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Land – Lessee
- Declaration of title - Damages
for trespass - Perpetual
injunction – Leave of the court
to discontinue his claim - Res
judicata - Whether or not the
plaintiff’s alleged grantors
have no right to allocate or
grant any portion of the said
plot - Whether or not all
processes filed that the
plaintiff’s writ is an abuse of
the process of court
HEADNOTES
The
respondent's case in that suit
numbered, LS 177/2002 was that
the plot in question was
allocated to him by the
Buokromhene. In the case of the
appellant herein, his
counterclaim was based mainly on
the legal effect of an earlier
writ LS 330/80 between Opanin
Kojo Boateng versus Nana Owusu
Bempoh which had declared the
appellant’s grantors to be
owners of the land which is the
subject matter of the writ.
That judgment had been confirmed
on appeal. The respondent later
sought and was granted leave of
the court to discontinue his
claim. The writ was struck out
as discontinued with liberty to
come back The respondent later
sought and was granted leave of
the court to discontinue his
claim. The writ was struck out
as discontinued with liberty to
come back .It is needless to say
that the counterclaim was not
discontinued and it is still
pending.On 17th day
of November, 2003, while the
defendant's counterclaim was
still pending, the respondent
instituted a fresh action
between the same parties The
High Court dismissed the suit
as it constitutes an abuse of
the court process Feeling
aggrieved by this decision the
respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeal which also reversed
it, It is this decision that the
appellants have appealed against
to this court
HELD
From whatever
angle you look at it this appeal
clearly lacks any merit, so same
is dismissed. The decision of
the Court of Appeal is confirmed
and the matter is remitted to
the High Court for trial on its
merits
STATUTES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
High court
(Civil Procedure Rules) 1954 LN
140 A
CASES
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Foly Adama
vrs Messrs Norpalm ASV and one
other civil suit no 212/2002
Sekond
Nmako Salt
Concession; Concession enquiry
no. 1120(Accra) 1962 GLR354
Amoako AttaII
v Osei KofiII [1962]1GLR
AhenkoraII
vKumah [1963] 1GLR 77
Amoako vrs.
Kwan [1975]1 GLR 25
Biei v. Assah
(1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 303
Speedline
Stevedoringco.Ltd; Republic vrs
High Court, Ex parte Brenya
2001/2002SC GLR 775
Republic V
National House of Chiefs Ex
parte Odeneho Krofa
Krukoko(Enimil VI Interested
Party) 2010 SCGLR at page 134
Pocklington
Foods Inc. v. Alberta
(Provincial Treasurer), (1995)
123 D.L.R. (4th) 141
Atta Kwadwo
and Others v. Badu [1977] 1GLR 1
BOOKS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
The Ghana Law
of Evidence Justice Ofori
Boateng
DELIVERING
THE LEADING JUDGMENT
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
COUNSEL
KWASI AFRIFA
FOR THE
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT.
K. A.
ASANTE-KROBEA FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
.
__________________________________________________________________
J
U D G M E N T
__________________________________________________________________
BAFFOE-BONNIE, JSC:-
This is an
appeal from the Court of Appeal.
Coram Akoto Bamfo JA (as she
then was) Osei and Duose JJA
allowing an appeal from the
judgment of the trial High Court
Judge which was given in favour
of the appellant herein. The
facts in this case are fairly
simple and straight forward.
In June 2002,
the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent
herein referred to as Respondent
filed a writ claiming;
a.
Declarations that the plaintiff
is the allotee/lessee of plot №Y
block XXXXIV Buokrom near
Kumasi.
b. Damages
for trespass.
c. An order
of perpetual injunction
restraining the defendant either
by himself or through his agents
and /or workmen from in any
manner interfering with
plaintiff’s said property plot 7
block XXXIV Buokrom near Kumasi.
The
defendant/respondent/appellant
hereafter appellant, filed a
defence and counter claimed for;
i.
A declaration of title in
favour of defendant and the wife
Mrs. Fosuhene to the property
known as Plot no. 7 block XXXIV
Buokrom, Kumasi, and (Buokrom
Denteso).
ii A declaration that any
purported allocation grant or
transaction in respect of the
said property and any document
purportedly made pursuant
thereto in favour of the
plaintiff is null and void ab
initio and the plaintiff’s
alleged grantors have no right
to allocate or grant any portion
of the said plot.
iii. An
order for the cancelation and
/or revocation of all documents
made by the plaintiff in respect
of the property the subject
matter of the suit.
Iv.
General and special damages for
trespass.
V. An
order of perpetual injunction
restraining the plaintiff his
alleged grantors agents assigns
privies those claiming through
under or by him at custom and in
law and in any manner whatsoever
from interfering with the
defendant’s right title and
interest to the said property.
ii.
SUCH FURTHER ORDER(S) as to this
Honourable Court deem fit.
The
respondent's case in that suit
numbered, LS 177/2002 was that
the plot in question was
allocated to him by the
Buokromhene. In the case of the
appellant herein, his
counterclaim was based mainly on
the legal effect of an earlier
writ LS 330/80 between Opanin
Kojo Boateng versus Nana Owusu
Bempoh which had declared the
appellant’s grantors to be
owners of the land which is the
subject matter of the writ.
That judgment had been confirmed
on appeal.
The
respondent later sought and was
granted leave of the court to
discontinue his claim. The writ
was struck out as discontinued
with liberty to come back .It is
needless to say that the
counterclaim was not
discontinued and it is still
pending.
On 17th
day of November, 2003, while the
defendant's counterclaim was
still pending, the respondent
instituted a fresh action
between the same parties
claiming;
1. A
declaration that the plaintiff
is the allottee/lessee of plot
no 7 block XXXVI Sisirase
Street, Buokrom near Kumasi.
2. Damages
for trespass.
3. Recovery
of the sums of monies removed by
the defendant from plaintiffs
room; and,
4. An order
of perpetual injunction
restraining the defendant either
by himself or through his agents
and/or workmen from in any
manner interfering with
plaintiffs said property plot no
7 block XXXIV, Sisirase Street
Buokrom near Kumasi.
The defendant
entered appearance to this writ
too and again filed a defence
and counterclaimed for
A. A
declaration of title to the
property the subject-matter of
the suit.
B. General,
special and punitive damages for
trespass.
C.
Declaration that any purported
allocation, grant or transaction
in respect of the property, the
subject-matter of the suit and
any document purportedly made
pursuant thereto in favour of
the plaintiff is null and void
ab initio as the plaintiff’s
alleged grantors have no right
to allocate or grant any portion
of the said plot.
D. An order
for the cancellation and/or
revocation of all documents made
by the plaintiff in respect of
the property, the subject-matter
of the suit.
E. An order
of perpetual injunction
restraining the plaintiff, his
agents, assigns workmen those
claiming through under or by him
at law or custom and in any
manner whatsoever from
interfering with the defendant’s
right, title and interest so the
said property.
F. Such
further order or Orders as this
Honourable Court may deem fit.
On 25/3/04
barely, 3 months after filing
his defence and counterclaim,
the appellant herein filed an
application praying for “an
Order setting aside and/or
dismissing the plaintiff’s writ
as being an abuse of the process
of court and in exercise of the
court’s inherent jurisdiction.”
The main
grounds for this application are
captured in paragraphs 5-9 of
the accompanying affidavit.
After referring to earlier
action and counterclaim he
averred as follows;
5 “That
seeing the futility of fighting
the matter, the plaintiff
discontinued the action.
6 That my
counterclaim is pending before
the High Court, Kumasi presided
over by Mr. Justice Winfred
Kpentey.
7 That
with full knowledge of the
pendency of my counterclaim
which is inextricably linked to
the reliefs sought in the
instant suit, the plaintiff has
commenced another action.
8 That I
will contend through counsel and
by reference to all processes
filed that the plaintiff’s writ
is an abuse of the process of
court.
9 That I
will further contend through
counsel that having regard to
the reliefs sought in the
counterclaim, the plaintiff’s
action is otiose and a
duplication of the process of
the court in a manner which is
not permissible by law”.
Over the
protestations of the respondent
herein, the trial judge granted
the application to set the writ
aside saying;
“The
plaintiff’s claim in suit
№LS177/2002 which he
discontinued cannot under any
circumstances be said to be
different form the present suit
pending before me. Once there
is a counterclaim in respect of
that suit the plaintiff cannot
repeat his claims in another
claim here. It is a very
serious case of abuse of the
court process.
The present
writ before me is here by
dismissed as it constitutes an
abuse of the court process”
Feeling
aggrieved by this decision the
respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeal which also reversed it
in the following terms, Per
Duose JA:
"What I make
of this aspect of the rule is
that any such discontinuance
consequent upon a court order
granting leave with costs shall
not be used as a defence in a
subsequent action. It appears
this aspect of the rule and the
general effect of discontinuance
of a suit `with liberty was lost
upon the learned trial court. In
my opinion despite the pendency
of the counterclaim in the
earlier suit, that is, suit no
L.S 177/02, the plaintiff in the
instant appeal is at liberty to
institute a fresh action with
substantially the same reliefs."
It is this
decision that the appellants
have appealed against to this
court on the following grounds;
A .The Court
erred in reversing the
legally-correct judgment of the
High Court of Kumasi.
B. The
judgment is against the weight
of affidavit evidence.
C. Additional
grounds to be filed on receipt
of certified true copy of the
judgment.
(No
additional grounds were filed or
argued).
Reading
through the written submissions
of the appellants herein we find
it incomprehensible how learned
counsel for the appellant had
gotten the issue at stake so
wrong. It is as if he being
unable to find an answer to the
true legal position as espoused
by the Learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal deliberately
misconstrued the issue for
whatever effect we cannot
fathom!
By his
application before the High
Court that has culminated in the
appeal before this court, the
appellant herein was simply
saying that despite the fact
that the respondent’s first
action was discontinued with
liberty to come back, in view of
the fact that appellant’s
counterclaim was still pending,
the filing of a fresh action by
the respondent on the same
subject matter constituted an
abuse of process. The
application was not premised on
res judicata at that stage.
Counsel's only reference to the
issue of res judicata was to
speculate that it was because he
had raised the issue of res
judicata in his defence that the
respondent had been forced to
discontinue his action.
Though the
issue of the abuse of process
found favour with the trial
judge, even she did not buy into
counsel’s veiled submission on
res judicata. This is what she
said;
“Whether the
decisions the
defendant/applicant is relying
on to raise a defence of res
judicata is applicable or not,
it is an issue that can be
determined by the court in that
suit. The present writ of
summons before me is hereby
dismissed as constituting an
abuse of the process.”
In his
written submissions, while
applauding the ruling of the
High Court as the legally
correct position of the law,
learned counsel has criticised
the Learned Justices of the
Court of Appeal in rather harsh
and uncomplimentary terms. After
erroneously expending all his
energies on the non issue of res
judicata he said;
“My
lords it cannot be denied that
the Court of Appeal erred in
arriving at the decision the
subject matter of the appeal.
Having regard to the
above, it cannot be controverted
that the decision of the
Court of Appeal reversing the
trial court is legally
untenable. Firstly, the Court of
Appeal asked itself the wrong
question by putting undue
emphasis on the discontinuance
with liberty. That was a wrong
question because it would have
been relevant if no counterclaim
were pending before the high
court even after discontinuance.
The pendency of the said
counterclaim meant that issues
had been joined in relation to
the same subject matter between
the same parties. It is thus
erroneous for the
plaintiff/appellant/respondent
to be permitted to initiate
another suit relative to the
same subject matter between the
parties.
The posing and answering of the
wrong question by the honorable
court made it embark on an
enquiry which was clearly
extraneous to the relevant
issues before their lordships at
the Court of Appeal. This path
of error has undoubtedly
occasioned a substantial
miscarriage of justice to
defendant/respondent/appellant
which this august court ought to
correct.”
Contrary to
what the appellant said in his
statement of case we believe the
Learned Justices of the Court of
Appeal actually asked themselves
the right question and came to
the right decision!
In his
reasoned opinion, Duose JA said:
“I have thoroughly perused the
brief but concise written
submissions of Counsel in the
case. I am however of the
opinion that the crux of this
appeal will be the determination
of the effect of the grant of an
application of a discontinuance
of a suit with liberty. What is
the procedural legal effect,
when a suit is discontinued with
liberty? This literally means
that the party in whose favour
such an application is granted
has the liberty, after the case
has been discontinued to
institute a fresh action”
It is our
view that the question that the
Court of Appeal asked itself was
at the heart of the problem and
it was perfectly answered by
them making their decision
unassailable!
Order 26
rule1 of the old High court
Rules LN 140 A provides as
follows;
“The
plaintiff may, at any time
before receipt of the defendants
defence, or after the receipt
thereof before taking any other
proceeding in the action (save
any interlocutory application),
by notice in writing, wholly
discontinue his action against
all or any of the defendants or
withdraw any part or parts of
his alleged cause of complaint,
and thereupon he shall pay such
defendant’s cost of action, or
if the action be not wholly
discontinued, the costs
occasioned by the matter so
withdrawn. Such costs shall be
taxed and such discontinuance or
withdrawal, as the case may be,
shall not be a defence to any
subsequent action. Save as in
this rule otherwise provided, it
shall not be competent for the
plaintiff to withdraw the record
or discontinue the action
without leave of the Court or
Judge, but the Court or a Judge
may, before, or at, or after the
hearing or trial, upon such
terms as to costs, and as to any
other action, and otherwise as
may be just, order the action to
be discontinued, or any part of
the alleged cause of complaint
to be struck out”.
The effect of
this rule vis-à-vis a party’s
right to bring a fresh action in
respect of the same subject
matter in a suit that has been
discontinued has been given
judicial interpretation in a
legion of cases. In the
unreported case of Foly
Adama vrs Messrs Norpalm ASV and
one other civil suit no
212/2002 Sekondi Dotse J as
he then was said
“It
must be noted that the effect of
a discontinuance with leave does
not operate as estoppel and the
effects of a discontinuance with
leave is based on the order of
the court granting such leave.
In other words, the court would
determine whether the grant of
leave to discontinue is subject
to liberty to institute a fresh
action or not.”
See also
Nmako Salt
Concession; Concession enquiry
no. 1120(Accra) 1962 GLR354
Amoako AttaII
v Osei KofiII [1962]1GLR
AhenkoraII
vKumah [1963] 1GLR 77
In his lucid
judgment in the case of
Amoako vrs. Kwan [1975]1 GLR 25,
after reviewing a host of cases
on the subject, Osei Hwere J, as
he then was, said at page 29
“It is rather
unfortunate that our highest
courts have given the very harsh
interpretation to the
construction placed by the Court
of Appeal on the rule regulating
discontinuance with leave in
Fox v. Star Newspaper Ltd.
Our courts have interpreted the
ruling that it is only by the
discretion of the judge that the
plaintiff can discontinue with
the right to bring another
action to mean that where the
plaintiff discontinues with the
leave of the court and he does
not obtain leave to bring a
fresh action he will be estopped
from doing so: see Biei v.
Assah (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 303
at p. 305. I think that the
better interpretation of the
construction placed on the rule
should be that where the
discontinuance is with leave,
unless the order giving the
leave expressly prohibits the
commencement of a fresh action,
it must be no bar to the
plaintiff bringing a fresh
action except the nature of the
order concludes the matter
between the parties. Where the
order merely strikes out the
action which is discontinued but
is silent as to the right of
commencing a fresh action it
must not operate as a bar to the
plaintiff. Where, on the other
hand, it dismisses the action
and it is silent as to the right
to bring a fresh action, it must
operate as an estoppel.”
Like Osei
Hwere, we are of the view that
where an action is discontinued
with leave of the court, unless
the court’s order striking out
the action specifically
prohibits it, the applicant for
leave to discontinue is
perfectly within his or her
rights to bring a fresh action
on the same subject and on the
same facts between the same
parties.
But in this
case the issue is even much
simpler. The respondent was
granted leave to discontinue
with liberty to come back. So
how could another court come to
the conclusion that a fresh
action filed pursuant to leave
granted by another court of
concurrent jurisdiction is an
abuse of process?
This, as the
Court of Appeal rightly held,
was the crux of the matter. And
as said earlier it was rightly
resolved in favour of the
respondent herein and we do not
think we ought to disturb it.
Even though
we believe this discourse should
dispose of the appeal we will
briefly touch on the subject of
res judicata of which the
appellant seems to so enamoured!
In the case
of Dahabieh vs. Turqui
cited by counsel for the
appellant it was held;
“It is a well known rule of law
that a person cannot bring an
action where the cause of his
claim or the issue he seeks to
have determined has as between
the parties or their privies
already been disposed of by a
competent court. This is
a salutary rule intended to
prevent the harassment of people
by a multiplicity of law suits.
Accordingly the rule is framed
widely enough to cover not only
matters which are actually
dealt with in the previous
judgment but those as
well which ought to have been
brought up then but which were
not.”(emphasis added)
Then in the
case of SPEEDLINE
STEVEDORINGCO.LTD; REPUBLIC VRS
HIGH COURT, EX PARTE BRENYA
2001/2002SC GLR 775'
also cited by couinsel it was
said,
" for a
judgment to operate as res
judicata, it must be valid
and subsisting, that is it must
be a final judgment
delivered by a court of
competent
jurisdiction."(emphasis added)
Reading
through the written submissions
of learned counsel for the
appellant it is not easy to
discern why he is raising res
judicata. Is the res
here referring to the two
judgments referred to in his
counterclaims which he claims
dealt with the subject matter or
he is referring to the earlier
suit filed by the plaintiff
which has been discontinued? If
he is referring to the two
earlier judgments then clearly
he got a legally correct answer
from the learned High Court
judge when she said:
“Whether the
decisions the
defendant/applicant is relying
on to raise a defence of res
judicata is applicable or
not, it is an issue that can be
determined by the court in that
suit.”
If on the
other hand the res here
refers to the discontinued
action then the Dahabieh and
Brenya cases cited are clearly
inapplicable as that suit was
not tried or any judgment given
that decided the rights of the
parties in that case.
In this
courts recent decision in the
case of The Republic V
National House of Chiefs Ex
parte Odeneho Krofa
Krukoko(Enimil VI Interested
Party) Civil Appeal No
J4/18/2009 dated 2nd
Dec 2009, (to be reported in
2010 SCGLR at page 134,
Dr Date Bah JSC said this of
res judicata in relation to
interlocutory matters.
“In
the case of Pocklington
Foods Inc. v. Alberta
(Provincial Treasurer), (1995)
123 D.L.R. (4th) 141,
the Alberta Court of
Appeal determined that res
judicata and issue estoppel did
not apply to procedural
interlocutory motions. I agree
with this view of the law and I
am not aware of any Ghanaian
precedent to the contrary which
is binding on this Court. I
consider therefore that this
Court should follow the
persuasive authority of that
decision. This view is also in
accord with the opinion of the
leading text writer on the
Ghanaian law of evidence, the
late Justice Ofori Boateng,
who in his The Ghana Law of
Evidence (at p.18) spells
out certain preconditions which
have to be established first
before estoppel per rem
judicatam can apply. Among
these he spells out the
following:
“(iii) That the
judgment was final, in that it
determined the disputed rights
of the parties in the case, and
was not just an interlocutory
judgment, for example, a
preliminary matter such as
interim injunction, or committal
order in a criminal trial, or a
coroner’s finding relating to
cause of death.
(iv) That the
judgment was on the merits of
the case. A judgment will not
be on the merits of the case if,
for example, the case was
dismissed for want of
prosecution, or in default of
appearance or any procedural
step.
(v) Nolle
prosequi granted will not
constitute a decision on
merits. In a civil action a
case discontinued before
judgment will also not be a
judgment on the merits of the
case. But a party to a suit who
suffers an adverse judgment
through default will be estopped
from raising a defence in a
subsequent judgment;…”
This is the
state of the law on the
principle of res judicata.
In the
instant appeal the respondent
merely discontinued his first
action with the leave of the
court which also granted him
liberty to come back. And as
Apaloo JA as he the was said in
the case of ATTA KWADWO AND
OTHERS v. BADU 1977 1GLR 1
holding 1;
“The notice
of discontinuance and the order
for costs against the respondent
made pursuant to it wholly
terminated the proceedings.
Although the respondent was
given liberty to bring a fresh
action, he might not do so, and
even if he did, that action
would not be a continuation of
the first but an entirely new
action”(emphasis added)
From whatever
angle you look at it this appeal
clearly lacks any merit, so same
is dismissed. The decision of
the Court of Appeal is confirmed
and the matter is remitted to
the High Court for trial on its
merits.
P.
BAFFOE-BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
YEBOAH, JSC:-
I had the privilege of reading
beforehand the opinion of my
learned brother Baffoe-Bonnie
JSC. I entirely agree with him
that the appeal be dismissed. I
am, however, adding few words of
my own in support of his
opinion.
In the affidavit in support of
the application for striking out
the action at the High Court,
the Respondent herein deposed to
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said
affidavit as follows:
“6. That my counterclaim is
pending before the High Court,
Kumasi presided over by Justice
Winfred Kpentey.
7. That with full knowledge of
the pendency of my counterclaim
which is inextricably linked to
the reliefs sought in the
instant suit, the plaintiff has
commenced another action”
In my opinion, it appears the
defendant has misconstrued what
a counterclaim is in civil
proceedings of this nature. The
defendant is of the view that in
so far as his counterclaim is
actively pending and relates to
the very subject –matter of the
claim the plaintiff should not
be allowed to prosecute his
action by a fresh writ of
summons. The Supreme Court in
the case of GBEDEMA V.
AWOONOR-WILIAMS [1970] CC 12
threw some light on the nature
of a counterclaim:
“A counterclaim is to all
intends and purposes an action
by the applicant against the
respondent. It is an
independent and separate action”
The court relied on the case of
WINTERFIELD V. BRADNUM 3
QBD 324 in which BRETT LJ said
at page 326 as follows:
“A counterclaim is sometimes a
mere set-off; sometimes it is in
the nature of a cross-action;
sometimes it is in respect of a
wholly independent transaction.
I think the true mode of
considering the claim and
counterclaim is that they are
wholly independent suits which
for convenience of procedure are
continued in one action”.
Bowen LJ also said in AMON V.
BOBBETT [1889] 22 QBD
543,548 as follows:
“A counterclaim is to be treated
for all purposes for which
justice requires it to be so
treated, as an independent
action”
Lord Esher MR. in STUMORE V.
CAMPBELL & CO [1892] IQB
314, at page 317 said,
“For
all purposes except those of
execution a claim and a
counterclaim are two independent
actions”
From the line of authorities
therefore, it is settled that a
counterclaim is in law a
separate and independent action
which is tried together with the
original claim of the plaintiff.
It follows that if in the course
of an action in which there is a
counterclaim and the plaintiff’s
claim is struck out, dismissed,
discontinued or stayed the
defendant can proceed to
prosecute his counterclaim as it
is independent of the original
claim even though a counterclaim
has no separate suit number
different from the original
suit. In practice, a
counterclaim may be claimed from
entirely new cause of action
unrelated to the original claim
and even against new parties who
were not appearing as parties in
the original action. An action
in tort against a defendant
could attract a counterclaim
from the defendant in contract.
The learned authors of BULLEN &
LEAKE & JACOBS: PRECEDENTS OF
PLEADINGS 18TH
Edition at page 98 said of a
counterclaim as follows:
“In short, therefore, if the
defendant has a valid cause of
action of any description
against a plaintiff, there is no
necessity for him to bring a
separate cross-action, since
he can make a counterclaim in
the same action against the
plaintiff”
As the defendant’s counterclaim
was a separate action in law,
even though the subject-matter
of the claim and counterclaim
were the same, the plaintiff was
in law at liberty to issue a
fresh writ to determine his
interest in the subject –matter.
The plaintiff as a citizen of
this country is entitled under
the constitution to own property
and can exercise his right to
sue to protect same, subject of
course to the existing laws
regulating his access to the
courts for redress.
I find no case law or rule of
procedure inhibiting the
plaintiff’s right to commence
fresh action under the
circumstances. There is
obviously no merit in this
appeal and I accordingly vote
for its dismissal.
ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
W. A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
DR. S. K.
DATE-BAH
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
B. T.
ARYEETEY
JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
KWASI AFRIFA
FOR THE
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT.
K. A.
ASANTE-KROBEA FOR THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT. |
