Appeal Court. 19 March, 1937.
Appeal from Supreme Court
exercising Appellate Jurisdiction.
Charge against licensed druggist
for failure to keep record of
supplies and sales of dangerous
drugs-Appellant discharged by
Magistrate at close of case for
prosecution-Appeal by way of
petition by Attorney-General to
Supreme Court-Direction by Supreme
Court to convict-Appeal therefrom-Meaning
of" a person who supplies"
discussed.
Held: Direction of Supreme Court
set aside, but prosecution had
made out a
prima facie
case, and the Magistrate erred in
not calling upon the respondent to
reply thereto. Case remitted to
Magistrate to hear defence.
The facts of the case are
sufficiently set out in the
judgment.
S. J. Barlatt
for Appellant.
The Solicitor-General
for Respondent.
The following joint judgment was
delivered :-
KINGDON, c.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES,
c.J., GOLD COAST, AND WEBBER, C.J.,
SIERRA LEONE.
In this case the appellant was
charged on the 11th September,
1936, in the Court of the Police
Magistrate, Freetown, as follows:-
.• For that you the said J. A.
Short of 61a Kissy Street. being a
person duly registered and
licensed to dispense drugs and
poisons at your shop situated at
No. 61a Kissy Street in Freetown.
in the Police District of Free·
town in the colony of Sierra
Leone, sometime during the month
of August. 1936. did fail to make
entries in the register or a book
(kept for the record of all
supplies and sale of dangerous
drugs obtained and sold by you)
contrary to sec. 10 sub-see.'
(c)
of the Dangerous Drugs Rules, 1929
made under Ordinance No. 10 of
1926."
He pleaded" not guilty," and at
the close of the case for the
prosecution his Counsel submitted
that no case had been made out for
him to answer. The Police
Magistrate in a considered
judgment upheld this contention
and discharged the appellant.
The Attorney-General petitioned
the Supreme Court against the
order of discharge, and upon the
petition coming before Macquarrie,
J., he recorded the opinion that
the appellant had committed the
offence charged and ordered that
the case be remitted to the
Magistrate to deal with it in
accordance with that 0J?inion,
after hearing the appellant on one
other submission.
It may be recorded at once that
this order cannot possibly be
upheld, because the appellant's
defence to the charge has not yet
been heard. The most that can be
said is that the prosecution has
.
made out a
prima facie
case for appellant to answer and
an order made for the case to be
remitted to the Police Magistrate
to proceed accordingly. The real
question for determination by this
Court, then, is whether or not the
evidence for the prosecution
discloses a
prima facie
case.
Shortly, the facts adduced by the
prosecution are that the appellant
is a licensed druggist under the
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1926.
From the beginning of 1936 up to
the date of the charge he had
purchased 6 ounces of tincture of
opium and 34 ounces of morphia
(both dangerous drugs within the
meaning of the Ordinance) from the
West African Drug Company. These
were obtained on orders "for
dispensing purpose" signed by
appellant as "Druggist." On the
appellant's shop being visited by
an Assistant Commissioner of
Police in August 1936, the
appellant was unable to produce,
on demand, any Dangerous Drugs
Register and he explained its
absence by saying that it had been
stolen. He produced
3i ounces of tincture of opium and
stated that he had no other
dangerous drugs, stating that he
had used the remaining quantity
(i.e. 2i ounces of tincture of
opium and 34 ounces of morphia)
for his personal use. Thereupon he
was charged as above recorded with
contravening rule 10 (c) of
the Dangerous Drugs Rules, 1929,
which reads as follows :-
"
10. Every person who supplies any
dangerous drug shall comply with
the following provisions:
"
(e)
he shall make the entry with
respect to any dangerous drug
purchased or otherwise obtained
by him on the day on which it is
received, and with respect to any
sale or supply by him of any
dangerous drug on the day on
which the drug is despatched or
delivered; or where that is not
reasonably convenient on the day
following the day on which the
dangerous drug is received, or
despatched or delivered."
It is clear that the first
essential to secure a conviction
under this rule is to show that
the person charged is a "person
who supplies any dangerous drug"
within the meaning of the rule. In
the present case, since there was
no evidence that the appellant
supplied any dangerous drug to any
other person, could it be said
that the .prosecution had shown
him to be "a person who
supplies"? The learned Police
Magistrate held that it could not.
The learned Judge in the Court
below, on the other hand, held
that the " words • every person
who supplies ' are no more than a
short expression to mean and
include every person who carries
on or holds himself out as
carrying on the business of
supplying." We agree with this
view. The question then arises:
Was there
prima facie
evidence that the appellant was
such a person? We think that the
following facts taken together do
constitute such
prima facie
evidence, viz. :-
1. The fact that appellant was·
registered as a licensed druggist.
159
The AttorneyGeneral of Sierra
Leone
v.
Josiah Short.
Kingdon, Petrides & Webber,
C.JJ.
100
The AttomeyGeneral of Sierra
Leone
v. ] osiah Short.
Kingdon, Petrides & Webber, C·I] .
The Attorney-General of Sierra
Leone v. Josiah Short.
2. The fact that he admitted
having kept a Dangerous Drugs
Register.
3. The fact that in his capacity
as a druggist, he obtained a large
quantity of dangerous drugs "for
dispensing purpose," i.e. for
supplying to customers in
prescriptions to be dispensed by
him.
4. The fact that he could not
produce, and therefore had
presumably used for dispensing
(i.e. supplying to customers),
almost all the dangerous drugs
purchased by him for dispensing
purposes.
Once it was shown that appellant
Was
prima facie
a
person within the meaning of the
words" every person who supplies
any dangerous drug," the
provisions of the rule requiring
him to make an " entry with
respect to any dangerous drug
purchased," etc., become
operative, and the prosecution
led evidence to show that the
appellant did not comply with this
requirement.
We therefore hold that the
prosecution made out before the
Police Magistrate a
prima facie
case for the appellant to answer,
and accordingly order that the
order of the Supreme Court be
varied by directing, in lieu of
the directions given in that
order, that the case be remitted
to the Police Magistrate to hear
the defence of the appellant to
the charge and, after so doing, to
decide the case in the light of
the opinions hereinbefore
expressed.
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