speaking
through me and relying on
respected judicial decisions
held that:-
“The Supreme Court had good
and solid grounds to interfere
with the findings of
fact made by the trial High
Court and the Court of
Appeal in the instant case
and to depart from them because
they were perverse and
inconsistent.”
Bringing the
said principles home to the
application of the instant
appeal, reveals that indeed the
findings which the first
appellate Judicial Committee
departed from and which were
concurred in by the second
appellate Judicial Committee,
the National House of Chiefs,
were not only perverse but also
showed signs of inconsistency
and were also inaccurate.
For example,
it is clear that the appellate
Judicial Committee’s did not
consider the entirety of the
evidence on record else there
was no way they would have
departed from the findings made
by the J.C.M.T.C which were not
only based on Exhibit A which
was tendered by the Plaintiffs,
but also the evidence of the
Defendants and their witnesses,
especially D.W.4.
Secondly, the
findings by the J.C.N.H.C to the
following effect whilst correct
in some respects also shows its
illogicality and inconsistency.
“A brief history of the founding
of Yonso summarized in the
judgments of the Judicial
Committees of the Mampong
Traditional Council and the
Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs shows that Jamasi was
founded long before the
arrival of the four clans,
namely, Asona, Oyoko, Asenie and
Bretuo. The Jamaishene was
thus the immediate overlord of
Yonso and each of them from
the onset had their own chief
and stool and was therefore
independent of the others. The
constitutional relationship
between these clans were
that none of them owes direct
allegiance to the Mampong Stool
save through the Jamasi stool.
The undisputed evidence on
record also shows that the name
Yonso refers to the combined
settlement of the four clans but
not to any of the individual
clans.”
The
conclusion reached by the
J.C.N.H.C to the effect that it
was Nana Jamasihene who
conferred the title Yonsohene on
the Defendants, i.e. the
Bedomasi Bretuo family is not
only perverse but illogical and
also inconsistent with the
evidence on record.
It has
already been demonstrated quite
convincingly from evidence on
record that the Yonsohene was
not conferred on the Defendants
predecessors by the Jamasihene,
but that they created their own
stool and had since the founding
of Yonso been the only clans
that occupied the said stool.
It is
therefore perfectly legitimate
for this court to depart from
the concurrent findings made by
the two appellate Judicial
Committee’s and which we hereby
do.
However, the
crux of this appeal is the
determination of the
constitutional relationship
between the Jamasihene and the
Yonsohene and its effect on the
status of the two chiefs
vis-à-vis their rights and
privileges. In view of the
claims of one stool having the
power to divest and vest etc.
This no doubt will have some
direct bearing on the reliefs
which the plaintiff’s so
craftily drafted in their case
at the J.C.M.T.C.
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHIEFS, (JAMASIHENE AND
YONSOHENE)
See section
76 (e) of the Chieftaincy Act,
2008 (Act 759) which states as
follows:-
“In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires, “cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy”
means a cause, matter, question
or dispute relating to any
of the following
(e) the constitutional
relations under customary law
between chiefs”
A critical
analysis of the reliefs which
the Plaintiffs’ claimed before
the J.C.M.T.C reveals that the
entire suit was one relating to
the constitutional relationship
between the Jamasihene and the
Yonsohene as spelt out under
section 76 (e) of Act 759
referred to supra.
For example,
how else can relief one be
understood if it is not a claim
to the effect that the rights
and privileges of the
Defendant’s Yonso Bedomase
Bretuo family to nominate,
elect, and install a Yonsohene
had been validly abrogated by
Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III, the
then Jamasihene because of acts
of rebellion by the former
against the latter.
Then the
second relief is a further
confirmation that because of the
said alleged acts of rebellion,
the 1st Plaintiff had
been elevated to occupy the
stool and positions previously
occupied by the Yonsohene from
the Bedomase Bretuo family.
Flowing from
the above two reliefs, it would
appear that the other three
reliefs are all confirmatory to
the fact of the constitutional
relationships between the 1st
Plaintiff claiming to have been
validly nominated, elected and
installed as Yonsohene and
therefore Benkumhene in contra
distinction to the same position
being occupied by the 8th
Defendant. Similarly, the
position of the 2nd
Defendant as Queenmother is
being seriously challenged by
the Plaintiffs, even though her
status as an Obaapanin of Yonso
Bedomase Bretuo family has not
been denied.
In our minds,
the reliefs are properly
cognizable as causes or matters
affecting chieftaincy.
In this
respect, it is important that,
all constitutional provisions
that have a bearing on the
determination of a cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy
have to be put in proper
perspective. It is in this
context that article 277 of the
Constitution 1992 becomes very
paramount and operative. The
same definition is contained in
section 57 (1) of Act 759.
We have
observed that the J.C.M.T.C took
all relevant customary practices
applicable to the matter into
consideration before coming to
their decision.
If the
plaintiffs should succeed on
their claims as has been
repeated supra, then every
family or clan that own a stool,
but is subservient to an
overlord chief would be at risk.
This is because it would take
the subjective thinking of the
overlord chief to consider an
act by the incumbent occupant of
the subordinate stool as an act
of rebellion. This will
automatically divest the chiefly
status from that person and
indeed the entire family and
vest it in another person and or
family of choice.
In our
opinion, there can be nothing
more arbitrary than the said
conduct. If these are allowed to
permeate and exist in our
revered and respected
chieftaincy institution, chaos
and disaster will be the by
products.
Who chooses
the family or stool that is
divested of their chieftly
status and the family that is
vested with the same status?
In this
respect, we cannot but agree
with the views of the eminent
constitutional Law Professor
Kofi Kumado in his article on
“Chieftaincy and the Law in
Modern Ghana”, University of
Ghana Law Journal, Volume XVIII
1990-1992, page 194 at 212 where
he stated thus:-
“Fourthly the framers of the
Constitution were painfully
aware, as indeed most of us
have been of the development by
which some very wealthy and
or prominent citizens, with
only tenuous links or none at
all to royal houses,
have attempted to buy or
bulldoze themselves into chiefly
office with attendant tension
and confusion. These attempts
sometimes even led to
the loss of human life. To
prevent this, the constitutional
definition required, not only
that a person must be nominated,
elected, and enstooled or
enskinned or installed but that
such a person must before
going through the
customary processes, “hail
from the appropriate
family and lineage” Thus a
person does not become a chief
even though he has
been taken through the customary
processes, if on the facts
he or she is not a member
of the appropriate royal family
or lineage.”
Having held
that the reliefs which
plaintiff’s claimed are causes
or matters affecting
chieftaincy, then the
appropriate steps should have
been taken under section 29 (1)
& (2) of Act 759 and not the
arbitrary nature of the decision
of Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey III
the Jamasihene to divest or
depose the Defendant’s family of
their chiefly status. See
sections 15 (1) & (2) and 28 (1)
& (2) of Act 370 of 1971 now
repealed.
We have
already stated that the
constitutional provisions in
article 181 of the Constitution
1979, on which Prof. Kumado
wrote his paper are pari materia
to the provisions in article 277
of the Constitution 1992.
It therefore
follows that so far as the
Yonsohene is concerned, the
Jamasihene, not having been
those who nominated, elected and
installed him cannot purport to
divest him and his family of
that status and vest it in
another family.
Indeed a
careful reading of the reliefs
which the plaintiff’s claimed
before the J.C.M.T.C reveals a
crafty plot to take away the
chiefly status of the Defendants
as far as the Yonso stool is
concerned. It s not surprising
that the J.C.M.T.C saw through
this mischievous attempt and
boldly rejected it in all its
forms.
We will
therefore hold and rule that the
constitutional relationship
between the Yonsohene then
occupied by the Defendant’s
predecessor Barfour Kofi
KwartengIII and the Jamasihene
then occupied by Nana Adu Ghamfi
Brobbey III was such that, as
far as the Yonso stool was
concerned, the Jamasihene cannot
vest that status in another
family who do not have the
appropriate royal lineage. In
terms of hierarchy, the
Jamasihene is the overlord of
the Yonsohene, beyond that, any
such brazen attempt to do a
customary coup d’état by
divesting them of their stool
must be frowned upon and
condemned. Due process must in
all cases be followed according
to law and procedure.
Again we are
conscious of the fact that the
constitutional relationship as
to which stool is Nifa, Benkum,
Adonten, Gyase etc are deeply
rooted in custom and tradition.
Some of these positions are
rewards for some heroic deeds
performed in times past. The
evidence is clear that it was
the Jamasihene who elevated the
Yonsohene to the position of
Benkumhene in addition to his
occupancy of the Yonso stool.
From the
evidence on record, it appears
that Nana Jamasihene has the
prerogative to elevate the
status of any of his sub-chiefs
to the position of Benkumhene.
This he has done by elevating
the 1st Plaintiff. We
cannot in this respect agree
more with the conclusion reached
in this matter by the J.C.M.T.C
as follows:-
Nana Jamasihene has the
traditional right to elevate any
of his Adikrafo or
sub-chiefs and even youngmen and
women who have distinguished
themselves in the service
of his traditional area. He can
create new stools to
people of his choice but he
cannot transfer an ancient
hereditary royal status
from one family to another.
We agree with
the above statement and endorse
it.
Before we
conclude this judgment, we want
to make a brief comment on the
length of time it has taken to
conduct this case from the
J.C.M.T.C to the Supreme Court.
From the
record, the writ in the case was
filed at the J.C.M.T.C on 7th
February 1997 and judgment was
delivered by the J.C.M.T.C on 16th
February 1999. Thereafter, the
J.C.A.R.H.C delivered their
judgment on 22nd
December 1999 within a period of
eight months which is highly
commendable.
However, the
appeal from the J.C.A.R.H.C to
the J.C.N.H.C all of which are
located in Kumasi, was
determined by the latter on 21st
July 2006, a period of seven
years. It has taken another
eight years for this court to
render judgment.
We are of the
opinion that Nananom who have
exclusive jurisdiction in causes
or matters affecting chieftaincy
must be expeditious in their
determination of cases that come
before them.
If there are
any logistical issues inhibiting
their smooth and expeditious
discharge of this awesome
responsibility they must speak
and let their voices be heard.
Else posterity will not treat
them with kind words when
violence which normally precedes
such protracted chieftaincy
disputes sometimes leading to
loss of lives, indeed does
occur.
CONCLUSION
In the
premises, we will allow the
appeal against the judgment of
the Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs, Kumasi
dated 5th April 2006.
We will accordingly set it aside
and by inference the judgment of
the JC.A.R.H.C dated 22nd
December 1999 is also set aside.
We will in
turn affirm the judgment of the
J.C.M.T.C dated 16th
February 1999 which we
accordingly restore. Judgment is
accordingly entered for the
Defendants.
(SGD) J. V. M. DOTSE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
AKAMBA,
J.S.C.
I have had
the privilege of reading
beforehand the erudite judgment
by my able and respected brother
Dotse JSC allowing the appeal. I
concur in the decision that the
appeal be allowed. I agree with
the reasoning and conclusion
therein advanced. My conclusion
is further informed by the fact
that the Judicial Committee of
the Mampong Traditional Council
(simply MTU) which was the first
trial tribunal in this matter
dealt with the issues of fact in
the petition adequately and
arrived at its conclusion
dismissing the appeal. The
petitioners had failed to
establish the basis for their
claim that the privilege or
right vested in the Yonso
Bedomasi family to nominate,
elect and install a Yonsohene
was validly abrogated. The
Chieftaincy institution has been
given a pride of place in the
Constitution 1992 by its article
270. This means that Nananom
cannot escape from the
requirements of the law and
equity in the normal performance
of their functions more
particularly administrative and
adjudicatory functions. The MTC
found that the responsibility to
nominate, elect and enstool a
Yonsohene was the preserve of
the Bedomasi Bretuo family of
Yonso. From where does the
Jamasihene suddenly get the
power to abrogate what he had
not conferred? The Constitution
1992 abhors capriciousness
and/or arbitrariness but this
appears to be the practice
sought to be advanced and relied
upon by the plaintiffs. The
accusation of rebellion is an
accusation of criminality which
must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt as required by section 13
(1) of NRCD 323. This is because
a rebellion as defined by the
Macmillan English Dictionary for
Advanced Learners is an attempt
to remove a government or leader
by force; a refusal to obey your
leader especially in politics;
opposition to someone in
authority or to accepted ways of
doing things.
The MTC found
as a fact that there was some
disagreement between the
Jamasihene and the Yonsohene
which was amicably resolved by
the Mampong Traditional Council.
The decision was accepted by the
parties and therefore binding on
both Jamasihene and Yonsohene.
Having accepted the settlement,
on what basis did the Jamasihene
purport to replace Nana Adu
Gyamfi Brobbey as Yonsohene?
Besides did he have the
authority to replace the
Yonkohene, a duty reserved for
the Bedomasi Bretuo family of
which he was not a member?
It is
therefore a travesty of justice
for the Judicial Committees of
the Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs (ARHC) and the National
House of Chiefs (NHC) to
overturn the rather very sound
and well reasoned decision of
the MTC. It is for these reasons
and those advanced in the lead
opinion of Dotse JSC that I
concur that the appeal be
allowed. The decisions of both
the ARHC and the NHC are hereby
set aside. The decision of the
Mampong Traditional Council
(MTC) is hereby restored.
(SGD) J. B . AKAMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) S. O. A.
ADINYIRA(MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DISSENTING OPINIONS
ANSAH JSC.
I had the benefit of reading the
judgment of the majority in this
appeal before hand, but try as I
did, could not agree with their
conclusion that the appeal
against the judgment of the
National House of Chiefs, should
be allowed. That being so it
became my duty to give the
reasons for my stand. Even as I
proceed to do so, I shall not
purpose to repeat the background
facts of this appeal as the
majority have done so already in
their judgment aforementioned. I
may only refer to them as it
becomes necessary for me to do
so.
There could be no doubt that the
appeal before us refers to a
cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy, statutorily
defined as a cause, matter,
question or dispute relating to
“(e) the constitutional relations
under customary law between
Chiefs.”
(section 66 (e) of the Chieftaincy
Act, 1971, Act 370.)
The National House of Chiefs held in
its judgment, inter alia, that,
“…we have no difficulty in
coming to the conclusion that
the right to confer the title
Yonsohene on any of the four
clans is the sole prerogative
and customary obligation on the
Jamasihene. The issue whether or
not Nana Kofi Kwarteng III was
conferred with the title
Yonsohene and the fact that he
ruled as chief in that capacity
is not in dispute. That he later
rebelled against the Jamasihene
on the grounds that he Nana
Kwarteng was at par with him
following the purported
elevation to the status of
Obrempong, is supported by the
evidence on record. In the first
instance the escalating
rebellion of Nana Kofi Kwarteng
III towards the Jamasihene, his
overlord, compelled the Mampong
Traditional Council to convene a
meeting to reconcile the two
feuding chiefs but they failed
to resolve the Jamasi/Yonso
Constitutional stalemate.
The President of the Jamasi
Divisional Council Nana Adu
Gyamfi III wrote in exhibit J on
30 May 1994, inter alia, that:
“(e) That for more than 25 years and
prior to his abdication and in
clear breach of his oath of
allegiance the ex-Yonsohene
Baffour Kofi Kwarteng III cut
his customary link with the Adu
Gyamfi Bretuo Stool of Jamasi by
refusing to serve the Jamasihene
and declaring that he would
serve the Silver Stool of
Mampong directly, albeit
contrary to established custom.
The Mampong Traditional Council
has already decided that
Yonsohene cannot serve the
Silver Stool directly except
through the Jamasihene his
overlord.
(f) That throughout the rebellion of
the Yonso Bedomasi Bretuo family
against the Jamasi stool all the
other Asafohene in Yonso
remained loyal to the Jamasi
stool in accordance with
established custom.
(g) That in my characteristic long
suffering and patient approach
to problems I waited for over 25
years, for the Yonso Bedomasi
Bretuo Royal family to repent
and prevail upon the occupant of
their Stool to remedy the breach
of his oath of allegiance sworn
to me.
(h) Since the above the title
situation could not prevail
forever and for the reasons
stated above the title of
Benkumhene and Yonsohene have
for some time now been bestowed
upon the Asona Royal family and
the occupant of its Stool, Nana
Yeboah-Kodie Asare II, following
his swearing of the oath of
allegiance to me”.
However, on 14th July
1984, when the Mampong
Traditional Council met under
the Presidency of Nana Atakorah
Amaniampong II, the Mamponhene,
the Jamasi-Yonso Stool Affairs
was on top of the agenda for the
day. During the meeting, the
President retired with his
council members to consult among
themselves on this issue after
which the ‘Kyeame’ reported to
the Council that there should be
no litigation between the two
chiefs and wanted to put his
feet on the matter.
Beyond that, there was no evidence
that the elevation made by the
overlord Nana Jamasihene was
reversed by the Mampong
Traditional Council or ever at
all.
Apparently, where a chief maintains
that he no longer owes
allegiance to his superior
chief, he shows clear disrespect
tantamount to what was commonly
called ‘rebellion’ in this
appeal, to the superior chief.
In the olden days such
rebellious conduct might attract
harsh punishment to bring many
an erring chief to order, thus
ending the
‘rebellion’.
According to the National House of
Chiefs, the rebellion was not by
that solitary act for, there was
evidence that the solicitor for
Nana Kwarteng III wrote to
emphasize that stools of
Effiduase, Jamasi and Yonso are
on the same status as far as
Mampong stool affairs were
concerned.
The reasons for coming to the
conclusion that Nana Kofi
Kwarteng III rebelled were given
as: “…. By claiming the same
status as the Jamasihene, the
Yonsohene had violated his oath
of allegiance to the Jamasihene
and that amounts to a
rebellion.” Evidence further
showed that when the
intervention of Nana Atakorah
Amaniampong II the Mamponghene
could not change the entrenched
position of the Yonsohene, the
Jamasihene Nana Adu Gyamfi
Brobbey III decided to elevate
the 1st plaintiff
Nana Yeboah Kodieh Asare II to
the status of Benkumhene and by
the prevailing custom, the
Yonsohene, since the two
customary offices had been fused
and were therefore one and the
same customary office.”
The National House of Chiefs
went on to disbelieve the claims
of the 8th defendant
that he had been customarily
enstooled the Yonsohene because
in 1986, he had accompanied the
1st plaintiff, Nana
Yeboah Kodieh Asare III, to
swear the oath of allegiance to
Nana Jamasihene as the
Benkumhene of Jamasi. Then in
1994 the elders of Yonso, made
up of the Krontihene,
Akwamuhene, Adontenhene,
Manwerehene, Twafohene,
Akyeamehene, all of Yonso, swore
the oath of allegiance to the 1st
plaintiff as Yonsohene.
On 30th May 1994, the
overlord of the parties, the
Jamasihene Nana Adu Gyamfi
Brobbey III, wrote Exhibit J to
confirm the status of the 1st
plaintiff as the Yonsohene, and
also that:
“In exercise of my right as
overlord of all stools in Yonso
and with the concurrence of all
members of the Jamasi Divisional
Council, the occupant of the
Asona Royal Stool of Yonso was
elevated by me to head the
Benkum wing of the Jamasi
Divisional Area and Yonsohene.
The above action was taken in order
to fill the vacuum left by the
Yonso Bretuo Bedomasi Royal
Family‘s withdrawal of
allegiance to the Adu Gyamfi
Stool of Jamasi over 25 years
ago contrary to established
custom.”
Throwing more light on what led to
the facts in this appeal, the
record has it that the President
of the Jamasi Divisional
Council, Nana Adu Gyamfi Brobbey
III wrote further in Exhibit J
that:
(e) That for more than 25 years, and
prior to his abdication and in
clear breach of his oath of
allegiance, the ex-Yonsohene
Baffour Kofi Kwarteng III cut
his customary links with the Adu
Gyamfi Bretuo Stoo of Jamasi by
refusing to serve the Jamasihene
directly albeit contrary to
established custom. The Mampong
Traditional Council has already
decided that Yonsohene cannot
serve the Silver Stool directly
except through Jamasihene his
overlord.
(f) That throughout the rebellion of
the Yonso Bedomasi Bretuo family
against the Jamasi Stool, all
the other Asafohene in Yonso
remained loyal to the Jamasi
Stool in accordance with
established custom.
(g) That in my characteristic long
suffering and patient approach
to problems I waited for over
25years, for the Yonso Bedomasi
Bretuo Royal Family to repent
and prevail upon the occupant of
their Royal Stool to remedy the
breach of his oath of allegiance
sworn to me.
(h) Since the above situation could
not prevail for ever and for the
reasons stated above, the title
of Benkumhene and Yonsohene have
for some now been bestowed upon
the Asona Royal Family and the
occupant of its Stool, Nana
Yeboah-Kodie Asare II, following
his swearing of the oath of
allegiance to me.”
The appellate National House of
Chiefs went on to state that
the evidence on record showed
that the Judicial Committee of
the Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs accepted it that the
title of Yonsohene was
customarily and properly
conferred on the 1st
plaintiff by the Jamasihene.
In consideration of the evidence
before us, it was difficult to
find any fault with the decision
by the National House of Chiefs
in its decision now under appeal
before us.
The prevailing custom in Ashanti was
that it is the prerogative of an
undisputed overlord incumbent
chief to elevate a deserving and
appropriate sub-chief to another
status.
A careful reading of the evidence on
record shows that the Jamasehene
did only confer the title on the
1st plaintiff but not
in any rash manner; he did it
after having waited for a period
of about twenty-five years when
efforts to reconcile himself and
Nana Kofi Kwarteng III failed to
produce the desired results. As
the chiefly office could not
reasonably be left empty for
that length of time, the
overlord chief exercised his
customary prerogative and filled
the vacuum by doing the
reasonable thing under the
prevailing circumstances, to
wit, by conferring the title on
the person most deserving of it
– he conferred it on the
Nkotokuasehene. He did not
purport to wrest a right
customarily reserved unto one
stool and bestowed or conferred
it on an undeserving stool. He
only bestowed the title on the
occupant of a stool that
exhibited unalloyed loyalty to
him.
I am of the opinion that the
Jamasehene could hardly be
accused of, or was guilty of any
rash, unconstitutional,
undemocratic conduct; especially
when by his action he did not
exercise his choice by picking
from outside the family
customarily entitled to occupy
that office. He did what he did
for the wing that should aid him
in administering affairs in the
traditional area had refused to
function as was customarily
expected of it so brazingly and
without the least show of
repentance all over a long
period of time – a quarter of a
century. How could any
traditional area function
customarily in that manner? A
customary overlord worthy of
that name and title ought to
move in a swift effective manner
to put things in the right
manner, for that was the right
and perfect way to rule a state
in the customary sense of the
word. It is by this that the
customary constitutional
relationship in a state should
or ought to be.
For the above reasons we are of the
view that the Judicial Committee
of the National House of chiefs
was right in their decision
under appeal before us;
consequently, I affirm their
decision and dismiss the appeal.
(SGD) J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT
ANIN YEBOAH
JSC.
I had the
privilege of reading beforehand
the two opinions of my esteemed
brothers. I am of the opinion
that the appeal from the
National House of Chiefs to this
Court be dismissed. I therefore
support the opinion of the
President of this Court.
(SGD) ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
ASANTE
KROBEA ESQ. FOR THE
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/
APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS.
KWEKU
PAINTSIL ESQ. FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS. |