HOME   UNREPORTED CASES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF GHANA 2009

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA

 

                                    CORAM:        ATUGUBA, J.S.C. (PRESIDING)

                                                            ANSAH, J.S.C.

                                                            ADINYIRA (MRS), J.S.C.

                                                            OWUSU (MS), J.S.C.

                                                            BAFFOE-BONNIE, J.S.C.

 

CIVIL APPEAL

J4/15/2007

                                                                                                            25TH NOVEMBER, 2009

 

 

JOHN K. A KLU                     …                  PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTAPPELLANT

 

VRS

 

1.   MAVIS DARKO               … DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/ RESPONDENT

 

2.    DR. KOFI KONADU APRAKU     ..          CO-DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/

RESPONDENT

 

 

 

                

 

 

J U D G M E N T

                                                                                                                       

 

ATUGUBA, J.S.C:

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

 

The Plaintiff / Respondent / Appellant (herein-after referred to as the plaintiff) and co-defendant/appellant/respondent (herein-after called the co-defendant) assert rival titles to plot no. 234 block 8 Section 114 situate at La-Bawaleshi (East Legon).

 

Resolution of the rival titles

The trial judge resolved the rival claims in favour of the plaintiff on the grounds inter alia, that the plaintiff was a bona-fide purchaser of the land without notice of the fact that Nii Odai Ayiku IV of Nungua the grantor of his vendor had been, prior to his vendor's  purported acquisition of title from him, destooled.  As to a judgment affecting the land by an Accra Circuit Court the trial judge held that it is a settled principle that a purchaser of land is not estopped or affected by a judgment adverse to his vendor in proceedings commenced subsequent to the acquisition of his title.  The trial judge also held that if the co-defendant had made the proper search at the proper place he would have known of the plaintiff's prior title, secured by a Land title Certificate, to the land and is therefore bound by it.

 

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge by a majority of 3 – 2, holding that on the principle that Nemo dat quod non habet, the plaintiff acquired no valid title, in view of the said destoolment of Nii Odai Ayiku IV.

 

The Validity of the competing Titles

Assuming that Nii Odai Ayiku’s grant to the plaintiff’s vendor is invalid by reason of his prior destoolment that fact is not decisive of the matter.

 

The Land Title Certificate

The effect of a Land Title certificate has been considered in a few local cases, see Amegahie v. Okine (1992) 2 GLR 319, Republic v. Land Title Registrar, Ex parte Boahen II (2001-2002)1 GLR 42 and Brown v. Quarshigah (2003 – 2004) 2 SC GLR 930.

Whether they are all reconcilable, and if not which should be preferred to the other, needs not detain us in this case as it can be decided on less cloudy grounds.

 

The Limitation Decree

The appellant has pleaded in paragraphs 18 and 19 of his amended Reply to the amended statement of defence of co-defendant and Defence to Counterclaim dated 30/7/1999 at p.69 of the record of appeal as follows:

“18.   Plaintiff avers that with all deference to the Judgment Plaintiff was not party to Suit No. CCL 67/89 which was instituted after Plaintiff has been in effective possession and occupation of Plot No. 234 without let or hindrance since 1980 and has physical evidence of occupation on the land.

 

19.       Plaintiff avers that he is protected by the Limitation Decree 1972, N RCD54 and the Land Title Registration Law, PNDC L 152” (e.s)

 

It is clear from the evidence on record that since 1980 the plaintiff has been in possession of the disputed land until the same was rocked as from around June 1997 by the building operations of the defendants.  The trial judge has rejected, and rightly on the evidence, the claim that other persons like Freeman Mensah and his agents did any acts such as building on the said land.  The trial judge found that it is the plaintiff who put up the outhouse on the said land.

 

In the circumstances, assuming his title from Nii Odai Ayiku IV the Nungua Mantse is bad, yet his adverse  possession of the said land for up to and even over 12 years confers  on him possessory title by reason of section 10 of the Limitation Decree 1972 (NRCD 54).  It should be noted that such acquisition of title prevails even against a registered proprietor of land under the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152) by virtue of s. 18 (1) and (2) thereof.  It is as follows:

            “Section 18 – Conclusiveness of the Register

(1)  The land register shall be conclusive evidence of title of the proprietor of any land or interest in land appearing on the register

(2)  Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect any right or interest in land acquired under the law relating to prescription or the Limitation Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D 54); provided that where title to registered land has been acquired under the law relating to prescription or the Limitation Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 54) the registered proprietor shall hold the land upon trust for the person who claims to have acquired the title” (e.s)

 

The defendants’ resort therefore to the Nungua stool authorities for a grant to the co-defendant is misconceived as in the circumstances by reason of s. 10 (1) and (6) of the Limitation Decree the stool’s title therefore had become extinguished.  Thus in GIHOC REFRIGERATION HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS LTD. V HANNA ASSI (2005 – 2006) SC GLR 458 at 468 – 469 Dr. Justice Date-Bah JSC masterly stated the legal position as follows:

The combination of the extinguishing of the original owner’s rights under section 10(6) of the Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54), with the barring of action against the adverse possessor under section 10(1), must in logic result in the adverse possessor being construed to have gained a right that is enforceable by action.  Otherwise, there would be the risk of “ownerless lands” resulting from a contrary interpretation of section 10(6) of the Limitation Decree.  Indeed, there is authority in support of the view that an adverse possessor of land in relation to which the original owner’s rights have been extinguished has rights in relation to which he can sue.  The adverse possessor gains a new estate of his or her own, which is not by transfer from the original owner whose rights have been extinguished by the limitation statute”(e.s).  See also DJIN v. MUSAH BAAKO (2007-2008) SC GLR 686.

There is no doubt that a grantee or purchaser of stool property can enforce the same against that stool and enjoys such property as of right.  In this case since it is clear that the plaintiff perceived himself as holding a valid grant of the land from the Nungua stool by devolution from his grantor, it follows that his control, possession and activities on the said land were done by him purportedly as of right and since the stool did not assert its title against him for upwards of and even over the limitation period of 12 years, he thereby has acquired title thereto by his adverse possession.

In the circumstances the defendants’ acts on the said land are clear acts of trespass committed vi et armis et contra pacem publicae

 

It must all along be borne in mind in this regard that the story constituting the acquisition of title to the said land by the co-defendant has been rightly, on the evidence and the findings of the trial judge, held to be a complete simulation emanating from testes diabolices qui magis fama quam fame moventur.  All this was a grand design to overreach the plaintiff.  How can such conduct and acts of the defendants attract the amnesty of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2)?

 

On the contrary, if it were necessary on the facts of this case, it is the plaintiff who would rather be the fit and proper beneficiary of Act 2.

Conclusion

On the facts and law of this case the judgment of the trial judge, is in the main, correct as against that of the Court of Appeal.

 

It is worth emphasizing that if even the contention of the co-defendant that neither party herein has title to the disputed land is sustainable at all, he will still not profit from it since in that case the prior possession of the plaintiff will still prevail against him as a trespasser.

 

For the avoidance of doubt I add that since it is clear on the evidence and the law that the plaintiff has a better case than the defendants it will profit no none to consider matters touching and concerning other persons since it is trite law that in a land suit the defendant cannot set up a plea of jus tertii.  It is plain however on the facts that the plaintiff’s case would withstand even such side winds.

 

For all the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the reliefs granted by the trial judge are restored.                                                                                                                                                         

 

 

 

W. A. ATUGUBA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

I agree: ANSAH, J.S.C.

 

J. ANSAH

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

 

I also agree: ADINYIRA,J.S.C.

 

 

S. O. A. ADINYIRA (MRS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

I also agree: OWUSU, J.S.C.

 

 

 

R. C. OWUSU (MS)

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

I also agree: BAFFOE-BONNIE,J.S.C.

 

 

P. BAFFOE-BONNIE

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

COUNSEL:

 

CHARLES HAYIBOR FOR APPELLANT.

KULENDI @ LAW FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

 

 
 

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