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JOSEPH NORTEY DOWUONA v. E. K. DOUDU [16/05/2002] CA/NO. 16/2000.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA – GHANA

______________________________

CORAM:       ESSILFIE-BONDZIE, JA(PRESIDING)

FARKYE, JA.

OWUSU-ANSAH, JA.

CA/NO.16/2000

16TH MAY 2002

JOSEPH NORTEY DOWUONA                     :              PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VRS

E. K. DOUDU                                                :              DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

____________________________________________________________________________________

 

 

JUDGMENT

ESSILFIE-BONDZIE, JA:

The Plaintiff/Respondent is the administrator of the estate of his late mother Esther Akuorkor Quaye owner of House No. B737/7 Abossey Okai Accra.  The defendant runs a nightclub known as “SUNKWA NIGHT CLUB in the said House No. B 737/7.  The Plaintiff/Respondent (who will hereinafter be simply referred to as the plaintiff) is one of the sons of Esther Akuorkor Quaye (deceased).  The Plaintiff’s case was that the Defendant/Appellant rented a room in the said house No. B737/7 and subsequently took a lease of a vacant space in front of the building at a monthly rent of £5.

There arose a controversy between the parties as to how the Defendant/Appellant  (who will hereafter be called the Defendant) came to occupy the premises and what interest if any he had in the property.  The Plaintiff therefore issued a Writ asking for the following reliefs:

(a)  An Order that H/No. B737/7 Kaneshie was redeemed on the 31st March 1975.

(b)  Payment of Mesne profits

(c)  Ejectment of Defendant from the said house. 

The Defendant also counter-claimed for the following reliefs:

(a)  An Order of the Court that the Plaintiff should execute a deed of conveyance in affirmation of the afore-mentioned agreement of 1968.

(b)  An account of the amount of compensation received from the Ghana Highways Authority by the Plaintiff in trust for the Defendant.

(c)  Interest of 10 percent on the amount found due to the defendant from the date of receive of the compensation by the Plaintiff to date of judgment or payment thereof to the Defendant.

The Defendant lost the suit and being aggrieved and dissatisfied he has appealed to this High Court dated 7th July 1989 on two grounds namely:

(a)  The  Honourable High Court Judge erred in law.

(b)  The judgment was against the weight of the evidence.

It is evident from the record of proceedings that the Plaintiff sued per his Lawful Attorney one Francis Sogah a younger brother of Plaintiff.  In arguing ground (b) of the two grounds learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the trial judge ignored or played down every material evidence in favour of the Defendant.  He said that everything the trial judge relied on to give judgment against the Defendant was as confessed by the Lawful Attorney what was passed on to him.  For example the trial judge ignored an important confession made by Francis Sogah, the lawful attorney which should have rendered the evidence in favour of the Plaintiff unreliable. The confession learned counsel referred were the answers the lawful attorney gave under  cross-examination.  Some are:

Q.  “All you know were passed on to you.

A.   That is so.  My brother till

Q.   It is not to your personal knowledge

A.   My brother told me I did not see it.”

He said that in the light of the above cross-examination and other hearsay evidence given by the Plaintiff’s attorney, learned counsel concluded that everything the trial judge relied on to give judgment against the Defendant was as confessed by the Lawful Attorney what was passed on to the Plaintiff and witnesses.

In his reaction to the submission of counsel for the Defendant counsel for the plaintiff recounted that the Plaintiff was represented by an Attorney in the matter.  This was because the Plaintiff had a stroke so his speech was seriously impaired.  He submitted that much of the case of the Defendant is based on the Supposition that the Attorney was not present when certain acts and matters took place and so the court should ignore the evidence completely. This is why counsel for the Defendant had referred to as “CONFESSIONS.” Learned counsel argued that instead of asking the Court to ignore the attorneys evidence, the Defendant should have adduced evidence to rebut the evidence on oath of the Attorney which in law amounted to statement on oath by the Plaintiff himself.  Counsel for the Plaintiff contended that the learned trial judge accepted the evidence on oath of the Attorney which was never shaken under cross-examination and which appeared to be the most probable of the conflicting, versions of the events transpired between Defendant and Plaintiff.

In paragraph 3, 4 and 5th of the statement of claim the Plaintiff pleaded as follows:

“ 3 That in or about 1968 Plaintiff agreed with the Defendant that in consideration for repayment of a mortgage loan of about ¢2,610.00 to the Ghana Commercial Bank and the expenses incurred in developing an area on the properly to the tune of ¢4,010 including interest Defendant held the aforementioned property as security for a period of 6 years 11 months.

(4)  That the sums mentioned supra are to be redeemed by defendant by collecting a monthly rent of ¢90.00 beginning 1st March 1968 to the 31st March 1975 when the security shall be redeemed and Defendant to hand over the property to the Plaintiff

(5) That Plaintiff says that the legal date of transfer of the property from Defendant to Plaintiff has passed but Defendant has refused and or failed to vacate the premises”.

In his evidence the Defendant gave quite a contrary account of the transaction that took place between him and the Plaintiff. He testified that sometime in 1968 in consideration of £500.00, the Plaintiff granted licence to him to construct a block building on part of the land on which house No. 737/3  Abossey Okai stands for use as building premises, on condition that the defendant would leave the building to the plaintiff when the defendant finally decided to go to his home-town.  He said after he had constructed 3-room building on the said part of the land, the whole property was attached towards the execution of a fife in satisfaction of a Bank mortgage loan. According to him as a result of this revelation, he immediately demanded from the plaintiff the refund of the £500 and cost of the construction of 3-room building.

The defendant’s evidence was that the plaintiff then entered into a fresh agreement with him the terms of which are that the defendant should negotiate with the Bank and pay off the loan with interest, that the defendant, should take possession of the plaintiff’s house No. 737/3 Abossey Okai on the land to manage and help the repayment of the loan. He said after the repayment of the loan the plaintiff failed to execute a conveyance or deed to evidence defendant’s title to the land whereof the plaintiff originally granted licence to him.  In other words the plaintiff failed to execute a conveyance in his favour to turn the said licence of 1968 into absolute sale of the said part of the land. Dr. Sogah, a brother of the Plaintiff gave evidence substantially the same as that of the Plaintiff.  He testified that when they were confronted with the attachment of the house to pay a Bank mortgage loan they decided to get some one to pay off the loan and then take the house and use the rent to defray or offset the payment. He said at that juncture the defendant came forward and said he could help them to pay the loan so that they could use the monthly rents he was to pay them to offset the payment.  The plaintiff subsequently found a lawyer who drew out an agreement. They signed their portion and gave a copy to the defendant to study.  That up to date the defendant has not signed the agreement.  Dr. Sogah went on to say that the contents of the agreement was however read and explained to the defendant as he said he was illiterate and could not read.  The amount of the loan was £3,713 and the defendant agreed to pay rent of £45 per month. After he had agreed to this, according to the witness, they sealed the agreement with schnapps. This was in 1968. the agreement was tendered in evidence and marked as Exhibit A.

The evidence was clear that all the tenants in the building were ejected and the whole premises given to the defendant.  The defendant himself said the plaintiff handed over the main building to him to manage so that he collected the rent and use it to pay the Bank loan.  The defendant testified that he used the building to run his business and got money to pay the loan.  When cross-examined as to how much he was paying to the bank he replied that he could not tell off hand as it happened a long time ago.  He also said as follows under cross-examination. 

Q. “ (i)   some time you paid ¢30,000 per month to the bank.

A.    I cannot remember. I paid the whole debt.  That is what I know.

Under further cross-examination the defendant gave the following answers:

Q.  If you calculate from 1967 by 1975 they would have settled this amount owed you.

A.  There was no agreement.  They said I should pay off the loan owed so that they would convey the land on which I had my building to me.”

Under further cross-examination the defendant said:

“Q.  They never agreed to give you a plot of land, for the land itself is only one plot

A.   They did promise where I use.”

Undoubtedly the evidence presented before the trial judge revealed that there were two conflicting claims and her duty as she saw it was to determine which of the two rival claims was the truth.  She eventually opted for the plaintiffs.

In her judgment the trial judge gave the following reasons to justify her preference to the plaintiff’s case.  She said “……….  Why I think defendant cannot be speaking the truth.  He plainly confesses under cross-examination that he does not know the size of the land in dispute i.e. the land he claims the plaintiff promised to convey to him. If he did not know, how was he in a position to assess the value and more particularly to know whether or not the plaintiffs were not demanding too much by asking him to settle the debt, the outstanding and future rates on the premises.”

Another reason why learned judge preferred the plaintiff’s case was that “In any case why was the defendant not paying rents to the plaintiff.”  If the arrangement was to pay off the debt and the land transferred to him?  We do clearly see from these circumstances that he occupied the premises on the understanding that the rents payable to the plaintiffs was to be used to defray the debt he had settled on their behalf.  This can be the only logical explanation for the ejectment of the original tenants particularly his occupation of the whole premises and the non-payment of rents whatsoever to the owners of the property.

A reading of the record, shows that there are inconsistencies in the defendant’s pleadings and the evidence adduced. On one hand the defendant is claiming that there was a verbal promise for an outright sale of the frontage of the house to him, on the other hand he claims he was given the assurance that he would be permitted to have the place until he leaves same when he decided to go home for good.  He claimed that the consideration for this was £500 he paid to plaintiff; no receipt was tendered to support this.

I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge made a critical analysis of the evidence in the light of the conflicting or rival claims before her.  I hold that the decision the learned judge arrived at is correct and supported by the evidence.  It should not be disturbed without clear proof that it is wrong and I fail to find proof, in the record that it is wrong.  For these reasons the appeal is dismissed.

A. ESSILFIE-BONDZIE

JUSTICE OF APPEAL

S.T. FARKYE, JA:

I agree.

P. K. OWUSU-ANSAH, JA:

I also agree.

COUNSEL

*vdm*

 

 
 

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