Appeal
Court, 30th May,
1940.
Claim by a mortgagor calling
upon the mortgagee to render an
account operation of Real
Property Limitation Act
1833-
Claim statute barred and appeal
dismissed.
Held:
(1) The claim being based on
Appellant's right and title as
mortgagor and the Respondent
being sued as mortgagee in
possession the suit must fail.
The Appellant's right and title
are completely extinguished by
the operation 0 R.P.L. Act.
1833.
(2) The provisions of Sch. II O.
19 R.l of the Supreme Court
Ordinance we!1 complied with,
and the Court below was right in
hearing argument and giving
judgment which it did. -
Sanders v. Sanders
(19 Ch. D.373) considered
and followed.
There is no need to set out the
facts.
D.
M. Abadoo (with him ].
W. de Graft Appellantt.
F. Awoonor Williams
for H.espondent.
The following joint judgment was
delivered :--
KINGDON, C.J.. NIGERIA, PETRIDES,
C.J., GOLD COAST AND GRAHAM
PAUL, C.j, SIERRA LEONE.
The Appellant sued Peter Awoonor
Renner, his claim being as'
follows :-" To call upon'
Defendant as Mortgagee in
possession t render an account
of rents collected or received
by the Defendant from
Plaintiff's house ... at Cape
Coast ... which said house was
handed over by Plaintiff to
Defendant in the year, 1905 in
order that Defendant might
collect rents accruing wherefrom
in payment of a retainer of £52
10s. charged by Defendant form
defending Plaintiff in a
criminal action, the same being
subsequently conveyed by
Plaintiff to Defendant under a
Deed of Mortgage date the 22nd
September, 1901), and for
payment by Defendant of any
amount found due and payable to
Plaintiff; also interest on the,
said amount. The Plaintiff
further claims redemption of the
said premises as comprised in
the said Deed of Mortgage from
the Defendant; and for such
other order or relief in the
premises as to the Court may
seem fit."
Pleadings were ordered and
filed, but before trial the
Defendant Peter Awoonor Renner
died and Franklin Beatrice
Awoonor Renner by her Attorney
was substituted as Defendant in
the suit by order of Court dated
15th April, 1939.
On the suit coming on for trial,
after the conclusion of the
evidence of the Plaintiff
himself and before the close of
his case, the Defendant's
Counsel raised a legal point
which he contended could have
been raised on the Plaintiff's
pleadings by way of demurrer
without any evidence being
taken. The legal point was
shortly that the Defendant had
pleaded that the claims is
statute-barred and that this
plea could be maintained on the
facts as stated in the
Plaintiff's Statement of Claim.
On this point being raised. the
Court below heard argument') of
Counsel upon it, and upon the
arguments gave judgment in
favour of the Defendant,
upholding the plea that the
claim was statute-barred.
Against that judgment the
Appellant has appealed to this
Court; his first ground of
appeal is that the trial was
irregular :-
(a)
In that the provision of
Schedule II Order 19 Rule 1 of
the Supreme Court Ordinance was
not followed; and
(b)
the Appellant had not called all
his witnesses and closed his
case when the Court heard
submissions of Counsel for
Respondent.
The Rule founded upon is as
follows :--
" Where a defendant conceives
that he has a good legal or
equitable defence to the suit,
so that even if the allegations
of the plaintiff were admitted
or established, yet the
plaintiff would not be entitled
to any decree against the
defendant, he may raise this
defence by a motion that the
suit be dismissed without any
answer upon questions of fact
being required from him."
That Rule makes it possible for
a party to move the Court at any
time to have a point of law,
raised upon the pleadings,
disposed of. But it in no way
restricts the inherent power of
the Court either of its own
motion or on application of a
party-to hear and determine at
any time a question of law
raised on the pleadings. It
would be manifestly absurd to
suggest that a Court was bound
to proceed with the taking of
lengthy evidence of the parties
to a suit where it appeared that
the whole suit could be decided
upon the pleadings without any
evidence being called. There can
be 110 doubt that the Court
below was quite right to hear
Counsel on the point of law as
and when it did, and to decide
that point of law as it did on
the Statement of Claim and
arguments of Counsel. That
disposes of the Appellant's
first ground of appeal.
The Appellant's other grounds of
appeal and the judgment of the
Court below must be considered
on the basis that the facts are
correctly stated in the
Plaintiff's Statement of Claim
taken along with the Exhibits
admitted by consent. From the
facts so stated it is clear that
the late Peter Awoonor Renner
was a Mortgagee in possession
under the Mortgage Exhibit" A "
and that he had been so in
possession from 1905 without
giving any account of the rents
collected; that he was still in
possession at the date of the
writ in this suit; that on 23rd
May, 1934, he caused to be
served on the Appellant a Notice
of Foreclosure and Sale of the
said house under
the said Mortgage, and calling
for payment forthwith by the
Appellant of £374 Is. alleged to
be due and owing from the
Appellant under the 8aid.
Mortgage.
I t is upon these facts that the
Respondent argued and the Court
below held that the Appellant's
whole claim was statute-barred,
The whole claim was dismissed by
the Court below.
The statute relied upon is the
Real Property Limitation Act
1833. That statute clearly
applied to this Colony under
section 1 of the Supreme Court
Ordinance which was in force in
this Colon at the material times
in this suit and it is still in
force under section~ 70 of the
present Courts Ordinance.
The relevant sections of the
statute are as follows (omitting
) the words which are
unnecessary or have no
application to the issue in this
suit) :-
S. 2/1 .•• When a Mortgagee
shall have obtained the
Possession or Receipt of
the Profits of any land, or the
receipt of any rent comprised
in" his Mortgage, the Mortgagor
... shall not bring a suit to
redeem the Mortgage but within
twenty years next after the time
at which the Mortgagee obtained
such possession or receipt
unless in the meantime an
acknowledgment of the title 0'
the Mortgagor or of his right of
redemption shall have been give~
to the Mortgagor •.. in writing
signed by the Mortgagee."
And S. 34 .•• At the
determination of the period
limited by this Act to any
person: for ... bringing any •.
; action or suit the right and
title of such person to the
land, rent, or, for the recover
whereof such. , . action or suit
respectively might hay, been
raised or brought within such
period, shall be extinguished,"
On 18th May, 1934, the late
Peter Awoonor Renner signed and
caused to be delivered to the
Appellant a Notice of FOre
closure (Exhibit " E "), That
notice certainly amounted to an
" acknowledgment of the title of
the Mortgagor." It was " give~
to the Mortgagor" and it is " in
writing signed by the
Mortgagee." It would therefore
be a sufficient acknowledgment
to stop the running of the
Limitation period against the
Appellant if it had been given
before the expiry of the twenty
years next after the time at!
which the Respondent as
Mortgagee obtained possession of
the mortgaged property; but the
case of Sanders v. Sanders
(19 Ch.D., 373)
decided quite definitely that an
acknowledgment given after, the
expiry of the twenty years next
after the time the Mortgage
obtained possession did not
restore the Mortgagor's right or
title which by operation of time
had been extinguished under
sections 2g and 34 of the Act.
It follows therefore that the
Foreclosure Notice given on 18th
May, 1934-29 years after the
Mortgagee had obtained
possession-was not effectual to
prevent the operation of the
statute against the Appellant.
The Appellant has sought to get
round the statute by raisin
several points :-
(1) The relationship of
solicitor and client between the
parties and that the agreement
embodied in the Mortgage
infringed the provision of
Schedule I Order Rule 12 of the
Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876,
(2) The fact alleged in the
Statement of Claim that all sums
of money due or owing under the
Mortgage had long been
discharged or paid off with
rents collected from the said
house of the Appellant.
(3) That there was no settled
account between the parties.
(4) That on the face of the
Mortgage it appears that items
were added to the Schedule of
the Mortgage after execution.
None of these points assists the
Appellant to maintain the
present action for the reasons
(1) that the whole of the claim
is based on the Appellant's
right and title as Mortgagor and
that he sued the Respondent as
Mortgagee in possession under
Exhibit " A "~ and (2). that his
right and title as Mortgagor
have been completely
extinguished by the operation of
sections 28 and 34 of the Act.
(See
Chapman v. Corpe,
41
L.T.R. 22).
Be it noted that section 28 is
perfectly general in its terms;
it bars
any
suit to redeem the mortgage on
whatever grounds such suit may
be taken, so that it in no way
helps the Appellant to put
forward that he has even the
best and most compelling of
grounds for his suit.
The terms of section 24 of the
Act are also relevant to explain
the sweeping general purpose of
the Act. Again, omitting
unnecessary or inapplicable
words, that section is as
follows :-
•... ,No person claiming any
land or rent in equity shall
bring any suit to recover the
same but within the period
during which by virtue of ,the
provisions hereinbefore
contained he might have ...
brought
an action to recover the
same if he had been entitled at
law to
such estate, interest, or right
in or to the same as he shall
claim therein in equity."
Sections 25 and 26 of the Act
contain safe-guarding provisions
in cases of express trust or
fraud but these have no
application to the present case
where there is no ., express
trust" and no allegation of
fraud ..
For these reasons we consider
that the Court below was right
in holding that the Appellant's
whole claim was barred by the
Real Property Limitation Act,
1833, and the appeal is
dismissed with costs assessed at
£42 19s.
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