HOME   UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF GHANA 2006

 

 

                                                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

SUPREME COURT

ACCRA.

-------------------------------

 

 

                                      CORAM:  AKUFFO (MS), J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

                                                         DR. TWUM, J.S.C.

                                                        DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C.

                                                        PROF. OCRAN, J.S.C.

                                                          ANINAKWA, J.S.C.

  

                                                                                   

                                                                                          CIVIL APPEAL

                                                                                                                                                                  NO. J4/23/200 

                                                                                                                                                   15TH FEBRUARY, 2006

 

JOHN DOMINIC OWUSU    …..          PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT

 

VRS.

 

AKUA AKOMAH                  …..          DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT

 

                                            

 

 

 

            ANINAKWA, J.S.C:

 

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 7th June, 2001.

On 4th October, 1993 the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant, whom we will hereafter refer to as "the plaintiff" filed this action at the High Court, Kumasi claiming against the Defendant! Appellant/Respondent (hereafter referred to as the Defendant) the following reliefs: ­1

 

"1.       A Declaration that by a contract in writing dated and executed by the defendant and the Plaintiff in the presence of a common witness on 6th July, 1987, all the rights powers privileges and interests of the defendant in property plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi became vested in the plaintiff.

 

2.         A declaration that it is wrongful for the defendant to fail refuse or neglect to perfect the plaintiff's title to the said property, plot No. 30, Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi despite repeated demands by the plaintiff on the defendant so to do.

 

3.         General damages for financial loss and inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's said wrongful failure, refusal or neglect to perfect the plaintiff's title to the said property plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi.

 

4.         An order of specific performance compelling the defendant to do all things necessary for the perfection of the plaintiff's title to the said property Plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi.

 

5.         Any other order or reliefs, as this Honorable Court would seem fit to make or give in the interest of equity and justice in this suit”.

The Defendant, by her statement of Defence denied the existence of the written agreement.

By paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Statement of Defence she set up on oral agreement made in 1986, and went on to claim by way of Counter-claim thus:­

 

"( a)    A declaration that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant for the sale of the premises H/No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi has lapsed or fallen through by reason of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to fulfill his part of the agreement.

(b)      A declaration that the alleged deed of assignment executed by the plaintiff and defendant and dated the 6th day of July, 1987 was procured in fraud and same is null and void.

 

(c)   An order for the recovery of possession of portions or part of the said  

premises House Number K 30, Kaase Kumasi." The plaintiff in his reply denied the existence of an oral agreement as alleged by the defendant.

The trial Court after a full trial made the following findings of fact: ­

 

(i)         The deed of assignment on which the plaintiff relied for         his title was not executed by the Defendant.

            (ii)        The plaintiff made ˘2.9 Million as part payment of the purchase price of ˘4 Million as contended by the defendant, and not ˘3.5million as full payment as contended by the plaintiff.

            (iii)       The plaintiff has moved into occupation of the property.

 

The trial Court also held that: ­

 

(a)          Time was not of the essence of the contract.

(b)       The Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance.

. In the result the trial Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff for his claims 2 and 4 and for the Defendant on her claim (b).The trial Court ordered the Defendant to prepare within three months a deed of assignment for the Plaintiff to better his title to the property.

The Defendant being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Court appealed to the Court of Appeal.

On 7th June 2001, the Court of Appeal by a unanimous decision allowed the Defendant's appeal and entered judgment for her on all the relief's she sought.

This Court is completely in agreement with the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal as well as the reasons, which led them to those conclusions. There will be no need to repeat what they said.

We will, however, contend ourselves with a few words on the questions of specific performance and time as an essence of the contract.

In this action the Plaintiff relied on a written assignment in 1987 for his case. The Defendant denied that assignment. The defendant did set up an oral agreement in 1986.

The plaintiff denied this oral agreement in his Reply.

In these circumstances it will be of some help to call to mind what Acquah JSC (as he then was) said in the case of - BARCLA YS BANK GHANA LTD. VRS. SAKARI (1996-97) SCGLR 639 at page 650 thus;­

 

"The importance of pleadings in circumscribing the scope and nature of the party's case cannot be under-estimated. The function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case, which has to be met and to define the issues on which the court will have to adjudicate in order to determine the matters in dispute between the parties. For this reason, a party is not permitted to set up a case inconsistent with his pleadings. Neither is the Court competent to decide the claims of the parties in a manner inconsistent with what the parties themselves have put forward in their pleadings………”

Acquah JSC (as he then was) supported his said statement with a reference with approval to a quotation by the Supreme Court in the case of Harmmond vrs. Odoi 1982-83 GLR 1215 act 1234, from an article by Master I.H. Jacobs titled "The present Importance of pleadings" thus; ­

 

"The Court itself is as much bound by the pleadings of the parties as they are themselves. It is no part of the duty or function of the Court to enter upon any inquiry into the case before it other than to adjudicate upon the specific matters in dispute, which the parties themselves have raised by their pleadings. Indeed the Court would be acting contrary to its own character and nature if it were to pronounce upon any claim or defence not made by the parties. To do so would be to enter the realms of speculation…….”

For specific performance there must exist a contract which should be carried out to the letter. In the instant case, the trial Court found that the deed of assignment pleaded was not signed by the Defendant. The Court went on to declare that assignment null and void. In Law the assignment did not exist. The oral agreement pleaded by the Defendant was denied by the plaintiff in his Reply.

The plaintiff did not put forward any other agreement. The question then is this:- What was the contract which the plaintiff says should be performed for him? The clear and only answer is that there is no contract whatsoever.

The trial Court's finding that Exhibit "A" i.e. the assignment relied on by the plaintiff, had been procured in fraud and, therefore null and void, has exposed the plaintiff and his witness, i.e. the Lawyer who allegedly prepared the said assignment as rogues and or crooks, -  Courtesy-Dr. Date - Baah JSC in the yet to be reported Supreme Court case of SIMON BOBI NTRI VRS. JOSEPH WILLIAMS. CA 11 2001 delivered 22 06 2005. Specific performance is a claim in equity, and the plaintiff's lack of clean hands renders him undeserving of the said equitable relief.

The trial Court ought not to have speculated and should have dismissed this claim of the plaintiff.

Now as to time for payment being or not being of the essence of the agreement, the unchallenged evidence was that the Defendant's said oral agreement contained a term to the effect that the whole purchase price should be paid within three months of the making of the agreement. This term was put in to minimize the effect of inflation.

A court is entitled to take notice of what is known by the well-­informed persons in the society. At the time the oral agreement was made it was well known that inflation had started running at a high rate. See the case of FOFIE VRS. ZANYO (1992) 2GLR 475: ­where the Court took into account the high rate of inflations in the country .

Six (6) years after the making of the oral agreement the plaintiff was saying he was not prepared to pay anything beyond the ˘3.5 million he said he had paid. To accept this will mean that payment under the contract may be made at an infinite time and it will be all right as payment was then not completed.

To hold that in such a situation the payment will comply with having been made "within 3 months" will amount to ignoring that term in the agreement. A strange result will then be achieved.

IN KOGLEX VRS. KATEFIELD (MRS.) (1998 - 99) SCGLR 451 at p. 459, Hayfron - Benjamin, JSC stated thus; - "And even if no time was agreed upon, the nature of the contract would imply reasonable time into it since the contract could not be expected to run "ad infinitum". " To state that time is not of essence will not make good sense. We accept that in this case time was of the essence of the oral agreement put forward by the defendant.

This appeal is also against the costs awarded by the Court of Appeal. The appellant failed to argue it in his Statement of case. It has not been shown that the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion wrongly. In the circumstances this appeal is dismissed.

 

 

R. T. ANINAKWA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

S.A.B. AKUFFO (MS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

DR. S. TWUM

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

 

DR. S. K. DATE-BAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

 

 

PROF. T. M. OCRAN

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

COUNSEL:

 

Mr. Ahenkorah for Appellant.

Mr. Somuah-Asamoah for Respondent.

 

 

 

gso*

 

 

 

 

 

VRS.

 

AKUA AKOMAH                  …..          DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT

 

 

 

            ANINAKWA, J.S.C:

 

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 7th June, 2001.

On 4th October, 1993 the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant, whom we will hereafter refer to as "the plaintiff" filed this action at the High Court, Kumasi claiming against the Defendant! Appellant/Respondent (hereafter referred to as the Defendant) the following reliefs: ­1

 

"1.       A Declaration that by a contract in writing dated and executed by the defendant and the Plaintiff in the presence of a common witness on 6th July, 1987, all the rights powers privileges and interests of the defendant in property plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi became vested in the plaintiff.

 

2.         A declaration that it is wrongful for the defendant to fail refuse or neglect to perfect the plaintiff's title to the said property, plot No. 30, Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi despite repeated demands by the plaintiff on the defendant so to do.

 

3.         General damages for financial loss and inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's said wrongful failure, refusal or neglect to perfect the plaintiff's title to the said property plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi.

 

4.         An order of specific performance compelling the defendant to do all things necessary for the perfection of the plaintiff's title to the said property Plot No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi.

 

5.         Any other order or reliefs, as this Honorable Court would seem fit to make or give in the interest of equity and justice in this suit”.

The Defendant, by her statement of Defence denied the existence of the written agreement.

By paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Statement of Defence she set up on oral agreement made in 1986, and went on to claim by way of Counter-claim thus:­

 

"( a)    A declaration that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant for the sale of the premises H/No. 30 Block "K" Kaasi, Kumasi has lapsed or fallen through by reason of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to fulfill his part of the agreement.

(b)      A declaration that the alleged deed of assignment executed by the plaintiff and defendant and dated the 6th day of July, 1987 was procured in fraud and same is null and void.

 

(c)   An order for the recovery of possession of portions or part of the said  

premises House Number K 30, Kaase Kumasi." The plaintiff in his reply denied the existence of an oral agreement as alleged by the defendant.

The trial Court after a full trial made the following findings of fact: ­

 

(i)         The deed of assignment on which the plaintiff relied for         his title was not executed by the Defendant.

            (ii)        The plaintiff made ˘2.9 Million as part payment of the purchase price of ˘4 Million as contended by the defendant, and not ˘3.5million as full payment as contended by the plaintiff.

            (iii)       The plaintiff has moved into occupation of the property.

 

The trial Court also held that: ­

 

(a)          Time was not of the essence of the contract.

(b)       The Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance.

. In the result the trial Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff for his claims 2 and 4 and for the Defendant on her claim (b).The trial Court ordered the Defendant to prepare within three months a deed of assignment for the Plaintiff to better his title to the property.

The Defendant being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the trial Court appealed to the Court of Appeal.

On 7th June 2001, the Court of Appeal by a unanimous decision allowed the Defendant's appeal and entered judgment for her on all the relief's she sought.

This Court is completely in agreement with the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal as well as the reasons, which led them to those conclusions. There will be no need to repeat what they said.

We will, however, contend ourselves with a few words on the questions of specific performance and time as an essence of the contract.

In this action the Plaintiff relied on a written assignment in 1987 for his case. The Defendant denied that assignment. The defendant did set up an oral agreement in 1986.

The plaintiff denied this oral agreement in his Reply.

In these circumstances it will be of some help to call to mind what Acquah JSC (as he then was) said in the case of - BARCLA YS BANK GHANA LTD. VRS. SAKARI (1996-97) SCGLR 639 at page 650 thus;­

 

"The importance of pleadings in circumscribing the scope and nature of the party's case cannot be under-estimated. The function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case, which has to be met and to define the issues on which the court will have to adjudicate in order to determine the matters in dispute between the parties. For this reason, a party is not permitted to set up a case inconsistent with his pleadings. Neither is the Court competent to decide the claims of the parties in a manner inconsistent with what the parties themselves have put forward in their pleadings………”

Acquah JSC (as he then was) supported his said statement with a reference with approval to a quotation by the Supreme Court in the case of Harmmond vrs. Odoi 1982-83 GLR 1215 act 1234, from an article by Master I.H. Jacobs titled "The present Importance of pleadings" thus; ­

 

"The Court itself is as much bound by the pleadings of the parties as they are themselves. It is no part of the duty or function of the Court to enter upon any inquiry into the case before it other than to adjudicate upon the specific matters in dispute, which the parties themselves have raised by their pleadings. Indeed the Court would be acting contrary to its own character and nature if it were to pronounce upon any claim or defence not made by the parties. To do so would be to enter the realms of speculation…….”

For specific performance there must exist a contract which should be carried out to the letter. In the instant case, the trial Court found that the deed of assignment pleaded was not signed by the Defendant. The Court went on to declare that assignment null and void. In Law the assignment did not exist. The oral agreement pleaded by the Defendant was denied by the plaintiff in his Reply.

The plaintiff did not put forward any other agreement. The question then is this:- What was the contract which the plaintiff says should be performed for him? The clear and only answer is that there is no contract whatsoever.

The trial Court's finding that Exhibit "A" i.e. the assignment relied on by the plaintiff, had been procured in fraud and, therefore null and void, has exposed the plaintiff and his witness, i.e. the Lawyer who allegedly prepared the said assignment as rogues and or crooks, -  Courtesy-Dr. Date - Baah JSC in the yet to be reported Supreme Court case of SIMON BOBI NTRI VRS. JOSEPH WILLIAMS. CA 11 2001 delivered 22 06 2005. Specific performance is a claim in equity, and the plaintiff's lack of clean hands renders him undeserving of the said equitable relief.

The trial Court ought not to have speculated and should have dismissed this claim of the plaintiff.

Now as to time for payment being or not being of the essence of the agreement, the unchallenged evidence was that the Defendant's said oral agreement contained a term to the effect that the whole purchase price should be paid within three months of the making of the agreement. This term was put in to minimize the effect of inflation.

A court is entitled to take notice of what is known by the well-­informed persons in the society. At the time the oral agreement was made it was well known that inflation had started running at a high rate. See the case of FOFIE VRS. ZANYO (1992) 2GLR 475: ­where the Court took into account the high rate of inflations in the country .

Six (6) years after the making of the oral agreement the plaintiff was saying he was not prepared to pay anything beyond the ˘3.5 million he said he had paid. To accept this will mean that payment under the contract may be made at an infinite time and it will be all right as payment was then not completed.

To hold that in such a situation the payment will comply with having been made "within 3 months" will amount to ignoring that term in the agreement. A strange result will then be achieved.

IN KOGLEX VRS. KATEFIELD (MRS.) (1998 - 99) SCGLR 451 at p. 459, Hayfron - Benjamin, JSC stated thus; - "And even if no time was agreed upon, the nature of the contract would imply reasonable time into it since the contract could not be expected to run "ad infinitum". " To state that time is not of essence will not make good sense. We accept that in this case time was of the essence of the oral agreement put forward by the defendant.

This appeal is also against the costs awarded by the Court of Appeal. The appellant failed to argue it in his Statement of case. It has not been shown that the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion wrongly. In the circumstances this appeal is dismissed.

 

 

R. T. ANINAKWA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

S.A.B. AKUFFO (MS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

DR. S. TWUM

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

 

DR. S. K. DATE-BAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

 

 

PROF. T. M. OCRAN

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

COUNSEL:

 

Mr. Ahenkorah for Appellant.

Mr. Somuah-Asamoah for Respondent.

 

 

 

gso*

 

 

 

 

 
 

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