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UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF GHANA 2019

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D. 2019

                                               

 

JAMES KWABENA BOMFEH JNR. VRS ATTORNEY GENERAL WRIT NO. J1/14/2017 23RD JANUARY, 2019

 

CORAM

ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC (PRESIDING) DOTSE, JSC, YEBOAH, JSC, GBADEGBE, JSC,AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), JSC, BENIN, JSC, MARFUL-SAU, JSC

 

 

Constitutional law - interpretation - 1992 Constitution - Articles 2(1) and 130(1) - Articles 258(1)(a) and (b) and 265 – Public land - Public interest -  Whether or not the Government of Ghana possess the legal authority to grant or allocate any public  Lland -  Whether or not Plaintiff’s case raises an issue for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution - Whether or not the establishment and operations of the Hajj Board by the Government and Government support for and/or involvement in the Ghana National Cathedral Project are unconstitutional or amount to an unconstitutional entanglement by the State with religion - Whether this case discloses a genuine or real interpretative issue - Whether the original interpretative jurisdiction of this Court has been properly invoked.

 

HEADNOTES

 

The instant suit is a public interest (constitutional) action wherein the Plaintiff requests this Honourable Court to conclude that by the letter, spirit and core values of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the Republic of Ghana must recognize, respect, safeguard and promote the formal equality of all religions practiced in Ghana, and to that end, must not confer benefits on one religion to the exclusion of others. Secondly, the Plaintiff submits that Ghana is committed to the value of “freedom of religion, belief and conscience” which can only be realized if the State recognizes the formal equality of all religions practiced in Ghana. it is the humble submission of the Plaintiff that upon a careful examination of the text and spirit of the Constitution as well as core values, principles and concepts that undergird our constitutional framework the Republic of Ghana is a secular state with no state or official religion. Consequently, the Republic of Ghana is constitutionally required to stay indifferent to or show balance in dealing with all faiths and non-faiths. A fortiori, it is constitutionally impermissible for the Government of Ghana to confer any benefits, advantages or privileges on one religion to the exclusion of other religions. The Attorney-General [AG] submits that the Plaintiff’s case does not raise an issue for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution and for that matter there is absolutely no cause of action.  The AG submits further that there is no constitutional issue that is legitimately raised around the authority of the President to allocate land for the construction of the National Cathedral by relying on article 257(1) that vests all public lands in the President on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of Ghana. The A-G contends that the President acted within his constitutional right to allocate public land for a specific purpose in the public interest

 

HELD

In respect of articles 258(1) and (2), and 265, which form the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim in Relief 1, the provisions are also clear and unambiguous and the President in whom all public lands are vested by virtue of Article 257(1) can deal directly with public lands through the appropriate Ministry as was done in this case. From the foregoing, we do not find the existence of a genuine issue for interpretation in the constitutional provisions relied on for the institution of an action under articles 2(1) and 130(1). The Plaintiff’s invitation is therefore refused

The Lands Commission though an independent body is to work “in co-ordination with the relevant public agencies and governmental bodies” in managing public lands (Article .258 (1). The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the allocation of the land was done without the involvement of the Lands Commission. The only evidence proffered is that it is the Minister responsible for Lands and Natural Resources who has been handling and communicating on matters relating to the land. Without any evidence to the contrary we presume everything was regularly done by the President acting through the appropriate ministry to allocate the land in question for the construction of the National Cathedral, which when completed was to be used for public purposes by all denominations From the foregoing we do not find any constitutional issue that is legitimately raised around the constitutional authority of the President to allocate the land for the purpose stated. Accordingly the Plaintiff fails the test for us to assume jurisdiction on the claim.

We see reliefs (3) and (4) as setting out the particulars of the acts of the government which the Plaintiff alleges are excessive entanglements in religion and therefore invite a declaration that such acts are unconstitutional. These reliefs raise enforcement issues and this Court has a duty to consider these claims regardless of the words used or the manner in which the reliefs are couched. We will therefore reject the A-G’s invitation to throw out in limine the Plaintiff’s case.

It is our considered opinion that the acts complained of i.e. the construction of the National Cathedral and the setting up of the Hajj Board does not contravene the guarantees of the freedom of religion and manifestation of beliefs of the people of Ghana. The State is free to lend support or aid to a religious group if it deems such beneficence to be for the good of the nation.

Accordingly we hold that the acts complained of do not infringe the constitutional provisions relied on by the Plaintiff. In conclusion, we do not see a legitimate question of constitutional interpretation and enforcement such as would justify our exercising our original jurisdiction under articles 2 (1) or 130(1) of the Constitution. The Plaintiff’s action fails. It is therefore dismissed

STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT

1992 Constitution

CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT

Adjei-Ampofo v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly & Attorney-General (No.1) [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 610,

Federation of Youth Association of Ghana (FEDYAG) v. Public Universities of Ghana & Others [2010] SCGLR 265

SAMUEL OKUDZETO ABLAKWA,DR. EDWARD KOFI OMANE BOAMAH V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,HON. JAKE OTANKA OBETSEBI-LAMPTEY WRIT J1 / 4 / 200922/05 /2012.

Kor v Attorney- General & Justice Douse [2015-2016] 1 SGLR 114 at 121

Mayor Agbleze & 2 Ors v The Attorney General & the Electoral Commission, Suit No J1/28/2018 SC dated 28th November 2018

Danso v. Daaduam II & Another [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1570 at 1574,

Bimpong Buta v General Legal Council & ors [2003-2004] SCGLR 1200,

Edusei v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 1.

REPUBLIC v. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE AKOSAH [1980] GLR  592-608 KOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL & JUSTICE DUOSE [2015- 2016] 1 SCGLR

National Democratic Congress v Electoral Commission [2001-2002] SCGLR 954 @ 958

Adjei Ampofo v. Attorney-General [2003-2004] SCGLR 411,

Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General and another (Abban Case) [2003-2004]  SCGLR 250 at 266 to 267

Tuffour v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637

 

BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT

 

DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT

ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC: -

COUNSEL

AZIZ BAMBA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

GODFRIED YEBOAH DAME, DEPUTY ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE DEFENDANT WITH HIM MRS. HELEN ZEWU, SOLICITOR GENERAL, SYLVESTER WILLIAMS, CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY, GRACE OPPONG, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY, MS. YVONNE BANNERMAN, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY, MODESTA LEGIPO, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY AND ORIEL ASARE BOATENG, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

ADINYIRA (MRS.), JSC: -

The Plaintiff brings this action in his capacity as a citizen of Ghana to seek the interpretation and/or enforcement of provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana pursuant to articles 2(1) and 130(1) thereof, claiming the following reliefs:

1.     A declaration that upon a true, combined and contextual interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, particularly articles 258(1)(a) and (b) and 265 thereof, the Government of Ghana does not possess the legal authority to grant or allocate any public land, and consequently the decision of the Government of Ghana to allocate or grant 6.323 Ha of the public lands of Ghana for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral to serve as Ghana’s Mother Church, is unconstitutional;

2.    A declaration that by the core values, basic structure and the nature of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and upon a combined and contextual interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, particularly articles 21(1)(b)(c), 35(1)(5)(6)(a), 37(1) and/or 56 of the Constitution, it is unconstitutional for the Republic of Ghana through its organs of Government, ministries, agencies, departments and/or authorized representatives to purposely aid, endorse, sponsor, support, offer preferential governmental promotion of, and/or be excessively entangled in, any religion or religious practice;

3.    A declaration that the setting up of a Hajj Board by the Government of the Republic of Ghana for the purpose of coordinating, supporting and/or aiding Ghanaian Muslims to embark on the Muslim religious pilgrimage to Mecca (“ Hajj’), being one of the five pillars of the religion of Islam, together with the financial support the Government of Ghana provides to Muslims embarking on the Hajj, amounts to the Government of Ghana purposely aiding, endorsing, supporting and/or offering preferential governmental promotion of, and/or excessive entanglement of the Republic of Ghana with, a religion or religious practice, and thus unconstitutional;

4.    A declaration that the nature and circumstances of the State’s involvement or support for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral to serve as Ghana’s Mother Church, to be used among others, for presidential inaugurations, amount to the Government of Ghana endorsing, supporting and/or offering preferential governmental promotion of religion, and/or excessive entanglement of the Republic of Ghana with religion, and thus unconstitutional;

5.    Any further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit.

The Plaintiff’s case

In the elucidation of his claim the Plaintiff averred in paragraphs 6-10 of his amended statement of case filed on 9/11/2018 as follows:

6.    The instant suit is a public interest (constitutional) action wherein the Plaintiff requests this Honourable Court to conclude that by the letter, spirit and core values of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the Republic of Ghana must recognize, respect, safeguard and promote the formal equality of all religions practiced in Ghana, and to that end, must not confer benefits on one religion to the exclusion of others. Secondly, the Plaintiff submits that Ghana is committed to the value of “freedom of religion, belief and conscience” which can only be realized if the State recognizes the formal equality of all religions practiced in Ghana.

7.    Thirdly, it is the humble submission of the Plaintiff that upon a careful examination of the text and spirit of the Constitution as well as core values, principles and concepts that undergird our constitutional framework the Republic of Ghana is a secular state with no state or official religion. Consequently, the Republic of Ghana is constitutionally required to stay indifferent to or show balance in dealing with all faiths and non-faiths. A fortiori, it is constitutionally impermissible for the Government of Ghana to confer any benefits, advantages or privileges on one religion to the exclusion of other religions.

8.    But even if the Republic of Ghana elects to confer any benefits, advantages or privileges on all religions or belief systems it must do so only under a law passed by Parliament that is non-arbitrary in purpose and scope, serves legitimate State (and not religious) purposes and/or must not result in the excessive entanglement of the State with any religions or religious practices.

9.    The Plaintiff further submits that when the Government(a symbol of national unity):

 

a.    moots the idea for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral to serve as “Ghana’s Mother Church”;

b.    describes the Ghana National Cathedral Project as “a National Cathedral for the state of Ghana”;

c.    declares the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral a “priority among priorities”;

d.    allocates 6.323 Ha of prime state land without due process for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral to serve as Ghana’s Mother Church in an enclave reserved for State buildings (symbols of national unity) and at gargantuan cost to the State without any parliamentary approval;

e.    describes the Ghana National Cathedral as a “legacy project” to commemorate the 60th Anniversary of Ghana’s Independence;

f.     sets up a Board of Trustees with offices at the Jubilee House, the seat of our President, to coordinate the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral;

g.    cuts the sod for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral as part of the programmes for the 60th Anniversary celebrations of Ghana’s Independence;

h.    unveils the architectural drawings/designs of the Ghana National Cathedral during the 61st Anniversary of Ghana’s Independence;

i.      stipulates that the Ghana National Cathedral, a religious symbol associated with a particular religion, shall be used, among others, for “presidential inaugurations”, which are national public events meant for all Ghanaians regardless of faith;

j.      seeks to demolish state/public buildings including bungalows of superior courts judges, the Judicial Training Institute, the Ghana Scholarship Secretariat, and other buildings belonging to private persons, to make way for the construction of the Ghana National Cathedral;

k.    commits to build a “new ceremonial route to the Cathedral’s main entrance [to be]…accessed through a generous parkland created specifically as a gift to the nation and its visitors for leisure, recreation and reflection.”

l.      the Government of Ghana President has conferred privileges and benefits on one religion over others; preferred, supported and endorsed one religion over others; and thus has crossed an impermissible red line in the relationship between the State and Religion.

 

1O. The Plaintiff further submits that when the Government of Ghana:

a.       sets up a Hajj Board under the colour of state authority to coordinate, run and operate the Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam, and provides public resources/ funds to support or finance the operations of the Hajj Board; and

b.       offers financial assistance to Muslims embarking on the Hajj, when such financial support contravenes the teachings of Islam relating to Hajj,

c.       the Government of Ghana/President has conferred privileges and benefits on one religion over others and/or has become excessively entangled in Islam by promoting, aiding and facilitating breaches of cardinal rules of Islamic law relating to Hajj.  It is the respectful submission of the Plaintiff that the above conduct of the Government crosses an impermissible red line in the relationship between the State and Religion.”

 

The Defendant’s Case

The Attorney-General [AG] submits that the Plaintiff’s case does not raise an issue for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution and for that matter there is absolutely no cause of action.

The AG submits further that there is no constitutional issue that is legitimately raised around the authority of the President to allocate land for the construction of the National Cathedral by relying on article 257(1) that vests all public lands in the President on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of Ghana. The A-G contends that the President acted within his constitutional right to allocate public land for a specific purpose in the public interest.

The AG also contends that reliefs 3 and 4 relating to the setting up of a Hajj Board and the construction of a National Cathedral are the only substantive reliefs sought by the Plaintiff to be declared as unconstitutional. The AG however submits that the Plaintiff has formulated the reliefs in a manner without identification of the specific provisions that have been allegedly breached by the State and they therefore do not disclose a cause of action. 

Issues for Determination

On the 1st of November 2018, the parties filed a joint memorandum of issues and same were adopted by this court as follows:-

a.    Whether or not Plaintiff’s case raises an issue for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution;

b.    Whether or not the Republic of Ghana has a constitutional obligation to recognize, respect and/or promote the formal equality of all religions and belief systems practiced in Ghana; and

c.    Whether or not the establishment and operations of the Hajj Board by the Government and Government support for and/or involvement in the Ghana National Cathedral Project are unconstitutional or amount to an unconstitutional entanglement by the State with religion.

 

ISSUE 1 Whether or not the Plaintiff’s case raises an issue for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Articles 2(1) and 130(1) (a) of the Constitution provide:

2(1) A Person who alleges that...

(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or

(b) any act or omission of any person;

is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.

130(1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in.

(a)  all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution.

       (b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers   conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.

The Plaintiff in this case has turned to this Court to seek the interpretation and/or enforcement of certain provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which turn on the constitutional relationship between the government and religious bodies in Ghana. In effect he is first seeking interpretation of those constitutional provisions and then their enforcement.

The Interpretative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The plaintiff submits that this case is a public interest action and is therefore within this Court’s jurisdiction by relying on our decisions in such cases as Adjei-Ampofo v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly & Attorney-General (No.1) [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 610, Federation of Youth Association of Ghana (FEDYAG) v. Public Universities of Ghana & Others [2010] SCGLR 265 and Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa & Another v The Attorney-General & Another.

The Plaintiff did not reveal his religious affiliation, but this action is certainly of public interest as they relate to issues that affect the two major Ghana, Christianity and Islam, However public interest is not the sole criteria for invoking the interpretative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The deciding factor is whether there is a real and genuine issue of interpretation.

“It is now trite law that no action can be brought to interpret a clear and unambiguous provisions of the 1992 Constitution.” per Atuguba JSC in Kor v Attorney- General & Justice Douse [2015-2016] 1 SGLR 114 at 121. The Supreme Court has consistently guarded against the invitation to assume jurisdiction in a matter which could clearly be discerned that the plaintiff has attempted cleverly, to create a case of interpretation, whereas no issue of interpretation genuinely arises upon a careful scrutiny of same.

A constitutional issue is not raised on account of a plaintiff’s absurd, strained and far-fetched understanding of clear provisions in the Constitution. For a person to assert a manifestly absurd meaning contrary to the very explicit meaning and effect of clear words in the Constitution does not mean that a genuine issue of interpretation of some relevant constitutional provision has arisen. See our recent decision in Mayor Agbleze & 2 Ors v The Attorney General & the Electoral Commission, Suit No J1/28/2018 SC dated 28th November 2018, unreported.

The Supreme Court has also guarded against enforcement of human rights actions masquerading as interpretation cases.  It has also rejected the invocation of its jurisdiction, which turns the highest court of this land, into a forum for the original adjudication of ordinary civil disputes. See Danso v. Daaduam II & Another [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1570 at 1574, Bimpong Buta v General Legal Council & ors [2003-2004] SCGLR 1200, Edusei v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 1.

The real test is whether the words in the constitutional provisions sought to be interpreted are ambiguous, imprecise, and unclear and cannot be applied unless interpreted. If it were otherwise, every conceivable case may originate in the Supreme Court by the stretch of human ingenuity and the manipulation of language to raise a tangible constitutional question. Practically every justifiable issue can be spun in such a way as to embrace some tangible constitutional implication. The Constitution may be the foundation of the right asserted by a plaintiff, but that does not necessarily provide the jurisdictional predicate for action in the Supreme Court.

Does a Real, Genuine Interpretative Issue Arise in this Case?

We now examine whether this case discloses a genuine or real interpretative issue and whether the original interpretative jurisdiction of this Court has been properly invoked.

The Plaintiff submits in paragraph 9 of legal arguments filed on 19 November 2018 that:

“…the Plaintiff’s action raises genuine and substantial questions of interpretation within the context of the decisions in  EX-PARTE AKOSAH (1980) GLR 592 C.A and KOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL & JUSTICE DUOSE [2015- 2016] 1 SCGLR 114.The pith and substance of the Plaintiff’s case is captured in paragraphs 6-10 of his Amended Statement of Case filed on 9th November 2018. It is respectfully submitted that the correctness or validity of the legal propositions advanced by the Plaintiff at the said paragraphs 6-10 of his Amended Statement of Case cannot be determined without an ascertainment of the meaning, legal effect and/or scope of application of numerous provisions of the Constitution including articles17,21(1)(b)(c), 35(1)(5)(6)(a), 37(1), 56, 58(1) and (2), 258(1) and (2), and 265. And as the Plaintiff’s discussion of Issues 2 and 3 will show, the parties disagree on the true and proper construction of some of these constitutional provisions, particularly, articles 17, 21 and 56 of the Constitution.

 

We will therefore examine articles 17, 21(1)(b)(c), 35(1)(5)(6)(a), 37(1), 56, 58(1) and (2), 258(1) and (2), and 265, to determine whether there is  ambiguity, imprecision or lack of clarity in these provisions calling for a genuine  interpretation or enforcement, and if there has been a breach of any of them by the establishment of the Hajj Board and the idea of constructing a National Cathedral.

Article 17(2) which is of relevance in quite mandatory terms endorses a very important element of secularism – equality of all persons of any religious persuasion provides:

  “A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status”

Article 21(1) (b) and (c) provision dealing with general fundamental freedoms of the citizen including religious freedom provides:

            “(1) All persons shall have the right to-                                               

              (b) freedom of thought, conscience and belief which shall include academic freedom

(c) freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice”.

Article 35(1) (5) and 37 (1) are provisions under Chapter Six of The Directive Principles of State Policy.

 Article 35(1) sets out the political objectives of the Constitution for the State to promote the integration of the people by providing:

35. (1) Ghana shall be a democratic state dedicated to the realization of freedom and justice; and accordingly, sovereignty resides in the people of Ghana from whom Government derives all its powers and authority through this Constitution.

Article 35(5) also sets out the duty of the State to promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibits discrimination in terms of Article 21(1) (b) by providing:

(5) The State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs.

Article 37(1) reinforces the objectives and duties of the state by providing

37. (1) The State shall endeavor to secure and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of freedom, equality, justice, probity and accountability as enshrined in Chapter 5 of this Constitution; and in particular, the State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that every citizen has equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law.

Article 56 prohibits Parliament from enacting laws imposing one religion or a political party on the people of Ghana by providing as follows:

            56. “Parliament shall have no power to enact a law to establish or authorize the establishment of a body or movement with the right or power to impose on the people of Ghana a common program or set of objectives of a religious or political nature”. [Emphasis supplied]

Articles 58(1) and (2), 258(1) and (2), and 265 refer to the executive authority of the President, the functions and authority of the Lands Commissioner in respect of State and public lands. These are set out in extenso below.

Article 58

(1): The executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

(2)The executive authority of Ghana shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and all laws made under or continued in force by this Constitution.

Article 258 (1) (a):

 There shall be established a Lands Commission which shall, in co- ordination with the relevant public agencies and governmental bodies, perform the following functions– (a) on behalf of the Government, manage public lands and any lands vested in the President by this Constitution or by any other law or any lands vested in the Commission;

Article 265: Except as otherwise provided in this constitution or in any other law which is not inconsistent with this Constitution, the Lands Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority, in the performance of its functions.

 “All public lands in Ghana shall be vested in the President on behalf of and in trust for, the people of Ghana.”

We do not find any ambiguity in the above constitutional provisions which are clear and unambiguous. The constitutional provisions as articulated in articles 17, 21(1) (b) (c), 35(1) (5) (6) (a), 37(1), 56, guarantee freedom of religion in no uncertain terms. The wordings are explanatory, simple and easy to appreciate their import and admit of no ambiguity.

The combined effect of the letter and spirit of these provisions guarantees the fundamental freedoms of the citizen including the right to practice any religion and to manifest such practice. By the letter and spirit of these provisions religious pluralism and diversity which are features of a secular state are clearly recognised and thereby discrimination on any ground is prohibited. By the Directive Principles of State Policy in articles 35 and 37, the State is to actively   promote, within reasonable limits; and facilitate the aspiration and opportunities by every citizen to exercise his fundamental freedoms as a way of ensuring national cohesion.

In respect of articles 258(1) and (2), and 265, which form the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim in Relief 1, the provisions are also clear and unambiguous and the President in whom all public lands are vested by virtue of Article 257(1) can deal directly with public lands through the appropriate Ministry as was done in this case.

From the foregoing, we do not find the existence of a genuine issue for interpretation in the constitutional provisions relied on for the institution of an action under articles 2(1) and 130(1). The Plaintiff’s invitation is therefore refused.

Issue B

From the foregoing issue b. does not arise.

 

Issue C 

“Whether or not the establishment and operations of the Hajj Board by the Government and Government support for and/or involvement in the Ghana National Cathedral Project are unconstitutional or amount to an unconstitutional entanglement by the State with religion”

Issue C definitely raises enforcement issues. Which we pose as follows:

Does the Plaintiff’s suit nevertheless raise any issues of constitutional enforcement within the terms of article 2(1) and 130(1) (a)?

It is the Plaintiff’s case that the setting up of a Hajj Board to facilitate the pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca and the provision of a piece of land for the construction of a National Cathedral (which would serve public purposes including State thanksgiving services, State funerals etc among other things) are excessive entanglement by the State in religion and also amount to unequal and unfair treatment of religions in Ghana and these acts contravenes the constitutional principles of equality or neutrality of religion.

Articles 2 (1) and 130(1) empower the Supreme Court to ensure compliance of the Constitution. Accordingly, a person who invokes the Court’s jurisdiction must demonstrate clearly that the acts or omission complained of are inconsistent with the particular provisions of the Constitution he alleges have been contravened.

The A-G submits that reliefs 3 and 4 are the only substantive reliefs sought by the Plaintiff to be declared as unconstitutional. The A-G however submits that the Plaintiff did not identify the specific provisions that have been allegedly breached by the state by the proposal to build a National Cathedral and the setting up of a Hajj Board. The A-G contends that the State has not engaged in acts that should lead the Plaintiff to conclude that the State is excessively entangled with religion.

It has been the position of this Court that:

“where an act or omission of any person is challenged under article 2 of the 1992 Constitution, such an act or omission must be shown to have taken place, and it must be shown that such act or omission falls foul of a specific provision of the Constitution, or at the very least, the spirit of an actual provision.”  Per Wiredu JSC (as he then was) in National Democratic Congress v Electoral Commission [2001-2002] SCGLR 954 @ 958.

Similarly, Sophia Akuffo JSC (as she then was) in the case of Adjei Ampofo v. Attorney-General [2003-2004] SCGLR 411, reiterated this position of the law as follows at page 418:

’And although we wholeheartedly acknowledge that a Constitution, as a living document, has in addition to its written words, also a spirit, when called upon to exercise our jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the constitution, we must first be referred to a specific provision therein.’’

Another way of looking at the issue is found in the dictum of Bamford-Addo JSC in Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General and another (Abban Case) [2003-2004]  SCGLR 250 at 266 to 267 which is as follows:

“In deciding the issue of jurisdiction, matters to take into consideration include the statute which invests jurisdiction as well as the true nature of the claim having regard to the pleadings, issues and reliefs sought or the actual effect of the reliefs, regardless of words used or the manner in which the claims and reliefs are couched.”  

Following the Abban Case we proceed to examine the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff to determine whether our enforcement jurisdiction has been properly invoked.

Relief (1)

Under the first relief which turns on articles 258(1) and (2), and 265, the claim by the Plaintiff is that the government has no authority to allocate any public land to the churches to construct the National Cathedral. As indicated earlier, the said provisions are clear and unambiguous and need no interpretation. However the relevant constitutional provision dealing with public lands is Article 257.

 Article 257 (1) unequivocally states: “All public lands in Ghana shall be vested in the President on behalf of and in trust for, the people of Ghana.”  Further, article 257(5) gives the right to the government to vest in itself of any land required in the public interest for public purposes. These prime lands that the government allocated for the purpose of building the National Cathedral are already public lands vested in the President by virtue of Article 257 (1).

 The Lands Commission though an independent body is to work “in co-ordination with the relevant public agencies and governmental bodies” in managing public lands (Article .258 (1). The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the allocation of the land was done without the involvement of the Lands Commission. The only evidence proffered is that it is the Minister responsible for Lands and Natural Resources who has been handling and communicating on matters relating to the land. Without any evidence to the contrary we presume everything was regularly done by the President acting through the appropriate ministry to allocate the land in question for the construction of the National Cathedral, which when completed was to be used for public purposes by all denominations

From the foregoing we do not find any constitutional issue that is legitimately raised around the constitutional authority of the President to allocate the land for the purpose stated. Accordingly the Plaintiff fails the test for us to assume jurisdiction on the claim.

Reliefs (2), (3), and (4) can be considered together

It is evident from the wording of his relief (2),that the Plaintiff  relies on Articles 17, 21(1) (b) (c), 35(1) (5) (6) (a), 37(1), 56,  and invites this Court to make a declaration that:

 “It is unconstitutional for the Republic of Ghana through its organs of Government, ministries, agencies, departments and/or authorized representatives to purposely aid, endorse, sponsor, support, offer preferential governmental promotion of, and/or be excessively entangled in, any religion or religious practice.”

We see reliefs (3) and (4) as setting out the particulars of the acts of the government which the Plaintiff alleges are excessive entanglements in religion and therefore invite a declaration that such acts are unconstitutional. These reliefs raise enforcement issues and this Court has a duty to consider these claims regardless of the words used or the manner in which the reliefs are couched. We will therefore reject the A-G’s invitation to throw out in limine the Plaintiff’s case.

Are the acts complained of excessive entanglement by the state in religion and hence unconstitutional?

Before embarking on this task we are mindful of the oft-quoted dictum of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in Tuffour v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, that a National Constitution “mirrors the history of the people” that reflect “the basic aspirations of the people” for which the Constitution was enacted.

The 2010 Population and Housing Census (Summary Report of Final Results) gives the statistics of religious affiliation in Ghana as follows: Christianity as the dominant faith at 71.2 percent of the population with Islam at 17.6 percent and traditional religion at 5.2 percent. Only 5.2 percent reported having no religious affiliations. There are other smaller religious groups including Eckankar, Hinduism, Buddhism and Bahai Faith, making up the remaining 0.8 percent of the population.

Historically, the state in Ghana recognized the existence and importance of religious identity and affiliation in the Ghanaian society and encouraged their open and lawful expression even at national events. There has been collaboration between the state and religion in Ghana by the establishment of educational institutions, medical facilities and agricultural projects by all groups of Christian and other faiths in the country and thus contributing immensely to the socio-economic growth of the country. In some remote areas of Ghana, it is the religious bodies that pioneered the establishment of schools and health facilities before the state recently ventured in those areas.

The church has been a transforming agent, contributing to the development of the moral character of people and impartation of knowledge. While acknowledging that there are other pressing national issues that deserved attention and resources, there are and will always be pressing needs for medical and educational facilities and infrastructures such as roads, electricity and good drinking water. The reasons and the need for establishing the Hajj Board, and the construction of the National Cathedral cannot be overlooked, given the diversity and peculiarities of the various religious groups and the heterogeneous nature of the Ghanaian society.

The Constitution of the 4th Republic, while secular in nature, affirms and maintains the historical, cultural, and religious or atheist character of Ghanaian society. Obviously secularism in the context of the Ghana Constitution must be understood to allow, and even encourage State recognition and accommodation of religion and religious identity. The Plaintiff alleges the setting up of ‘a Board of Trustees with offices at the Jubilee House to co-ordinate the construction of the National Cathedral’ is an example of the government crossing ‘an impermissible line in the relationship between the state and religion’. We do not see this act as an excessive entanglement by the state, as the office can be relocated.

As noted earlier the Constitution does not specifically prohibit the Government from supporting, assisting or cooperating with religious groups. What the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions forbids is the state hindering freedom of worship, religion and belief in the country and discrimination on grounds of religion The Constitution specifically prohibits Parliament from enacting a law “to impose on the people of Ghana a common program or set of objectives of a religious or political nature”.

The Constitution guarantees the equal right of all persons to subscribe to the religious belief and faith of their own choosing without interference or imposition by the State. The State is thus prohibited from discriminating against any person on grounds of religion or creed or the establishment of a State religion, and also preventing the free expression of religious orientations.

 In this respect the benchmark for determining whether any act or omission of the President or any other authority in Ghana infringes any of the constitutional provisions is whether the actor omission complained of, prevents any person resident in Ghana to practice any religion or belief of his choice, or discriminates against any person with different religious persuasion.

It is our considered opinion that the acts complained of i.e. the construction of the National Cathedral and the setting up of the Hajj Board does not contravene the guarantees of the freedom of religion and manifestation of beliefs of the people of Ghana. The State is free to lend support or aid to a religious group if it deems such beneficence to be for the good of the nation.

We rather see the government’s plan to build a National Cathedral and the setting up of the Hajj Board as the desire of the state to provide for social cohesion and unity in a country where 88.8 percent of its population is predominantly Christian and Islamic. We find this to be in tune with the political and social objectives as set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy under the provisions of articles 35 and 37 of the Constitution, referred to by the Plaintiff. We take note that the Government has maintained a consistent theme about the unifying effects of the Cathedral on Ghanaian Christians. So far its contribution is to provide land for the cathedral, and the actual construction to be sponsored and financed by the churches.

Counsel for the Plaintiff contends further that by his understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions, the Government is supposed to be neutral but if the Government is to assist or support religious groups then the support should be extended to all known religious groups in the country. In our opinion, the Plaintiff by this submission is making a statement of a case for ‘minority’ religions and a request for equal treatment by the government for all religions.

If this is a claim for minority rights then it is misconceived as nowhere in his brief has the Plaintiff alleged a request by any specified religious group for any form of assistance which has been denied by the State. The Plaintiff does not allege or allude to any action, policy or legislation by the State which seeks to project one religion over the others. In our considered opinion, lending a helping hand to one religious community does not mean a denial or preclusion of similar or other support/ assistance to another in similar circumstances. This support to the Christians and Moslems is not necessarily discriminatory and would not necessarily have the effect of indoctrinating the citizens with a particular religion. These acts by the government are to satisfy the particular needs of these religious groups which ultimately are for the public good and interest.

Accordingly we hold that the acts complained of do not infringe the constitutional provisions relied on by the Plaintiff.

In conclusion, we do not see a legitimate question of constitutional interpretation and enforcement such as would justify our exercising our original jurisdiction under articles 2 (1) or 130(1) of the Constitution. The Plaintiff’s action fails. It is therefore dismissed.

 

 

 

 

       S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

DOTSE, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

 

                                                                         

               J. V. M. DOTSE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

 

YEBOAH, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

            

               ANIN YEBOAH

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

GBADEGBE, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

 

                                                                          

                 N. S. GBADEGBE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.), JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

 

                                                                         

         V. AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

BENIN, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

 

                                                                         

               A. A. BENIN

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

MARFUL-SAU, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my sister Adinyira, JSC.

 

                                                                          

              S. K. MARFUL-SAU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

AZIZ BAMBA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

GODFRIED YEBOAH DAME, DEPUTY ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE DEFENDANT WITH HIM MRS. HELEN ZEWU, SOLICITOR GENERAL, SYLVESTER WILLIAMS, CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY, GRACE OPPONG, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY, MS. YVONNE BANNERMAN, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY, MODESTA LEGIPO, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY AND ORIEL ASARE BOATENG, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

KOTEY, JSC:-

This appeal is taken against the judgement of the Court of Appeal, which judgment reversed a judgment of the trial High Court.

By a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeal allowed in part an appeal filed by the Defendant/Appellant/Respondent (hereinafter the Defendant) against the decision of the High Court entered in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter the Plaintiff).

 

Facts

A brief background of the events leading to these proceedings would be necessary for a better appreciation of the issues raised in this appeal.

The Plaintiff was the Deputy Branch Manager of the Defendant bank’s Tema Fishing Harbour Branch. The Plaintiff was presented with two transfer request letters from Emefs Construction Limited, a customer of the Defendant, for the transfer of £32,400 and £82,364 to a customer of Emefs Construction Limited. The Plaintiff signed against the signatures on the transfer request letters and forwarded them to the International Business Centre (IBC) of the Defendant bank which deals with foreign transfers. After the IBC had completed its processes, it approved the request and duly transferred the said sums of £32,400 and £82,364 to the named beneficiary.

It subsequently transpired that the signature on the transfer request letters was a forgery and the Defendant bank was unable to recover the amounts transferred and thereby lost the £114,764.

The Defendant bank then charged the plaintiff with negligence in the verification of the signature on the transfer request letters. It contended that it was the responsibility of the Plaintiff to verify the signatures on the transfer request letters with the signatures and mandates in the Defendant Bank’s Core Banking System (Flexcube), that the Defendant failed to do this diligently, and that this set in motion the sequence of events that led to the wrong transfer and loss of the sum of £114,764.

The Defendant denied it was his sole responsibility, as Acting Branch Manager, to verify the signatures on the transfer request letters. He further contended that he had in fact verified the signatures on the transfer request letter before stamping and signing the transfer request letters.

After an internal (house) process, the Defendant bank terminated the employment of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for wrongful and unlawful termination of unemployment.

The Plaintiff per his Writ of Summons and accompanying Statement of Claim, claimed against the Defendant as follows:

(a)  A declaration that the Plaintiff was not negligent or incompetent when he verified the signature on the transfer letter from Emefs Construction Limited.

(b)  An order for reinstatement as a Deputy Manager of the Defendant Bank or alternatively payment of accumulated salary from the date of termination of appointment including all the benefits that would have accrued to him if he was still in employment, leave allowance, clothing allowance and any other allowance that would have been entitled to within the period.

(c)  Payment of general damages in the sum of One Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS 100,000) for wrongful and unlawful termination of employment.

(d)  Payment of adequate compensation for embarrassment, pain and loss that the Plaintiff suffered as a result of defendant’s actions and inactions.

(e)  Interest on all monies that will be adjudged to be due him from the day it became due.

(f)    Cost including Solicitors fees.

 

At the conclusion of the trial, the High Court entered judgement for the Plaintiff. The Court held that the Defendant had wrongfully and unlawfully terminated the employment of the Plaintiff and awarded damages against the Defendant.

The trial High Court held that it was not satisfied that the Plaintiff had been negligent in the verification of the signatures on the transfer request letters and that it was the IBC that had approved and authorized payment.

The Defendant being dissatisfied with the judgement of the trial High Court appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the Defendant’s appeal and set aside the judgement of the High Court.

The Court of Appeal held that on the evidence adduced at the trial it was satisfied that it was the responsibility of the Defendant to verify the signature on the transfer request letters. The Court also held that the Defendant had been negligent in his verification of the signatures on the transfer request letters. The Court further held that the employment of the Plaintiff had not been terminated unlawfully or wrongfully as he had been negligent in the performance of his duty and the termination was in accordance with the terms of his contract of employment and the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651).

 

Grounds of Appeal

Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal the Defendant lodged an appeal to this Court on the following grounds;

a. The decision of the Court dated 14/12/17 was against the weight of the evidence before the Court.

b. The Court of Appeal failed to analyze and evaluate the entire evidence placed before it particularly the established internal procedures for transfer of money and exhibit ‘P’.

c. The Court of Appeal erred when it held that the termination was not wrongful.

 

Decision of Court of Appeal Against Weight of Evidence and Failed to Analyze and Evaluate the Entire Evidence.

Grounds (a) and (b) were argued together. They claim that the decision of the Court of Appeal was against the weight of the evidence adduced at the trial and failed to analyze and evaluate the entire evidence.

These grounds of appeal therefore raise two issues relating to:

i. Verification of the signatures on the transfer request letters, and;

ii. Authorization and approval for payment by the IBC.

 

 Verification of Signature

This issue may be divided into two;

a. Who is responsible for the verification of the signatures on the transfer request letters, Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A1’?

b. Were the signatures on the transfer request letters Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A1’ properly verified in accordance with existing protocol?

 

Responsibility for Verification of signature

The Plaintiff admitted receipt of the transfer request. He also admitted stamping and signing the transfer request letters. He, however, sought to down play his role in the verification of the signatures. He described his role as “only a mere acceptance procedure”.

This was contradicted by the Defendant who contended that the Plaintiff, as Branch Manager, was responsible for the verification of the signatures on the transfer request letters.

The Plaintiff sought to shift responsibility for the verification of the signature on the transfer request letters from himself to the IBC. This was disingenuous. The Plaintiff failed to indicate what the responsibility of the Branch Manager is when a transfer letter is lodged at his branch. He also failed to indicate what his signature and stamp on the transfer request letters was attesting to. The better evidence from Exhibit ‘F’, “Operating Procedure For Handling Request For Import By Direct Transfer and Payment” is that the branch manager is responsible for verification of the signature. If the manager is satisfied that the signature on the letter tallies with what is the in Flexcube he then signs and stamps the transfer request letter and forwards it to the IBC for further action. Verification of the signature is therefore the responsibility of the Plaintiff.

Where, as in this case, the Plaintiff as Branch Manager has verified the signatures on the transfer request letters, the IBC does no further verification of the signature, but proceeds with other approval requirements. The role of the IBC is, by paragraph 6.4 of Exhibit ‘F’ to “ensure that the signature has been verified by the Branch”. In fact, the evidence is that the Flexcube system available at the IBC did not contain the signatures of account holders. It is where a branch manager, does not or is unable to verify a signature, that the IBC will take further action in relation to verification of the signature as per paragraph 6.5 of Exhibit F.

Having regard to the evidence led, we are wholly in agreement with the learned trial judge that the evidence showed that it was in fact the plaintiff’s duty to verify exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A1’ and not, as he contended, the responsibility of the IBC.

The Court of Appeal found on this matter, at page 14 that;

“The Plaintiff’s case that the matter of verifying signatures did not rest with him but with the IBC was contradicted by Plaintiff’s document exhibit ‘F’ the document titled ‘Operating Procedure for Handling request for import by Direct Transfer and Payment’. That document was quite unequivocal that the verification of signatures was to be done at the level (Paragraph 6.4). While the IBC staff were to ensure that signatures were correct (Paragraph 6.5 and 6.6), it did not, in the face of clear instructions of paragraph 6.4, relieve the Branch Manager (the plaintiff who was a Deputy Manager was in charge of the Branch at the material time), of his responsibility to do the verification”.

On the preponderance of the evidence adduced at the trial, it is our considered view that the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal were right in finding that responsibility for the verification of the signatures on the transfer letters lay with the Plaintiff and not the IBC.

Did the Plaintiff Verify the Signatures on the Transfer Request Letters according to existing Protocol?

The plaintiff gave evidence before the House Committee that Emefs Construction Limited had three signatures in the system when in fact it had only one. The evidence is to the effect that the Plaintiff did not verify the signatures on the transfer letters with the signature in the Flexcube system. The Plaintiff conceded that he used signatures on other letters from  Emefs Construction Limited to verify the signatures on the transfer letters, Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A1’. This was contrary to existing protocol and wrongful.

On the preponderance of the evidence, the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Plaintiff did not verify the signatures on the transfer request letter according to established protocol.

We therefore dismiss grounds (a) and (b) of the appeal and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal that it was the responsibility of the Plaintiff to verify the signatures on Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A1’ and that the Plaintiff failed to do so in accordance with existing protocol.

 

“Wrongful Dismissal” and /or “Unlawful Termination”

 Ground C of the grounds of appeal is that “the Court of Appeal erred when it held that the termination was not wrongful. This raises the question of whether the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was “wrongful” and/or “unfair”.

Wrongful Dismissal 

The trial High Court had held that the Plaintiff’s employment was unfairly terminated as it was in contravention of section 62 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651).

The Court of Appeal reversed this finding and held that the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was not wrongful or unlawful but was in accordance with his contract of employment. The Rules and Conditions of Service, Exhibit ‘G’ provide in Section 12.0 that; “Either party i.e. the employee or the bank may terminate the Contract of Employment by giving the other party a month’s salary in lieu of notice”. The Court further held that the termination of the employment of the Plaintiff was not in violation of Act 651.

The termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was by a letter, Exhibit ‘D’. It stated that the Plaintiff’s actions amounted to gross negligence and that his employment was being terminated in accordance with section 12 of Exhibit ‘G’.

We agree with the Court of Appeal that “the respondent’s admission of failure to use the Flexcube , which was the Defendant bank’s protocol for the verification of signatures, supported the claim of negligence or incompetence in the performance of his duty as contained in this letter of termination.”

We have already held that the Plaintiff was negligent in the performance of his duty to verify the signatures on the transfer request letters. Section 11.4 of Exhibit G, titled “Rules and Conditions of Service” provides that the Bank shall dismiss an employee after the appropriate procedure has been followed. The dismissed shall be as a result of violation and breach of these Rules and Conditions, the Code of Conduct and for just and reasonable cause involving dishonesty, willful refusal to obey legitimate and reasonable instructions, negligence of duty and gross misconduct.

But an employer is not really required to give any reasons for the termination. Once the employer complied with section 12 of the Rules and Conditions of Service by giving either one month’s notice in writing or one month’s salary as lieu thereof, then the termination is not wrongful. In Kobea & Ors v. Tema Oil Refinery [2003-2004] SCGLR 1033, per Dr Twum JSC at 1039 stated;

“At common law, an employer and employee are free and equal parties to the contract of employment. Hence either party has the right to bring the contract to an end in accordance with his terms. Thus an employer is legally entitled to terminate an employee’s contract of employment whenever he wishes and for whatever reasons, provided only that he gives due notice to the employee or pay him his wages in lieu of the notice. He does not even have to reveal his reasons much less to justify the termination.”

The termination of the Plaintiff’s employment also complies with the general provisions of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) governing the termination of employment. Sections 15 and 17 of Act 651 provide that;

15. Grounds for termination of employment

A contract of employment may be terminated,

(a)  by mutual agreement between the employer and the worker;

(b) by the worker on grounds of ill-treatment or sexual harassment;

(c) by the employer on the death of the worker before the expiration of the period of employment;

(d) by the employer if the worker is found on medical examination to be unfit for employment;

(e) by the employer because of the inability of the worker to carry out work due to

i. Sickness or accident; or

ii. the incompetence of the worker; or

iii. the proven misconduct of the worker.

 

17. Notice of termination of employment

(1) A contract of employment may be terminated at anytime by either party giving to the other party,

(a)  in the case of the contract of three years or more, one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice.

(b)   In the case of a contract of less than three years, two weeks’ notice or two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice; or

(c)  In the case of contract from week to week, seven days’ notice.

(2) A contract of employment determinable at will by either party may be terminated at the close of any day without notice.

(3) A notice required to be given under this section shall be in writing.

(4) The day on which the notice is given shall be included in the period of notice.

The letter of termination, Exhibit ‘D’ stated that the action of the Plaintiff amounted to gross negligence and that he was being terminated pursuant to section 12 of Exhibit ‘G’ which provided that “Either party i.e the employee or the Bank may terminate the contract of employment by giving the other a month’s notice or a month’s salary in lieu of notice”. The termination of the employment of the Plaintiff therefore complied sections 15 and 17 of Act 651.

We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal that the Plaintiff’s employment was not wrongfully terminated.

 

Unfair termination

The provisions relating to “fair” and “unfair” termination of employment are contained in sections 62 and 63 of Act 651 which provide that;

 

62. Fair termination

A termination of a worker’s employment is fair if the contract of employment is terminated by the employer on any of the following grounds:

(a)    that the worker is incompetent or lacks the qualification in relation to the work for which the worker is employed;

(b)    the proven misconduct of the worker;

(c)    redundancy under section 65;

(d)    due to legal restrictions imposed on the worker prohibiting the worker from the performing the work for which the worker is employed.

 

63. Unfair termination of employment

(1)  The employment of a worker shall not be unfairly terminated by the worker’s employer.

(2)  A worker’s employment is terminated unfairly if the only reason for the termination is

(a)  that the worker has joined, intends to join or has ceased to be a member of a trade union or intends to take part in the activities of the trade union;

(b)  that the worker seeks office as, or has acted in the capacity of, a workers’ representative;

(c)  that the worker has filed a complaint or participated in proceedings against the employer involving alleged violation of this Act or any other enactment;

(d)  the worker’s gender, race, colour, ethnicity, origin, religion, creed, social, political or economic status;

(e)  in case of a woman worker, due to pregnancy of the worker or the absence of the worker from work during maternity leave;

(f)  in the case of a worker with a disability, due to the worker’s disability;

(g)  that the worker is temporarily ill or injured and this is certified by a recognized medical practitioner;

(h)  that the worker does not possess the current level of qualification required in relation to the work for which the worker was employed which is different from the level of qualification required at the commencement of the employment; or

(i)  that the worker refused or indicated an intention to refuse to do work normally done by a worker who at a time was taking part in a lawful strike unless the work is necessary to prevent actual danger to life, personal safety or health or the maintenance of plant and equipment.

(3)  Without limiting the provisions of subsection (2), a worker’s employment is deemed to be unfairly terminated if with or without notice to the employer, the worker terminates the contract of employment

 (a). because the ill-treatment of the worker by the employer, having regard to the circumstances of the case, or

(b). because the employer has failed to take action on repeated complaints of sexual harassment of the worker at the workplace.

(4)  A termination may be unfair if the employer fails to prove that,

(a). the reason for the termination is fair, or

(b). the termination was made in accordance with a fair procedure or this Act.

 

Section 64 then provides that;

64. Remedies for unfair termination

(1) A worker who claims that the employment of the worker has been unfairly terminated by the worker’s employer may be present a complaint of the commission.

(2) If on investigation of the complaint the Commission finds that the termination of the employment is unfair, it may

(a) order the employer to re-instate the worker from the date of the termination of employment;

(b) order the employer to re-employ the worker, in the work for which the worker was employed before the termination or in any other reasonably suitable work on the same terms and conditions enjoyed by the worker before the termination; or

(c) order the employer to pay compensation to the worker.

 

“Unfair termination”, as distinct from the common law concept of “wrongful dismissal”, is therefore a creature of statute, currently the Labour Act, 2003 ( Act 651).;

The Plaintiff in this case did not sue for “unfair termination” but “wrongful dismissal”. As the Court of Appeal noted, “the plaintiff’s suit was grounded on wrongful termination yet the learned trial judge failed to make such a finding, but rather held that his employment was unfairly terminated in that it sinned against S.62 of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651)”.

We hold that the trial Court erred when it failed to consider whether the Plaintiff’s employment had been wrongfully terminated under the terms of his contract of employment. This was required of the trial High Court as an initial first step. This failure was a grievous error. There was no basis for the trial High Court’s holding that; “I believe that the Plaintiff’s appointment was terminated under section 62”.

As we have noted, the letter of termination Exhibit D stated quite clearly that the Plaintiff’s employment was being terminated under his contract of employment and pursuant to section 12 of the Rules and Conditions of service, Exhibit G.

The trial High Court’s holding that the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was in violation of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) is therefore untenable as this is not an action for “unfair termination”.

Furthermore, under section 62 the termination of a worker’s employment is fair if the contract of employment is terminated by the employer because the worker is incompetent. We therefore hold that the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was not “unfair” in terms of Act 651 as the Plaintiff was incompetent in the performance of his duty.

Conclusion

In the result, we would dismiss all the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed in its entirety as being without any merit.

 

             PROF. N. A. KOTEY

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my brother Prof. Kotey, JSC.

 

                                                                         

                                                                     P. BAFFOE-BONNIE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

GBADEGBE, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my brother Prof. Kotey, JSC.

 

                                                                         

                                                                       N. S. GBADEGBE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

PWAMANG, JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my brother Prof. Kotey, JSC.

 

                                                                         

                 G. PWAMANG

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

DORDZIE (MRS.), JSC:-

I agree with the conclusion and reasoning of my brother Prof. Kotey, JSC.

 

                                                                         

A.   M. A. DORDZIE (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

 

COUNSEL

GORDON C. AKPADIE FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT.

NII ARDAY WONTUMI FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT.

 

 

 
 

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