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JUDGMENT
ANINAKWAH, J.S.C.
The Appellants are both British
subjects. On the 28th
day of January, 2004, they were
charged jointly with four (4)
others on two Counts:-
1. Engaging in Criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence
relating to Narcotic Drug
contrary to Section 56(c.) of
the Narcotic Drugs (Control,
Enforcement and Sanctions) Law,
P.N.D.C.L 236.
Particulars of the offence given
as follows:-
“Kevin Dinsdale Gorman, Mohammed
Kamil, John David Logan, Frank
David Laverick, Allan William
Hodgson and Sven Leonhard Herb
between September 2003 and 7th
January 2004 in Spain, United
Kingdom and Tema Ghana engaged
in Criminal conspiracy to commit
an offence relating to narcotic
drug”.
2. Possession of Narcotic Drugs
without Lawful Authority
contrary to Section 2 of the
Narcotic Drugs (Control,
Enforcement and Sanctions) Law,
1990, P.N.D.C.L. 236.
The particulars of this offence
are given thus:
“ Kevin Dinsdale Gorman,
Mohammed Ibrahim Kamil, John
David Logan, Frank David
Laverick, Allan William Hodgson
and Sven Leonhard Herb between
30th December, 2003
and 7th January, 2004
at Tema in the Greater Accra
Region and within the
jurisdiction of this Tribunal
had in their possession 588.33
Kilograms of Cocaine, a Narcotic
Drug”.
All the accused persons pleaded
“NOT guilty” and were remanded
in custody.
After a full trial all the
accused persons were convicted
and Sentenced to 20 (Twenty)
years I.H.L each, sentences to
run concurrently.
Dissatisfied with their
convictions and sentences, John
David Logan, Frank David
Laverick and Allan William
Hodgson appealed to the Court of
Appeal on many and various
grounds.
On 4th November 2005,
the Court of Appeal by a
Majority of 2 to 1 decision
dismissed the appellants’
appeal.
Still not satisfied, the
appellants, this time – John
David Logan, and Frank David
Laverick are now before this
Court on appeal and praying that
their convictions be quashed and
sentences set aside. Their
appeal is grounded on as many as
Seven (7) Original grounds and
four additional grounds with
most of them repeating
themselves. For purposes of this
Appeal I find ground (a) of the
original grounds and ground 4 of
the additional grounds both of
them saying the same thing as
the most pertinent grounds, and
are hereby stated as one
hereunder.
“ That the Verdicts of both the
trial Court and the Court of
Appeal are unreasonable and not
supported by the evidence on
record”.
Other grounds would be referred
to in the course of this
judgment as and when the need
arises.
The nature of the charges
against accused persons is such
that it requires the full
knowledge of the facts in order
to properly appreciate the kind
of evidence adduced to prove the
same. The facts as presented by
the prosecution are therefore
quoted “in extenso” hereunder.
“Following intelligence reports
received from International
Sister Agencies by the Narcotic
Board in Ghana concerning
Narcotic drugs the Ghana
Narcotic Control mounted
surveillance on the 1st
Accused for about a year ago.
The first Accused is a Director,
Shareholder and Operation
Manager of Shipping Company
called TUNA T-GO based in Tema.
On 7/1/2004 acting on further
Intelligence information a
combined team of the Narcotic
Control Board and the Drugs Law
Enforcement Unit of the Police
Service raided the residence of
the 1st Accused,
where it discovered bails and
parcel of whitish substances
suspected to be cocaine
concealed in a special
compartment or hole in a wall
within the corridor upstairs
behind a large dressing mirror.
My Lord, the 1st
Accused together with 3rd,
4th and 5th
Accused person who were in the
house at the time were
confronted with the substances.
In reaction, the 1st
Accused said the items were
brought there by one Yakuba for
safe keeping (by the 1st
Accused) for a fee of
(US$50,000.00 Dollars) Fifty
thousand US dollars. While this
was going on the 6th Accused who
had arrived at the residence of
the 1st Accused
together with all other accused
persons except the 2nd
Accused person were arrested and
sent to Narcotic Control Board
Offices together with the items.
The items were forwarded to
Ghana Standards Board for
examination. My Lord, further
investigation by the Police and
Narcotic Control Board revealed
that all the accused persons
were engaged in criminal
conspiracy to commit crime
relating to Narcotic Drugs. At
the trial evidence will be led
to show that A4 came from Spain
to Ghana on 15/9/03 and on
17/9/2003 he together with the 1st
Accused (A1) traveled to Brazil
and continued to Venezuela
ostensibly to procure cement for
prospective customers in Calabar
in Nigeria and Mallagu in
Equatorial Guinea. They returned
to Ghana on 29/9/03. We shall
lead evidence at the trial to
show that they did not go there
for cement.
Further evidence disclosed that
the 1st Accused used
3 operational passports, two
British passports and one
America. And the 4th
Accused also uses two
operational British passports.
My Lord A4 returned to Spain and
was later joined by A1. From
Spain A1 travelled shortly to
America (U.S) and returned on
27/12/03 and met A3, and A5 in
London. In London A1 gave A3
£8,000.00 and U$5,500.00 Dollars
to be brought to Ghana for
him. Our investigation reveals
that this was brought down to
Ghana to A1.
My Lord further investigations
revealed that on 30/12/2003 the
A1 returned to Ghana from London
with a lot of foreign currency.
In the evening of the same day
the A2 who was later arrested
came to collect the money in a
polythene bag in the house of A1
at night and left that same
night of 30/12/2003 at about 11
p.m. After A2 had collected the
money from A1 they both met at
Prampram Beach Lodge to await
the arrival of a canoe to take
delivery according to them,
cartons of fish and food. This
canoe did arrive powered by 2
outboard motors carrying big
parcels or bail of certain items
which were off loaded and later
re-loaded into a van which had
been brought there by A2 for
conveyance. My Lord, the canoe
which brought the items was A6
and one Craig whose whereabouts
is up to now not known. Evidence
will reveal that A1 supervised
the loading and off loading of
the items from the canoe into
the van. They also engaged the
services of workers of the Lodge
to off-load the items after
which they were given
¢200,000.00 each. On the
following day 31/12/2003 the A2
brought the items in two
consignments to the A1’s house.
The items with the assistance of
a witness (who will testify were
sent upstairs in the room of A1
which items were later concealed
in a compartment as earlier
mentioned. My Lord, the items as
earlier indicated were forwarded
to the Ghana Standards Board for
examination and the same found
to be positively narcotic Drugs
i.e. Cocaine. My Lord, we intend
calling six witnesses to prove
our case against the accused
persons herein.”
These are the facts as given by
the prosecution, and in support
of which evidence was led to
prove the prosecution’s case
against the accused persons. And
whatever evidence that was led
in support should directly
concern and be in line with the
particulars of the offence as
given by the prosecution. This
admonishing becomes necessary
when particulars of A1 and A4’s
travels from Spain to Ghana and
to Brazil and continued to
Venezuela, then to Calabar in
Nigeria and Mallegu in
Equitorial Guinea are given.
These places mentioned in the
facts of the case do not form
part of the particulars of the
offences given by the
prosecution and therefore
should not have any place in the
scheme of reckoning in this
case.
Any attempt to connect any of
the accused persons to these
places mentioned would amount to
importation of evidence not
forming part of the case, and
which if relied upon would
amount to miscarriage of
justice.
In supports of its case, the
prosecution called 12 witnesses,
5 of whom gave eye witnesses
account of how the cocaine
arrived at A1’s house.
None of the 5 eye witnesses gave
any evidence or at all
implicating any of the two
appellants John David Logan and
Frank David Laverick and none of
the remaining 7 witnesses gave
any direct evidence or at all to
incriminate any of them in
either the conspiracy charge or
that of possession. The only
evidence of note against the two
Appellants is that the police
met them in 1st
Accused’s house during the raid
into the house and arrested
them. And the question is
whether their mere presence in
the 1st Accused’s house at the
material time, without any
evidence implicating them
justified conviction.
The Appellants John David Logan
and Frank David Laverick were
charged together with 4 others
with the offences of CONSPIRACY
and POSSESSION.
All parties to this case,
Lawyers and the Lower Courts
have done justice to the offence
of Conspiracy. They have
adequately and accurately spelt
out in no uncertain terms as to
what constitute the offence of
Conspiracy under our Criminal
Law. I will therefore refer to
only a few statute and case law
definitions, which I find
relevant to this case.
Sections 23(1) of the Criminal
Code, 1960 (Act 29) defines
Conspiracy thus:-
“If two or more persons agree or
act together with a common
purpose for or in committing or
abetting a crime, whether with
or without any previous concert
or deliberation to commit or
abet that crime, as the case may
be.”
And in the oft - quoted case of
The State Vrs. Otchere & Ors.
[1963] 2 GLR, 463, the Supreme
Court observed at page 471
thus:-
“That the law of conspiracy as
stated in our Criminal Code
embodies the principles of the
English law of Conspiracy as
enunciated in judicial decisions
of the English Courts.”
The Supreme Court made
references to the following
English cases-
In the case of R. v
Meyrick [1929] 21 Cr. App
p.94 at 99, Lord Hewart C.J
delivering the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeal in
England referred to two
passages from the judgments in
the cases of R vs. Mulcahy
[1868] LR 3HL 306 HL and R vs.
Brisac [1803] 4 East 164; 102
ER. 792 respectively and to the
charge to the jury in R. vs
Parnell as together embodying
the English Law on the subject.
In R v Mulcahy, Willess J
stated thus;- “A conspiracy
consists not merely in the
intention of two or more, but in
the agreement of two or more to
do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.
So long as such a design rests
in intention only, it is not
indictable. When two agree to
carry it into effect, the very
plot is an act in itself, and
the act of each of the parties,
actus contra actum, capable of
being enforced, if lawful,
punishable if for a criminal
object or for the use of
criminal means”.
In R vs. Brisac, Grose J stated,
“conspiracy is a matter of
inference deduced from certain
criminal acts of the parties
accused done in pursuance of an
apparent criminal purpose in
common between them”.
In R vs. Parnell, Fitzgerald J
in his reference to the jury
said:
“It may be that the alleged
conspirators have never seen
each other, and have never
corresponded, one may have never
heard the name of the other, and
yet by the law they may be
parties to the same common
criminal agreement”.
“Thus in some of the Fenian
cases tried in this country, it
frequently happened that one of
the conspirators was in America
the other in this country, that
they never seen each other but
that there were acts on both
sides which led the jury to the
inference, and they drew it,
that they were engaged in
accomplishing the same common
object, and when they had
arrived at this conclusion the
acts of one became evidence
against the other”.
At the close of prosecution’s
case, there was no evidence from
which it could be inferred that
the appellants John David Logan
and Frank David Laverick had
involved themselves with any of
the other 4 accused persons to
perform any criminal acts in
pursuance of any criminal
purpose in common among them.
On the possession charge it is
in evidence that when the Police
arrived at A1’s house they
conducted a thorough search on
the bodies and rooms of the
accused persons. There is no
evidence that the appellants
herein had any knowledge or at
all of the existence of the
cocaine in A1’s house, let alone
having possession of the drugs.
This, notwithstanding, and as
the accused persons were tried
summarily, the trial court
exercised its jurisdiction under
sections 173 and 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ghana
(1960) (Act 30) and formed the
opinion that a case had been
made out against the accused
sufficiently to require them to
make their defence.
Sections 173 and 174 dealing
with summary trials state thus:-
173 “If at the close of the
evidence in support of the
charge, it appears to the court
that a case is not made against
the accused sufficiently to
require him to make a defence,
that Court shall, as to that
charge acquit him”.
174 “At the close of the
evidence in support of the
charge, if it appears to the
Court that a case is made out
against the accused
sufficiently to require him to
make a defence, the Court shall
call upon him to enter into
his defence and shall remind
him of the charge and inform him
that, if he so desires, he may
give evidence himself on Oath
or make a Statement …..”.
It is not clear what evidence
informed the trial Court to
exercise its discretion under
Section 174 and called upon the
Appellants John David Logan and
Frank David Laverick to make
their defence. As at the close
of the evidence for the
prosecution, there was no direct
or circumstantial evidence
implicating the 2 Appellants.
In conspiracy charges such as
the one in our instant case
where there is no direct
evidence, the conspiracy
therefore, as Grose J put it :-
“Is a matter of inference, to
be deduced from the physical
Criminal acts of the parties
accused, done in pursuance of an
apparent Criminal purpose in
common between them”.
The Supreme Court in the case of
The State vs. Ali Kassena
[1962]1 GLR p144 at 149
pronounced on Section 173 of the
Criminal Procedure Code,1960
(Act 30) thus:
“Section 173 is concerned with
Summary trials where the judge
decides both questions of law
and fact. It is for the judge in
a summary trial to weigh the
evidence and then decide whether
from the facts proved the guilt
of the accused can be inferred.
Evidence is said to be
sufficient when it is of such
probative force as to convince
and which if un-contradicted
will justify a conviction. The
Supreme Court quoted with
approval the opinion of Lord
Wright in Casewell v Powell
Duffryn Associated Collieries
Ltd. [1940] AC 152 p 169 thus: -
“There can be no inference
unless there are objective facts
from which to infer the other
facts which it is sought to
establish. In some cases the
other facts can be inferred with
as much practical certainty as
if they had actually been
observed. In other cases the
inference does not go beyond
reasonable probability. But if
there are no positive proved
facts from which the inference
can be made, the method of
inference fails and what is left
is mere speculation and
suspicion.”
The Supreme Court continued –
“where therefore, the evidence
adduced on behalf of the
prosecution fails to take the
case out of the realm of
conjecture, the evidence is best
described as ‘insufficient’-. It
is the type of evidence which
because it cannot convince,
cannot be believed, and
therefore is incapable of
sustaining conviction. In these
circumstances it would be wrong
in a summary trial to over-rule
a submission of no case to
answer.”
In the instant Appeal, it is
clear that there is no evidence
on record to support conviction.
Section 173 is mandatory, the
operative word is shall,
thereby giving no option to the
trial court where a case is not
made out against the accused
sufficiently to require him to
make a defence.
There
being no such evidence the trial
court erred in calling upon the
appellants to make a defence.
We agree with the minority
opinion that by the Court so
erring, grave miscarriage of
justice has been occasioned and
that on the authority of the
Supreme Court cases of
Donkor vs. The State
[1964] GLR 598 and Nyarko vs.
The State [1963] 2GLR p.59, the
appellants were wrongly called
upon to make their defence.
In Donkor v. The State (supra)
the Supreme Court held that
where the defence is wrongly
called upon, the fact that the
accused gives incriminating
evidence filling the omissions
for the prosecution will not
change the legal position
especially where no offence has
been alleged or proved by the
prosecution. This statement by
the Supreme Court re-echoed the
same sentiments expressed by the
Supreme Court in Donkor v. The
State (supra).
We will therefore, like the
judge in the Minority decision
quash the convictions and set
aside their sentences.
When the appellants Logan and
Laverick opened their defence
they produced such concrete
evidence, that turned out to be
more consistent with innocence
than with guilt. The gravamen
of their evidence was that they
had planned to travel on to
Nigeria for the release of an
Oil Tanker owned by Frank David
Laverick and managed by John
David Logan, which at that time
was being held in the Nigerian
Navy.
These two men according to their
evidence stopped in Ghana on
their way to Nigeria to consult
first accused – David Dinsdale
Gorman, who held Power of
Attorney over the vessel. The
two appellants tendered genuine
documents to support their
defence to the satisfaction of
the trial Judge. It was on one
of the mornings they spent at
Gorman’s house, i.e. on the 7th
January 2004, when the Police
raided the house, met them there
and arrested them.
When the Police discovered the
drugs from the hidden
compartment the first accused,
Gorman, the owner of the house
readily admitted that he put the
drugs in the secret compartment
for a friend called YAKUBA at an
agreed fee of $50,000.00 US
Dollars.
Logan and Laverick had their
rooms and bodies searched, but
nothing was found on them. They
could, therefore, be said to be
“at that wrong place at the
wrong time”.
Despite being satisfied with
their defence the trial judge
went ahead to convict and
sentence them. The said
conviction and sentence were by
a majority of 2-1 affirmed by
the Court of Appeal, which found
no merit in the appellants
appeal.
In support of his judgment the
trial judge made some dangerous
and damning findings against 3rd
and 4th accused. As
there was no direct evidence
against them, the trial judge
based his said findings on
alleged circumstantial evidence.
According to him, “linking
the 1st accused to
his imaginary spokes of a wheel,
the prosecution had it that 1st
accused went to overseas to meet
the 3rd and 4th
Accused persons and travelled
with 4th accused to
Venezuela and met the 3rd
accused in Spain before
Christmas in 2003. And soon
after the return of the 1st
accused to Ghana, the 3rd,
5th and 4th
accused travelled to Ghana at a
shorter (sic) intervals, namely
2/1/2004; 3/1/2004 and 6/1/2004
respectively. Then the 1st
accused instructed the 6th
accused to pick the 3rd
and 4th accused
persons at Kotoka International
Airport when they arrived in
Ghana on 3/1/2004 and 6/1/2004
respectively which he did.
To me the 3rd and 4th
accused did not travel to Europe
and South America with 1st
Accused respectively for
nothing. They travelled on a
purpose to procure the goods in
question i.e. Narcotics Drugs,
Cocaine. The purposes of the
travel was for procuring,
exporting and may be
distributing or selling the
stuff, cocaine.
The defence on the other hand
had submitted to the contrary.
The main reasons given by the 3rd
and 4th accused was
that they have come together to
resolve their differences in
respect of oil tanker business
in Nigeria to resolve the
differences between them in
respect of their oil tanker on
which the 1st accused
held a Power of Attorney for the
4th accused.
The 3rd and 4th
accused person have provided
credible evidence that they deal
with that oil tanker business. I
therefore find that they are in
Oil tanker business.
Nonetheless, I also find that
they (1st, 3rd
and 4th accused
persons) are also in narcotic
business since the three of them
can do more than one business.
Secondly, I find that the reason
being given by the 3rd
and 4th accused
persons for their presence in
Ghana was a ruse in that:-
(1) The 3rd and
4th accused persons
came upon the heels of one
another i.e. the 3rd
accused came to Ghana on
2/1/2004 while the 4th
accused also arrived in Ghana on
6/1/2004, and they were picked
up by the 6th accused
at Airport in Accra on the
instructions of the 1st
accused.
It is my considered opinion that
the fact that 1st
accused instructed the 6th
accused to pick the 3rd
and 4th accused
persons from the Airport on
their arrival in Ghana on
2/1/2004 and 6/1/2004
respectively presupposes that
there was an arrangement between
the 1st accused and
them.
I therefore find that the
arrivals by the 3rd
and 4th accused
persons in Ghana and their
convergence in the 1st
accused house have been
pre-designed to further their
diabolical plans in pursuit of
their dealings in cocaine. And
that it was fortuitous that they
converged in the house of the 1st
accused with others – i.e. 1st,
5th and 6th
accused persons to see whether
the goods-cocaine had arrived at
the place in which they were
meant to be stored.
(2) They said that they
were on their way to Nigeria but
I consider that that was false.
They had not procured a visa to
visit that country at the time
of their arrest on 7/1/2004,
even though they claimed they
were visiting that country on
9/1/2004.
(3) Even though the 3rd
accused has a rented place of
abode at house No. H11/N11
Community 2, Tema, where the 1st
accused’s house is, he never
went to stay there. That was not
surprising because he well knew
that the offending matter had
landed or about to land in Ghana
and that he ought to stay
together with the
co-conspirators to clinch the
deal. The reason that he (3rd
accused) give the court amply
belied his purpose of staying in
the 1st accused’s
house. He said that he was in
arrears of rent with his
landlord even though he admitted
that; he was not under any
harassment or threat of ejection
from him.
I therefore find that the
presence of the 3rd
and 4th accused
persons in the 1st
accused’s house could not have
been coincidental or accidental,
but for the purpose of engaging
in criminal conspiracy.
I further find that the 1st,
3rd, and 4th
accused persons were also in
conspiracy in relating to the
subject matter of the charge(s)
before this court. Accordingly,
I convict them (1st 3rd
and 4th accused
persons) together with the 2nd,
5th and 6th
accused persons on the charge of
conspiracy”.
These are inferences allegedly
drawn from circumstantial
evidence on the record. And the
question then is, speaking as an
appellate Court, whether, in
fact, such inferences were drawn
from facts that really existed
in the evidence, and whether
these findings, based on such
inferences are supported by
evidence on record.
Our answers to these questions
can only be in the negative.
These findings of the trial
judge are a mixture bag of
imported evidence, falsehoods
and little truths. The only
truths from it being pieces of
evidence concerning the arrivals
of the 3rd and 4th
accused from overseas and their
being picked by the 6th
accused and their staying at 1st
accused’s house.
All other pieces of the evidence
are mere fantasies, not borne
out of the evidence on record.
For circumstantial evidence to
support a conviction, it must be
inconsistent with innocence of
the accused. It must lead to
irresistible conclusion not only
that the Crime charged had been
committed, but it was in fact
committed by the persons charged
in order to arrive at a definite
conclusion.
Conviction based on
circumstantial evidence that has
no facts supporting it, as is
seen in the instant case, is
therefore, wrong.
As has already been stated the
defence put up by the Appellants
was more consistent with
innocence than with guilt and on
the authority of R vs. ANSERE
3WALR 385 at 387, the
trial Court should have given
the benefit of the doubt created
by the appellants’ defence to
the appellants and acquitted and
discharged them. The findings in
support of the conviction are
mere speculations and
suspicions.
When the case came before the
Court of Appeal, the Honourable
Lords by a majority of 2-1
dismissed the appeal. The Court
of Appeal held that there was
substantial circumstantial
evidence to sustain the charges
beyond reasonable doubt against
the appellants Logan and
Laverick in the absence of any
direct evidence against them.
This holding cannot be supported
having regard to certain
findings by Akamba JA in his
lead judgment. In his
submissions the Learned Court of
Appeal judge stated among others
thus:
“The appellants in their written
submission have raised a number
of issues, which according to
them, informed albeit wrongly,
the conclusions of the trial
judge.
They contend that the conduct of
the trial judge in his attempt
to “bridge the gap” in the
evidence and misstating the
facts has led to a miscarriage
of justice.
For instance the trial judge
alluded to 3rd and 4th
appellants as having travelled
to Europe and South America with
the 1st accused
respectively for the purpose of
procuring, exporting and may be
distributing or selling the
stuff, cocaine”.
Reacting to the said contention
of the appellants, Akamba JA,
stated thus:-
“There is however nothing on
record to support his finding.
There is equally no evidence to
suggest that the narcotic
substance retrieved from the
A1’s house was procured from
Europe and South America and by
3rd and 4th
Appellants”.
Akamba JA stated further thus:-
“Counsel for the 3rd
and 4th appellants
also referred to other
conclusions made by the trial
judge, which were not backed by
evidence”.
“This includes the finding that
even though the 3rd
and 4th appellants
dealt in the Oil business they
were also in the narcotic
business, which latter finding
is based upon suspicion and
speculation. There is no doubt
that even though the trial judge
lapsed into certain conclusions
bordering on speculations and
suspicions as recounted above,
there was nevertheless
substantial circumstantial
evidence to sustain the charge
beyond reasonable doubt against
the 3rd and 4th
appellants and I so hold”.
Akamba JA went on further to
make the following finding
thus:-
“The first count for which the 5th
appellant was charged together
with the 3rd and 4th
appellants and others took place
between September 2003 and 7th
January 2004 which period fell
within the period the 5th
appellant was in Ghana. It is my
finding that although the judge
based his conclusions on some
faulty reasons there was
nevertheless sufficient evidence
to support his conclusion that
the prosecution had proved the
charges against the 3rd
4th and 5th
appellants beyond reasonable
doubt and I so hold.”
Whatever substantial
circumstantial and sufficient
evidence there was that His
Lordship referred to was not
stated. However, throughout the
entire proceedings, what the
prosecution relied on as its
strongest evidence against the
appellants have been their
alleged sequential arrival in
Ghana and their presence at
first accused’s house at the
material time. These pieces of
evidence being relied on by the
prosecution have been so
satisfactorily explained in
their defence to the
satisfaction of the trial judge.
And it was the quality of their
said defence that informed the
prosecution to throw in the
towel at the Court of Appeal.
Again Akamba JA erred when he
tried to place the burden of
proof on the 3rd
appellant at certain stage in
the case.
In considering the fate of the
appellants in this case, our
hearts tell us one thing whilst
our heads tell us another.
However, the Constitutional
imperative created under Article
19 of the 1992 Constitution of
Ghana demands that any person
put before the Court be given a
fair trial. We will listen to
our heads and allow the appeal.
The Minority judgment of the
Court of Appeal is hereby
affirmed. The Majority judgment
is quashed and sentences set
aside.
S.A.B. AKUFFO(MISS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
S. A. BROBBEY
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
J.
ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COUR
MRS. S.
O. ADINYIRA
JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT
R. T. ANINAKWAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
MR. ADDO ATTUAH FOR APPELLANTS.
MR. AGYEMANG-DUODU, PRINCIPAL
STATE ATTORNEY
WITH MRS. SHELA BADU, SENIOR
STATE ATTONEY AND
MS. BARBARA SAKYI, STATE
ATTORNEY, FOR THE
REPUBLIC.
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