Constitutional law - Article 127
(4) and (5) of the 1992
Constitution - Action as a
matter of public interest -
Whether or not the benefit of
its members, whose pension
rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 1992, are allegedly
being infringed - Whether or not
continuing to place some of the
persons serving in the Judiciary
on or under the SSNIT pension
scheme after the coming into
force of the 1992 Constitution
was wrongful and violates
article 127 (4) of the 1992
Constitution. - plaintiff has
wrongfully invoked the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court-
Whether or not plaintiff has
wrongfully invoked the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court-
Whether or not the duty imposed
on the President by article 149
of the 1992 Constitution to
determine the conditions of
service of Judicial Officers can
be delegated to, or performed
by, the 3rd Defendant
- Whether or not sections
213 (1) (a) and 220 of the
National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act
766) contradict articles 71 (i)
(b), 127 (4) and (5) of the 1992
Constitution
HEADNOTES
The Plaintiff’s case and
arguments in the statement of
case have been briefly as
follows,“Which of the two
existing pension schemes in
Ghana, namely, (a) the CAP. 30
pension scheme and (b) the
Social Security and National
Insurance Trust (“SSNIT”)
pension scheme, ought to be the
proper pension scheme determined
by the 1992 Constitution to
govern the contract of
employment of persons serving in
the Judicial Service of Ghana;
Whether the pension rights
conferred by the 1992
Constitution on persons serving
in the Judicial Service can
subsequently be varied or taken
away by a latter subordinate
legislation, specifically, the
National Pension Act, 2008 (Act
766). In the case of Justices of
the Superior Court of Judicature
and Judicial Officers, the
further issue of whether the
pension rights conferred on them
by article 71 (1) (b) and
article 127 (5) of the 1992
Constitution, namely, that their
conditions of service shall not
be varied to their disadvantage
can be achieved by removing them
from a purely non-contributory
(CAP.30) pension scheme founded
upon the Consolidated Fund to a
purely contributory pension
scheme under Act 766 managed by
a Fund Manager outside the
Consolidated Fund; and finally,
Whether the Single Spine Salary
Grade Structure (“SSSGS”)
administered by the 3rd
Defendant herein is applicable
to all of Plaintiff’s members,
including the Judicial Officers
therein, or, as contended by the
Plaintiff, that it does not
apply to the Judicial Officers
within the Plaintiff’s ranks.”
In articulating it’s views in
support of the above statement,
the Plaintiff’s members argued
that the treatment being meted
out to it’s members by the
Defendants amount to
discrimination as provided for
by Article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992
HELD
In the exercise of our powers
under article 2 (2) of the
Constitution, the 1st
Defendants are hereby directed
to take requisite measures to
ensure that all the
constitutional requirements in
articles 149 and 158 (2) of the
Constitution are duly complied
with within a period of three
months from the date of this
judgment. In conclusion, we
dismiss Plaintiff’s reliefs, I,
II, III and IV in their
entirety. We however grant and
allow plaintiff’s reliefs VI,
VII and IX in terms of judgment
as is stated supra.In respect of
relief number V, to the extent
that section 213 (1) (a) of Act
766 seeks to vary and or bring
to an end the enjoyment of the
pension scheme allowed Judges of
the Superior Courts and other
Judicial Officers mentioned in
article 127 (4) and (5) therein,
the said relief is granted.
Finally, relief number VIII is
also granted in part to the
extent that the migration of the
Judges and Magistrates outside
the SSSGS is not discriminatory,
whilst the continued placement
of the Judicial Officers on the
SSSGS is unconstitutional and
contravenes articles 149 and 158
(2) of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINIONIt should also be clear
from all the foregoing, that the
constitutional provisions
relating to the Judiciary aim at
setting up the Judiciary as a
unique, special and independent
Institution of governance that
should be treated as such in its
terms and conditions of service
away from other public services
or entities except where
commonalty is expressly or by
clear implication countenanced.
I however acknowledge that this
has been a difficult case and I
am therefore not surprised that
we are not unanimous as to its
determination on all the issues
involved. I also thank counsel
on all sides of this case for
their immense help to the court
by their industry and ingenuity.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Pensions Ordinance CAP 30.
Pensions and Social Security
(Amendment) Decree, 1975 (SMCD8)
Social Security Decree 1972 (NRCD
127)
1992 Constitution
1969 Constitution
1979 Constitution
National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act
766)
Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179)
Audit Service Act 2000 (Act 584)
Ghana Police Service, (Pensions)
Law 1985 (PNDCL 126),
Public Officers (Pension)
(Amendment) Law 1986 (PNDCL 165)
Prison Service (Pension) Law,
1987 (PNDCL 168)
Legal Services Act, 1993 (PNDCL
320)
Legal Services Act, 1993 (PNDCL
320)
Ghana National Fire Service Act
1997 (Act 537)
Audit Service Regulations 2011
(C.I. 70)
Pensions Ordinance, No. 42,
chapter 30 of 1950
Fair Wages and Salaries
Commission Act, 2007 (Act 737).
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9),
Interpretation Act, 2009(Act
792)
JUDICIARY (RETENTION OF REVENUE)
ACT, 2003
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Brown v Attorney-General
and 2 others [2010] SCGLR 183,
at 200
Adumoa II and others v Adu
Twum II [2000]SCGLR 167
Republic v Special
Tribunal, Ex-parte Akosah [1980]
GLR 592 at pages 604-60
Republic v High Court,
(Fast Track) Division Accra,
Ex-parte Electoral Commission
(Mettle Nunoo & Others;
Interested Parties) [2005-2006]
SCGLR 514
Republic v High Court, (Fast
Track Division) Accra, Ex-parte
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice (Richard
Anane, Interested Party)
[2007-2008] SCGLR 213,
Nartey v Gati [20101 SCGLR 745
Asare-Baah III and others v
Attorney-General and Electoral
Commission [2010] SCGLR 43
Osei Boateng v National
Media Commission [2012] 2 SCGLR
1038
Kwaku Asare v
Attorney-General [2012] 1 SCGLR
460
K Thimmappa v Chairman,
Central Board of Directors AIR
2001 SC 467
Nartey-Tokoli v Volta
Aluminum Co. Ltd, [1989-90] 2
GLR 341
Osei-Boateng v National
Media Commission [2012]2 SCGLR
1038
Emmanuel Noble Kor v The
Attorney-General and Justice
Delaili Duose, Suit no.
J1/16/2015 dated 10/3/2016,
unreported
Akainyah v The Republic
(1968) GLR 548 C.A
Huddart, Parker & Co
Proprietary Ltd. v Moorehead
(1909)8 CLR 330
Brandy v. Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission and
Others (1995)2 LRC 9.
Banson v Abbey (1962)1 GLR
213 S.C
Asare v The Republic
(1968) GLR 37.
NPP v Attorney-General [31st
December case] (1993-94)2 GLR 35
S.C
Baiden v Ansah (1973)1 GLR
33
Forson v the Republic
(1976)1 GLR 128
Ameyibor v Komla (1980)
GLR 820 C.A
In re Yendi Skin Affairs;
Andani v Abudulai (1982-83)2 GLR
1080 S.C
In re Odonkor (Decd)
Odonkor v Odonkor (1982) GLR 57
Seyire v Anemana (1971)2
GLR 32C.A
Pauley v Kenaldo Ld.
(1953) IWLR 187.
In Republic v Secretary,
to the Cabinet; Ex parte Ga
Traditional Council (1971)1 GLR
71
Barlow v Ross (1890)24 Q
B.D. 381, C.A
JH Mensah v Attorney
General (1996-97) SCGLR 320 at
362
Asare v Attorney-General
[2003-2004]2 SCGLR 823
Agbevor v Attorney-General
(2000) SCGLR 403.
Kuenyehia v Archer
(1993-94) 2 GLR 525 S.C
Republic v Ghana
Industrial Holding Corporation;
Ex parte Appiah (1981) GLR 736,
C.A
Akufo-Addo v Quashie-Idun
(1968) GLR 667 C.A
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Blacks Law Dictionary
Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis
Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 2009
(5th ed)
Bennion’s Constitutional Law of
Ghana (1962)
Ampiah Ampofo v
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice
(2005-2006) SCGLR 227
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
DOTSE JSC
DISSENTING
ATUGUBA JSC
COUNSEL
KWEKU
PAINTSIL WITH HIM EUDORA BAAH-
DODOO ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.
STELLA
BADU (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY)
WITH HER MS. ZAINAB AYARIGA
(ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY) FOR
THE 1ST DEFENDANT.
SOMUAH-
ASAMOAH ESQ. FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT.
ABDUL
BAAZIT BAMBA ESQ. WITH HIM
GODWIN KODZO TAMEKLO AUGUSTINE
AHAMEY AND REINDOF TWUMASI
ANKRAH FOR THE 3RD
DEFENDANT.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJORITY
OPINION
DOTSE JSC:
CAPACITY OF PLAINTIFF
AND RELIEFS CLAIMED
The plaintiff has instituted the
instant action as a corporate
citizen of Ghana pursuant to
article 2 (1) of the
Constitution 1992 for the
benefit of its members, whose
pension rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 1992, are allegedly
being infringed upon by the
Defendants.
Additionally, the plaintiff
states that, in so far as some
of the reliefs it seeks against
the defendants, go beyond the
immediate confines of its
members, (who are to a
large extent the non-bench
members of the Judicial Service)
the plaintiff should be deemed
to have commenced the action as
a matter of public interest also
pursuant to article 2 (1) of the
Constitution 1992.
In that respect, the plaintiff
is deemed to be seeking to
enforce the pension rights of
the Judges of the Superior Court
of Judicature and also of the
lower court, who by the nature
of their profession cannot
pursue their own grievances
through the court’s system
whilst still in active public
service. This then explains the
basis of the reliefs which the
plaintiff claims against the
defendants which are as
follows:-
i.
Declaration that upon a
true and proper construction of
article 127 (4) and (5) of
the 1992 Constitution, all
persons serving in the Judiciary
were entitled to be placed on
CAP. 30 pension scheme upon the
coming into force of the 1992
Constitution.
ii.
Declaration that the
practice of placing or
continuing to place some of the
persons serving in the Judiciary
on or under the SSNIT pension
scheme after the coming into
force of the 1992 Constitution
was wrongful and violates
article 127 (4) of the 1992
Constitution.
iii.
Declaration that the
practice of placing or
continuing to place
Judicial Officers falling under
Article 161 (b) and (c) of the
1992 Constitution on the
SSNIT pension scheme, whiles
leaving the Judicial Officers on
the bench, namely Judges and
Magistrates under article 161
(a) of the 1992 Constitution, on
CAP. 30 pension scheme was
discriminatory, contrary to
article 17 (2) of the 1992
Constitution.
iv.
Declaration that all
persons serving in the Judicial
Service were and are entitled to
have their gratuity and pension
entitlements computed or
re-computed under CAP. 30
pension scheme and paid the
difference of sums due and owing
them between the two schemes, if
any, together with interest,
including a refund of all SSNIT
contributions deducted from
their salaries with effect from
1992.
v.
Declaration that section
213 (1) (a) of the National
Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766),
seeking to bring to an end the
operation or continuing
operation of CAP. 30 pension
scheme in Ghana and compulsorily
placing Judges of the Superior
Courts and Judicial Officers
under a contributory pension
scheme under Act 766 violates
the letter and spirit of
Articles 127 (4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution.
vi.
Declaration that section
220 of the National Pensions
Act, 2008 (Act 766) offends and
contradicts article 71 (1) and
127 (4) and (5) of the 1992
Constitution and the same is
null and void to the extent of
the inconsistency.
vii.
Declaration that upon a
true construction of article 149
of the 1992 Constitution,
Judicial Officers falling under
article 161 of the 1992
Constitution are not amenable or
do not fall under the purview of
the SSSGS scheme administered by
the 3rd Defendant.
viii.
Declaration that the
continuing placement of the
Judicial Officers within the
Plaintiff’s ranks on the SSSGS
scheme after migrating the
Judges and Magistrates, is not
only discriminatory, contrary to
Article 17 (2) of the 1992
Constitution, but violates their
rights.
ix.
An order directed to the 3rd
Defendant to ensure the
restoration of the said affected
persons to their positions
status quo ante, away from the 3rd
Defendant’s jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
In a well prepared and
articulated statement of
plaintiff’s case, Learned
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr.
Kweku Paintsil, contended that
the plaintiff is a body
corporate, registered under the
Ghana Companies Act, 1963 (Act
179) as a company limited by
guarantee in addition to having
registered as a Trade Union,
with a bargaining certificate
for and on behalf of its
members, who are the non-bench
staff of the Judicial Service,
already stated supra.
The 1st Defendant the
Attorney-General, has been sued
as the principal legal adviser
to the Ghana Government and is a
nominal defendant herein.
The 2nd Defendant the
National Pension Regulatory
Authority, has been sued as the
statutory body established under
section 5 of the National
Pension Act, 2008 (Act 766) with
responsibility for the
regulation and policy
development of pensions
administration in Ghana, with a
further mandate under Act 766 to
unify all pension schemes in
Ghana after the CAP 30 Pension
ceases to be operative and the
3-tier mandatory pension scheme
established under Act 766
becomes operational.
Finally, the 3rd
defendant, the Fair Wages and
Salaries Commission, has been
sued as a statutory body
established under the Fair Wages
and Salaries Commission Act,
2007 (Act 737) with the
purposes of ensuring a fair,
transparent and systematic
implementation of the Government
Public Service Pay Policy.
The Plaintiff has sued the 3rd
Defendant because of it’s
alleged wrongful conduct in
subjecting all of it’s members
to the Single Spine Salary Grade
(SSSGS) notwithstanding that the
Constitution 1992 excludes
plaintiff’s members,
particularly Judicial Officers,
from its purview.
PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT
OF CASE
The thrust of the Plaintiff’s
case and arguments in the
statement of case have been
briefly summarized by learned
counsel for the plaintiff, Mr.
Kweku Paintsil as follows:
The three main areas of concern
which the statement of case
addressed are:
(i)
“Which of the two existing
pension schemes in Ghana,
namely, (a) the CAP. 30 pension
scheme and (b) the Social
Security and National Insurance
Trust (“SSNIT”) pension scheme,
ought to be the proper pension
scheme determined by the 1992
Constitution to govern the
contract of employment of
persons serving in the Judicial
Service of Ghana;
(ii)
Whether the pension rights
conferred by the 1992
Constitution on persons serving
in the Judicial Service can
subsequently be varied or taken
away by a latter subordinate
legislation, specifically, the
National Pension Act, 2008 (Act
766). In the case of Justices of
the Superior Court of Judicature
and Judicial Officers, the
further issue of whether the
pension rights conferred on them
by article 71 (1) (b) and
article 127 (5) of the 1992
Constitution, namely,
that their conditions of service
shall not be varied to their
disadvantage can be achieved by
removing them from a purely
non-contributory (CAP.30)
pension scheme founded upon the
Consolidated Fund to a purely
contributory pension scheme
under Act 766 managed by a Fund
Manager outside the Consolidated
Fund; and finally,
(iii)
Whether the Single Spine
Salary Grade Structure (“SSSGS”)
administered by the 3rd
Defendant herein is applicable
to all of Plaintiff’s members,
including the Judicial Officers
therein, or, as contended by the
Plaintiff, that it does not
apply to the Judicial
Officers within the Plaintiff’s
ranks.” Emphasis
supplied
In articulating it’s views in
support of the above statement,
the Plaintiff’s members argued
that the treatment being meted
out to it’s members by the
Defendants amount to
discrimination as provided
for by Article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992.
1ST AND 3RD
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSES
The Learned Deputy
Attorney-General Dr. Ayine, in
his elaborate presentation in
the 1st Defendant’s
statement of case denied the
plaintiff’s claims and instead
argued that the plaintiff’s case
is based on a number of
“fundamentally flawed
assumptions and a
misapprehension of the nature
and import of the constitutional
provisions dealing with the
salaries, gratuities, pension
and other allowances of judicial
officers”.
Proceeding from the above
assumptions, the 1st
defendant states as follows:-
“Your Lordships, the
Attorney-General would argue
that the current regime is
totally in sync with the
Constitution and that it is
within Parliament’s legislative
power to set up a new pension
regime for the country in line
with the dictates of public
policy. Consequently, to the
extent that the new pension
regime maintains or even
enhances those benefits, it
cannot be said to have violated
the Constitution. This is
because according to him, the
basic rationale behind the
constitutional injunction
against disadvantageous
variation of financial benefits
for Judicial Officers is solely
to protect those benefits from
encroachment by the egregious
political branches as an
integral component of the
independence of the judicial
branch. In other words, the
framers did not intend and could
not have intended CAP 30 benefit
be cast in stone even with
changing circumstances in the
economy as a whole and in the
work place in particular.”
Secondly, the 1st
defendant contended that the
role of the 3rd
defendants in determining the
terms and conditions of the
plaintiff’s members is not
unconstitutional since it is
possible for that power and role
to be delegated.
This is because, according to
the 1st defendants,
no efficient public service
business can occur without
delegation. They contend
that the 3rd
defendants are merely an
instrumentality of state
established to deal
comprehensively with public
sector wage issues.
Thirdly learned Deputy
Attorney-General submitted that
the National Pensions Act, Act
766 is not unconstitutional
vis-à-vis the provisions
contained in article 127 (4) and
(5) of the Constitution 1992.
Learned Counsel submitted that,
when read together, the two
clauses, 127 (4) and (5) seek to
achieve two distinct but
interdependent objectives.
The first is to state clearly
the source of funds out of which
the administrative expenses of
the judiciary, must be paid. The
second is to prohibit deliberate
and or formal encroachment on
the independence of the
Judiciary or of persons
exercising judicial power
through disadvantageous
variation of the financial
benefits due to such persons.
The learned Deputy
Attorney-General concludes his
arguments by stating
emphatically that, the
Plaintiff’s contention of there
being a violation of article 127
is based on an expansive reading
of that provision. Furthermore,
learned Deputy Attorney-General,
argued that, “that way of
thinking is a deliberate attempt
to blend or combine the
Judiciary, which comprises
persons exercising judicial
power, with the Judicial Service
which comprises the public
services arm of the Judiciary.”
Emphasis supplied
This the 1st
defendants contend, the
plaintiff has succeeded in doing
by sidestepping the clear
provisions of the Constitution
and importing the words ”person
serving in the judiciary”
from article 127 (4) into 127
(5). In order to establish what
is meant by exercise or vested
with judicial power, learned
counsel referred to Black’s Law
Dictionary which defines
judicial power as a noun as
follows:-
“The authority exercised by that
department of government which
is charged with declaration of
what the law is and it’s
construction. The authority
vested in courts and Judges as
distinguished from the executive
and legislative power.”
(Reference Sixth Edition, West
Publishing Co. USA, p. 849 which
is an older edition of Blacks
Law Dictionary.)
Flowing from the above
definition, the learned Deputy
Attorney-
General contended that,
Accountants, Human Resource
Managers etc., who are members
of the plaintiff’s not being
vested with judicial power do
not fall within the scope of
the term judiciary.
Fourthly, the learned Deputy
Attorney-General urged this
court to dismiss the claims of
the plaintiff on the grounds
that, section 213 of Act 766
which seeks to bring to an end
CAP 30 pension benefits does not
contradict articles 127 (4) and
(5) of the Constitution 1992.
He argued that, merely charging
the payment of all pension
benefits of the Judiciary on the
consolidated fund does not make
the repeal of CAP 30
unconstitutional.
Indeed, learned counsel argued
that, contextually speaking
there is nothing to suggest the
linkage of articles 127 (4) and
(5) of the Constitution 1992 to
CAP 30 pension benefits.
Learned Deputy Attorney-General
then referred to the decision of
this court in Brown v
Attorney-General and 2 others
[2010] SCGLR 183, at 200
to the effect that payment of
pension benefits to retired
staff of the Audit Service from
funds other than the
consolidated fund was
unconstitutional, to buttress
his point.
Finally, the learned Deputy
Attorney-General, challenged
plaintiff’s contention that
there has been a discrimination
in terms of article 17 (2) of
the Constitution 1992 by the
defendants in the treatment of
plaintiff’s members in terms of
their conditions of service etc
vis-a vis Judges of the Superior
Courts and lower courts.
In conclusion, the learned
Deputy Attorney-General prayed
this court to dismiss the
plaintiff’s action as lacking in
merit. He also prayed that the
plaintiff having failed to
establish that section 213 and
220 of Act 766 have violated the
Constitution 1992, prayed the
court not to be seen to bring
dead statutes back to life. This
is because, the said sections
213 and 220 of Act 766 are not
inconsistent with any
constitutional provisions as
contended by the plaintiff.
3RD
DEFENDANTS STATEMENT OF CASE
In substance the 3rd
Defendant’s Statement of Case is
not different from that of the 1st
Defendants.
However, we will proceed to set
out the arguments of substance
of the 3rd
defendant’s as follows:-
1. LACK OF
JURISDICTION
Learned counsel for the 3rd
defendant, Dr. Aziz Bamba argued
that the plaintiff has
wrongfully invoked the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court. This
is because according to him, the
plaintiff’s suit does not raise
any substantial, real or genuine
issue of interpretation or
enforcement of any provision of
the Constitution 1992.
Relying on several decisions of
this court, such as
i.
Adumoa II and others v Adu
Twum II [2000]SCGLR 167
ii.
Republic v Special
Tribunal, Ex-parte Akosah [1980]
GLR 592 at pages 604-605
iii.
Republic v High Court,
(Fast Track) Division Accra,
Ex-parte Electoral Commission
(Mettle Nunoo & Others;
Interested Parties) [2005-2006]
SCGLR 514
iv.
Republic v High Court,
(Fast Track Division) Accra,
Ex-parte Commission on Human
Rights and Administrative
Justice (Richard Anane,
Interested Party) [2007-2008]
SCGLR 213, 1
v.
Nartey v Gati [2010] SCGLR
745
vi.
Asare-Baah III and others
v Attorney-General and Electoral
Commission [2010] SCGLR 43 and
vii.
Osei Boateng v National
Media Commission [2012] 2 SCGLR
1038
just to mention a few, the 3rd
defendant argued that this court
should deny jurisdiction in the
instant case on the basis of the
decisions referred to supra.
2. APPLICATION OF THE PENSIONS
ORDINANCE, CAP. 30 TO ARTICLES
127 (4) AND (5) OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1992
The 3rd defendants,
having traced correctly the
history of the pensions law and
practice from the Gold Coast era
to date, argued that, prior to
the coming into force of the
Constitution 1992, the state of
the law on Pensions or Social
Security was that, all persons
employed in the public sector on
or after 1st January
1972, except those expressly
exempted by or under enactments
relating to Social Security and
Pensions were deemed by law to
be members of the Social
Security Fund, and not
beneficiaries of the Pensions
Ordinance CAP 30.
The 3rd
defendant stated categorically
that, the members of the
plaintiff’s association do not
form part of the categories of
public officers whose pensions
and gratuities must be
determined pursuant to CAP 30.
The 3rd defendant’s
need to be commended for the
accurate, and very helpful,
historical background they
provided for the analysis of the
pension laws since the Gold
Coast era. This has been
acknowledged by the plaintiff’s
composite response to the 1st
and 3rd defendant’s
statement of case, filed on
22/4/2015.
The learned counsel for the 3rd
defendant expended a
considerable space in the
statement of case to debunk the
assertion that the plaintiff’s
members are entitled to the
unfunded pension scheme under
CAP 30. According to learned
counsel for the 3rd
defendants, the CAP. 30 Pension
system is unsustainable, and is
a sure recipe for national
bankruptcy. They contend that
the Plaintiff’s argument is
inconsistent with article 36 (7)
of the Constitution 1992 which
enjoins the state to
“ensure that contributory
schemes are instituted and
maintained that will guarantee
economic security for all
self-employed and other citizens
of Ghana.”
Relying on studies conducted by
eminent Ghanaian jurist Prof.
Kofi Kumado and economist
Dr. Fritz Gockel who
concluded that the unfunded CAP
30 is unsustainable, (reference
Exhibit FWSC C), learned counsel
for the 3rd
defendants strenuously argued
that, the embedding of CAP. 30
pension scheme into articles 127
(4) and (5) of the Constitution
1992 would work untold hardship
on the economy as it’s practical
effect would lead to public
sector workers whose pension
rights are charged on the
consolidated fund to claim to be
entitled to this non
contributory pension regime.
Based upon the above
submissions, learned counsel for
the 3rd defendant
submitted finally that sections
213 and 220 of the National
Pensions Act do not infringe
articles 71 and 127 (4) and (5)
of the Constitution 1992.
3. CLAIM OF
DISCRIMINATION – PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 17 (2) OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1992
The 3rd defendant
argued that, the plaintiff has
not led any cogent or
substantial evidence to support
the allegation that some
categories of it’s members are
treated differently when it
comes to pensions and
gratuities.
According to the 3rd
defendants, it is the
Constitution 1992, that has
provided different
constitutional processes and
regimes for the determination of
the gratuities and pensions of
the different categories of
persons working in the Judiciary
as is evident in articles 71,
149 and 158 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the 3rd
defendant, referred to the case
of Nartey v Gati
already referred to supra and
Kwaku Asare v
Attorney-General [2012] 1 SCGLR
460 to conclude that
there is indeed no
discrimination as alleged by the
plaintiff.
RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFF
TO 1ST AND 3RD
DEFENDANTS STATEMENT OF CASE
On the 16th of April
2015, this court granted the
plaintiff leave to respond to
the statements of case of the 1st
and 3rd defendants.
That task was complied with by
the plaintiff who filed a
composite response to these
statements of case on 22/4/2015.
In that statement, learned
counsel for the plaintiff, Kweku
Paintsil, responded seriatim to
all the arguments made therein
and articulated the following
submissions:-
1.
Plaintiff submitted that,
the Defendants arguments on the
legal position and the purported
divide between CAP 30 and SSNIT
pension schemes before the
coming into force of the
Constitution is not tenable.
Rather, the plaintiff
maintained it’s position that,
despite the provisions of
sections 1 and 3 of the Pensions
and Social Security (Amendment)
Decree, 1975 (SMCD8) articles
127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution have put all of the
Plaintiff’s members on CAP 30
pension scheme upon the coming
into force of the Constitution.
Plaintiff also stated that,
whenever a reference is made in
the Constitution to pension
rights of public sector workers,
that reference is to CAP 30.
They also argued that, whenever
a specific right is conferred on
a specific person for example,
the Chief Justice or Auditor
General, it is also meant to
apply generally to all other
workers in the establishment
headed by that person.
2.
Secondly, the Plaintiff
argued that, there was a clear
intention on the part of the law
makers to ensure that by a
certain time in our legal
history, (reference Social
Security Act, 1965 (Act 279) to
Social Security Decree 1972
(NRCD 127) up to SMCD 8) when
all those who opted to remain on
CAP 30 were all gone, that
particular pension scheme would
phase out and SSNIT pension
scheme would be applicable to
all.
3.
However, the Plaintiff
argued that, despite this clear
legislative intent to shut the
CAP. 30 door, there was a lot of
legislative activity tending to
open this CAP. 30 door before
the Constitution 1992 came into
being. Reference the Ghana
Police Service, (Pensions) Law
1985 (PNDCL 126), Public
Officers (Pension) (Amendment)
Law 1986 (PNDCL 165) for the
Legal Class and Prison Service
(Pension) Law, 1987 (PNDCL 168)
for the Prisons Service. It must
be noted that, all these
specific laws excepted the
application of (SMCD 8) to those
organisations and institutions.
4.
The Plaintiff then listed
some institutions like the
Police Service, Legal Service,
Prisons, Ghana Immigration and
the Armed Forces to argue that
these were the institutions
which were exempted from the
purview of SMCD 8 and put on CAP
30, before the Constitution 1992
came into force. They therefore
conceded that these did not
include plaintiff’s and Judges
of the Superior courts as well
as those of the lower courts.
5.
The Plaintiff next responded
that the Constitution 1992
exempted the following
institutions from the SSNIT
pension and enabled their
employees to enjoy CAP 30
pension scheme. These are
contained in (a) article 127 (4)
in relation to “persons serving
in the Judiciary” (b) article
187 (14) in relation to persons
serving in the Audit Service (c)
article 171 in relation to
“persons serving with the
(National Media) Commission” (d)
article 54 in relation to
“persons serving with (the
Electoral) Commission and (e)
article 227 in relation to
“persons serving with CHRAJ”.
Once these are to be a charge on
the Consolidated Fund, Plaintiff
submitted that they were out of
the purview of SSNIT Pension.
The plaintiff also listed the
following institutions and their
applicable laws that were
enacted to exempt their
employees from SSNIT pension as
follows:-
(i)
PNDCL 165 was amended by
section 16 of the Legal Services
Act, 1993 (PNDCL 320) for the
Legal Services,
(ii)
Section 34 of the Legal
Services Act, 1993 (PNDCL 320)
See also section 27 of the Ghana
National Fire Service Act 1997
(Act 537) which expressly
removed personnel of the Fire
Service from the purview of SMCD
8.
6.
The Plaintiff then argued
that the definition of CAP 30 as
provided in Act 766 contained
discrepancies as it included
names of institutions like the
Judiciary, but did not include
the Audit Service. However, an
exhibit that was produced from
the Controller and
Accountant-General as per letter
dated 13th February
2015, contained the names of all
public sector institutions
including the Judiciary and the
Audit Service as those
institutions entitled to CAP 30
pension benefits. Learned
counsel again referred to the
case of Brown v
Attorney-General,
already referred to supra and
reiterated the point that, after
the decision by the Supreme
Court in that case, the Audit
Service Regulations 2011 (C.I.
70) was enacted which guaranteed
the payment of retiring
gratuities and pensions from the
Consolidated Fund to staff of
the Audit Service. Learned
counsel for Plaintiff however
correctly stated the view that,
the inclusion of staff of the
Audit Service in the payment of
pension rights under CAP 30 took
its roots from article 187 (14)
of the Constitution and not from
C. I. 70 as contended.
7.
Contending that the
payment of pension benefits to
Judges of the Superior Courts
are based on the Constitution
1992 and not on PNDCL 165 as was
urged by the Defendants, learned
Counsel for plaintiff then
posited that Judges and
Magistrates of the lower courts
and even some Directors within
the Judicial Service are also
paid CAP 30 pension benefits.
They therefore reiterated the
fact that, the denial of the
payment of these pension
benefits to the Plaintiff’s
members is unconstitutional.
Plaintiff therefore reiterated
the view that based on article
127 (4) the phrase,
”persons serving in the
Judiciary” must include
the plaintiff.
8.
Learned counsel for the
plaintiff, Kweku Paintsil
rightly in our view concluded
his response to the Defendants
statement of case by stating
that it is wrong for the
Defendants to use the value or
quantum of pension benefits
payable to persons entitled as a
basis to deny them their rights
if they are really and truly
entitled to them.
In our opinion, it is
completely wrong to appeal to
our emotions on the cost element
in this very serious
constitutional matter affecting
the pension rights of employees
who have worked several years
for the state.
MEMORANDUM OF ISSUES
We will therefore proceed to the
analysis of the issues set down
in the memorandum of issues
taking into due consideration
all the factors raised and
argued by all the counsel
referred to supra in this
judgment. We will also relate
the determination of the issues
to the reliefs claimed by the
Plaintiff.
The issues set down are the
following:-
i.
Whether and to what extent
the Plaintiff’s action raises
any real, genuine or substantial
issues of constitutional
interpretation to warrant the
invocation of the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
ii.
Whether or not the
constitutional requirement in
article 127 (4) of the 1992
Constitution that the
“gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons
serving in the judiciary shall
be charged on the Consolidated
Fund” imposes a duty to
place the Plaintiff’s members on
the CAP 30 pension scheme and
not the SSNIT pension scheme;
alternatively.
iii.
Whether or not the
expression “all” “persons
serving in the Judiciary”
appearing in Article 127 (4) of
the 1992 Constitution applies
only to the Justices, Judges and
Magistrates to the exclusion of
all other judicial service
employees, including the
non-bench Judicial Officers.
iv.
Whether or not the payment
of CAP. 30 pension benefits to
the Justices, Judges and
Magistrates to the exclusion of
members of the Plaintiff
Association amounts to
discrimination against the
latter within the meaning of
Article 17 (2) of the 1992
Constitution.
v.
Whether or not the duty
imposed on the President by
article 149 of the 1992
Constitution to determine the
conditions of service of
Judicial Officers can be
delegated to, or performed by,
the 3rd Defendant.
vi.
Whether or not the conduct
of the Judicial Service in
requesting the 3rd
Defendant to remove the Judicial
Officers on the bench from the
purview of the SSSGS whiles
retaining the non-bench Judicial
Officers on the SSSGS constitute
discrimination against
the non-bench judicial officers
within the meaning of article 17
(2) of the 1992 Constitution;
and
vii.
Whether or not sections
213 (1) (a) and 220 of the
National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act
766) contradict articles 71 (i)
(b), 127 (4) and (5) of the 1992
Constitution.
ISSUE I
WHETHER AND TO WHAT
EXTENT THE PLAINTIFF’S ACTION
RAISES ANY REAL, GENUINE OR
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO
WARRANT THE INVOCATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT
Even though the defendants have
raised this jurisdictional issue
and cited several of this
court’s decisions in support, we
are of the considered view that
the plaintiff’s case raises
substantial issues of genuine
and real constitutional
interpretation to warrant the
invocation of the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court.
This is because, in our opinion,
having considered in detail the
reliefs which the plaintiff’s
are seeking before this court,
and taking into consideration
the responses of the defendants,
it is clear that serious and
real issues of constitutional
interpretation have been raised
to evict the type of concern
and response given thereto.
Taking the plaintiff’s reliefs 1
and 2 into consideration, it is
clear that some serious, genuine
and real constitutional issues
have been raised. For example,
who are to be considered members
of the Judiciary under articles
127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution 1992 to bring them
under the CAP. 30 pension
scheme when the Constitution
1992 came into force?
Secondly, relief 2 also raises
some genuine issues of
interpretation such as who among
the Judiciary under the
Constitution 1992 have been
placed on SSNIT pension scheme
contrary to article 127 (4) of
the Constitution?
One may take a cue from the
seminal book of our illustrious
Justice Date-Bah,
“Reflections on the Supreme
Court of Ghana” in which
he discussed and analysed some
of the notable pronouncements on
this issue of jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in the case of
Republic v Special Tribunal,
Ex-parte Akosah, already
referred to supra, where he
recounted the criteria used to
determine whether an issue of
enforcement or interpretation
arises under the Constitution in
analogous constitutional
provisions under the 1979 3rd
Republican Constitution. The
learned author taking guidance
from the Ex-parte Akosah case
supra adopted the criteria used
by Anin J.A (as he then was)
in the Akosah case as the
criteria to be used to determine
whether or not the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction has been
properly invoked.
(a)
“Where the words of
the provisions are imprecise or
unclear or ambiguous. Put in
another way, constitutional
interpretation or enforcement
arises if one party invites the
court to declare that the words
of the article have a double
meaning or are obscure or else
mean something different from or
more than what they say”.
In the instant case, the
ferocious nature of the
divergent interpretations being
put on the Constitution and
meaning of the words in article
127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution 1992 and also
whether sections 213 and 220 of
Act 766 are inconsistent with or
violate the relevant provisions
of the Constitution raise
genuine issues which call for
this court’s jurisdiction to be
invoked.
The learned author continued his
references to the Akosah
case
as
follows:-
(b)
“Secondly, where the
rival meanings have been placed
by the litigants on the words of
any provisions of the
constitution.”
In the instant case, this is
exactly what has happened when
both parties have divergent
rival meanings on the relevant
provisions of the Constitution
regarding what class of staff
within the Judicial Service
constitute the Judiciary and
those who are not but are
Judicial Officers and those who
ought to be placed under
C.A.P 30 pension scheme.
The learned author further
states as follows:-
(c)
“Thirdly, where there
is a conflict in the meaning and
effect of two or more articles
of the Constitution, and the
question is raised as to which
provision should prevail.”
In the instant matter, the
apparent inconsistency between
the provisions in article 127
(4) and (5) in respect of who or
what constitutes “the Judiciary”
(article 127 (4)) on the one
hand and the meaning of article
127 (5) vis-à-vis the terms used
therein and the addition of the
words “Judicial Officer or other
person exercising Judicial
Power.”
The learned author completed the
categorization thus:-
(d)
“Finally, where on
the face of the provisions,
there is a conflict between the
operation of particular
institutions set up under the
Constitution, and thereby
raising problems of enforcement
and of interpretation.”
In this particular instance,
reference needs to be made to
provisions in article 71 (1) of
the Constitution 1992 which has
set up a constitutional body for
the determination of emoluments
and conditions of service of
some members of the Judiciary
under article 127 (4) and (5) of
the Constitution 1992. Those
provisions have to be considered
alongside the provision of
articles 149 and 158 (2) which
also set up different bodies and
institutions for the
determination of emoluments and
conditions of service of
different levels within the
Judicial Service.
Based on the above criteria, and
the principles of law referred
to in the decided cases, we are
of the considered opinion that
the preliminary objection raised
by the defendants that the
plaintiff’s case does not raise
genuine and real issues of
constitutional interpretation
and or enforcement and therefore
should be dismissed is
untenable. The said objection
fails, and is overruled, and we
will proceed to consider the
remaining issues raised in the
memorandum of issues seriatim.
We will take issues ii and iii
of the memorandum of issues
together. This is because they
all touch upon and concern
similar constitutional, legal
and factual issues arising from
the plaintiff’s reliefs (I),
(II) and (IV).
ISSUES II AND III
II. Whether or not the
constitutional requirement in
article 127 (4) of the 1992
Constitution that the
“gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons
serving in the judiciary shall
be charged on the Consolidated
Fund” imposes a duty to
place the Plaintiff’s members on
the CAP 30 pension scheme and
not the SSNIT pension scheme;
alternatively.
III. Whether or not the
expression “all persons
serving in the Judiciary”
appearing in Article 127 (4) of
the 1992 Constitution applies
only to the Justices, Judges and
Magistrates to the exclusion of
all other judicial service
employees, including the
non-bench Judicial Officers.
Articles 127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution 1992 provides as
follows:
(4) “The administrative
expenses of the Judiciary,
including all salaries,
allowances, gratuities and
pensions payable to or in
respect of, persons serving in
the Judiciary, shall be charged
on the Consolidated Fund.”
(5) “The salary, allowances,
privileges and rights in respect
of leave of absence, gratuity,
pension and other conditions of
service of a Justice of the
Superior Court or any judicial
officer or other person
exercising judicial power, shall
not be varied to his
disadvantage.”
In order to understand the real
meaning of the expression,
“gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons
serving in the judiciary shall
be charged on the consolidated
fund,” it is imperative that
the entire article 127 (4) and
the meaning of “judiciary” as
used throughout in the
Constitution be put in context
and understood in clear terms.
Indeed, if one considers the use
of the term “Judiciary”
in articles 125 (1), (3) (4) (5)
and 126 (1) (a) (i) (ii) (iii)
and (b) for example, the meaning
of the word “Judiciary”
becomes clear and consistent
with the definition of the word
in current and contemporary law
Dictionaries.
This is because, whilst article
125 (1) states that “Justice
emanates from the people and
shall be administered in the
name of the Republic by the
Judiciary which shall be
independent”… article 125
(3) on the other hand states
that “the judicial power
of Ghana shall be vested in the
Judiciary” and the
article proceeds to state
that “neither the President nor
Parliament nor any organ or
agency of the President or
Parliament shall have or be
given final judicial power.”
These provisions are consistent
with the practical everyday
meaning of “judiciary” which is
a system where a body of persons
constituting a distinct group
have been put together to
exercise judicial power on
behalf of the people in the
country.
Thus Blacks Law Dictionary 9th
edition, by Bryan A. Garner,
page 924, defines Judiciary as
follows:-
(1)
“The branch of government
responsible for interpreting the
laws and administering justice,
(2)
A system of courts and
(3)
A body of judges – also
termed judicature – Judiciary
adj.”
This definition is also
consistent with the definition
of judicial power contained in 1st
Defendant’s statement of case
from Black’s Law Dictionary
which made reference to an
earlier edition, the sixth
edition by West Publishing Co.,
USA at page 849 which is that,
“it is the authority
exercised by the department of
government responsible for
declaring what the law and it’s
constructions are. This power is
vested in courts and Judges,
quite distinct from the
executive and legislative
branches of government.”
The above definition of the word
judiciary and Judicial power are
consistent with it’s use
throughout chapter eleven of the
Constitution 1992 especially in
article 126 (1) which states as
follows:-
“The Judiciary shall consist of
(a)
the superior Courts of
Judicature comprising
(i)
the Supreme Court,
(ii)
the Court of Appeal; and
(iii)
the High Court and
Regional Tribunals
(b)
such Lower courts or
Regional Tribunals as
Parliament may by law
establish.”
From the above, it is clear
that, the expression “judiciary”
as used throughout the
Constitution 1992, can only be
deemed to refer to the body of
persons exercising judicial
power in the sense that they are
charged with the responsibility
of administering justice.
Thus, article 127 (4)
can literally be said to mean
that, “the administrative
expenses including all the
salaries, allowances,
gratuities, and pensions payable
to or in respect of, persons
administering justice or who
have been given the
responsibility of interpreting
the laws of the country shall be
an encumbrance or a lien on the
consolidated fund.”
With the above definition and
explanation of the entire
article 127 (4), it is clearly
apparent that, taken in
context, where the word
“Judiciary” is used in article
127 (4) there is a clear
reference to only persons
exercising judicial power and
administering justice, in the
sense that they are those
persons entrusted with the
responsibility of interpreting
the Constitution and laws of the
country in contra distinction to
those in the Executive and
Legislative branches of
Government, and therefore does
not include the supporting staff
of the Judiciary who do not
exercise judicial power. In any
case it is of crucial importance
to note that no where in either
article 127 (4) or 127 (5) does
the expression “all persons
serving in the Judiciary”
appears. The phrase used is
“persons serving in the
judiciary”.
Furthermore, a reading of
article 161 of the Constitution
1992 is very much revealing and
needs to be taken into account.
This article provides as
follows:-
Judicial office means:-
(a)
“the office of a person
presiding over a lower court or
tribunal howsoever described”.
This definition or description
is consistent with article 126
(1) of the Constitution which as
aforesaid, states what the
Judiciary consists of and sets
out in a hierarchical order the
composition of the Judiciary of
Ghana and is also consistent
with the contemporary meanings
of judiciary and exercise of
judicial power.
The above provisions are in
tandem with the definition of
the word Judiciary as used in
article 127 (4). In essence, the
gravamen of the provisions
referred to supra are that the
words “Judiciary” as used
in article 127 (4) of the
Constitution 1992 refers only to
persons who consist of the
Judiciary as described in
article 126 (1) of the
Constitution 1992. Furthermore,
all the category of the persons
mentioned therein are to our
mind administering justice and
exercising judicial power in the
sense that they are involved in
the declaration of what the law
is, the construction and
interpretation of the
Constitution and Laws of Ghana
and, authoritative settlement of
disputes brought before any of
the adjudicating bodies
established by and under the
Constitution 1992 in chapter
eleven of the Constitution. In
coming to the following
conclusions, we have been
constrained to apply the
meanings as ascribed to the
words “Judiciary” and “Judicial
Power” as appearing in context
in the other articles of the
Constitution 1992 whenever these
words have been used.
We have also considered in great
detail the arguments of learned
counsel for the parties herein.
We have indeed benefited
tremendously from the
submissions of learned counsel
for the plaintiff.
For example, after setting out
the historical, constitutional
and legal development of Ghana’s
pensions regime from the pre
1957 constitutions and
statutory provisions to our
present Constitution, learned
counsel for the plaintiff
rightly in our view submitted as
follows:-
“From the foregoing, and reading
articles 158 (1) and 161 of the
1992 Constitution together, we
notice that in terms of service
conditions, there are at least
three broad categories of
“persons serving in the
Judiciary” namely
(i)
Justices of the Superior
Courts of judicature under
Articles 71 and 127;
(ii)
Holders of Judicial
Officers defined under Article
161 (a), (b) and (c) as:-
a.
persons presiding over the
lower courts and tribunals and
(b)
The occupants of the
office of Judicial Secretary and
or Registrars of the Superior
Courts” such other offices
connected with any court as may
be prescribed by Constitutional
Instrument made by the Chief
Justice acting in accordance
with the advice of the Judicial
Council and with the approval of
the President.
(iii)
officers and employees of
the Courts”, falling under
Article 158 (1) and (2) being
persons who the Chief Justice
has unfettered jurisdiction to
appoint or may direct other
justice or other officers of the
court in writing to appoint on
the Chief Justice’s behalf.”
Learned counsel for the
plaintiff’s then concluded his
submissions as follows:-
“These three broad categories of
persons serving in the Judicial
Service can further be
conveniently sub-divided into
two, being those on the bench,
consisting of about 324 in all
and the non-bench, consisting of
about 6,000 personnel in all,
all of whom or the vast majority
of whom are plaintiff’s
members.”
Even though we have seriously
considered these submissions of
learned counsel for the
plaintiff as well as the
responses of the learned counsel
for the defendants which we have
already referred to, we are with
respect, unable to accede to the
invitation being made to us by
the plaintiff’s to equate all
such persons as belonging to the
Judiciary.
Those arguments, though
attractive and well intended are
inconsistent with the clear
terms and meanings ascribed to
the expressions “Judiciary”
and exercise of judicial power
as used in article 127 (4) and
other parts of the Constitution
1992.
The only qualification we would
want to make is that, judicial
notice can now be taken of the
fact that, since 2008 or
thereabout, the occupants of the
positions of Judicial Secretary
and the Deputies have
specifically been appointed to
substantive positions in the
Judiciary under article 126 (1)
of the Constitution 1992, i.e.
High Court, Circuit Court Judge
or District Court Magistrate.
Where such specific appointments
have been made i.e. as a
Superior Court Judge or Lower
Court Judge or Magistrate, it is
to those specific appointments
that we must look to, in
addition to the provisions in
article 161 which defined the
position of a Judicial Secretary
for the true and practical
meaning to be ascertained.
Secondly, it must also be
emphasized that, where an
officer, not being a member of
the class of the Judiciary, as
defined in Article 126 (1) of
the Constitution 1992 i.e. is
not administering justice or
exercising judicial power as is
stated supra, but has had his
conditions of service made
analogous (i.e. bench-marked) to
that of a Superior Court Judge,
or a Lower Court Judge, it is
only to that specific office
holder that the said conditions
of service are applicable,
rather than one for general
application to other officers of
that class. In any case, such
descriptions must be frowned
upon as the constitutional
designation are, in essence,
terms of science rather than art
and referable only as stipulated
in the Constitution. What must,
therefore, be noted is that,
such descriptive analogous
positions to especially Superior
Court Judges when made, must be
taken to be in respect of
remuneration and Conditions of
Service only but not equating
them with the functional and
constitutional roles of Superior
Court Judges. Furthermore, such
positions are also based on
contract benchmarking as stated
elsewhere in this judgment and
therefore referable only to the
contracting parties.
It should also be noted that
Article 161 defines “judicial
officer” as “the holder of a
judicial office”. If this
meaning is considered alongside
the earlier definition of what
judicial office means in Article
161 (a) (b) and (c) supra, the
following category of staff of
the Judicial Service qualify to
be called Judicial Officers.
(i)
Judges and Magistrates of
the lower courts and tribunals,
e.g. persons presiding over
Circuit Courts, District Courts,
Juvenile Courts, Family
Tribunals etc.
(ii)
The Office of the Judicial
Secretary, which includes his
Deputies, and persons acting as
Registrar’s of the Superior
Courts only. For the avoidance
of doubts this includes persons
acting as Registrars in charge
of what are known as the
Superior Courts of Judicature,
to wit Supreme Court, Court of
Appeal, High Court and the
Regional Tribunals.
(iii)
Thirdly, persons connected
with any other court as may be
denoted or prescribed by a
constitutional instrument made
by the Chief Justice acting in
accordance with the advice of
the Judicial Council and with
the approval of the President.
Under the circumstances, it is
very difficult, if not
impossible to determine the
class of persons captured under
the category of Judicial
Officers in Article 161
(c). For the time being, this
class of persons must be deemed
to be non-existent. But it does
not preclude the Chief Justice
and the Judicial Council from
taking steps to correct the
anomaly.
There being no controversy
whatsoever about who under the
Constitution qualifies as a
Judicial Officer under Article
161 (a) and (b) thereof, it is
our opinion that, the persons
therein so qualified are capable
of enjoying all provisions in
the Constitution 1992 wherever
the words “Judicial officer” has
been used.
A clear example is Article 127
(5) where the salary,
allowances, privileges and
rights in respect of leave of
absence, gratuity, pension and
other conditions of service of a
Justice of the Superior Court or
any judicial officer or
other person exercising
judicial power, shall not be
varied to his disadvantage.
Beyond these and other rights
conferred under the
Constitution, Judicial Officers
have been adequately provided
for under Article 149 of the
Constitution 1992.
In that article, the
salaries, allowances, facilities
and privileges and other
benefits of the Judicial
Officers are to be determined by
the President, acting on the
advice of the Judicial Council.
Indeed, it is quite apparent
from the reading of Articles 149
through to 151 of the
Constitution that, Judicial
Officers in contra distinction
to Superior Court Judges, and
Judges and Magistrates of the
Lower Courts have different
conditions of service. The
only factor they have in common
is that, under Article 127 (5)
those conditions are not to be
varied whatsoever to their
disadvantage at anytime.
We will deal more on this when
we consider the resolution of
issues V and VII.
Based on the above analysis and
discussions, our conclusions on
the resolution of issues ii and
iii are as follows:-
1.
In respect of issue II,
the phrase “gratuities and
pension payable to or in respect
of persons serving in the
Judiciary” does not impose a
duty to place the plaintiff’s
members on CAP 30 pension scheme
because quite clearly, as
demonstrated supra, they do not
belong to the class of persons
described as constituting the
Judiciary.
2.
In respect of issue III
there is no phrase in Article
127 that makest reference to
“all persons serving in the
Judiciary”, rather, the
expression “persons serving
in the Judiciary” appearing
in Article 127 (4) of the
Constitution 1992 actually and
factually applies only to the
Justices, Judges and Magistrates
of the Superior and lower Courts
to the exclusion of all other
Judicial Service employees,
including the non-bench Judicial
officers.
Therefore considering
reliefs I, II and IV which the
plaintiff is claiming before
this court, we are of the
considered opinion that, the
phrase “persons serving in
the Judiciary” in the
context in which it is used in
article 127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution 1992, is
inapplicable to the Plaintiff’s
members.
Consequently, the practice of
placing the plaintiff’s members
on SSNIT pension whilst placing
the Judges and Magistrates of
the Superior and Lower Courts on
CAP 30 is neither wrongful nor
in violation of article 127 (4)
of the Constitution
From the analysis
made supra, it follows that
relief (IV) as it stands is
refused as there is no nexus
between the employment contract
of the plaintiff’s members and
CAP 30 pension scheme in the
Constitution 1992.
In the premises,
reliefs, (I), (II) and (IV) are
refused.
Having now dealt with issue
numbers I, II and III, we
propose to deal with issue
numbers IV and VI together since
they also constitutionally and
factually deal with the same
matters.
ISSUES IV AND VI
iv. Whether or not the
payment of CAP. 30 pension
benefits to the Justices, Judges
and Magistrates to the exclusion
of members of the Plaintiff
Association amounts to
discrimination against the
latter within the meaning of
Article 17 (2) of the 1992
Constitution.
vi. Whether or not the
conduct of the Judicial Service
in requesting the 3rd
Defendant to remove the Judicial
Officers on the bench from the
purview of the SSSGS whiles
retaining the non-bench Judicial
Officers on the SSSGS constitute
discrimination against the
non-bench judicial officers
within the meaning of article 17
(2) of the 1992 Constitution;
The resolution of these issues
naturally involves a discussion
of the provisions in article 17
(2) of the Constitution 1992
which provides as follows:-
“A person shall not
be discriminated against on
grounds of gender, race, colour,
ethnic origin, religion, creed
or social or economic status.”
Article 17 (3) provides what the
framers of the Constitution
conceive this discrimination in
the following terms:-
“For the purposes of this
article, ‘discriminate’ means
to give different treatment to
different persons attributable
only or mainly to their
respective descriptions by race,
place of origin, political
opinions, colour, gender,
occupation, religion or creed,
whereby persons of one
description are subjected to
disabilities or restrictions to
which persons of another
description are not made subject
or are granted privileges or
advantages which are not granted
to persons of another
description.”
What are the arguments of the
plaintiff in support of these
alleged discriminatory issues?
The plaintiff anchors it’s
submissions on a premise which
was stated by learned counsel
for the Plaintiff, Mr. Kweku
Paintsil thus:-
“Further, whatever doubts
that one may entertain on the
present constitutional
dispensation to be enjoyed by
“all” persons serving in the
Judicial Service is dispelled by
the interpretation given to the
CAP. 30 pension scheme in the
interpretation clause of the
National Pension Act, 2008, Act
766, which defined the same as
follows:-
“CAP. 30 Pension Scheme” means a
pension scheme operated under
the Pension Scheme under the
Pensions Ordinance, No. 42,
chapter 30 of 1950, for
(a)
Pensionable public servants in
the civil and other public
services, who have been in the
Service before 1st
January 1972 and
(b)
Public servants who have been
exempted by law from
participation in the Social
Security Pension Scheme, i.e.
the Judiciary, Legal
Service, Police Service, Fire
Service, Prison Service,
Immigration Service, the Bureau
of National Investigation and
the Research Unit of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
Based on the above provisions,
learned counsel for the
Plaintiff, concluded rightly in
our view that, until the passage
of Act 766 in 2008, there were
only two pension schemes that
public servants were subject to,
one being under CAP 30 and the
other being the SSNIT Pension
Scheme.
Learned counsel for the
Plaintiff then submitted that,
all persons serving in the
Judiciary, were subject only to
CAP 30 and not SSNIT Pension
Scheme.
In the light of our earlier
decision on the scope of what
constitutes “Judiciary”
under the Constitution 1992 to
include only the Superior Court
Justices, Judges and Magistrates
of the lower courts, and persons
occupying the positions of
Judiciary Secretary and the
Deputies appointed to
substantive positions on the
bench, the statement that
persons serving in the
Judiciary, with the above
description were subject to CAP.
30 is correct.
However, the crux of the
arguments of learned counsel for
the Plaintiff is that, contrary
to the clear terms of the
Constitution 1992, the Judicial
Service has maintained a policy
where only Justices of the
Superior Courts and Judges and
Magistrates of the lower courts
enjoy CAP 30 Pension Scheme. The
Plaintiff’s continue by stating
in their written statement of
case that, in the enjoyment and
application of pension benefits,
the Judicial Service maintains a
policy which is not transparent.
According to the Plaintiff this
finds expression where some very
senior employees in the category
of Directors are placed on CAP.
30 pension scheme whilst others
of the same or similar grades
are placed on SSNIT Pension
Scheme. The plaintiff therefore
complains that whilst the bulk
of their membership are
subjected to compulsory
contributions to the SSNIT
Pension Scheme, others are not.
The Plaintiff contends that, the
decision to put their members on
a compulsory contributory SSNIT
Pension scheme is wrongful, and
unconstitutional. They further
contend that, the conduct of the
Judicial Service in placing the
Justices of the Superior Courts
and Judges and Magistrates on
the non-contributory CAP 30
pension scheme whilst leaving
out or placing plaintiff’s
members who are non-bench
judicial officers such as
Registrars on the SSNIT pension
scheme was discriminatory and
contrary to Article 17 (2) of
the Constitution 1992.
As stated supra elsewhere in
this judgment, learned counsel
for the plaintiff made copious
references to the decision of
this court in the case of
Brown v Attorney General &
Others [2010] SCGLR 183.
With respect, save for the fact
that, this court, in that case
decided that, the plaintiff
therein, a retiree from the
Audit Service must have his
pension and gratuities paid from
the consolidated fund and not
from the Social Security Scheme,
the reference to the Brown case
is of no further relevance
herein.
We have hereinbefore referred to
the cases of Nartey v Gati
and Kwaku Asare v
Attorney-General.
It is worth noting what the
Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Date-Bah stated on this
issue of discrimination in the
Kwaku Asare v
Attorney-General, case as
follows:-
The court stated thus:-
“In short, inequality in rights
simpliciter is not a sufficient
basis for declaring the
unconstitutionality of the
rights complained of. One needs
to undertake a further inquiry
that even discrimination on the
grounds of social status is not
unlawful simpliciter. It is
unlawful if it is not for a
lawful and legitimate purpose.
After the fact of discrimination
on the ground of social status
has been established, a further
inquiry is needed to find out
why the discrimination has taken
place. It is the result of this
inquiry which will determine the
unlawfulness or not of the
offending discrimination.”
“To our mind, it is
clear what article 17 does not
mean. It certainly does not
mean that every person within
the Ghanaian jurisdiction has,
or must have, exactly the same
rights as all other persons in
the jurisdiction. Such a
position is simply not
practicable. Soldiers,
policemen, students and judges,
for instance, have certain
rights that other persons do not
have. The fact that they have
such rights does not mean that
they are in breach of article
17. The crucial issue is
whether the differentiation in
their rights is justifiable, by
reference to an object that is
sought to be served by a
particular statute,
constitutional provision or some
other rule of law. In other
words, article 17(1) is not to
be construed in isolation, but
as part of article 17. This
implies that the equality
referred to in article 17(1) is
in effect freedom from unlawful
discrimination. Article 17(2)
makes it clear that not all
discrimination is unlawful. It
proscribes discrimination based
on certain grounds. The
implication is that
discrimination based on other
grounds may not be unlawful,
depending on whether this Court
distils from article 17(1) other
grounds of illegitimate
discrimination which are not
expressly specified in article
17(2).
Thus, for instance,
in India, the Supreme Court has
there held that mere
differentiation or inequality of
treatment is not per se
equivalent to discrimination
within the proscription
contained in that country’s
equal protection clause. That
clause, which is article 14 of
the Indian Constitution, reads
as follows:
“The State shall not
deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within
the territory of India.”
The Supreme Court of
India has said in relation to
this clause in the case of K
Thimmappa v Chairman, Central
Board of Directors AIR 2001 SC
467 (quoted in Jain, Indian
Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, 2009 (5th
ed) p 858) that:
“When a law is
challenged to be discriminatory
essentially on the ground that
it denies equal treatment or
protection, the question for
determination by the Court is
not whether it has resulted in
inequality but whether there is
some difference which bears a
just and reasonable relation to
the object of legislation. Mere
differentiation does not per se
amount to discrimination
within the inhibition of the
equal protection clause. To
attract the operation of the
clause it is necessary to show
that the selection or
differentiation is unreasonable
or arbitrary, that it does not
rest on any rational basis
having regard to the object
which the legislature has in
view.”
Continuing, the court stated
thus
This approach is a
reasonable one and flows from
the obvious fact that no two
human beings are equal in all
respects. Accordingly, if the
law were to treat all human
beings rigidly equally, it would
in fact result in unequal
outcomes. Rigid equal treatment
would often result in unfair and
unequal results. Accordingly,
it is widely recognized that
equality before the law requires
equal treatment of those
similarly placed, implying
different treatment in respect
of those with different
characteristics. In simple
terms, equals must be treated
equally, while the treatment of
unequals must be different. The
law must be able to
differentiate between unequals
and accord them the
differentiated treatment which
will result in enabling them, as
far as practicable, to attain
the objective of equality of
outcomes or of fairness. In
effect, equality of opportunity
will often entail the law
treating people differently in
order to give them a fighting
chance of attaining equality of
outcomes or of fairness. If the
differentiated legal rights
arising from such an approach to
the law were to be struck down
as not conforming with the
constitutional prescription that
all persons are equal before the
law, it would be thoroughly
counterproductive.”
What should be noted is that,
the type of discrimination that
article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992 outlaws has
been explained in article 17
(3).
It is that type of different
treatment to persons based on
such criteria as race, gender,
colour, place of birth or
origin, political opinions etc.
It is these that the
Constitution outlaws and
determines as discrimination.
Thus, if a person is denied
certain rights on account of his
religious beliefs, or the place
of his origin, or political or
ideological beliefs, gender etc.
then article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992 would be
brought to bear on such an
occurrence.
For example, if the position of
the Director of Finance, or of
the Director of Works within the
Judicial Service, is reserved
for only males, or persons and
from a particular place of
origin in the country or persons
belonging to a certain religious
faith based group, then such
requirement would be deemed to
be in flagrant violation of
article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992.
What must be noted is that, the
Constitution 1992 itself
contains many instances where
certain constitutional office
holders are to be treated
differently from others.
For instance, article 57 (2) of
the Constitution 1992 states as
follows:-
“The President shall
take precedence over all other
persons in Ghana, and in
descending order, the
Vice-President, the Speaker of
Parliament and the Chief
Justice, shall take precedence
over all other persons in
Ghana.”
Everybody in Ghana has to
respect the above provisions.
Whether you are a rocket
scientist, or a Professor who
has won a Nobel Peace Prize, or
you may be the Bill Gates of
Ghana, all the above four
personalities take precedence
over you in everything.
Similarly, the Constitution
1992, in articles 71 (1) and (2)
make provisions for the
treatment of the conditions of
service of most of the various
constitutional office holders
therein mentioned differently.
It states as follows:-
71. (1) “The salaries and
allowances payable, and the
facilities and privileges
available, to
(a) the Speaker
and Deputy Speakers and members
of Parliament
(b) the Chief Justice and
the other Justices of the
Superior Court of Judicature;
(c) the Auditor-General,
the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen
of the Electoral Commission, the
Commissioner for Human Rights
and Administrative Justice and
his Deputies and the District
Assemblies Common Fund
Administrator;
(d) the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman and the other
members of
(i) a
National Council for Higher
Education howsoever described;
(ii) the
Public Services Commission;
(iii) the
National Media Commission;
(iv) the Lands Commission;
and
(v) the National
Commission for Civic Education;
being expenditure
charged on the Consolidated
Fund, shall be determined by the
President on the recommendations
of a committee of not more than
five persons appointed by the
President, acting in accordance
with the advice of the Council
of State.
(2) The salaries and
allowances payable, and the
facilities available, to the
President, the Vice-President,
the Chairman and the other
members of the Council of State;
Ministers of State and Deputy
Ministers, being expenditure
charged on the Consolidated
Fund, shall be determined by
Parliament on the
recommendations of the Committee
referred to in clause (1) of
this article.”
The point being emphasized here
is that, the Constitution 1992
itself has in a number of
instances made provisions which
at first glance will appear as
discriminatory, but in essence
are not at all, taking into
consideration the cold words of
articles 17 (2) and (3) of the
Constitution 1992.
The fact that some Directors of
the Judicial Service, may have
been employed on the Conditions
of Service benchmarked to those
of Superior Court Judges,
thereby placing them on
retirement on CAP 30 pension
scheme would not automatically
and necessarily lead to
discrimination contrary to the
Constitution.
The placement of those Directors
on CAP 30 does not mean that
they were put on those
conditions by reason of their
gender, race, place of birth or
origin, colour, religion, etc.
so as to bring their employment
under those conditions in breach
of article 17 (2) of the
Constitution 1992.
Matters of employment are purely
contractual. There is a Court in
the U.S. State of Virginia on
the Campus of William and Mary
College, where the Recorder of
the Court receives remuneration
that is higher than the
President of the Court. That
however does not mean that he or
she is on a higher level than
the Judges or that it
constitutes discrimination. Once
such conditions of service are
based on open contractual terms
to which the persons applied and
are qualified, no discrimination
results.
On the other hand
notwithstanding the immediately
preceding conclusions, we need
to note that, though not
discriminatory within the
meaning of Article 17 of the
Constitution, the practice of
applying the said terms and
conditions to some categories of
staff not specified by the
Constitution, is contrary to
best practices in human resource
remuneration management in the
Judicial Service, and
constitutional compliance. This
practice does not follow
procedures laid down, in
Article 158 (2) of the
Constitution 1992 which provides
that the Judicial Council in
consultation with the Public
Services Commission and with the
prior approval of the President
make regulations prescribing the
terms and conditions of service
of persons employed pursuant to
article 158 (1) of the
Constitution 1992. We will
therefore urge compliance with
all constitutional provisions
which require enactment of
Constitutional Instruments to
regulate the conditions of
service of staff. See articles
149 and 158 (2). Furthermore,
the Judicial Council is hereby
mandated to harmonise all
conditions and terms of office
of Judicial Officers pursuant to
article 149 of the Constitution
1992 to obviate any perception
(however unfounded) of unlawful
discrimination.
To conclude, it is our view
that, the payment of CAP 30
pension benefits to Superior
Court Justices and the Judges
and Magistrates of the lower
court bench to the exclusion of
members of the plaintiff
association does not amount to
discrimination within article 17
(2) of the Constitution 1992.
Similarly, the conduct of the
Judicial Service in requesting
the 3rd defendants
herein, (Fair Wages and Salaries
Commission) to remove Judicial
Officers on the bench from the
purview and scope of the Single
Spine Salary Structure SSSGS
whilst retaining the plaintiff’s
members on the SSSGS does not
constitute discrimination
against the said officers within
the meaning of article 17 (2) of
the Constitution 1992. The said
conduct is consistent with the
relevant constitutional
provisions referred to supra.
The retention of Plaintiff’s
members on the SSSGS without
compliance to appropriate
constitutional provisions in
articles 149 and 158 (2) are
dealt with later in the
judgment.
In view of the analysis made
supra in respect of issues IV
and VI, plaintiffs reliefs
numbers III, and VIII are not
sustainable and same are
accordingly refused.
ISSUES V AND VII
Whether or not the
duty imposed on the President by
article 149 of the 1992
Constitution to determine the
conditions of service of
Judicial Officers can be
delegated to, or performed by,
the 3rd Defendant.
Whether or not
sections 213 (1) (a) and 220 of
the National Pensions Act, 2008
(Act 766) contradict articles 71
(i) (b), 127 (4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution.
The Plaintiff sums up their
argument in support of issue V
as follows:-
“The Plaintiff contends that
the terms and conditions of the
Judicial Officers is a matter
solely within the purview of the
President, acting on the advice
of the Judicial Council whilst
those of the “officers and
employees of the Courts” is
essentially within the purview
of the judicial Council and
Public Services Commission,
acting with the approval of the
President through the enactment
of a Constitutional Instrument.
Article 149 of the
Constitution 1992 provides
thus:-
“Judicial Officers
shall receive such salaries,
allowances, facilities, and
privileges and other benefits as
the President may, acting on the
advice of Judicial Council,
determine.”
In order to put the arguments of
learned counsel for the
plaintiff into proper
perspective, it is useful to set
out the constitutional
provisions he relied upon in
relation to the terms and
conditions of other staff of the
Judicial Service. This finds
expression in articles 158 (1) &
(2) which states as follows:-
(1) “The appointment
of officers and employees of the
courts other than those
expressly provided for by other
provisions of this Constitution,
shall be made by the Chief
Justice or other Justice or
other officer of the Court as
the Chief Justice may direct in
writing.
(2) The
Judicial Council shall, acting
in consultation with the Public
Services Commission and with the
prior approval of the President,
by constitutional instrument,
make regulations prescribing the
terms and conditions of service
of the people to whom clause (1)
of this article applies.”
From the above constitutional
provisions, what is clear is
that, different institutions and
procedures have been created
under the Constitution for
determining the terms,
conditions and facilities for
the benefit of the various
categories of staff covered in
articles 149 and 158 of the
Constitution 1992.
1.
Under article 149, it is
certain that Judicial Officers
who have been defined in terms
as set out in this judgment
supra shall receive such
conditions of service as the
President acting on the advice
of the Judicial Council shall
determine.
2.
On the other hand, the
category of staff covered under
article 158 (1) of the
Constitution are those staff
whose appointments are made by
the Chief Justice or any
Superior Court Judge acting on
her behalf in writing. The terms
and conditions of service of
these category of staff are to
be determined by the Judicial
Council acting in consultation
with the Public Services
Commission, with the prior
approval of the President who
shall indicate this approval by
a constitutional instrument to
that effect.
However, the plaintiff’s
complaint against the Defendant
is that, the continued placement
of the non bench judicial
officers who are essentially
Plaintiff’s members on the SSSGS
was wrongful as in Plaintiff’s
own words “the SSSGS is
essentially one made by the
Public Services Commission for
public servants generally and
not one mandated by the
President of the Republic of
Ghana acting with advice of the
Judicial Council.”
It is noteworthy that, whilst
the Plaintiff concedes that all
the category of staff covered by
the article 158 provisions
qualify to be placed under
SSSGS, it’s major complaint is
that no Constitutional
Instrument has been enacted to
date in pursuance of the said
provisions. The plaintiff
therefore urges this court to
compel the President to act with
alacrity to comply with the said
constitutional provisions in
article 158 (2).
The 3rd Defendants
have conceded the fact that, it
is articles 149 and 158 (2)
which relate to the resolution
in issue V. For example, the 3rd
Defendants state that, “it
would be legitimate for the
Chief Justice and the Judicial
Council pursuant to articles 149
and 161 of the Constitution to
have differentiated conditions
of service for Judicial Officers
based upon length of service,
job description, nature of
training or some other
significant variable.”
Having analysed the
constitutional provisions in
articles 149 and 158 of the
Constitution 1992, what remains
to be done in order to determine
issue V is to consider the legal
environment within which the 3rd
Defendants functions in the Fair
Wages and Salaries Commission
Act, 2007 (Act 737).
It is proper to infer from the
Act that, it is a law whose
objective is to ensure fair,
transparent and systematic
implementation of the Government
public service pay policy. The 3rd
Defendants are therefore
enjoined by law to develop
salary structures for the public
service.
Article 190 (I) (a) of the
Constitution 1992, defines the
Public Services of Ghana to
include the Judicial Service
inter alia other institutions.
By parity of reasoning, the
Judicial Service, in contra
distinction to the Judiciary, as
explained hereinbefore,
constitutes part of the Public
Services of Ghana.
However, there are clear
constitutional provisions in
articles 149 and 158 (2) of the
Constitution denoting how
salaries and other conditions of
service of staff of the Judicial
Service are to be determined.
Without sounding to be
repetitive, under article 149,
Judicial Officers are enjoined
to receive such salaries and
allowances etc. as the President
may, acting on the advice of the
Judicial Council, determine.
Similarly, pursuant to article
158 (2) the Judicial Council
shall acting in consultation
with the Public Services
Commission and with the prior
approval of the President by
Constitutional Instrument make
regulations prescribing the
terms and conditions of service
of persons referred to in
article 158 (1) of the
Constitution.
That being the case, it is
evident that, in either case,
the relevant body, that is the
Judicial Council must initiate
the processes upon which the
President will act in respect of
article 149 provisions, and in
consultation with the Public
Services Commission with the
prior approval of the President
and culminate with the enactment
of a Constitutional Instrument
for staff covered under article
158 (1) and (2).
In the instant case, the 3rd
Defendants even though have
statutory backing cannot side
step constitutional provisions
to make recommendations direct
to the President without the
involvement of the Judicial
Council in either case. The
President and or the Judicial
Council may use the expertise of
the 3rd Defendants,
but that cannot be used to
completely relegate the position
that the Judicial Council and
the Public Services Commission
have been granted by the
Constitution.
Thus, whereas in this
case it is clear that the
Judicial Council was not part of
the process by which the 3rd
Defendants arrived at it’s
conclusions, then afortiori, the
same will be flawed by virtue of
it being an unconstitutionality,
reference articles 149 and 158
(2). In that respect therefore,
the President could not have
delegated his functions to the 3rd
Defendants since that is an
unconstitutional conduct, is
null and void and of no effect.
The president cannot
delegate this function without
the involvement of the relevant
constitutional bodies mentioned
therein.
In the premises,
issue number V is determined in
the negative. Plaintiff’s
reliefs, VII and IX are
accordingly granted.
ISSUE VII
In order to appreciate whether
sections 213 (1) (d), (I
believe this is really a
typographical mistake and should
rather be a reference to)
section 213 (1) (a) and
220 of the National Pensions
Act, 2008 (Act 766) contradict
articles 71 (1) (b), 127 (4) and
(5) of the Constitution, it is
worthwhile to set out the said
sections of Act 766 in full as
follows:-
213 (1) “The following
enactments and schemes shall on
the commencement of this Act
apply for a transitional period
of four years and cease to be in
force after that period,
(a)
The Pensions Ordinance No.
42 of 1950 (CAP 30) as amended
220 “On the commencement of this
Act where an enactment relating
to pensions is inconsistent with
this Act, this Act shall to the
extent of the inconsistency
prevail.”
As, articles 71 (1) (b) and 127
(4) and (5) of the Constitution
have already been referred to
supra there is therefore no need
to set them out again.
There appears to be some measure
of incoherence in the
formulation of this particular
issue VII. This is because
whilst section 213 (1) (a) of
Act 766 makes it clear that it
is the enactments referred to
therein in sections 213 (1) (a)
to (i) that are deemed to cease
to apply four years after the
coming into force of Act 766,
(which came into force on the 12th
day of December 2008) the
impression is given as if the
provisions therein specifically
repeal a constitutional
provision which is not the case.
It is to be noted therefore
that, a quick glance at the
enactments contained therein
indicate that they are all Acts
of Parliament, and by virtue of
the Interpretation Act, 2009 Act
792, it is possible for a later
enactment to retain in
force and effect an existing
enactment for periods stated
therein until the existing
enactment is entirely repealed.
See section 12 (5) of Act 792.
Viewed from against that legal
background, we are of the
opinion that there is absolutely
nothing wrong with the
formulation of section 213 (1)
(a) of Act 766. Besides and more
importantly, article 11 (1) (a)
of the Constitution puts the
Constitution 1992 at the apex of
the Laws of Ghana, and in
descending order from article 11
(1) (b) to (e) of the
Constitution, Acts of
Parliament, Orders, Rules and
Regulations, the existing law
and common law as the other laws
of Ghana, are listed in that
order of precedence.
Thus, it follows that, Act 766
could not have amended any
provision of the Constitution
and more particularly did not
amend article 71 (1) (b), 127
(4) and (5) of the Constitution
1992. Indeed an Act of
Parliament such as Act 766
cannot amend a constitutional
provision. If it purports to do
so, then it is in contravention
of the Constitution and will be
null and void.
If we properly understand the
submissions of learned counsel
for the plaintiff in this
respect they are to the
following effect:-
1.
That the framers of the
Constitution 1992 made a
conscious effort to set apart
the Judicial Service for
special treatment by
guaranteeing the payment of
their salaries, allowances,
pensions and gratuities in a
particular way.
2.
That, however, Act 766 has
come to put asunder this
carefully arranged structure
which was aimed at insulating
the Judiciary.
3.
That it is therefore wrong
and unconstitutional for Act 766
which is subordinate to the
constitution to seek to subvert
it or contradict it.
4.
That whether or not the
new pension schemes put together
in Act 766 might enhance the
pension benefits of the Chief
Justice and other Superior Court
Judges, the fact still remains
that they should not be put on a
contributive pension scheme.
Again, there appears to be some
element of incoherence in the
above submissions. Whilst
learned counsel for the
Plaintiff uses the words
“Judicial Service” in commencing
his arguments, he in the latter
stages substituted those words
with “Judiciary”. It has already
been stated elsewhere in this
opinion that whilst the
Judiciary refers to the Superior
Court Judges, Judges and
Magistrates of the lower courts,
the Judicial Service refers to
the administrative and
supporting staff.
Furthermore, the provisions
contained in article 71 (1) (b)
of the Constitution admit of no
ambiguities whatsoever.
This is because, the category of
persons whose emoluments are
subject to the Presidential
Commission on emoluments in
article 71 (1) (b) has been
clearly stated therein without
any measure of doubt. These
include the Chief Justice and
the other Justices of the
Superior Courts of Judicature.
Quite clearly, those categorised
do not include the members of
the Plaintiff’s Association, nor
the Lower Court Judges and
Magistrates.
In any case, Act 766, cannot be
said to have set out to
contradict any of the provisions
of article 71 (1) (b) either
directly or indirectly. The
provisions in article 127 (4)
and (5) of the Constitution does
not indicate the type of pension
scheme that must be provided for
the Judiciary. Article 127 (4)
only states the source from
which the heads of expenditure
including pensions stated
therein are to be paid with
regard to the Judiciary to wit,
the Consolidated Fund. Article
127 (5) on the other hand
contains reference to certain
categories of staff, who
happened to be within
plaintiff’s membership, but it
does not indicate any particular
pension scheme or mode. Indeed
that provision (article 127 (5))
serves an entirely different
purpose from Article 127 (4); it
safeguards the conditions of
service of the categories stated
therein and guarantee’s the
efficacy of all the heads of
expenditure benefits created
therein by stating that these
cannot be varied to their
disadvantage.
We give credit to learned
counsel for the Plaintiff for
his candour in stating the
obvious and correct position in
our view in the footnote to the
statement of case on page 32
where he delivered himself
thus:-
“We may wish to comment that in
so far as the issue remains
focused on the actual pension
benefit that persons serving in
the Judicial Service are
entitled to be paid, it would
appear that “ a rose smells as
good by whatever name you call
it”. It is to be noticed that
the real issue at stake is not
the name of the Scheme by which
the affected persons will
receive their pension benefits
as long as the benefits are a
charge upon the Consolidated
Fund.
This is because in real
essence, what is important is
what ends up in beneficiaries
pocket at the end of the day,
coming from the correct source.
On this note, CAP 30 as the
name of a specific piece of
legislation may die off, but the
spirit of CAP. 30 containing the
basis for computing pension
benefits for public officers who
are exempted from the SSNIT
pension scheme or founded on the
Constitutional provisions would
live forever and may have to be
fashioned upon or borrowed from
CAP. 30”. Emphasis supplied.
In that respect, the reference
to and reliance by the
plaintiff’s on the decision of
this court in the celebrated
case of Nartey-Tokoli v
Volta Aluminum Co. Ltd,
[1989-90] 2 GLR 341 per
Taylor JSC, even though good law
is completely inapplicable under
the circumstances of this case.
In our opinion, the difficulty
of the plaintiff stems from a
desire to read the provisions of
the Constitution in a manner as
would bring them at par with
article 71 office holders. This
is unfortunate. The National
Pensions Act, Act 766, must be
understood to be an Act whose
objective is to provide for
pension reforms in the country
by the introduction of a
contributory three-tier pension
scheme, the establishment of a
National Pension Regulatory
Authority to oversee the
administration and management of
registered pension schemes and
trustees of registered schemes,
the establishment of a Social
Security and National Insurance
Trust to manage the basic
national second security scheme
to cater for the first tier of
the contributory three tier
scheme, and to provide for
related matters.
Viewed against this background,
we are of the considered view
that, the National Pension Act,
Act 766 has met all the stated
objectives in the Long title of
the Act.
However, learned counsel for the
3rd Defendants made
references to a study conducted
by Prof. Kofi Kumado and Dr.
Fritz Gockel.
From the said study, the learned
academics concluded that non-
contributory pension schemes are
not sustainable, but they were
also very quick to add that
employees should not be made to
suffer disadvantaged pension
benefits. Out of abundance of
caution, we wish to refer
briefly to the statements made
by the two academics in that
study.
Writing on non sustainability of
unfunded pension schemes, they
stated as follows:-
“As at now, there are
three main retirement schemes
namely the recently resurrected
End of Service Benefits, CAP 30
and the SSNIT Fund. As we
demonstrate shortly, besides the
SSNIT Fund, the other two are
virtually unfunded schemes with
implications for sustainability.
The Government of Ghana does not
have the means to take on
pension obligations that are not
funded for its citizens.”
See page 8 of the study.
On the other hand, the learned
authors were quick to caution
that it would be dangerous to
disadvantage employees in their
pension benefits in the
following terms:-
“The general scenario
is that, social security as it
exists today in Ghana, had been
developed on a piecemeal basis
for different target groups. It
lacks cohesion or overall
designs. Not surprisingly, those
who are not under CAP 30 are
fighting to get on it or trying
to make SSNIT conditions
identifiable with the largely
advantageous benefits of CAP 30.
What is prudent is that the
disadvantaged person should be
brought up but not for the
advantaged person to be brought
down; it is not acceptable in
Pareto optimal relations or
labour relations that condition
of service could be made worse”.
See page 15 of the study.
With the above rendition, it is
certain that learned counsel for
the 3rd Defendants
misrepresented the substance of
what Prof. Kofi Kumado and Dr.
Fritz Gockel really meant, when
he failed to state in its
entirety the views of the
academics on the subject of the
unsustainability of the CAP 30
pension scheme. The writers,
made it quite clear that the
solution to the problems of the
inequalities of the pension
regime in the country does not
lie in removing those in the
advantaged position downwards,
but raising those in
disadvantaged positions upwards.
In any case, as we have
indicated elsewhere in this
judgment, the cost of a pension
scheme or it’s unsustainability
should not be used as yardstick
by this court in assessing
whether or not to
constitutionally uphold the
application of the scheme to
members of the Plaintiff.
On the basis of the foregoing
analysis, and taking into
account the effect of sections
213 (1) (a) and 220 of Act 766
vis-à-vis articles 71 (1) (b),
127 (4) & (5) of the
Constitution which have been
discussed elsewhere in this
judgment we are of the opinion
that sections 213 (1) (a) and
220 of Act 766 are not
contradictory of articles 71 (1)
(b), 127 (4) and (5) of the
Constitution 1992.
What should however
be noted is that any attempt by
any of the provisions in Act 766
specifically sections 213 (1)
(a) and 220 to amend the
pension benefits of members of
the Judiciary in terms as
defined in this judgment and as
it were take them out of their
non contributory pension scheme
guaranteed by the Constitution
1992, reference articles 71 (1)
(b), 127 (4) and (5) is
unconstitutional and to that
extent is struck down as null
and void and of no effect.
Issue number VII is
therefore granted.
In substance, the
Plaintiff has succeeded on their
claims in respect of issue V.
Flowing from the
above, reliefs, V, VI and IX are
hereby granted.
We commend the plaintiff for the
boldness displayed in initiating
the action and pursuing it to
its logical conclusion. We also
commend all counsel in the
matter, especially learned
counsel for the plaintiff Kweku
Paintsil for his candour and
research capabilities.
In the exercise of our powers
under article 2 (2) of the
Constitution, the 1st
Defendants are hereby directed
to take requisite measures to
ensure that all the
constitutional requirements in
articles 149 and 158 (2) of the
Constitution are duly complied
with within a period of three
months from the date of this
judgment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we dismiss
Plaintiff’s reliefs, I, II, III
and IV in their entirety. We
however grant and allow
plaintiff’s reliefs VI, VII and
IX in terms of judgment as is
stated supra.
In respect of relief number V,
to the extent that section 213
(1) (a) of Act 766 seeks to
vary and or bring to an end the
enjoyment of the pension scheme
allowed Judges of the Superior
Courts and other Judicial
Officers mentioned in article
127 (4) and (5) therein, the
said relief is granted.
Finally, relief number VIII is
also granted in part to the
extent that the migration of the
Judges and Magistrates outside
the SSSGS is not discriminatory,
whilst the continued placement
of the Judicial Officers on the
SSSGS is unconstitutional and
contravenes articles 149 and 158
(2) of the Constitution.
(SGD) V. J.
M. DOTSE
JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
S. A. B.
AKUFFO(MS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD) S. O. A.
ADINYIRA (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
ANIN YEBOAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(SGD)
P. BAFFOE - BONNIE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DISSENTING OPINION
ATUGUBA, JSC:
FACTS
The
Plaintiff has invoked the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of this Court under article 2 of
the 1992 Constitution seeking
the following reliefs:
“I. Declaration that
upon a true and proper
construction of Articles 127(4)
and (5) of the 1992 Constitution
all persons serving in the
judiciary were entitled to be
placed on CAP 30 pension scheme
upon the coming into force of
the 1992 Constitution;
II. Declaration that the
practice of placing or
continuing to place some of the
persons serving in the judiciary
on or under the SSNIT pension
scheme after the coming into
force of the 1992 Constitution
was wrongful and violates
article 127(4) of the
Constitution;
III. Declaration that the
practice of placing or
continuing to place Judicial
Officers falling under article
161(b) of the 1992 Constitution
on the SSNIT pension scheme
while leaving the judicial
officers on the bench, namely
judges and magistrates under
Article 161(a) of the
Constitution on CAP 30 pension
scheme was discriminatory,
contrary to article 17(2) of the
1992 Constitution;
IV. Declaration that all
persons serving in the Judicial
Service were and are entitled to
have their gratuity and pension
entitlements computed or
recomputed under CAP 30 Pension
scheme and paid the difference
of sums due and owing them
between the two schemes, if any,
together with interest,
including a refund of all SSNIT
contributions deducted from
their salary with effect from
1992;
V. Declaration that
section 213(1)(a) of the
National Pensions Act 2008 (Act
766) seeking to bring to an end
the operation or continuing
operation of CAP 30 pension
scheme in Ghana and compulsorily
placing Judges of the superior
court and judicial officers
under a contributory pension
scheme under Act 766 violates
the letter and spirit of
Articles 127(4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution;
VI. Declaration that
section 220 of the National
Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766)
offends and contradicts Articles
71(1) and 127(4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution and the same
is null and void to the extent
of the inconsistency;
VII. Declaration that upon
a true and proper interpretation
of Article 149 of the 1992
Constitution Judicial Officers
falling under Article 161 of the
Constitution are not amenable or
do not fall under the purview of
the SSSGS scheme administered by
the 3rd Defendant;
VIII. Declaration that the
continuing placement of the
Judicial Officers within the
Plaintiff’s rank on the SSSGS
after migrating the judges and
magistrates is not only
discriminatory, contrary to
Article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution, but violates their
rights;
IX. An order directed to
the 3rd Defendant to
ensure the restoration of the
affected persons to their
positions status quo ante, away
from the 3rd
Defendant’s jurisdiction.”
The
parties’ memorandum of Issues
dated the 27th day of
April 2015 has set down the
following:
“i. Whether and to what
extent the Plaintiff’s action
raises any real, genuine or
substantial issues of
constitutional interpretation to
warrant the invocation of the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court;
ii.
Whether or not the
constitutional requirement in
Article 127(4) of the 1992
Constitution that the
“gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons
serving in the judiciary shall
be charged on the Consolidated
Fund” imposes a duty to place
the Plaintiff’s members on the
CAP 30 pension scheme and not
the SSNIT pension scheme;
alternatively;
iii.
Whether or not the
expression “all persons serving
in the judiciary” appearing in
Article 127(4) of the 1992
Constitution applies only to the
Justices, Judges and Magistrates
to the exclusion of all other
judicial service employees,
including the non-bench Judicial
Officers;
iv.
Whether or not the payment
of CAP.30 pension benefits to
the Justices, Judges and
Magistrates to the exclusion of
members of the Plaintiff
Association amounts to
discrimination against the
latter within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution;
v.
Whether or not the duty
imposed on the President by
Article 149 of the 1992
Constitution to determine the
conditions of service of
Judicial Officers can be
delegated to, or performed by,
the 3rd Defendant;
vi.
Whether or not the conduct
of the Judicial Service in
requesting the 3rd
Defendant to remove the Judicial
Officers on the bench from the
purview of the SSSGS whiles
retaining the non-bench Judicial
Officers on the SSSGS
constitutes discrimination
against the non-bench judicial
officers within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution; and
vii.
Whether or not section
213(1) (d) and 220 of the
National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act
766) contradict Articles
70(1)(b), 127(4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution.”
Issue i
Whether and to what
extent the Plaintiff’s action
raises any real, genuine or
substantial issues of
constitutional interpretation to
warrant the invocation of the
exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
This is
becoming typical and endemic in
constitutional litigation in
recent times. This need not
detain this court further than
to state that (1) inasmuch as it
is aided and abetted by this
court’s decision in
Osei-Boateng v National Media
Commission [2012]2 SCGLR
1038 to the effect that the
enforcement jurisdiction of this
court cannot be invoked unless
the provision sought to be
enforced requires
interpretation, this court has
departed from the same in
Emmanuel Noble Kor v The
Attorney-General and Justice
Delaili Duose, Suit no.
J1/16/2015 dated 10/3/2016,
unreported and (2) the decision
on the other issues will
impliedly also more fully deal
with this issue.
Issues ii
and iii:
ii.
Whether or not the
constitutional requirement in
Article 127(4) of the 1992
Constitution that the
“gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons
serving in the judiciary shall
be charged on the Consolidated
Fund” imposes a duty to place
the Plaintiff’s members on the
CAP 30 pension scheme and not
the SSNIT pension scheme;
alternatively
iii.
Whether or not the expression
“all persons serving in the
judiciary” appearing in Article
127(4) of the 1992 Constitution
applies only to the Justices,
Judges and Magistrates to the
exclusion of all other judicial
service employees, including the
non-bench Judicial Officers.
A close
scrutiny of issue (iii) reveals
that it ought to precede issue
(ii) in which case issue (ii)
will not arise if issue (iii) is
answered positively.
A
minority status stares me in the
face for daring to answer issue
(iii) in the negative. However
after very prolonged reflexion
on this issue I am quite clear
in my mind that that issue must
be answered in the negative.
The provision in question,
article 127(4) of the 1992
Constitution is as follows:
“(4) The administrative
expenses of the Judiciary,
including all salaries,
allowances, gratuities and
pension payable to or in respect
of, persons serving in the
Judiciary, shall be charged
on the Consolidated Fund.”(e.s)
The word
Judiciary has, as it were, been
defined in article 126 (1) as
follows:
“(1) The Judiciary shall
consist of -
(a)
the Superior
Courts of Judicature
comprising,
(i)
the Supreme Court
(ii)
the Court of
Appeal, and
(iii)
the High Court and
Regional Tribunals
(b)
such lower courts
or tribunals as Parliament may
by law establish.” (e.s)
It must
be noticed that article 126(1)
defines the Judiciary in terms
of courts and not merely judges
or magistrates. Do courts
comprise only persons on the
bench? It should be noted that
article 125(1) provides as
follows:
“(1) Justice
emanates from the people and
shall be administered in the
name of the Republic by the
Judiciary which shall be
independent and subject only to
this Constitution.”
Article
125(3) of the constitution
provides that “the Judicial
power of Ghana shall be vested
in the Judiciary----”
Who are
the persons involved in the
administration of justice and
the exercise of judicial power?
There is
no doubt that the Judiciary as
set out in article 126(1) is the
Judiciary that is to exercise
the judicial power vested in it
by article 125(3). In
Akainyah v The Republic
(1968) GLR 548 C.A it was held
that an essential feature of
judicial power is the power to
enforce the decisions of the
body exercising that power.
Upon scrutiny it is noticeable
from the judgment in that case
that it also states that the
power of enforcement of a
decision is not an indispensable
part of judicial power, see the
excerpt therein from the
Australian case of Huddart,
Parker & Co Proprietary Ltd. v
Moorehead (1909)8 CLR 330 at
357. See also Brandy v.
Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission and
Others (1995)2 LRC 9.
Whatever it is, it is
indisputable that where the
power to enforce a binding
decision affecting the rights
and obligations of the parties
is also given to a court or
tribunal that power of
enforcement is a part of the
judicial power conferred. It
necessarily means therefore
that when a court enforces its
decisions through its own
officers it is the Judiciary
that is doing so in exercise of
its judicial power and therefore
since such enforcing officers
are not judges or magistrates
but are nonetheless part of the
courts system, they are part of
the Judiciary, though an
administrative segment thereof.
Short of enforcement of court
orders some administrative staff
of the judiciary perform
functions that are a necessary
auxiliary or even complementary
part of the exercise of judicial
power, e.g the filing of court
processes, preparation of
dockets, court records, etc.
Thus in Banson v Abbey
(1962)1 GLR 213 S.C the High
Court granted an application for
extension of time to execute a
bond for security for costs on
appeal. To an objection that
the High Court had no
jurisdiction so to do, Korsah
C.J delivering the judgment of
the court held at 215-216 thus:
“In support of the preliminary
objection, counsel for the
respondent has referred to the
concluding passage of the
learned judge’s order when
granting the extension. He
said, “In exercise of the powers
conferred on me by rule 6 of
Order 64 of the Rules of Court,
1964 I grant an extension of
time 7(seven) days within which
the applicant may execute the
bond”.
In our view the objection is not
well founded, because failure to
execute the bond within the time
limit fixed by the registrar is
not a breach of a statutory
provision which cannot be cured
by extension, but merely a
breach of a procedural rule
which the court, in exercise of
its discretion, may rectify: see
Kojo Pon v. Atta Fua and
Fugah and Others v. Tamakloe
and Another. It is further
contended that there is no
provision in the rules enabling
the registrar to extend the
time. This omission in our view
does not preclude the registrar
from granting extension when
necessary. Relying on the
provisions of the Interpretation
Act, 1960, section 10(2), “Where
an enactment confers power, or
imposes a duty, to do any act or
thing all such powers shall be
deemed to be also given as are
reasonably necessary to enable
that act or thing to be done or
are incidental to the doing
thereof.” If the registrar
can grant extension, a fortiori
the court must be deemed, in the
exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction to have the power
which its officers have in
matters concerning which the
rules of procedure require
the registrar to perform duties
relating to appeals.”
Indeed it
has frequently been said that
jurisdiction attaches to the
court and not the judges unless
otherwise provided, see Asare
v The Republic (1968) GLR
37.
In NPP
v Attorney-General [31st
December case] (1993-94)2 GLR 35
S.C at 50 Archer CJ shed some
light on the real composition of
courts when he said thus:
“I have always held the view
that this court like equity must
not act in vain. In other
words, it should not make orders
that could be lawfully and
legitimately circumvented so as
to make the court a laughing
stock. Under the Constitution,
1992 the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Ghana
Armed Forces. Suppose he
accepts the declaration sought
and confers with his commanders
and service chiefs not to hold
any route marches on 31st
December 1993, yet the
non-commissioned officers who
were instrumental in staging the
31 December 1981 coup d’etat
choose to parade through the
streets of Accra, who can stop
them? Is this court going to
send judges, magistrates,
registrars, court bailiffs and
ushers to erect barricades in
the paths of the marchers?”
(e.s)
Again in
Baiden v Ansah (1973)1
GLR 33 at 35 Baidoo J said:
“During the transitional period
from the moment the notice of
appeal is lodged right up to the
time the appeal is entered, the
trial court can entertain
interim applications especially
on matters affecting execution.
By virtue of its inherent
jurisdiction to control the
registrar, the bailiffs and the
whole staff, the High Court
is the appropriate forum to deal
with the judgment debtor’s
application, especially as the
order was made on 31 July 1972
just when the Court of Appeal
went on long vacation.”
That the
courts have consistently
recognized the Registry staff as
part of the courts is also
evident from Forson v the
Republic (1976)1 GLR 128 at
147, Ameyibor v Komla
(1980) GLR 820 C.A at 824, In re
Yendi Skin Affairs; Andani v
Abudulai (1982-83)2 GLR 1080
S.C at 1087, In re Odonkor
(Decd) Odonkor v Odonkor
(1982) GLR 57 at 60.
It is
therefore quite clear that at
common law employees such as
registrars, bailiffs, court
clerks, etc are part of the
courts. This is statutorily
supported by section 112 of the
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
It is
notorious that the 1992
Constitution has largely been
based on the 1969 and 1979
constitutions of Ghana.
Therefore since the Judiciary
has been set out in virtually
the same manner under these
constitutions and the officers I
have referred to ut supra,
have consistently been
judicially held to be part of
the courts it follows that they
are part of the Judiciary. It
is trite law that the
Legislature legislates with
regard to the existing law and
is deemed not to alter the same
unless very expressly or by
necessary implication otherwise
provided. Although it will
presently appear that there are
other provisions in the 1992
Constitution from which it can
be deduced that the
administrative staff of the
Judiciary are part of the
Judiciary and that the
expression “Judiciary” does not
bear one and the same meaning in
all the contexts of the
constitution, the common law
which is part of the existing
law of Ghana under article 11 of
the constitution clearly shows
that some persons
aforementioned, intimately
connected with justice delivery
are part of the courts or the
Judiciary.
At this
stage I state it bluntly that in
my humble opinion, the Judiciary
when considered against all the
relevant provisions of the 1992
Constitution, consists of two
components, i.e the Adjudicative
and Administrative segments and
that these segments are better
described and constitute the
Judicial Service of Ghana.
First of
all the whole of Chapter II of
the Constitution is headed “THE
JUDICIARY.” It therefore stands
to reason that this chapter,
inter alia, sets out the
organs or components of the
Judiciary. Furthermore, article
127(1) provides thus:
“(1) In the exercise of the
judicial power of Ghana, the
Judiciary, in both its
judicial and administrative
functions, including
financial administration, is
subject only to this
Constitution and shall not be
subject to the control or
direction of any person or
authority.”
This
clearly shows that for the
purposes “of the exercise of
the Judicial power of Ghana”
it is necessary for the
Judiciary to perform both
judicial and administrative
functions. Quite clearly the
phraseology, “the Judiciary, in
both its judicial and
administrative functions,
including financial
administration” means that the
constitution envisages that
apart from the judicial
functions the Judiciary will be
performing also administrative
functions including even
financial administration.
Certainly
since it is not judges or
magistrates who perform, at any
rate, the bulk of the
administrative functions for the
benefit of the judges and
magistrates but the constitution
categorises those functions as
ones performed by the Judiciary
it must follow that those other
persons who perform them are
constitutionally constituted as
part of the Judiciary. And
since all these actors in the
said judicial and administrative
functions must be paid for their
services and purchases incurred
for their undertaking must also
be paid, article 127(4) provides
quite starkly that:
“(4) The
administrative expenses of the
Judiciary, including all
salaries, allowances, gratuities
and pension payable to or in
respect of, persons serving in
the Judiciary, shall be
charged on the Consolidated
Fund.”
The words
“persons serving in the
Judiciary” in article 127(4)
are significant. These words
shed light on the preceding
words “The administrative
expenses of the Judiciary”
in that clause. In the context
of this provision “persons
serving in the Judiciary”
are part of the word “Judiciary”
therein appearing. The question
is whether the non-bench
employees of the courts can be
considered as “serving in the
Judiciary.” In addition to the
authorities I have already
cited, ut supra, in
Seyire v Anemana (1971)2 GLR
32C.A Azu Crabbe J.A (Amissah
and Anin JJ.A concurring), at 41
stated as follows:
“Though the Courts Ordinance
Cap. 4, as subsequently amended,
was repealed by section 156 of
the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9),
the repeal has not in any way
affected the functions of the
registrars of the superior
courts, nor has it diminished
their importance and status in
our court system.”
At 47 his
Lordship emphasized that “The
registrar has no separate
existence apart from the high
Court …” I think, therefore
that a registrar of the courts
is certainly a person “serving
in the Judiciary” and
mutatis mutandis all the other
persons employed to work in the
courts, though with varying
degrees of closeness to the
operation of the courts, are
also “persons serving in the
Judiciary.”
This is
particularly so since a person
can be said to be working in an
Institution without even being
an employee thereof, see
Pauley v Kenaldo Ld. (1953)
IWLR 187.
Holistic and Purposive
Construction
It is
obvious that if article 126(1)
is not read in isolation but
together with, inter alia,
articles 127(1) (4), and (7),
148 to 160, it will be seen that
the word “Judiciary” has an
overall larger meaning than any
restrictive meaning that may be
attributed to that provision and
is used in the larger
institutional, organizational
and functional sense. In
Republic v Secretary, to the
Cabinet; Ex parte Ga Traditional
Council (1971)1 GLR 71 at
76, Abban J quoted Lord Esher MR
in Barlow v Ross (1890)24
Q B.D. 381, C.A at 389 as
follows “But it is a familiar
rule of construction that,
although the Courts are prima
facie bound to read the words of
an Act according to their
ordinary meaning in the
language, if there are other
circumstances which show that
the words must have been used by
the legislature in a sense
larger than their ordinary
meaning, the Court is bound to
read them in that sense.”
(e.s)
The need
for holistic and purposive
interpretation has been stressed
in several decisions of this
court and is exposed, for
example, by a consideration of
article 127(4) concerning the
charge of the administrative
expenses of the Judiciary on the
consolidated fund. That
provision, standing alone, gives
the impression that those
expenses once arisen are a
charge on the consolidated fund,
whereas that provision is
subject to article 179(3)-(6).
The oft quoted words of Acquah
JSC (as he then was) in JH
Mensah v Attorney General
(1996-97) SCGLR 320 at 362 bear
eternal warning. He said:
“I think it is now firmly
settled that a better approach
to the interpretation of a
provision of the 1992
Constitution is to interpret
that provision in relation to
the other provisions of the
Constitution as to render that
interpretation consistent with
the other provisions and the
overall tenor or spirit of the
constitution. An interpretation
based solely on a particular
provision without reference to
the other provisions is likely
to lead to a wrong appreciation
of the true meaning and import
of that provision. Thus in
Bennion’s Constitutional Law of
Ghana (1962) it is explained at
page 283 that it is important to
construe an enactment as a whole:
…..since it is easy, by
taking a particular provision of
an Act in isolation, to obtain a
wrong impression of its true
effect. The dangers of
taking passages out of their
context are well known in other
fields, and they apply just as
much to legislation. Even where
an Act is properly drawn it
still must be read as a whole.
Indeed a well-drawn Act consists
of an inter-locking structure
each provision of which has its
part to play. Warnings will
often be there to guide the
reader, as for example, that an
apparently categorical statement
in one place is subject to
exceptions laid down
elsewhere in the Act, but
such warnings cannot always be
provided.” (The emphasis is
mine).”
In
Ampiah Ampofo v Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative
Justice (2005-2006) SCGLR
227 the plaintiff challenged as
unconstitutional the panel of
CHRAJ that investigated
corruption charges against him
on the ground that the
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice consists
of only the three persons
enumerated in article 216,
whereas the panel that
investigated him included some
other persons.
Rejecting
the contention Dr. Twum JSC (his
brethren concurring), held at
234-235 as follows:
“It is not clear whether the
Commission was established as a
body corporate. In such
situations it is advisable to
proceed empirically. In my
view, the word “Commission”
appearing in Chapter Eighteen of
the Constitution is used in two
senses. In article 216 and
217, it must refer to the
three persons, namely, the
Commissioner and the two Deputy
Commissioners. In particular,
when article 217 speaks of
appointing the members of the
Commission, it can only be a
reference to these three
persons. But where article
220 provides for the creation of
regional and district branches
of the Commission, this
can only refer to something
which can have branches. It
would lead to manifest absurdity
if the word “Commission” in
article 220 were to be
interpreted to mean the three
persons who would thus have
regional and district branches.
In this context, the word
must refer to an organization, a
body, an institution, an
establishment or a bureaucracy.”(e.s)
Similarly
at 242 Dr. Date-Bah JSC
forcefully said:
“Applying a purposive approach
to the interpretation of the
provisions of Chapter Eighteen
of the 1992 Constitution and the
Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative justice Act, 1993
(Act 456), I am of the view that
the interpretation contended
for by the plaintiff is not
viable and not in keeping with
the spirit and purpose (both
subjective and objective) of
the provisions concerned:
see Asare v Attorney-General
[2003-2004]2 SCGLR 823. I
am further of the view that
the Commission should be viewed
as a particular kind of
statutory corporate entity
comprising the Commissioner, the
two Deputy Commissioners and the
staff employed by them to assist
them in carrying out the
functions of the Commission.”
(e.s)
His
lordship continued in this vein
at 244 thus:
“A concept of the Commission
as a corporate body comprising
the Commissioner and his or her
two deputies as well as the
staff employed by them to assist
them in carrying out their
functions is compatible with the
language of the relevant
provisions and make better sense.
Although section 2 of Act 456,
reflecting article 216 of the
Constitutions, provides that the
Commission shall consist of the
Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioners, this provision
need not be interpreted to mean
that the Commission consists
exclusively of these three. The
employees of an organization can
hardly be sensibly conceived of
as apart from the organization.
Thus the employees of the
Commission, for which section 20
of Act 456 makes provision,
can reasonably be interpreted as
forming a part of the
Commission. This implies that
what the Commission does through
its employees, it does itself.”
(e.s)
Mutatis
mutandis this reasoning should
apply to the word “Judiciary” as
used in the constitution. It is
to be emphasized however that
the word “Judiciary” cannot be
given the same peremptory and
narrow meaning throughout the
constitution. The context and
purpose matter much. Such
narrow meaning is properly
attributable to provisions like
articles 125(5), 126(4), etc but
not to others like articles
127(1), (4), (7), etc. In
particular were the Judiciary to
consist always exclusively of
the bench one would wonder why
article 127(5) relating to the
non disadvantageous variation of
the monetary entitlements of the
persons therein enumerated could
not simply be expressed in terms
of the word Judiciary.
Viewed
from the governance and
functional perspective as
eloquently emphasized by the
eminent Dr. Date-Bah JSC in his
invaluable book, Reflections on
the Supreme Court of Ghana and
supported by section 10(4) of
the Interpretation Act, 2009(Act
792) against the fundamental
foundation of the 1992
Constitution as springing from
particularly the 1968 Proposals
of the Constitutional
Commission, particularly
paragraphs 539 to 549 thereof,
the Judiciary is to be
considered as a composite whole
comprising the adjudicating and
administrative personnel
thereof.
This is
particularly borne out by the
unanimous decision of this court
in the celebrated case of
Agbevor v Attorney-General
(2000) SCGLR 403. The facts of
the case are that “by a letter
from the office of the
President, dated 20 March 2000
and addressed to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff was informed as
follows:
“His Excellency (HE) the
President has accepted the
recommendation of the Judicial
Council, given in accordance
with LI 319, section 28(2) of
the Judicial Service
Regulations, 1963 and has
directed your immediate
redeployment out of the Judicial
Service for displaying a high
degree of incompetence in the
discharge of your duties.”
The
plaintiff brought an action in
this Court for a declaration
that his removal from the
Judicial Service as a judicial
officer by the President, for
the reasons stated, is contrary
to article 151(1) of the 1992
Constitution. At 407-408 Sophia
Akuffo JSC delivering the
judgment of herself, Edward
Wiredu Ag. CJ(as he then was)
and Adjabeng JSC, said:
“Articles 148 to 151 of the 1992
Constitution deal with the
appointment, retirement and
removal of judicial officers.
These provisions fall under
chapter 11, of the 1992
Constitution which is
concerned with the Judiciary, in
whom the judicial power of Ghana
is vested. The
underlying concept upon which
chapter 11 of the 1991
Constitution is founded is that
of assuring and safeguarding the
independence of the Judiciary.
Consequently, the Committee
of Expects, in its Report on
Proposals for a Draft
Constitution of Ghana, at
paragraph 252 at p 117 included
amongst the principles that must
be reflected in the Constitution
to assure the realization of
this concept, the following
principle:
“5. The Judiciary
should be assured full financial
and administrative autonomy.
This means that the governmental
structure should not subordinate
the Judiciary to any Government
department or Ministry for the
purposes of presenting or
realizing its administrative or
financial requirements”
In pursuance of this principle,
article 127(1) stipulates that:
“In the exercise of the
judicial power of Ghana, the
Judiciary in both its judicial
and administrative functions,
including financial
administration, is subject only
to this Constitution and shall
not be subject to the control or
direction of any person or
authority.” (The emphases
are ours)”
Kpegah
JSC at 411 said poignantly as
follows:
“That the President took this
action on “the recommendation of
Judicial Council” devastates
me. The President should expect
and, indeed, deserves quality
professional legal advice from
the Judicial Council because it
is a body which is dominated by
what can be described as the
crème de la crème of the
legal profession in this
country. To recommend to the
President the type of action
typified in the letter quoted
above is to needlessly mislead
and embarrass the President and
I am saddened by it. I say so
because the council, in
effect, recommended to the
President to do an act which is
in clear violation of article
127(1), which guarantees, in
very robust language, the
independence of the Judiciary in
its administrative matters. For
the avoidance of doubt, I beg to
quote the said provision:
“127(1). In the exercise of the
judicial power of Ghana, the
Judiciary, in both its judicial
and administrative functions, …
is subject only to this
Constitution and shall not be
subject to the control or
direction of any person or
authority.”
This provision
completely insulates the
Judiciary from the type of
directive emanating from the
Secretary to the President’s
letter.
The second point I find
disturbing about the
recommendation by the Judicial
Council is that it has not
only undermined its own
authority under article 151(1)
of the Constitution, but
also that 0f the Chief Justice,
the disciplinary authority for
judicial officers. He alone can
punish such officers (for
example, removal from office)
upon the resolution of not less
than two-thirds of all the
members of the council.”
Clearly,
Sophia Akuffo and Kpegah JJ.S.C.
are rightly holding that the
President can’t interfere with
an administrative member of the
Judiciary by virtue of article
127(1) of the Constitution.
Articles
158-160 clearly show that the
constitution provides for
certain employees to be part of
the courts (and therefore the
Judiciary) though they are not
judges or magistrates or panel
members of a tribunal. They are
as follows:
“158.(1) The
appointment of officers and
employees of the Courts
other than those expressly
provided for by other provisions
of this Constitution, shall be
made by the Chief Justice or
other Justice or other officers
of the Court as the Chief
Justice may direct in writing.
(2) The Judicial Council shall,
acting in consultation with the
Public Services Commission and
with the prior approval of the
President, by constitutional
instrument, make Regulations
prescribing the terms and
conditions of service of the
persons to whom clause (1) of
this article applies.
x x x
160. Fees of the
Courts to form part of the
Consolidated Fund
The fees, fines and other
monies paid to the Courts
shall form part of the
Consolidated Fund.”
Under
article 160 are the “monies
paid to the courts” paid to
judges? Certainly not. It
therefore means that article 160
regards the administrative
officers to whom such monies are
paid as being a component part
of the courts.
In
summary, it is obvious from all
the provisions of the
constitution referred to herein
that (a) the appointment of the
administrative staff covered by
those articles is to be done in
essence and substance by the
Chief Justice,(b) their
conditions of service are
likewise in essence and
substance determined by the
Chief Justice and the Judicial
Council and (c) their
disciplinary authority is
exclusively an internal matter
for the Chief Justice alone or
upon the decision of the
Judicial Council. It must
therefore follow that they are
an administrative segment of the
Judiciary. Attention is
particularly hereby called to
the legal effect of article 154
which concerns the
administrative supervision,
though auxiliary, of the
Judicial Council over the
Judiciary. Since the judicial
council’s functions relate to
the Judiciary and it is
indisputable that their
functions extend to the
administrative staff of the
courts it must follow that such
staff is a component part of the
Judiciary. It must be emphasized
that unless a matter relates to
the Judiciary under article 154
1(a) and (b) the Judicial
Council cannot deal with it.
Issue iii
Whether or
not the expression “all persons
serving in the judiciary”
appearing in Article 127(4) of
the 1992 Constitution applies
only to the Justices, Judges and
Magistrates to the exclusion of
all other judicial service
employees, including the
non-bench Judicial Officers.
There is
no “all” before the words
“persons serving in the
Judiciary” in this provision.
In
consequence of my holding that
the plaintiffs are within the
purview of article 127(4) of the
constitution it follows that any
gratuities and/or pensions
payable to them must be a charge
on the Consolidated Fund and
payable to them therefrom and
not the SSNIT pension scheme,
see Brown v Attorney General
(Audit Service Case) (2010)
SCGLR 183 h.(5), mutatis
mutandis.
However
the constitution has not set up
any particular pension fund for
the plaintiffs and I cannot
therefore peg the same for them
on Cap. 30 pension scheme.
Whatever pension scheme there is
for them the moneys payable for
the same must be from the
Consolidated Fund.
Issue iv
Whether or not the
payment of CAP.30 pension
benefits to the Justices, Judges
and Magistrates to the exclusion
of members of the Plaintiff
Association amounts to
discrimination against the
latter within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution.
This
issue has been fully dealt with
by my industrious and respected
brother Dotse JSC and I agree
with him.
Issue v
Whether or not the
duty imposed on the President by
Article 149 of the 1992
Constitution to determine the
conditions of service of
Judicial Officers can be
delegated to, or performed by,
the 3rd Defendant.
This
issue is deceptively simple.
The power of delegation by the
President was discussed, with
varying views, in Kuenyehia v
Archer (1993-94) 2 GLR 525
S.C. Article 58 of the 1992
Constitution did not appear to
have been considered therein.
Article 58 as far as relevant is
as follows:
“Executive
authority of Ghana
(1)
The executive authority of
Ghana shall vest in the
President and shall be
exercised in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution.
(2)
The executive authority of
Ghana shall extend to the
execution and maintenance of
this Constitution and all laws
made under or continued in force
by this Constitution.
(3)
Subject to the provisions
of this Constitution, the
functions conferred on the
President by clause (1) of
this article may be exercised
by him either directly or
through officers subordinate to
him.
(4)
Except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution or
by a law not inconsistent with
this Constitution, all executive
acts of Government shall be
expressed to be taken in the
name of the President.”(e.s)
Article
149 is as follows:
“Conditions of
service of judicial officers
Judicial officers shall receive
such salaries, allowances,
facilities and privileges and
other benefits as the President
may, acting on the advice of the
Judicial Council, determine.”
I find it
difficult to consider the Fair
Wages and Salaries Commission as
an “officer … subordinate” to
the President within article
58(3), see by analogy
Republic v Ghana Industrial
Holding Corporation; Ex parte
Appiah (1981) GLR 736, C.A.
Accordingly I would answer this
issue in the negative.
Issue vi
Whether or not the
conduct of the Judicial Service
in requesting the 3rd
Defendant to remove the Judicial
Officers on the bench from the
purview of the SSSGS while
retaining the non-bench Judicial
Officers on the SSSGS
constitutes discrimination
against the non-bench judicial
officers within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution
On the
aspect of discrimination against
the non-bench judicial officers
involved in this issue I agree
with my brother Dotse JSC that
there is no proof of
discrimination. However my
resolution of issue (iii) supra
is handy here.
Issue vii
Whether or not
section 213(1) (d) and 220 of
the National Pensions Act, 2008
(Act 766) contradict Articles
70(1)(b), 127(4) and (5) of the
1992 Constitution.
Under
this issue I agree with Dotse
JSC that section 231(a) and not
23(1)(d) was probably intended
by the plaintiffs. The
intendment behind this issue is
not clearly expressed. However
viewed in the context of the
plaintiffs’ submissions I would
hold that sections 23(1) (a) and
220 of Act 766 or any provision
thereof that seeks to vary the
conditions of service to the
disadvantage of persons covered
by article 127(5) or to require
contributions from any employee
of the Judiciary or Judicial
Service to his pension scheme or
to authorize payment of any of
the monetary entitlements of any
such person from any source
other than the Consolidated Fund
or to determine the pecuniary
rights or entitlements of any
such person contrary to articles
70(1) (b), 127(4) and (5) or any
other provision of the 1992
Constitution is or are
unconstitutional.
Conclusion
A
consideration of the background
proposals for the 1992
Constitution dating back to 1968
and the intent thereby to create
a strong and independent
Judiciary reveals that the
concept of the Judiciary was a
holistic one embracing both the
judicial and administrative
welfare of the Judiciary. Hence
in paragraph 255 sub paragraphs
4 and 5 thereof the Committee of
Experts which formulated the
Proposals for the 1992
Constitution stated as follows:
“4. The Judiciary
should be insulated from all
subtle forms of Executive
pressure or influence. In
the words of the Akufo-Addo
Report, the Executive should not
be “placed in a position
vis-à-vis the Judiciary such as
would enable it, or at least
would offer it the temptation,
to exert any pressures, however
subtle, on the Judiciary.
5. The Judiciary
should be assured full financial
and administrative autonomy.
This means that the
governmental structure should
not subordinate the Judiciary to
any Government Department or
Ministry for the purposes of
presenting or realizing its
administrative or financial
requirements.”(e.s)
The
Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A.
10) in s.1 groups all persons
working in the courts together
as members of one and the same
Judicial Service. This
reinforces my opinion that the
expression “Judicial Service” is
meant to cover both the Judicial
and Administrative Staff of the
Judiciary.
Indeed I
think “Judicial Service” means
Service in the Judiciary, in a
composite and holistic sense.
The case
of Akufo-Addo v Quashie-Idun
(1968) GLR 667 C.A [Full Bench]
shows that the Judiciary, in
terms of the bench, is part of
the Judicial Service.
Again the
Judiciary (Retention of Revenue)
Act, 2003 is revealing,
particularly as to its preamble
and s.3(1) thereof.
They are
as follows:
“ACT 661
JUDICIARY (RETENTION
OF REVENUE) ACT, 2003
AN ACT to
reproduce the provisions on the
expenditure of the Judiciary as
set out in the Constitution;
to authorize the Judiciary to
retain a percentage of the
moneys it collects in the course
of the performance of its
functions to defray
specified expenses of the
Judiciary and to provide for
related matters
x x x
3. Retention of
percentage of collection
(1) The Judiciary shall,
to supplement its budgetary
provisions, retain fifteen
percent of moneys collected by
it in the course of the
performance of its functions
for the purpose of defraying the
expenses of the Judiciary.”(e.s)
It is
difficult, to see how unless,
since lex non cogit ad
impossibilia, the non-bench
staff are part of the Judiciary
as a holistic Institution, the
Judiciary can be conceived in
terms of “the operation of
banking facilities by the
Judiciary” under article 127(7)
or the Judiciary retaining
“fifteen percent of moneys
collected by it” within the
preamble and s.3(1) of Act 661.
By way of
ultimate clarification, I state
emphatically that the 1992
Constitution has set up the
Judiciary as an Institutional
arm of government. That
Institution consists of a system
of courts. That system consists
of the adjudicative and
administrative members of the
courts. Very plainly article
158(1) in providing for “The
appointment of officers and
employees of the Courts other
than those expressly provided
for by other provisions of this
Constitution … “is referable
to the appointment of (a) the
bench members of t he courts and
(b) judicial officers, which has
already been covered by articles
144, 148 and 152. It follows
that since article 158(1)
categorises the residue of the
appointments therein dealt with
as also “officers and employees
of the Courts,” all persons
appointed pursuant to articles
144, 148, 152 and 158 are
“officers and employees of the
Courts” and since article 126(1)
constitutes the Judiciary in
terms of a system of courts, all
those persons are members of the
Judiciary.
It should
also be clear from all the
foregoing, that the
constitutional provisions
relating to the Judiciary aim at
setting up the Judiciary as a
unique, special and independent
Institution of governance that
should be treated as such in its
terms and conditions of service
away from other public services
or entities except where
commonalty is expressly or by
clear implication countenanced.
I however
acknowledge that this has been a
difficult case and I am
therefore not surprised that we
are not unanimous as to its
determination on all the issues
involved. I also thank counsel
on all sides of this case for
their immense help to the court
by their industry and ingenuity.
(SGD)
W. A. ATUGUBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
KWEKU PAINTSIL WITH HIM EUDORA BAAH-
DODOO ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.
STELLA BADU (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY)
WITH HER MS. ZAINAB AYARIGA
(ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY) FOR
THE 1ST DEFENDANT.
SOMUAH- ASAMOAH ESQ. FOR THE 2ND
DEFENDANT.
ABDUL BAAZIT BAMBA ESQ. WITH HIM
GODWIN KODZO TAMEKLO AUGUSTINE
AHAMEY AND REINDOF TWUMASI
ANKRAH FOR THE 3RD
DEFENDANT.
]
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