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RULING

JOYCE BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C:

The brief facts of this case are that the Plaintiff was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), by the President in accordance with Article 232(2) of the 1992 Constitution on the 6th July 1993 till 28th August 1999 when he was removed from office in accordance with Articles 236 and 146 of the Constitution. Under Article 236 the procedure for the removal of the Deputy chairman of NCCE shall be the same as provided for the removal of a Justice of the High Court under Article 146(1) which says

"A Justice of the Superior Court or a chairman of the Regional Tribunal shall not be removed from office except for stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on ground of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind".

The procedure provided for the removal of a High Court Judge was that when the President receives a petition for the removal of a High Court Judge or Chairman of a Regional Tribunal he refer same to the Chief Justice whose duty it is to determine whether there is a prima facie case or not.

If there is, the Chief Justice is empowered to set up a Committee to investigate the allegation of 'stated misbehaviour' against the person accused and then, if proved, to make final recommendation to the Chief Justice who would then forward same to the President.

Article 146(9) says:—

"The President shall in each case, act in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee".

In this case the President received a petition containing complaints of stated misbehaviours against the Plaintiff and consequently the requisite procedure referred to above was set in motion. The Justice George Acquah Committee i.e. 2nd Defendant herein, was appointed which investigated the alleged stated misbehaviour and thereafter made findings of fact and recommendations to the President on account of which the Plaintiff was removed from office.

The Plaintiff took action against the Defendants by the invocation of the exclusive original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 130(1) (a) seeking an interpretation of Articles 146(1) and 236 of the Constitution. The various reliefs sought are contained in 16 paragraphs of the writ. In my view two of those reliefs are pertinent here, namely:

(1) A declaration that by the combined effect of Articles 146(1), (3) and (5) and 236 of the Constitution, and by their proper interpretation the standards set for the removal of a constitutionally appointed office holder such as The Deputy Chairman, National Commission for Civic Education, is a high Constitutional standard that is implied by the “stated misbehaviour” incompetence and ground of inability to perform the function of his office arising from infirmity of body and mind” and that this high standard should be the yardstick for assessing any allegation of “stated misbehaviour” levelled against Plaintiff and not an ordinary connotation of the word “misbehaviour”.

(2) A declaration that without any stated recourse or resort to Appeal or review the procedure used for obtaining the removal of Superior Court Judges or constitutionally appointed persons such as plaintiff is dangerous enough…as to defeat the good intentions which the framers of the Constitution had in mind when they inserted this provisions of ‘Article 146 in the Constitution.”

In paragraph 13, plaintiff asked for an order

“Nullifying the said Instrument of Revocation of (Plaintiff’s) appointment and declaring any such purported removal from office as unlawful and not in accordance with Article 146(9) of the 1992 4th Republic Constitution”, and further in paragraph 16:

“Damages or compensation for the public embarrassment mental torture, defamation act of intimidation, threat that the Plaintiff has suffered from the unlawful and unconstitutional attempt to remove him from office as Deputy Chairman of the 3rd Defendant Commission".

It is quite evident from the above quoted paragraphs 13 and 16 of the Plaintiffs Writ that his claim is for unlawful removal from office and he is therefore asking for the nullification of his removal, and reinstatement plus damages.

A motion on notice of intention to raise a Preliminary objection was filed by the 4th Defendant namely:

"The plaintiff's action has improperly invoked the Original Jurisdiction of this Court because it raises matters (issues) outside the ambit of this Honourable Court's Original Jurisdiction and therefore this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear the case in exercise of the Original jurisdiction of the Court".

The issue then is does such a matter fall within the Original Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 130(1) of the Constitution.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is contained in Article 129(1), namely Original Jurisdiction. Appellant Jurisdiction, Supervisory jurisdiction Review Jurisdiction and reference jurisdiction see, Article 129(1), 130(1), 131, 132, 133 and 130(2).

The Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) can properly be invoked to interpret and enforce the provisions of the Constitution and it is a special exclusive jurisdiction meant to be exercised in suits raising genuine and real issues involving interpretation of the provision of the constitution, its enforcement and a question whether an enactment was properly made intra vires the powers Parliament or other authority or person by law or under the Constitution see the case of Baffour Kwame Fante Aduamoah II and 6 others v. Nana Gyakorang Adu Twum II Suit No. 3/94 dated 9th February 2000 (unreported) SC.

Where it was stated as follows:

"This special jurisdiction is not meant to usurp or to be resorted to in place of any of the jurisdictions of a lower court in other words, where our said jurisdiction has been invoked in an action which properly falls within a particular cause of action at a lower court this Court shall refuse to assume jurisdiction in that action, notwithstanding the fact that it has been presented as an interpretation and or enforcement suit. For a large number of actions which fall within specific causes of action can be presented in the form of interpretation and/or enforcement of actions".

This point was reiterated further by the Supreme Court in the case of Nana Sarpong Gyamfi v. Nana Kwaku Dakore II Writ No. 1/99 dated 9th February 2000 (unreported), and a chieftaincy case couched as a constitutional case was therefore dismissed.

See also earlier case of Republic v. Maikankan (1971) 2GLR 473 at 478 per Edmund Bannerman CJ to the effect that if in the opinion of the lower court the answer to a submission is clear and unambiguous on the face of the provisions of the Constitution or laws of the Ghana, no reference need be made to the Supreme Court since no question of interpretation arises and a person who disagree with or is aggrieved by the Ruling of the lower Court has his remedy by the normal way of Appeal if he so chooses.

The same issue was discussed in the case of Yiadom I v. Amaniampong (1981) GLR 3 SC where Apaloo C.J said at p.8, "The plain truth of the matter is that the Original Jurisdiction of this Court has been wrongly invoked... Perhaps we should point out at least for the benefit of the profession that where the issue sought to be decided is clear and not resolvable by interpretation we will firmly resist any invitation to pronounce on the meaning of Constitutional provisions..."

The question then is does thus a matter fall within the Supreme Court's interpretative jurisdiction under Article 130(1) of the Constitution? If not this Court would decline jurisdiction.

In the case of Tait v. Ghana Airways Corporation (1970) 2G&G 527 the Court while interpreting Article 106 of the 1969 Constitution which is in pari materia with Article 130 of the 1992 Constitution found that the plaintiffs' case was one of wrongful dismissal case and therefore the Court rejected same saying:

"We have already held that on its true construction and having regard to the issues settled the plaintiff's action is essentially one of wrongful dismissal and does not therefore fall within the ambit of Article 106(1) (a) ... since our original jurisdiction is limited to Article 106 we are driven to the conclusion that this Court is not seized with jurisdiction to try this Suit as a Court of first instance".

The interpretative original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusively meant for the interpretation of the Constitution which does not sit as a Court of first instance or on Appeal. Other lower Courts are designated for these purposes under the Constitution, the Courts Act, as well as other laws.

The Tait case was approved and followed by a number of other cases see Gbedemah v. Awoonor-Williams (1970) G and G 438, as well as later cases like Baffour Kwame Fante Aduamoah II vrs. Nana Gyakorang Adu Twum II Suit No. 3/94 dated 9/2/2000 (unreported) and Nana Sarpong Gyamfi vrs. Nana Kwaku Dakore II Writ No. 1/99 dated 9th February 2000. SC (unreported).

The above cited cases as well as others provide useful guides as to which cases are proper constitutional interpretation cases. Particularly, see In Rep. Vs. Special Tribunal Ex-Parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592. CA. where the Court after considering relevant authorities on the issue as to which cases are proper enforcement or interpretation matters under Article 118(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution which is in pari materia with Article 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution said that the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution arises in certain circumstances namely:

(a) Where the words of the Statue are imprecise, unclear, or ambiguous, put in another way it would arise if one party invited the Court to declare that the words of the Article had a double meaning or were obscure or else meant something different from or more than what they said; the Statute have a double meaning or is obscure or else means something different from or more than what they say;

(b) Where rival meanings are placed by the litigants on the words of any provision of the Constitution;

(c) Where there is a conflict in meaning and effect of two or more Article of the Constitution and the question was raised as to which provision should prevail; and

(d) Where on the face of the provisions there was a conflict between the operation of particular institutions set up under the constitution…

Also where the submission made related to no more than a proper application of the provisions of the Constitution to the facts in issue that was a matter for the trial Court to deal with.

Clearly I find that from the facts and circumstances of this case as well as the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiffs that even though his case is couched in Constitutional garb it is essentially a case for reinstatement as Deputy Chairman of (NCCE) which matter does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court under 130(1)(a) of the Constitution. Further this Court is not sitting as an Appellate Court in this matter and would not userp the appellate jurisdiction of a lower Court clothed with the proper jurisdiction.

The plaintiff’s arguments in support of his case is mainly that the proper standard of proof or weight to be put on the words “stated misbehaviour” under Article 146 (1) by 2nd Defendant should be of a high standard and should be understood to mean “gross misbehaviour” since it is not any ordinary ‘misbehaviour’ which is implied. This argument should have been canvassed before the 2nd Defendant committee at the hearing, before coming to its findings and recommendations. It is not a matter for the Supreme Court to consider under Article 130 despite the fact that is has been made out as a constitutional interpretation matter. The plaintiff is really challenging the findings of fact and recommendation of the Justice George Acquah Committee as a nullity in order to get a reinstatement and the proper forum is the Court of Appeal, not the Supreme Court.

See the plaintiff’s statement of case filed on 19th March 2002, where he states as follows:

“Plaintiff therefore wishes to seek the indulgence of the Honourable Supreme Court to declare the Report of 2nd Defendant Committee Null and Void and unfit to be used as a basis for Constitutional impeachment”

In other words the Plaintiff is seeking an appeal of the recommendation of the 2nd Defendant committee and he should exercise his right of appeal provided under the Constitution. Article 295(1) of the Constitution provides that:

“Commission of inquiry 'includes a Committee of inquiry”. Therefore Chapter 23 and Article 278 applies to committees of inquiry as also Article 280(2) which says that:

“Where a Commission of inquiry makes an adverse findings against any person, the report of the Commission of inquiry shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be the judgment of the High Court and accordingly an appeal shall lie as of right from the findings of the commission to the Court of Appeal”

This article clearly specifies the forum of Appeal for the Plaintiff as the Court of Appeal.

See Fawkes vrs. Accra Brewery Ltd. (1981) GLR 489 at 490. H.C. And Dankwah vrs. Republic (1981) GLR 241 CA

For the above reasons I am of the opinion that our jurisdiction has been wrongly invoked and the Preliminary objection succeeds. This action ought to be dismissed.

J.A. BAMFORD-ADDO (MRS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

AFREH, J.S.C.:

I agree

D.K. AFREH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

BADDOO, J.S.C.:

I agree.

S.G. BADDOO

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

DR. TWUM, J.S.C.:

I agree.

DR. S. TWUM

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

ADZOE, J.S.C.:

The Plaintiff, Dr, Jacob Emmanuel Oppong, was appointed on 9th July, 1993 as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission for Civic Education. It is a commission which the 1992 Constitution has provided for in Article 231. Its membership consists of a Chairman, two Deputy Chairmen and four other members, all appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Council of State.

Functions of the Commission:

The Commission's functions are, inter alia,

(1) to create and sustain within the society the awareness of the principles and objectives of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the people of Ghana;

(2) to educate and encourage the public to defend the Constitution at all times, against all forms of abuse and violation;

(3) to formulate for consideration of Government, from time to time, programmes at the national, regional and district levels aimed at realising the objectives of the Constitution;

(4) to formulate, implement and oversee programmes intended to inculcate in the citizens of Ghana awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people; and perform

(5) such other functions as Parliament may prescribe.

Terms and Conditions of service:

As regards the terms and conditions of service of members of the Commission, Article 235 provides that a Deputy Chairman of the Commission shall enjoy the same terms and conditions of service as a Justice of the High Court. Accordingly Article 236 also provides that the procedure for the removal of a Deputy Chairman of the Commission from office shall be the same as that provided for the removal of a Justice of the High Court under the Constitution.

The High Court forms part of the Superior Courts of Judicature which also include the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the Regional Tribunals (Article 126); and when Article 146(1) stipulates that a Justice of the Superior Court "shall not be removed from office except for stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on ground of inability to perform the functions of his office arising from infirmity of body or mind", the plaintiff as Deputy Chairman of the Commission is also covered by this provision - the cumulative effect of Articles 235, 236 and 146(1).

The procedure laid down in the Constitution for removal is in Article 146(2) to (11) which, by virtue of Article 236, must be applied in the case of the plaintiff also. It is this:

i. There must be a petition to the President for plaintiff's removal from office; and on receipt of the President must refer the petition to the Chief Justice who will determine whether there is a prima facie case - Article 146(3).

ii  Where the Chief Justice decides that there is a prima facie case, he will set up a committee consisting of three Justices of the superior courts appointed by the Judicial Council and two others appointed by the Chief Justice on the advice of the council of state - Article 146(3)

iii  the Committee will investigate the complaint and make recommendations to the Chief Justice and the Chief Justice will then forward the said recommendation to the President - Article 146(5).

iv The President shall cut in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee.

The NCCE office:

The plaintiff ostensibly found the atmosphere in the NCCE office not at all tranquil. He might have had problems with some junior staff and his colleague members of the commission; and in a petition dated 21st January, 1999, to the President, the Chairman of the Commission, the 4th defendant herein, asked for the removal of the plaintiff as the Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

The Committee of inquiry and its work.

In due course a Committee was set up to investigate the complaints made against the plaintiff. The Committee was chaired by His Lordship G.K. Acquah, a Justice of the Supreme Court. The Committee took evidence from ten witnesses including Mr. Larry Bimi, the 4th defendant herein and the plaintiff in respect of the charges levelled against the plaintiff. These charges were that: (1) the plaintiff "misbehaved by refusing to accept the authority of the chairman of the Commission [NCCE] and refusing to swap offices which acts amounted to insubordination and prejudicial to the effective and efficient performance of the functions of the commission"; and (2) that the plaintiff misbehaved by making inappropriate sexual advances towards Georgina Barnes, an employee of the NCCE which conduct is "unbecoming of your office". The Committee accepted the evidence against the plaintiff on the two charges and made the following recommendations in their reports:

"RECOMMENDATIONS

We therefore recommend that for the proper and smooth performance of the functions of the NCCE, Dr. Oppong ought to be removed from office".

The Committee's report was dated 16/8/99 and signed by all five members of the Committee.

Removal.

According to the plaintiff he heard of his removal from office by the President in an announcement on Radio Ghana on 28th August, 1999. He also read the same news story in the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times on 29th August, 1999. What he heard on the radio and read in the newspapers was in his own words to the effect that:

"The President has removed Dr. J.E. Oppong as Deputy Chairman of the National Commission for Civic Education. This was on the recommendation of a 5-member committee set up by the Chief Justice to investigate various misbehaviours on the part of Dr. Oppong".

The plaintiff himself quotes the above announcement in paragraph 6 of his statement of case filed on 10/3/2000.

What plaintiff was expected to do.

Article 295(1) of the Constitution states that a commission of inquiry includes a committee of inquiry. This definition is very crucial in the context of the instant suit in view of the fact that the plaintiff has chosen to issue a writ challenging his removal instead of appealing against the proceedings before the committee and its recommendations. It is provided in Article 280(2) of the Constitution that where a commission of inquiry makes adverse findings against any person, the report of the commission shall be deemed to be the judgment of the High Court and accordingly an appeal shall lie as of right from the findings of the commission to the Court of Appeal.

According to Article 280(5)(a) the finding of a commission shall only have effect as a judgment of the High Court six months after the finding is made and announced to the public, and after the said six months the person against whom the findings is made now has three months within which to lodge his appeal; or the appeal may be lodged within such other time as the High Court or the Court of appeal may, be special leave and on such conditions as it may consider just, allow - Article 280(6).

What do these provisions mean? In my opinion they mean first, that the Committee which investigated the complaints made against the plaintiff must be considered to be a Commission of inquiry as described in the Constitution with all its functions and procedures as set out in the Constitution; secondly they mean that the plaintiff has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; thirdly, they mean that the finding made against the plaintiff should be regarded as a High Court decision six months after the date of publication, namely 28th August, 1999 which, by calculation, would take us to the 28th February, 2000; thereafter, within three months - ie. by the end of May, 2000, the plaintiff could exercise his right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against the finding made against him by the committee of inquiry. Even after May 2000, the plaintiff could apply to the High Court or the Court of Appeal for special leave to appeal against the finding of the Committee.

It is unfortunate that the plaintiff did not even wait to allow the committee's finding to metamorphose into a judgment of the High Court so as to enable him exercise his right of appeal before issuing the writ in the present case on 25th February, 2000. It appears the plaintiff did not have any intention to appeal against the committee's decision. His Counsel does not even agree that the committee which investigated the allegations made against the plaintiff could be properly considered as a commission of inquiry notwithstanding the definition contained in Article 295(1) of the Constitution that in this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires ... "Commission of inquiry" includes a committee of inquiry: His argument as stated in his written submission to court concludes thus:

"All of these attributes of a Commission of Inquiry did not apply to the 2nd Defendant committee as plaintiff's affidavit challenging the record of proceedings has shown".

"We respectively submit, therefore, that the 2nd Defendant Committee was NOT a committee inquiry or a committee of Inquiry as understood as a 'Term of Art' in the 1992 Constitution. It was, therefore, NOT equivalent in rank to a High Court......"

When the Constitution enacts that the committee is a commission and its finding shall "be deemed to be the judgment of the High Court", the argument of counsel pales into mere sophistic chicanery which I cannot accept. The points I have so far noted have a grave impact on the action instituted by the plaintiff and the preliminary objection taken by the 4th defendant.

The plaintiff's claim.

In the writ issued on 25:2:2000, the plaintiff is seeking, inter alia, thirteen (13) declaratory reliefs, reinstatement and damages or compensation. I wish I could reproduce all the reliefs verbatim but that is as difficult as it is difficult to summarise them one by one because each of them is set out in such a prolix language that to quote them will be tedious and time-consuming whiles they also defy any comprehensible précis.

You need to read them only to conclude that the entire speaks for itself. The action is essentially and substantially a claim for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff’s grievances are directed mainly at the decision reached by the 2nd defendant Committee of Inquiry. According to the plaintiff the interpretation put by that committee on “stated misbehaviour” was wrong; it was a result of the said wrong interpretation that the Committee found him guilty of the charges and recommended to the President that his (the plaintiff’s) appointment should be revoked; that the charges levelled against him were not the type of acts contemplated by the Constitution as “misbehaviour” warranting his removal from office; the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction, or scope of authority; he also wants an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from removing him from office; he wants to be reinstated and wants damages or compensation for the embarrassment caused to him by his purported removal from the NCCE.

To summarise it all, the plaintiff must be understood to be saying that the Committee of Inquiry had wrongly found him guilty when there was no evidence that he had committed offences that could properly be said to amount to “stated misbehaviour” under the Constitution and, therefore, his removal from office was not lawful. This argument, on analysis, is only another way of saying that the Committee of inquiry made an error of substantive law in holding that the actions allegedly proved to have been committed by the plaintiff amounted to the type of  “misbehaviour” contemplated by the constitution to justify the removal from office of a person in the position of the plaintiff. As can be gathered from the plaintiff’s statement of case the standards set for the removal of a constitutionally appointed office-holder such as that of the Deputy Chairman, National Committee for Civic Education, is a high Constitutional standard that is implied by the "stated misbehaviour" and that this high standard should be the yardstick for assessing any allegations of "stated misbehaviour", levelled against plaintiff and not an ordinary connotation of the word misbehaviour" but that the committee of inquiry did not apply or use the high constitutional standard for impeachment required by the framers of the constitution to determine whether these grounds for removal of superior court judges has been flouted.

The objection: The objection raised by the 4th defendant reads:

"Plaintiffs action has improperly invoked the original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court because it raises matters (issues) outside the ambit of this Honourable court has no jurisdiction to hear the case in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court".

If the Court upholds the objection, that would be the death-knell of the plaintiff's action. But the plaintiff does not want a still-born action and is, therefore, resisting the objection. One of his arguments is that because both the invitation to the plaintiff to appear before the committee of inquiry and the report submitted by the committee on the matter to the President were captioned "in the matter of removal from office ... in accordance with Article 236 and 146(3), (4) and (5) of the Constitution", the expression "in accordance with the constitution" makes the suit a constitutional suit as the question for determination is "whether or not the removal of plaintiff from office by the Execution was truly done in accordance with the Constitution". I have no doubt in my mind that this argument is untenable. This suit must derive its constitutional character from the provisions of Article 2(1) of the Constitution which read as follows:—

2(1) A person who alleges that—

(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done, under the authority of that or any other enactment; or

(b) an act or omission of any person;

is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.

The declaration to be sought in the Supreme Court under Article 2(1) is either that:

(a) an enactment is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of the Constitution, or

(b) anything contained in or done under the said enactment is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of the Constitution or

(c)  any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of the Constitution.

And Article 2(1) must be understood to mean that it is for such a declaration alone that a person may "bring an action" in the Supreme Court.

The original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 130(1) must therefore be strictly limited to the area of litigation defined by Article 2(1), which must always be read together with the said Article 130(1) which defines the court's original jurisdiction to be in

(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and

(b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.

The Supreme Court has, therefore, consistently insisted that for a party to invoke the Original jurisdiction of the court the action must raise a real and genuine issue of interpretation. See Baafour Kwame Fante Aduamoah II & Ors v. Nana Gyakorang Adu Twum II (unreported Suit No. 3/94 - judgment dated 9/2/2000). The plaintiff must show clearly that the question at issue can only be resolved by an interpretation of the constitution. There may be cases where some provision of the constitution could come into focus barely incidentally without having any direct impact on the dispute between the parties, with the result that the court is not obliged to interpret the Constitutional provision in order to determine the matter in controversy.

Indeed the mere fact that a plaintiff has raised some incidental constitutional issue should not make his case a constitutional case within the meaning of Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitutional - see the cases of Yiadom I v. Amaniampong (1981) GLR 3 and Edusei v. Attorney-General (1996-97) SCGLR 1. The opinion was expressed in Rep. V. Naikankan (1971) 2 GLR 473 that a lower court can apply a provision of the Constitution if the provision is clear and unambiguous on the face of it and no question of constitutional interpretation arises. If the language of the provision is clear, precise and unambiguous, no interpretation arises and the court is to give effect to that provision; and when the committee of inquiry, chaired by a justice of the Supreme Court assisted by two other judges of the Superior courts of judicature sat to decide on the allegations made against the plaintiff in the petition referred to the committee, which decision involved the application to the facts before them of a provision of the Constitution that was relevant to the determination of the case, the law as interpreted by the committee in reaching its decision must be taken as the law so far as the dispute between the parties is concerned. If the law as declared by the Committee appeared erroneous to the plaintiff herein, he had the opportunity to avail himself of his right of appeal, failing which he must forever hold his peace with regard to the committee's decision.

The plaintiff's contention that "stated misbehaviour" should be construed to mean "gross misbehaviour" because the Constitution must be taken to intend that a high standard should be the yardstick for assessing any allegations of "stated misbehaviour" in Article 146(1) is mere wishful thinking. Where the words of a statute are clear there is no room for applying any principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity. See Croxford v. Universal Insurance Co. (1936) 2 KB 253, at 280; and Patu-Styles v. amoo Lamptey (1984-86) 2 GLR 644 at 691 where Taylor J.S.C. said:

"Where words are clear and unambiguous the fundamental rule is that they need not be interpreted or construed. They are given effect to".

Otherwise stated, the principle is that (as expressed by Anin J.A.) unless the words of an Article of the Constitution are imprecise and ambiguous an issue of interpretation does not arise - see Tait v. Ghana Airways Corp. (1970) 3 ALR (all African Law Reports) 249. The same idea was implicit in the words of Bowen L.J. when he said that when the meaning of a statutory provision "is unequivocally expressed, the necessity for rules of construction disappears and reaches its vanishing point". See London & N.W. Rly Co. v. Evans (1983) 1 Ch. 16. at 27.

If the framers of the Constitution had intended "gross misbehaviour" and not mere "misbehaviour" they would have said so, and not having said that a person in the position of the plaintiff could only be removed from office for "gross misbehaviour" the plaintiff's argument calling for an interpretation to that effect cannot be sustained.

A careful study of the plaintiff's claim leaves no doubt that all he is claiming is, in his own words, a declaration that his "purported removal from office is wrongful..." even though he has not denied, and cannot deny, that the laid down constitutional procedure for his removal was rigidly complied with. I am also of the opinion that the claim raises no constitutional issue to warrant the invocation of the court's original jurisdiction. I accordingly uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the action.

T.K. ADZOE

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

COUNSEL

Mr. Ward-Brew appearing for plaintiff.

Mrs. M.C. Quansah for 1st & 2nd Defendants with Sylvia Adusah, State Attorney.

Mr. Samuel Cojoe for 3rd Defendant.

Mr. Abrose Derry for 4th Defendant.

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