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RULING
SOPHIA A.B. AKUFFO, J.S.C.:
This is a motion praying for an
Order of Certiorari quashing the
ruling delivered on 6th June,
1997, by the High Court Judge,
Bolgatanga, in Originating
Summons No. 1/1996. In his
Statement of Case in Opposition
to the application herein,
Counsel for the Interested Party
has raised a preliminary point
of law challenging the
competency of the motion. The
basis for the preliminary point
is simple, though fundamental,
and it is that the application
is out of time and, therefore,
not in compliance with Rule 62
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996
(C.I. 16). Consequently, it is
necessary for us to deal first
with this preliminary point of
law, since, in the event it is
valid, there will be no need for
us to embark upon the merits of
the application itself.
According to the said Statement
of Case, the application is out
of time because although the
decision sought to be quashed
was delivered on 6th June, 1997,
the motion herein was filed on
14th November, 1997. These
dates are borne out by the
record.
Rules 61 to 66 of C.I. 16 govern
the procedure for invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court. Rule 62 is quite clear
and it succinctly sets out, as
follows, the time limits within
which applications invoking the
jurisdiction may be brought:—
“An application to invoke the
supervisory jurisdiction of the
Court shall be filed within
three months of the date of the
decision against which the
jurisdiction is invoked unless
the time is extended by the
Court.”
Additionally, Rule 66 further
clarifies the matter of time
limits in the following manner:—
“An application for the
extension of time within which
to invoke the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Court under
Rule 62 shall not be made after
the expiration of the three
months period within which an
application seeking to invoke
the supervisory jurisdiction may
be filed.”
The combined effect of these
provisions is so clear as to
require no lengthy
expatriation. Suffice it to say
that, by these provisions, a
party seeking to invoke our
supervisory jurisdiction must
file his application within the
stipulated time, unless we have
specifically extended that time
for him, which extension must
have been obtained within the
same three months period. Thus
our discretion to adjust the
time frame is tightly limited to
extensions for which application
is made within time. For the
purposes of invoking our
supervisory jurisdiction, time
is, clearly, a crucial factor,
with which an applicant cannot
be, and is not, permitted by the
Rules to play around as he
pleases. Therefore, any
application for our supervisory
jurisdiction, which is filed
after the stipulated three
months, without our express (and
one might add, valid) order for
extension of time, would not be
an application properly before
us. An application, which is
not properly before us, is for
all legal intents and purposes
non-existent and we would have
no jurisdiction to consider it.
The instant application ought to
have been filed on or before 6th
September, 1997. Otherwise,
before 6th September, 1997, the
applicant ought to have obtained
from us an extension of the time
within which to file the
application. Thus, there is no
doubt that the application
before us is woefully and
incurably incompetent and we
have absolutely no jurisdiction
to hear it. For that reason, it
must be struck out.
E. K. WIREDU
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. K. B. AMPIAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
F. Y. KPEGAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
E. D. K. ADJABENG
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
S. A. B. AKUFFO (MS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
E. ANSAH-OBIRI FOR THE
RESPONDENT
APPLICANT AND COUNSEL ABSENT |
