20 November 1934
Appeal Court. Case stated by
Supreme Court exercising
Appellate jurisdiction.
Person debarred from sueing for
damages, where compensation
ordered at criminal trial in
respect of same injury-Section
75 of Criminal Code (Gold
Coast)-" receipt of
compensation" judicially
interpreted as "having
opportunity to receive
.
Held: Court below was right in
holding that plaintiff was
debarred from bringing his
action.
P. A. Renner
for Appellant.
V.
L. Buckle
for Respondent.
The following joint judgment was
delivered:-
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, YATES,
ACTING C.J., GOLD COAST AND
GRAHAM PAUL, J.
This is a case stated by Deane,
C .. J" under section 6 of the
1Vest African Court of Appeal
Ordinance, 1929, reserving for
the consideration of this Court
a question of law which arose
before him upon his hearing of
an appeal from the Court of the
Police Magistrate at 'Accra.
The point at issue is whether a
plaintiff is debarred from
bringing an action claiming
damages for assault and battery
by the fact that the defendant
had already been charged
criminally in respect of the
same assault, convicted
summarily and adjudged by the
Court under section 74 (2) of
the Criminal Code to make
compensation to the person
injured,
i.e"
the plaintiff in the civil
proceedings, although the
plaintiff did not wish such
compensation to be adjudged to
be made in the criminal
prosecution and has since
refused to accept the money,
which has been paid into Court
by the defendant in order that
he may avoid imprisonment in
default.
The question turns upon the true
interpretation to be put upon
section 75 of the Criminal Code
which reads as follows:-
"Where any person, who is
injured by any offence
"punishable under this code, or
under any other "statute,
receives compensation for such
injury " under the order of the
Court, or where the offender, "
having been ordered to -make
such compensation, " suffers
imprisonment for non-payment
thereof, the
" receipt of such compensation
or the undergoing of " such
imprisonment, as the case may
be, shall be a " bar to any
action for the same injury; but,
except "as aforesaid, nothing in
this code shall bar the "action
of any person in respect of any
injury " sustained by him or his
property".
The learned Chief .Justice held
that that section debarred the
plaintiff from bringing the
action and allowed the appeal
against the decision of the
Police Magistrate in a contrary
sense, reserving the question,
however, for the consideration
of this Court.
We agree with the opinion of the
Chief Justice and endorse the
reasons he gives therefor. The
wording of the section is
certainly ambiguous and requires
judicial interpretation. In
giving such interpretation there
are two principles to be
followed; the first is that the
aim must be to ascertain the
real intention of the
legislature and the second is
that if there is any doubt in
the conflict of rights between
the parties, that doubt must be
resolved in favour of the party
penalised, because sections 74
and 75 must be read together and
section 74 is a penal enactment,
the order for making
compensation being the
infliction of a punishment
(see
section 73).
The whole question turns on the
meaning of the words " receives
compensation". Have they the
restricted meaning of actual
physical receipt of money or
have they a wider meaning so as
to include an award giving the
opportunity to receive payment?
It seems to be the obvious
intention of the two sections
that in appropriate cases the
Court should be able to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings by
dealing at one and the same time
with both the public wrong and
the private injury, and should
have power to protect a
convicted person from undue
harshness in pursuing' him on
the part of the person injured.
We
therefore think that the wider
interpretation should prevail
and that the learned Chief
Justice was right. in allowing
the appeal before him on the
ground that by section 70 the
plaintiff was debarred from
bringing his action.
