pg150
Appeal Court, 8th Nov.,
1941.
.Claim
for damages for injury to
building-Expert evidence
Admission of liability
-Construction of letter.
This was a claim for damages for
injury caused to the appellant'.
house by vibration during
building operations of the
respondents. Expertly were
called in to examine the house
and an undertaking was given to
repair any damage after the
building had been completed:
these experts were not available
at the trial, at which the
appellant called two other
expert witnesses and the
respondents one. The trial Judge
rejected the evidence of the
former and accepted that of the
latter and found that the damage
was not due to vibration, and
gave judgment for the
respondents: he referred to a
letter put in as a promise in
writing to in somewhat vague
terms to make good any damage to
plaintiff's premises caused by
their operations.
Held: That there was ample
evidence on which the Court
below could reach the conclusion
it did that the appellant had
failed to prove damage, that
there was no suggestion that a
cause of action arose on the
alleged admission of liability
and undertaking to repair which
were evidence but not proof of
the claim; further that it may
be shown that an admission wall
made under an erroneous view of
the party's own liability.
Case cited:-
Newton v. Liddiard
12 Q.B. 925.
E. J. Ale.x Taylor
for Appellant.
J. E. David
for Respondents.
The following joint judgment was
delivered: BAKER, BROOKE, AND
JEFFREYS, JJ.
This is an appeal from the
judgment of Butler Lloyd, J.,
given in the Supreme Court,
Lagos, on 21st April, 1941. The
plaintiff-appellant is the owner
of a dwelling house at 18 Kosoko
'street, Lagos. This house was
built sometime before 1910 on
ground which had been reclaimed
and was formerly mud. The
defendants-respondents are a
business firm who erected a
large commercial building on
adjacent ground some three years
ago.
The appellant claimed in the
Court below damages for injury
to his house during the
respondents' building-
operations caused by vibration
resulting from the use of a
pile-driving machine by the
builders, the respondents'
agents,
The appellant gave evidence in
support of his claim and stated
that he had complained to the
respondents' agent at the time
and had shown him the damage
being done. He also called in
two experts at that time to
examine his house and they went
to see the agent who then
undertook to repair the damage
after the respondents' building
had been completed. These two
experts were not available at
the trial.
The plaintiff also put in
correspondence between him and
the respondents
and relied particularly upon his
Solicitors letter dated 8th
January 1938 (Exhibit "E") and
the respondents reply on 10th
January, 1938 (Exhibit "F ").
Those letters read: -
Plundayo Alaba Akerele,
Barrister-at-Law & Solicitor,
24 Odnnlami Street, Lagos,
Nigeria.
8th January, ]938.
Ex. "E"
2222/40 .1. W. Bamiro v. S.a.O.A.
Put in by Mr. Taylor Intd. Ola
S.
Regtr. 26/2/41.
" The Agent, S.O.O.A.,
Broad Street, Lagos.
RE 18 KOSOKO STREET,
LAGOS.
Sir,
I am instructed by my client Mr
Willie Bamiro to inform yon that
during the building of your
store at Kosoko Street Lagos, my
client house No. 18 Kosoko
Street was badly damaged due to
the Iron holdings used by you in
your building.
The Iron on being knocked down
simply cracked my client's house
and your then Agent :Mr Nicoday
was shewn the damages and he
promised to have the place
repaired after completing your
store.
Since completion my client
informs me that nothing was done
to repair his house.
TAKE NOTICE therefore that
unless my client's house is
satisfactorily repaired within
fourteen days my instructions
are to put the matter in court
claiming damages and that
without any further notice from
this office.
I am, faithfully yours,
(Sgd.) E. A. Akerele, Solicitor
to W. Bamiro."
"Ex. 'F.'
2222/40 J. W. Bamiro v. S.a.O.A.
Put in by Mr. Taylor Intd. Ola
S.
Regtr. 26/2/41.
pg152
Mr. Ekundayo A. Akerele,
Barrister-at-La w ,
24, Odunlami Street.
Lagos.
RE
18 KOSOKO STREET, LAGOS.
Sir,
In reply to your letter of
the 8th instant
re
the above.
Contrary to what your client
has told you our store at
Alakoro is still under
erection and it was not
completed yet; our
arrangement with your client
was that his house will be
repaired after completion of
our store and this is not
finished yet, we cannot do
anything until the
completion of the building.
Yours faithfully,
p.
pon. S.C.O.A. (Sgd.) F. Jawz."
The respondents did not do
any repairs and in reply to
a letter from the
appellant's solicitor dated
26th May, 1938, demanding
immediately fulfillment of
the promise to repair
(Exhibit "G-"). The
respondents' then agent
wrote on 26th May, 1938,
(Exhibit "H") proposing that
a competent engineer should
examine the appellant's
house and report upon the
cause of the damage thereto
but not admitting liability.
At the trial, the appellant
called two expert witnesses
one of whom examined his
house on 18th May, 1938, and
again shortly before the
trial.
The other expert examined
appellant's house on 26th
August, 1940, both these
expert witnesses1aescribed
extensive cracking and
buldging of the walls and
other damage which they
attributed to vibration but
gave no reason for that
opinion. One of them
(Macaulay, who made his
inspection on 26th August,
1940) said in answer to the
Court "The damage due to
settlement and vibration are
indistinguishable."
The respondents called one
expert witness who made his
examination on 9th December,
1940. In his opinion the
damage was due to subsidence
and not vibration and he
gave reasons for his
opinion.
The trial Judge rejected the
evidence of the appellant
and his expert witnesses,
accepted the evidence of the
respondents' expert witness
and gave judgment for the
respondents.
The appellant has appealed
on the grounds that the
trial Judge was wrong in
finding that the damage was
not due to vibration and
that his finding was against
the weight of the evidence.
In our opinion there was
ample evidence on which the
Court below could reach the
conclusion it did; it was a
question of fact and the
trial .Judge found that the
appellant had not proved
'his case. We see no reason
to interfere with his
finding.
pg 163
Appellant's counsel at the
hearing of this appeal has
contended
that
the respondents' letter of
10th January, 1938, (Exhibit
" F") was a clear admission
of liability and an
undertaking to repair
and that the trial Judge was
wrong in holding that the
S.C.O.A. damage was not due
to vibration in view of the
very clear admissions in
this letter. We do not find
this contention well
founded. Even if this letter
admitted that the
appellant's house
had suffered some damage by
the respondents' building
operations
and gave an undertaking to
repair such damage, it gave
no indication of the nature
or extent of the damage
admitted and it is evident
that, in the event of
subsequent dispute, the
question what damage had in
fact .been done would have
to be ascertained.
The letter could not surely
be construed as an
undertaking to repair any
damage of which the
appellant might choose to
complain.
The respondents did in fact
later question what damage,
if any, had been done. The
appellant then brought his
action and the Court below
found that the appellant had
failed to prove that any
damage had actually been
caused.
The fact that the
respondents in their letter
" F " appear to admit some
damage can make no
difference if as is the case
no damage was in fact
proved. The trial Judge
referred to this letter as a
promise" in writing in
somewhat vague terms to make
" good any damage to
plaintiff's premises caused
by their operations "; this
in our opinion is the
correct construction of the
letter in question.
The fallacy in the
appellant's argument seems
to be treating letter" F "
as proof of his claim; it is
not proof but evidence.
It is also clear that it may
be shown that an admission
was made under the erroneous
view of the party's own
liability
(Newton v. Liddiard
12 Q.B. 925) and the two
Exhibits before this Court
read together support the
contention that it was so
made. '1'here is no
suggestion that a cause of
action arose upon these
documents and they were only
referred to as confirming a
previous admission of which
there was no evidence before
the Court. The trial Judge
considered this evidence
with the other evidence and
found for the respondents.
In our opinion he was right
and this appeal fails with
costs assessed at twenty
guineas.