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" the 9th day of November, 1937, at 8.30 o'clock in the fore-noon, then and there to answer a suit by DJabarley of ..... against you.

The plaintiff sometime about the year 1929 contracted with the Stool of Begoro by its representatives at the time to wit: Benkumhene Twum Antwi I and his elders and purchased and had conveyed to him in accordance with __ . "native customary law and was 'put into possession of a " portion of stool land situate at Odedeso and measuring two hundred and fifty-five (255) native ropes, for the price of two thousand five hundred and fifty pounds (£2,550), which amount the plaintiff has paid to the said stool.

"It was an implied term of the contract that the "plaintiff and members of his company should be left 'in " undisturbed possession of the land by the defendant stool, " but in breach of agreement the defendant would not leave "the plaintiff in undisturbed possession of the land, and " would not allow the plaintiff and his agents and workmen " to survey the land and the plaintiff therefore claims from "the defendant the sum of five hundred pounds (£500) " damages for the breach of the term of the contract to leave ,. him in ·peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land. "

Sum claimed	£500 damages.
Court fees	10 0 0
Bailiff's fees	0 9 0
Total	£510 9 0

" ST. JOHN YATES,

" Acting Chief Justice."

The defendant after obtaining leave filed the following counterclaim: -

Take notice that. the above-named defendants whilst. denying the plaintiff's claim, by way of counterclaim. "claims from the plaintiff the sum of one thousand and " ninety pounds (£ 1,090) being balance of purchase-price due " and owing by the plaintiff to the defendant in respect of "land situate at Odeoeso in the Begoro Division and " measuring two hundred and fifty-five (255) native ropes.

" Issued at Victoriaborg, Accra, the 22nd day of October, " 1937.

In his affidavit supporting his application for leave to file a

counterclaim the defendant swore, inter alia:-

"2. That the land at Odedeso subject-matter of the suit " herein was agreed to be solo in accordance with " native custom by the stool of the Benkumhene of " Begoro to a group of Krobo farmers for whom the ., plaintiff herein... acted as spokesman.

"3. That of the purchase price of £2,550 for 255 ropes, " £1,460 has been paid leaving a balance of £1,090 " due by the plaintiff herein.

"4. '['hat upon payment of this said balance by the " plaintiff and his people the sale will be complete "in accordance with the requirements of native " custom.

"5. That to avoid multiplicity of suits the defendant " herein desires to file a counterclaim for the sum of "£1,090 in respect of the unpaid balance of the " purchase price."

On the suit coming on for hearing before Yates, J. in the Divisional Court at Accra he made the following order:-

"The parties are referred to the appropriate tribunal " as this is purely a land case over which the Court has no " jurisdiction."

Plaintiff's counsel who was absent when the order was made asked next day that it be reconsidered. The judge acceded to the request and heard argument, after which he gave the following ruling: -

" In this matter the question is whether or not the Court "has jurisdiction? Mr. Bossman submits that the "counterclaim and not the writ of summons discloses the " real issue and is the construction of a contract. He further " relies on Sasraku III v. Mate Kole, West African Court " of Appeal, November 2nd, 1933. In that case the ratio " decidendi was there was nothing to show on the writ of "or pleadings that the lower Court had no jurisdiction. "This case is entirely different, and the claim is £500 "damages for breach of contract entered into and made "between the parties according to native customary law. " That being so and the parties being natives, this Court "has no jurisdiction and the parties are therefore referred " to the appropriate tribunal.

" The plaintiff having brought his action in the wrong " Court the defendant is entitled to costs here but he is not "entitled to any costs he may' have incurred on his "counterclaim as he should have raised the question of " jurisdiction before filing it."

Against that ruling the plaintiff has appealed to this Court on the following grounds:-

"1. That the Court was wrong in deciding from the "mere writ of summons and counterclaim but "without any formal pleadings or counsel's " openings, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain " the suit.

"2. That the writ of summons and counterclaim in the "suit, if anything, disclosed that the issue was " whether the parties had fulfilled or complied with "the terms of the contract of sale and purchase "entered into between them concerning the " land-and that no question of title or ownership " or adverse possession and occupation was involved" and the Court was therefore wrong in deciding it " had no jurisdiction to try that issue as to the terms " of the contract of sale and purchase between the " parties .

•• 3. That the judgment of the Court dismissing the suit " for want of jurisdiction was contrary to law, in "that the Court had no material or other proof " before it that question or issue of ownership, title " or adverse possession or occupation was involved in " the suit, to warrant the said Court to refer the " parties to the competent native tribunal as it did."

The section under which the order was made is section 65 of the Native Administration (Colony) Ordinance (Cap. 76), the material parts of which read as follows:-

" Whenever it shall appear to the Court that any civil " cause or matter brought before it is one properly cognizable " by a tribunal under sections 48, 49 or 50 ..... , the " Court shall stop the further progress of such civil cause or "matter before it, and refer the parties to a competent tribunal

And the relevant parts of section 48 are:-

"48 (1) A Paramount Chief's Tribunal shall have and "may exercise within the state of such paramount chief " civil jurisdiction for the ,hearing and determination of the "causes and matters hereinafter mentioned, whether "commenced by oath, writ of summons, or other lawful " means, in which all parties are natives and the defendant " was at the time when the cause of action arose within such

" State ............. "

., (2) The pauses and matter hereinabove in this section .• referred to are the following:-

In connection with the extracts quoted it may be noted-(l) That under section 65 of chapter 76 it is not the suit but the parties who must be referred to the appropriate tribunal; and {2) In sub-paragraph 2 (c) of section 48 of chapter 76 there is no financial limitation such as that imposed in sub-paragraph 2 (e).

" Personal suits in which the debt, damage, or demand " does not, exceed one hundred pounds;"

Section 17 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap.4) is also relevant,

the material part reading as follows: - '

" Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance " the Supreme Court shall not exercise jurisdiction-

" (Il) in the Gold Coast Colony in any civil cause or " matter subject to the provisions of section 65 of "the Native Administration (Colony) Ordinance

In connection with the extract's quoted it may be noted-(l) That under section 65 of chapter 76 it is not the suit but the parties who must be referred .to the appropriate tribunal; and (2) In sub-paragraph 2 (c) of Section 48 of chapter 76 there is no financial limitation such as that. imposed in sub-paragraph 2 (e).

" Personal suits in which the debt, damage, or demand

" (loess not. exceeding hundred pounds;"

I confess that I am unable to understand the reasons given by the Judge in his ruling for making the order, but I do understand and agree with the argument of the respondent in support of the order, namely that the suit is on the face of it and in fact a suit relating to the possession of lands situated within the state of the Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa and that therefore that. paramount chief's tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine it, so that under section 65 of chapter 76 it was compulsory upon the Court below to make the order which it did.

The argument of the appellant contra is to the effect that a narrower meaning is to be put upon Fub-paragraph 2 (c) of section '!B of chapter 76 and it must be interpreted as though it read:-

" Suits claiming ownership, possession etc., etc."

and in support of his argument he relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sasraku v. Mate Kole (unreported) on the 2nd November, 1933, contending that that case is on all fours with the present case. I do not agree with him on either point; if the legislature had intended the narrower meaning it would have used the narrower wording, and the case relied upon il" entirely different. It was merely a claim for an account of tolls collected in a market and the payment of the amount so collected, and the reasons given for the decision were:-

" The Court being satisfied that on the writ and pleadings there is nothing to show that the lower Court "had no jurisdiction. If the matter for instance " amounts to a claim to one-third of the tolls under "an agreement between the parties there would " clearly be jurisdiction."

In the present case on the other hand it is apparent on the face of the writ that the suit is one relating to the possession of land, the plaintiff contending that he is entitled to undisturbed possession and has not been left in undisturbed possession and claiming damages in consequence. If this is not a suit relating to possession of land I don't know what is. Moreover the affidavit supporting the application for leave to file a counterclaim confirms the point, for it shows that the dispute is as to whether, according to native law and custom, the plaintiff is entitled to full possession until he has paid the purchase price in full. It is, in my view, obviously a suit which the legislature intended should be tried in a native tribunal, and I am of opinion that the legislature has effectively carried out that intention by the wording of sub-paragraph 2 (c) of section 48 of chapter 76j For it is " the first and most elementary rule of construction that " it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical "legislation after used in their technical meaning if they have acquired and, otherwise, in their ordinary meaning." (Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes (8th Edition page 2); and ill their ordinary meaning the words " suits relating to the possession of lands" mean something wider than the words" suits claiming possession to lands," and are surely amply wide enough to cover the wording of the writ in the present suit. It is not necessary to go to the opposite extreme and suggest that they mean "all suits connected in some way or other with the possession of lands." Here again, if the legislature meant that, it would have so expressed itself.

Nor can I agree with the contention that it is essential to take evidence or at any rate hear counsel's opening before "referring the parties" under section 65 of chapter 76. In some cases the question may be doubtful on the face of the writ, and then, of course, it will be necessary to hear counsel's opening and perhaps take some evidence before it will "appear to the Court" that the matter is one properly cognizable by a native tribunal. But as I read the section and more particularly the first word " whenever," it is the duty of the Court, immediately it does " appear" that the matter is so cognizable, to stop the case, and then it has no jurisdiction to do anything but refer the parties to a competent tribunal.

When it appears on the face of the writ, as in my opinion it does in this case, that the suit is one relating to the possession of lands the Court is right to make the order, as it did in this case, immediately the suit is called on for hearing.

For these reasons I am of opinion that. the appeal shoul(1 he dismissed with costs.

PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST.

I concur.

WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.

Section 43 (2) (c) of Cap. 76 provides that a Paramount Chief's Tribunal shall have jurisdiction (inter alia) in "suits relating to the ownership, possession, or occupation of lands situated within the state of such paramount chief," and the question for decision is whether this case comes within that provision so as to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.

'The learned Judge dealt with the case by saying " ............ the claim is £500 damages for breach of contract entered into and " made between the parties according to native customary law. " That being so and the parties being natives, this Court has no "jurisdiction and the parties are therefore referred to the appropriate tribunal."

As I understand it is conceded that there is no law which ------1 provides in general terms that the Supreme Court has no

- jurisdiction in cases arising out of contracts between natives made

according to native customary law, the only provision of this nature to which I have been referred is that contained in section 43 (2) (e) " Personal suits in which the debt, damage, or demand " does not exceed £100."

It therefore seems to me that the decision cannot be supported on the ground contained in the judgment.

But the question remains whether this is not a " suit relating to the ownership, possession, or occupation of land." So far as the writ goes it might seem that it is, for the indorsement thereon, after setting out a purchase by the plaintiff from the predecessors of the defendants of land at Odedeso for £2,550, goes on to say that " in breach of agreement the defendant would not leave the " plaintiff in undisturbed possession of the land, and would not " allow the plaintiff and his agents and workmen to survey the "land." The claim however is for £500 damages for breach of contract. No pleadings were. ordered but the defendant by leave filed a counterclaim claiming from the plaintiff £1,090 "being " balance of purchase-price due and owed ; by the plaintiff to the defendant in respect of land situate at Odedeso ................thus apparently recognising that the sale was complete and that the property had passed, all that was left to the defendant being a claim for the unpaid balance of the purchase money. It is true that the affidavit grounding the motion for leave to set up the counterclaim does suggest that possibly it was intended to argue that the sale was not intended to be complete until the purchase money had been paid in full. In the circumstances I think the Court should have regard to the statements of counsel in order to ascertain what was the real matter in dispute. Mr. Bossman said (in the Court below), "Ownership is not in dispute," to/ which Dr. Danquah replied, " Issue is question of native contract under " native law and custom and comes under section 48 (2) (c) of the Native Administration Ordinance. No contract in the English sense is involved." This perhaps does not make matters much clearer, but I understand Dr. Danquah's argument before us to be that section 48 (2) (c) should be construed in the widest sense as excluding from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a suit in any way relating to the ownership, possession, or occupation of land whether or not the right of ownership, possession or occupation is in issue. I cannot agree with this contention if it is right then an action for damages for an assault committed because of a dispute over land would be excluded, in spite of the fact that section 4~ (2) (e) expressly gives the native tribunals exclusive jurisdiction,

Without knowing something about native customary law relating to land tenures I should not venture to define the exact meaning of section 48 (2) (c) or to hazard an opinion as to what the legislature intended by the words" relating to," it is enough for me to say that, in my judgment, these words cannot be regarded as equivalent to " in some way connected with."

Somewhat-similar words occur in R.S.C. Order 51 rule 1 " (If in any cause or matter relating to real estate it shall appear necessary or expedient the Court may order the same to be sold )," and it has been held that this provision did not give the Court power to order as sale where the claim was for an account of the rents and profits of real estate, re Staine.~ (33 Ch. D. 172).

In Kwalw Adu Sei v. Glori (F.C. 1926{29, 87) it was held that where no question of title is involved an action of trespass relating to native land may be brought in the Supreme Court.

In the present case, therefore, I am of opinion that the learned Judge was wrong in holding, on the materials then before him, that he had no jurisdiction, although it may be that when the issues had become more clearly defined it would have appeared that this was a case in which the right of ownership or possession of land was in issue or one which in some other way clearly fell within the provisions of section 48 (2) (c). I therefore think that the appeal should be allowed and the case remitted to the Supreme Court for trial.